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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Between June and July 1952, around ten thousand South Africans participated in 
numerous demonstrations around the country to mark the 300-year anniversary 
since the Dutch trader Jan van Riebeeck established a colony in the Cape of Good 
Hope.1 The demonstrators were protesting against the apartheid government‘s ‘pass 
laws’, which required black South Africans to live and work in inferior areas of the 
country and under oppressive conditions, solely on the basis of their race. Marking 
the beginning of a decades-long ‘Campaign of Defiance Against Unjust Laws’ (de-
fiance campaign) by the African National Congress, the demonstrations were aimed 
at advocating the accountability of the South African government to all the people 
of South Africa. By exercising their civic agency to defy unjust laws, the demon-
strators insisted, to South Africa and to the world, that the government be held ac-
countable to national and universal human rights norms that the white minority re-
gime recognised for white South Africans, but not for the black majority. 
Accordingly, the defiance campaign was directed not only at the government 
and people of South Africa. It was also addressed to other countries and the United 
Nations, which had passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights four years 
earlier (South Africa had abstained from voting). However unrealistic the prospects 
were at the time, advocating for accountability through the defiance campaign 
raised consciousness, or at least hope, in South Africa and around the world, that 
apartheid could eventually be defeated. The campaign provided considerable moral 
backing to various grassroots civic groups and eventually liberal civic organisa-
tions, many of which used the legal system to advocate for accountability, making 
legal-political claims against the government’s unjust policies. The experiences of 
the anti-apartheid movement against South Africa provide a powerful illustration of 
                                                        
1  The demonstrations, well documented in the magazine Drum, responded to an earlier, highly sym-
bolic demonstration on 6 April 1952, which was exactly three hundred years to the day since the 
Dutch trader Van Riebeeck and other white settlers were recorded to have landed on the Cape Pen-
insula. 
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how national and trans-national civic actors2 can, in general, mobilise and influence 
government and inter-governmental institutions to hold states accountable for their 
human rights obligations and in particular their obligations to promote, protect and 
fulfil human rights.3 
This book discusses the dynamics of civic-state interactions aimed at the state or 
government‘s4 obligations to promote, protect and fulfil human rights. Through the 
lens of refugee rights advocacy in South Africa in the early years of its post-1994 
period of democracy, this book examines and explains the circumstances under 
which civic-state interactions can lead to structural change, and what these interac-
tions can teach us about the potential of civic society5 to realise rights in general. 
Mass action in South Africa during the defiance campaign of the 1950s drew on 
a significant historical moment, which is difficult to compare with other moments. 
Furthermore, this mass action precipitated other civic or government responses. In 
1952, the decision to organise a mass action was motivated by the three-hundred-
year anniversary of colonial domination in South Africa, and the then-limited op-
tions available for civic actors to hold the government accountable. Although pro-
gressive political change came much later, for numerous reasons, the defiance cam-
paign served as an important reference point for civic action, as civic resistance to 
the apartheid regime continued for four more decades until democratic elections in 
1994. However, the emergence of a democratic, accountable government in South 
Africa, which was framed by a progressive constitution, did not mark the end of 
public protest. The country’s embracing of a democratic, accountable, constitutional 
culture gave rise to different kinds of human rights claims, including refugee rights 
claims. 
In Pretoria, in June and July 1996, several hundred refugees gathered on the 
lawns in front of the historic Union Buildings, where the office of the President was 
located, to demand social assistance. After having begun their protest in front of the 
regional offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
the refugees had decided to direct their protest against the government of South Af-
                                                        
2  The term ‘civic actor’ that is used throughout this book designates various individuals, NGOs, 
scholars, practitioners and activists, engaged in promoting state compliance, and/or confronting 
states, with their human rights obligations. The defining characteristic of civic actors is that they 
are non-state and non-governmental actors. This book is not, however, a study of civic actor types, 
but rather the types of – strategic – choices and interactions they make, mostly in relation to the 
state. 
3  (Thorn 2006); (Fieldhouse 2005); (Love 1985); (Atkinson 1992); (Mandela 1994), passim. 
4  The terms ‘state’ and ‘government‘ are used interchangeably throughout this book, in the under-
standing that a government is the representative of the state at a particular moment, but that gov-
ernment inherits the responsibilities of previous governments through the international law princi-
ple of state succession. 
5  The terms ‘civic society’ and ‘civil society’ have been used interchangeably (the latter term more 
commonly in contemporary literature). In this book, the term ‘civic society’ is preferred, reflecting 
both the broad diversity of non-state perspectives, and an assumption that non-state actors need not 
always be ‘civil’. 
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rica as well. The demonstrators were advocating for the accountability of both the 
United Nations and the government of South Africa towards meeting their demands 
for better treatment. The protest generated attention from the local and national me-
dia, but the South African government had not yet responded to the refugees’ de-
mands for better treatment. Civic organisations, and the South African public in 
general, had responded mostly with surprise rather than solidarity. 
The demonstration had taken place at a key historical moment. South Africa had 
recently acceded to the policies of the United Nations and African Refugee Conven-
tions, but had not yet developed a permanent policy on refugees. Some assistance 
was being provided through NGOs in regional offices, but this was far from ade-
quate. Rather than being offered the opportunity for dialogue, the protestors were 
told that their presence on government property was illegal, and that they would be 
forcibly evicted if they did not move their makeshift camps. The UNHCR refused 
to intervene. 
The protest had generated national (and even some international) attention and 
reactions, including from well-known international human rights organisations such 
as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, who began to advocate the 
accountability of South Africa to protect refugees according to its constitution and 
its international legal obligations. Meanwhile, a priest from the South African 
Catholic Bishops Organisation, a national church-based NGO, and his colleagues 
organised emergency accommodation at the city cathedral, and later formed a ‘tem-
porary’ tent camp on a patch of church-owned land in Ga’Rankuwa. 
The protest in July 1996 created a greater consciousness in South Africa regard-
ing the plight of refugees, and precipitated other forms of civic organisation. Fol-
lowing the protest, South African NGOs began to engage more with the government 
and the UNHCR on their responsibilities towards refugees. Legal advice projects 
were set up to inform asylum seekers about their rights, particularly in terms of the 
asylum determination procedure that had recently been established to evaluate 
whether they fulfilled the conditions for legal status as refugees. Training pro-
grammes were also established to inform police officers, NGOs, church groups, 
lawyers, judges and others on refugee matters. From committees formed within the 
tent camp in Ga’Rankuwa, refugee leaders went on to form organisations that be-
came the basis of the Co-ordinating Body of Refugee Communities (CBRC), a 
refugee-led NGO advocating for accountability of the South African government 
and public to respect the rights of refugees. Two months after the demonstration, 
various civic actors formed what became the National Consortium on Refugee Af-
fairs (NCRA), a national platform of South African NGOs and organisations repre-
senting refugee communities that would jointly advocate the accountability of the 
government to promote, protect and fulfil refugees’ rights. 
The refugee-led protest that took place in 1996 in South Africa occurred within 
a specific historical context that shaped the structural conditions through which 
civic actors would later advocate for change. However, the strategies and means 
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were by no means unique. Historically, human rights claims around the world have 
drawn on similar processes. 
For example, at almost exactly the same time in July 1996, on another continent, 
a group of Palestinians were protesting their forced eviction and the destruction of 
their homes in East Jerusalem.6 The forced removal of Palestinian residents of East 
Jerusalem was the most recent chapter in a decades-long struggle by forcibly dis-
placed Palestinians to advocate the accountability of the government of Israel in 
recognising their residence and property rights.7 The outcome of the protest con-
tributed to a series of ‘popular conferences’, and eventually led to the founding of 
the international Right of Return Coalition and Badil Resource Centre on Palestin-
ian Residency and Refugee Rights, a research and legal advocacy NGO based in the 
occupied city of Bethlehem. Both the Coalition and Badil work closely with United 
Nations (UN) organisations, including the UN Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA), the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and 
other international organisations, to advocate for accountability by raising aware-
ness about the political circumstances in which they provided humanitarian assis-
tance, and subsequently became involved in a growing debate on Palestinian refu-
gee rights. Finally, Palestinians and Israelis who possessed Israeli citizenship, who 
also formed organisations to raise awareness and launch legal claims, advocated for 
accountability through the Israeli courts and the United Nations institutions, insist-
ing on the return of lands and property confiscated over a period of several dec-
ades.8 
While efforts to advocate for accountability at different historical moments in 
South Africa and in historical Palestine occurred separately of one another, and 
arose from very different circumstances, they are comparable in at least two impor-
tant respects that are reflected upon in this book. Firstly, these examples suggest 
that civic efforts to hold government accountable are both structurally conditioned 
and actively informed by specific historical events. Secondly, they reveal the poten-
tial of legal and other forms of civic advocacy to hold states accountable through 
co-operative or confrontational interactions within the framework of both national 
and international institutions. 
This introductory chapter first presents the justification for and relevance of this 
book in the context of a primary tension faced by civic human rights advocates, 
namely the lack of critical analyses on how civic advocacy has the potential to hold 
states accountable to human rights norms. This chapter then presents and justifies 
the relevance of the book’s core research question and analytical approach. Next, 
three theoretical propositions are presented, reinforced by the book’s core concepts. 
                                                        
6  Documented in (Abunimah 2006), passim. I use this example because I am familiar with it, and 
because there are a growing number of scholarly comparisons between the past situation in South 
Africa and that of present-day Israel/Palestine. However, this book does not seek to develop these 
comparisons. 
7  (Dajani 2005); (Masalha 2003), passim. 
8  (Bronstein 2005), passim. 
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The book’s case study of refugee rights advocacy in South Africa – against which 
the theoretical propositions will be argued – is also introduced, illustrated by three 
examples of civic interactions to hold states accountable for their human rights ob-
ligations. Finally, this chapter explains the sources and methodology used in this 
research, followed by an overview of the book’s structure. 
1.1 ADDRESSING A PRIMARY TENSION IN HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY 
The idea that civic actors – and especially human rights advocates – should support 
a government as it moves in a progressive direction is in tension with the idea that 
civic advocates remain independent and retain their capacity to sanction govern-
ments when they violate human rights protection norms. This primary tension faced 
by civic actors who seek to hold states accountable conditions both the strategic 
choices they make and the interactions they undertake to change government pol-
icy. For example, a government’s explicit promise to make domestic violence a 
criminal offence would be something that most human rights organisations would 
assist in, whether through the drafting of new legislation, the training of police offi-
cers or the monitoring of police practices. However, there may be instances in 
which domestic violence continues to be ignored by law enforcement officers. This 
has tended to be very widespread in South Africa and other countries in similar 
situations. In these circumstances a government that fails to live up to its obliga-
tions may need to be held publicly accountable in a national court of law, the media 
or the United Nations. 
The reverse may also be true. The idea that organisations vigorously maintain 
their independence carries the danger that they hold the government to unrealisti-
cally high standards; they may become detached from the government’s difficulties 
in trying to implement a policy, and miss out on opportunities to help the govern-
ment live up to its human rights promises. For example, civic organisations that 
work with the legislature or departmental officials in lobbying for, and possibly co-
drafting, a national law to criminalise domestic violence may ignore the realities of 
on-the-ground police work, or fail to appreciate the need for training of police offi-
cers. Consequently, the police may feel they have no obligation to enforce a law 
that fails to take their operational concerns into consideration, and may not feel pre-
pared to handle such incidents in any event. 
Resolving this principal tension in human rights advocacy requires different 
kinds of strategies; increasingly, these draw on global standards. In addressing this 
tension, I illustrate the dynamic nature of civic-state relationships by examining the 
internal and external factors that contribute to civic actors’ success in holding states 
accountable. 
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1.1.1 Examining the strategic potential and pitfalls of civic-state interactions 
This book critically examines the strategic potential of – and pitfalls awaiting – 
civic actors in advocating for accountability by holding a government to its national 
and international law obligations to protect the human rights of individuals, by way 
of co-operative and confrontational civic-state interactions. This is achieved by ex-
amining refugee protection in South Africa during a ten-year period, 1996 to 2006. 
Civic interactions aimed at holding the government of South Africa to its human 
rights promises to protect refugees, both in terms of the government’s constitutional 
obligations, and more especially from the moment the government had acceded to 
both the United Nations and African regional conventions on refugees on 12 Janu-
ary 1996. The legal advocacy that took place in this ten-year period reflects an in-
teresting interplay of individual and collective civic interactions with the govern-
ment. This interplay has led to the following questions: How can the dynamics of 
civic interactions to advocate state accountability for promoting, protecting and ful-
filling refugee rights in South Africa be strengthened; under what circumstances do 
civic-state interactions lead to structural change and what do these interactions 
teach us about the potential and pitfalls of realising rights in general? 
Beyond the roles South African civic organisations fulfil in seeking to enhance 
refugee protection, what does the South African experience in advocating refugee 
rights tell us more generally about the potential space for enhancing human rights 
protection, both through co-operation and confrontation? How does this study illus-
trate the dangers of civic organisations becoming compromised or even co-opted, 
blunting their ability to hold government accountable? How do the experiences in 
South Africa relate to promoting global human rights protection efforts? Do these 
experiences confirm some universal lessons, or do they reflect the need for treating 
each case entirely separately? 
The interplay between civic and state actors in advocating government account-
ability to refugees has not been adequately studied in a critical way. While there is a 
growing body of literature that explains the types of social movements and civic 
participation in human rights protection,9 there are fewer efforts to critique the prac-
tice of civic interventions to advocate human rights. Those that have critiqued hu-
man rights advocacy have taken a global perspective,10 although some are begin-
ning to examine the practice of human rights in terms of its simultaneously global 
and local dimensions.11 
In general, studies on the protection of human rights have tended to focus on the 
legal-normative perspective of rights claims – that is, the way society ought to be, 
as specified by the law – without addressing the social interplay between the civic 
                                                        
9  (Tarrow 1998); (Meyer et al. 2002); (Diani and Mcadam 2003); (Welch 2001) and (Korey 2003), 
passim. 
10  However, see (Barnhizer 2001b), passim; (Mutua 2001: 151-159); (Mutua 2002), passim and (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998), passim. 
11  (Rajagopal 2003); (Merry 2006b) and (Goodale and Merry 2007). 
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actors who make these claims, and the government institutions that are obliged to 
answer them.12 The degree to which accountability is claimed on the basis of social 
norms and on the relationships between various actors responsible for the legal and 
social protection of individuals is rarely addressed.13 By extension, the potential of 
civic efforts to advocate state obligations to promote, protect and fulfil human 
rights, while maintaining a degree of civic independence, is also not adequately 
addressed. Finally, there have been few critical attempts to assess whether civic-
state interactions are capable of achieving structural change, although Shirin Rai 
has usefully argued that, to be effective, civic actors wishing to change their social 
environment need to be more ‘deliberative’, reflecting on both the risks and the po-
tential of a particular intervention.14 
1.1.2 Human rights claims are both contested and interactional 
Human rights are claimed through contestation and strategic interactions. Civic ac-
tors and governments have very different perspectives on their respective roles in 
the protection of human rights; civic actors tend to see their role as that of ‘watch-
dog’, and see few limits to what they can accomplish in confronting governments 
and seeking to hold them accountable for their legal obligations to promote, protect 
and fulfil human rights. Some even perceive civic actors as central to change in the 
formation and monitoring of these legal obligations, either as active participants or 
as autonomous agents of civic power.15 Meanwhile, governments, and especially 
democratically elected governments, tend to argue that legal obligations to realise 
human rights are important, but their implementation must be balanced with other 
interests; according to governments, forming human rights obligations may or may 
not include civic involvement. 
An alternative approach, which this book examines, recognises that protecting 
human rights – whether through co-operative interactions or legal confrontations – 
is a contested process in which civic and state actors have particular motivations for 
producing a particular outcome. Legal process is not simply a product of static (al-
beit well-intentioned) norms and institutions, but a cultural system that, by defini-
tion, is subject to change. From this perspective, state accountability and civic ad-
vocacy are necessarily dialogic or interactional. 
Furthermore, interventions to advocate government accountability in respect of 
their human rights commitments take place within a specific context, drawing on 
                                                        
12  Scholarly work on the political and legal doctrinal aspects of human rights practice is still very 
significant, however, including Baehr and others’ work on the function of human rights in interna-
tional relations; (P.R. Baehr 1994), (P.R. Baehr 1999); (P. Baehr et al. 1999); (P.R. Baehr and Gor-
denker 2005) and Ramcharan’s extensive work on the principle of legality and his critiques on the 
functioning of human rights institutions; (Ramcharan 1982); (Ramcharan 1988); (Ramcharan 2006) 
and (Ramcharan 2008). 
13  However, see (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005), passim. 
14  (Rai 2008: 112-113). 
15  (Fowler and Biekart 2008) and (Bebbington et al. 2008), passim. 
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the combined participation of civic organisations that play a role in mediating be-
tween international human rights law and its expression in national legal norms. 
Fully understanding the interplay between civic actors and state institutions can 
explain which civic interventions have real influence in forming state policies, and 
how they can hold states accountable for these policies, without civic actors losing 
their critical independence; it has potentially far-reaching practical implications for 
ensuring effective human rights protection of all civic stakeholders, citizens and 
non-citizens alike. 
Finally, the conceptual approach of this book can explain civic-state interactions 
to advocate state accountability both at different times – i.e. periods in a country’s 
history – as well as in different spaces, both in relation to the type of right(s) being 
advocated as well as the geographical context in which civic-state interactions take 
place. In other words, the book’s understanding of civic-state interactions has po-
tentially universal application. Accordingly, it aims to engage a broad community 
of academics, human rights lawyers, NGOs and other civic actors in a critical dis-
cussion that questions the structural impact of civic interventions to hold govern-
ments accountable for their human rights commitments. 
1.2 THEORISING CIVIC INTERACTIONS TO ADVOCATE STATE ACCOUNTABILITY 
More than ten years after the demonstration at the Union Buildings in South Africa, 
this book tests three theoretical propositions (further developed in chapter two) to 
explain civic interactions to advocate state accountability. First, the book maintains 
that the capacity of civic actors to promote and impose state accountability is re-
lated to structural changes in the normative international and national legal frame-
work. Second, boundaries that define the structural relationship between civic ac-
tors and the state shift in very specific ways that must be respected by civic actors 
(the agents) if they want to be strategic in their efforts to promote or enforce state 
accountability. Third, civic actors play a crucial role in mediating the translation of 
international legal norms into local contexts. 
The first of these three theoretical propositions recognises the capacity of civic 
actors to advocate state accountability as the outcome of long-contested social jus-
tice claims by civic actors, with both global dimensions, in terms of what Ignatieff 
terms a ‘human rights revolution’,16 and their local expressions, especially as re-
flected in terms of administrative law. Administrative law has been the principal 
instrument used by civic actors for formally holding democratic governments ac-
countable to their obligations to protect human rights, although other sources of law 
are also used to protect human rights.17 
                                                        
16  (Ignatieff 1999), passim. 
17  For example, family law has been used to realise a state’s obligations regarding protection of chil-
dren; labour law has been used to realise women’s equal right to work, and criminal law has been 
used to realise a state’s obligations to punish individual perpetrators of international crimes. 
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As Abel’s study of anti-apartheid legal struggles has illustrated, South Africa 
has historically been a place where law has been effectively wielded as both a 
‘shield’ (to protect individuals against the abuses of the state, such as unlawful 
home demolitions and forced removals) and as a ‘sword’ (to advance individual and 
collective human rights, such as restitution of property).18 Expanding the field of 
administrative law in South Africa has forced lawyers to be innovative, often co-
ordinating their efforts with broad-based civic initiatives.19 Beyond legal actions, 
civic participation has taken other forms, ranging from non-judicial forms of repre-
sentation to collaboration with government, social and policy analysis, and mass 
mobilisation. In the area of human rights, civic interventions to advocate state ac-
countability have successfully challenged outdated notions of state sovereignty, and 
enhanced civic capacity to invoke direct claims against states. In recent years, the 
role of civic advocacy in advocating the accountability of states to promote, protect 
and fulfil the human rights of refugees seems to have been especially productive, 
although this has not been critically evaluated. 
Advocating for accountability to refugees is particularly suited to examining the 
relationship between global human rights norms and the national contexts in which 
they find expression. While the mechanisms and processes of advocating for ac-
countability are principally located at the national level, the realisation of refugee 
rights is rooted in international enforcement mechanisms and the geo-politics of 
refugee protection. Civic actors who have sought to promote or enforce refugee 
rights in South Africa have to some extent appealed to these international mecha-
nisms, either in international meetings or through the representatives of interna-
tional organisations. Civic actors have also drawn on international refugee protec-
tion norms in making claims through administrative justice mechanisms, both 
internal (appealing to the administration itself) and external (on judicial review), as 
they have tested the limits of administrative and judicial review. 
The second of these theoretical propositions that recognises boundaries as hav-
ing shifted in very specific ways draws principally on Archer’s approach to struc-
ture-agency relationships. According to this approach, state-created structures con-
dition civic agency; at the same time, there is space for elaborating these state-
created structures through the interplay that takes place between structure and 
agent.20 By focussing on the interplay between structure and agency, the potential 
for interventions by civic actors to lead to structural change becomes clear. Inputs 
                                                        
18  (Abel 1995), passim. 
19  In (‘Minister of Health (and others) v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others’ 2002), discussed in 
(Heywood 2002), the AIDS Law Project supported the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in 
bringing a case to force access to anti-retroviral drugs for HIV patients, a process that eventually 
resulted in the Constitutional Court finding in favour of the TAC. Other civic initiatives in South 
Africa have creatively utilised public administrative law and public international law, and have co-
ordinated with civic groups and social movements to advocate for economic and social rights, in-
cluding affordable access to water (Dugard 2007) and shelter (S. Wilson 2007). 
20  (Archer 1996), passim. 
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by civic organisations may be peripheral, particularly in the case of co-operative 
civic-state interactions, but they are by no means insignificant in seeking to press 
for greater state accountability, and even to hold a state to its national and interna-
tional legal obligations. 
This book will provide agency- and structure-based explanations for civic efforts 
in advocating for accountability, both in terms of socially enforceable norms and 
state-enforceable law. Agency-based explanations for civic participation in state-led 
policy and enforcement processes illustrate the aspirations of civic actors in seeking 
to influence the outcome of government policy or practice. While structure-based 
explanations define the boundaries of civic interaction, civic agents can advocate 
state accountability and engage with states in a way that still maintains a critical 
distance. Accordingly, civic actors are able to calculate the strategic prospects for 
advocating state accountability that can lead to lasting, structural change. 
The third theoretical proposition draws principally on socio-legal theory in ex-
plaining the mediating role that civic actors fulfil in the translation of international 
legal norms into local contexts. Standard tools of legal analysis have provided a 
doctrinal approach to evaluating civic efforts to hold states accountable. As men-
tioned, public administrative law in particular has shown itself to be a flexible and 
potentially very productive instrument for holding governments accountable by 
measuring compliance with national law obligations, and, by extension, obligations 
contained in public international law. 
On its own, however, legal analysis tends to be of limited value in explaining the 
highly contested space in which various civic actors have participated in the form-
ing of human rights policies, as well as in promoting (and in some cases also par-
ticipating in) their implementation. Socio-legal approaches provide an alternative 
means of explaining civic efforts to hold states accountable, building on well-
developed methodologies.21 This book draws principally on Merry’s concept of 
‘translators’ who fulfil a mediating role between international legal rules and their 
expression in the ‘vernacular’ form, or locally relevant context.22  
Furthermore, the book draws on Kidder, who constructed an ‘integrated theory 
of imposed law’, which explained the significance of ‘social distance’ between the 
law maker (state or government) and the citizen (civic actor or civic organisation), 
as measured by divergences between their respective meanings, interests and politi-
cal positions.23 While Merry’s concept explains the role of civic actors in mediating 
the relationship between international law and national law, Kidder’s theory ex-
                                                        
21  Socio-legal theory has drawn much inspiration from the earlier work of (Ehrlich 1936), who fa-
mously argued that ‘law in the books’ ought to be contrasted with what he termed ‘living law’. 
Socio-legal theory has grown rapidly since the 1960s, with the work of (Nader 1964); (S.F. Moore 
1978); (Cotterrell 1992), followed by the more recent work of (Griffiths 2003); (Merry 2006b); 
(Rajagopal 2003); (Barnhizer 2001a) and others. 
22  (Merry 2006b), passim. 
23  (Kidder 1979). (Rai 2008: 113) refers to the concept of ‘political distance’ in a similar way. 
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plains the nature of civic-state interactions, in which this mediation or translation of 
international law principally takes place. 
1.3 THREE FORMS OF CIVIC-STATE INTERACTIONS FOR ADVOCATING FOR 
ACCOUNTABILITY TO REFUGEES 
This book’s theoretical propositions are tested against three forms of civic-state 
interactions to advocate state accountability for refugee rights. It makes a distinc-
tion between co-operative forms of civic-state interactions, promoting state ac-
countability in promoting, protecting and fulfilling its domestic and international 
legal obligations, and confrontational forms of civic interactions, for holding states 
accountable through the courts, sometimes together with non-legal civic confronta-
tions. 
The first form of co-operative civic-state interaction involved civic participation 
in a primarily South African government-led process to draft a refugee policy. This 
process of refugee policymaking took place mainly within a two-year period be-
tween 1996 and 1998, and involved multiple interactions between civic actors and 
the government. Two policy ‘tracks’ may be distinguished; the first led by the 
South African government, and the second led by civic actors, and which to some 
extent informed the first track. The product of this policymaking process was the 
Refugees Act of 1998. 
The second form of co-operative civic-state interaction involved support by lo-
cal and international civic organisations for the South African government in a pro-
gramme to regularise the legal residential status of former Mozambican refugees, 
most of whom had arrived in South Africa in the 1980s – without formal recogni-
tion by South Africa – during the civil war in Mozambique. While a number of 
these refugees had participated in a UNHCR-led repatriation programme in the 
early 1990s, and many more were deported by the South African authorities, several 
hundred thousand former Mozambican refugees remained in South Africa without 
any form of legal documentation. The implementation of the programme to regular-
ise their status took place between 1999 and 2000, and principally involved three 
South African organisations, as well as a Dutch NGO, which co-ordinated the pro-
ject. 
The third form of civic-state interaction involved confrontational civic advocacy 
in order to hold states accountable through legal actions that tested government de-
cisions and their compliance with administrative and constitutional law. These legal 
actions included promoting access to a fair refugee status determination procedure 
as well as access to basic services, and challenging employment practices that dis-
criminated against refugees. The legal actions were often undertaken in combina-
tion with other – non-legal – forms of confrontational civic advocacy. 
Advocating for accountability may take many forms other than the three men-
tioned here, which were selected on the basis of the empirical evidence available. 
Furthermore, civic advocacy is not necessarily directed at the state that is violating 
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human rights; for example, the target could be journalists, employers or the general 
public. However, civic advocacy very often involves invoking global norms and 
‘translating’ them into a locally relevant context. In advocating for accountability 
through legal means – whether through participation in a policymaking process or 
through litigation – constitutional and administrative law is the principal medium 
through which global norms are translated. 
In applying the book’s theoretical propositions to these three forms of civic 
agency, I intend to argue that the implications of civic agency aimed at promoting 
state accountability through co-operative interactions are diverse, but do not neces-
sarily lead to structural change; or if they do, it is rarely in a way that is devoid of 
compromise. Conversely, while there are only very limited mechanisms available to 
civic agents seeking to enforce state accountability (through confrontations), their 
potential to lead to structural change is significant, if used strategically. 
1.4 SOURCES, METHODS AND METHODOLOGY 
The methodological starting point for this study was the approach, developed 
mainly by Rosalyn Higgins, that non-state actors are important participants in the 
forming, monitoring and invoking of international law. This legal approach corre-
sponds to a political approach; as human rights have developed as a normative sys-
tem, the power relationship between civic actors has shifted, creating possibilities 
for civic actors to hold states directly accountable through international and national 
mechanisms. In applying this methodological approach to a local context, I encoun-
tered literature from the area of socio-legal studies that provided less doctrinal and 
more sophisticated approaches to explaining how civic interventions play a role in 
forming normative obligations and holding states accountable to them, in particular 
Merry’s notion of global rules ‘translated’ into a locally relevant context. Finally, I 
adapted Archer’s analytical dualism approach to present structure- and agency-
based arguments that explain the interplay and interactions between civic actors and 
various state-created structures. 
These approaches were developed into three theoretical propositions that created 
a framework for analysing the empirical examples of co-operative and confronta-
tional civic-state interactions, as seen through the lens of refugee rights advocacy in 
South Africa. The empirical data to illustrate the examples came from various pri-
mary and secondary sources, as explained in this section, and reinforced the conclu-
sions that I came to in the final chapter of this book. 
Being a participant in the first few years of the 1996-2006 period that this study 
examines, I was faced with exceptional access to the various civic actors engaged in 
advocating for accountability, and the ‘grey material’ they produced. I also gained 
unique insights into how civic actors use their agency to try and hold states ac-
countable for their national and international obligations to protect refugees; in-
sights that would have been difficult for an outside observer to obtain. However, 
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this close contact also presented methodological challenges, in that it was difficult 
to distance myself from the events that took place.  
1.4.1 Literature survey and grey material 
A survey was made of scholarly articles on administrative law in South Africa and 
international law, in particular with regard to the role of civic actors in international 
legal process. Surveys were also made of scholarly socio-legal work on legal plural-
ism and legal consciousness, as well as a more limited survey of structure-agency 
debates. Finally, surveys were made of scholarly work on civic advocacy, particu-
larly on the promotion of states’ human rights obligations. Additional literature 
came from South African and international non-governmental organisations. 
In the rural province of Limpopo, a great deal of archival material came from 
the University of the Witwatersrand Refugee Research Programme (RRP), a rural-
based research project. I reviewed material from the main areas of work done by the 
RRP from 1996 to 2002: voluntary return programmes, facilitated by RRP in con-
junction with numerous other government agencies and non-governmental organi-
sations; the regularisation of former Mozambican refugees; and a series of work-
shops organised on humanitarian alternatives to deportation. 
In Durban, archival material, including minutes of meetings, was supplied by 
one of the founders of the Durban Refugee Forum, as well as by a founder of the 
Durban Refugee Service Providers Network. In Cape Town, numerous NGOs sup-
plied material from their organisations, as well as reports and minutes, covering the 
work of the Cape Town Refugee Forum, now known as the Tutumike network. In 
Port Elizabeth, a more limited amount of documentation was obtained from NGOs. 
In Pretoria and Johannesburg, a great deal of material was obtained from Lawyers 
for Human Rights, as well as other NGOs in Gauteng Province. Numerous e-mails, 
mainly from the e-mail list-servers of SAIMMIG (set up by Professor Jonathan 
Klaaren of the University of the Witwatersrand), and the short-lived LHR-Refugees 
list, also clarified particular issues. 
Finally, newspaper stories in the South African and international media were 
drawn upon, many of them archived by the Institute for Contemporary History at 
Free State University in Potchefstroom, and the Southern African Migration Pro-
gramme (SAMP) of the South African NGO, the Institute for Democracy in South 
Africa (IDASA), and Queens University in Canada. 
1.4.2 Interviews, primary sources and personal observations 
To confirm written assertions contained in the secondary data, between February 
and May 2006 I conducted thirty-five individual, semi-structured interviews with 
refugee advocacy organisations, academics, lawyers, refugee-led organisations, 
government officials and UNHCR employees. The interviews took place in Johan-
nesburg, Pretoria, Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. Further-
Chapter 1 
14 
more, I facilitated a focus group discussion of twenty refugees in Port Elizabeth. A 
handful of other unstructured follow-up interviews took place at various stages dur-
ing the field research. 
The numerous primary sources drawn upon for this study include legislation by 
the South African government, as well as regulations, circulars, passport control 
instructions and other policy documents from the Department of Home Affairs. Pol-
icy documents were also obtained from the South African Police Services as well as 
the municipal governments of Cape Town and Johannesburg. The UNHCR sup-
plied policy documents, some of which are now accessible through the Refworld 
section of their website. 
This book also draws on much personal observation from working as a legal ad-
vocate in South Africa, particularly in the years 1996-1998. For a short time in 
1993, and later from 1996 until the beginning of 2000, I was employed by LHR, in 
large part to establish a project focusing on refugees. I helped establish the Refugee 
Rights Project, now called the Refugee and Migrants’ Rights Project, established in 
1996, which has since become one of the leading NGOs advocating government 
accountability for the rights of migrants and refugees in South Africa. Following the 
success of the Refugee Rights Consortium in 1996, LHR co-founded the National 
Consortium on Refugee Affairs (NCRA) network, with a small grant from the 
(then) EU Foundation for Human Rights in South Africa.24 LHR co-ordinated the 
NCRA from 1997 until the network became an independent NGO in 2000. I was 
co-ordinator of these two initiatives in their early days, employed in various capaci-
ties between June 1996 and July 1998, and afterwards in an associate capacity until 
January 2000. 
Furthermore, while at the Forced Migration Studies Programme (FMSP) at the 
University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa from January to 
June 2006, I participated in two research projects. The first was the New African 
Cities Project, a survey of 800 households in central Johannesburg, with respon-
dents including South Africans and persons of Mozambican, Congolese and Somali 
nationality. The second was a project commissioned by Atlantic Philanthropies to 
evaluate the priorities, gaps and weaknesses in the migration and refugees sector. 
1.4.3 Challenges of assessment 
Explaining the role of civic actors in the development, implementation and en-
forcement of the South African government‘s refugee policy was made particularly 
challenging because of two ethical considerations. 
The first ethical consideration faced in writing this book was that I focused 
mainly on South African organisations that have represented the interests of refu-
gees, and did not adequately document the extensive (and largely ignored) roles 
                                                        
24  The NCRA reformed in 2007 to become the Consortium on Refugees and Migrants in South Africa 
(CoRMSA). 
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played by refugees and asylum seekers themselves in advocating for accountabil-
ity.25 To avoid an overly ambitious study, I deliberately chose to focus on the South 
African civic actors, and especially those with a legal advocacy perspective, in or-
der to critically appreciate how these particular actors engaged strategically with a 
democratic state in advocating a sensitive human rights issue. While it was ac-
knowledged that alliances between South African refugee-led organisations could 
lead to some impressive outcomes, this study did not have the space to examine 
these relationships in much depth. 
The second ethical consideration in undertaking this study related to my per-
sonal involvement in certain events that took place during the period of study, 1996 
to 2006. As a participant in the early stages of the development of a refugee rights 
policy in South Africa, and later as a researcher, I had exceptional access to the ac-
tors involved in framing a refugee policy and associated documentation.26 There 
was a generally high level of trust among those I interviewed in order to develop the 
picture of discussions on refugee rights policy in South Africa that began to emerge 
in earnest from 1996 onwards. Like Belvedere, I also believe strongly that my direct 
involvement has been of tremendous benefit to this study in that I was able to make 
more informed decisions about what aspects of refugee rights advocacy in South 
Africa were most likely to illustrate and answer the book’s central research ques-
tion.27 
However, the disadvantages in having been engaged in the subject of my study 
as a participant – in the early stages of refugee policy development and implementa-
tion – are also important to note. While objectivity is difficult, if not impossible for 
any researcher, it is particularly difficult where one has participated in some of the 
events being reflected upon.28 There may, for example, be dual pressures on the 
researcher to take a position that is policy-relevant, while also meeting the very real 
needs of those who are the subject of the research.29 I made it clear to those I inter-
viewed that this was not my principal intention, although I hoped that the findings 
and conclusions contained in this book would be of use to practitioners. In other 
words, while a subjective perspective may make one more sensitive to the topic 
being represented and the actors involved, inevitably it also leads one to make 
judgements. Given this dilemma, I have scrupulously avoided labelling the ‘right-
ness’ or ‘wrongness’ of certain approaches, but have attempted to explain their im-
                                                        
25  (Merry 2007) makes this observation, referring to a pioneering study by (Malkki 1996). (Harrell-
Bond 1986) and (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005) have also made this observation. This is cer-
tainly an important area for future research. However, see (Amisi and Ballard 2005), who studied 
the role of Congolese in South Africa, advocating for rights on behalf of their community. 
26  I was not, however, directly involved in the implementation of the regularisation programme for 
Mozambican refugees, nor was I directly involved in the litigation that is described in chapter six. 
27  (Belvedere 2006: 22-26) acknowledged that she was similarly involved in events she later analysed 
in her PhD thesis. 
28  (Cooke and Kothari 2001). 
29  (Jacobsen and Landau 2003). 
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pact instead. Furthermore, I based my conclusions on South Africa’s explicit nor-
mative commitments, as well as written documentation and interviews. 
1.5 OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK 
The book is divided into seven chapters, including this introduction. In Chapter one, 
the book’s central research question is revealed: How can the dynamics of civic 
interactions for advocating a state’s accountability for promoting, protecting and 
fulfilling refugee rights in South Africa be strengthened; under what circumstances 
do civic-state interactions lead to structural change and what do these interactions 
teach us about the potential and pitfalls of realising rights in general? In explaining 
the dynamics of civic interventions to hold the South African state accountable to 
its national and international law obligations to protect refugees, I take three illus-
trations of civic interactions to promote state accountability to explain co-operative 
measures by civic actors to promote state accountability, and confrontational meas-
ures by civic actors to hold states directly accountable. 
Chapter two presents the book’s conceptual framework. Three theoretical propo-
sitions are presented that explain certain social, political and legal aspects of civic-
state interactions. Social explanations include the types of agency that civic actors 
employ in seeking to hold states socially and legally accountable. Structure and 
agency-based explanations draw on Archer’s analytical dualism approach, which 
(1) considers state-created structures to be the products of specific historical events; 
(2) postulates that these structures condition civic agency in its interactions with the 
state; and (3) asserts that through civic-state interactions, there is the possibility of 
structural elaboration (or structural change). The concept of the capacity of civic-
state interactions to lead to structural change meshes well with Merry’s explanation 
of civic actors as ‘translators’ of global rules into their local vernacular contexts.30 
Social explanations also draw upon Kidder’s interactional approach, which consid-
ers externally imposed law to be the external norms and principles ‘that increase(s) 
the power of external legal actors to offer alternatives (and) thereby increases the 
vulnerability of the internal system’.31 The degree of ‘externalisation’ or social dis-
tance between the lawmaker, for example an administrative official, and the civic 
actor making a claim, may be illustrated by a divergence in meanings, interests and 
political positions. 
Political explanations show the space for civic advocacy as being the outcome of 
juridical, advocacy and enforcement revolutions. This political analysis includes an 
assessment of the relationship between, and specific roles of, three key South Afri-
can institutions. These are: the Department of Home Affairs, which is responsible 
for immigration and border policy enforcement, as well as refugee status determina-
tion; the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs in Parliament; and the so-called 
                                                        
30  (Merry 2006b), passim. 
31  (Kidder 1979: 297). 
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‘section nine institutions’,32 particularly the South African Human Rights Commis-
sion. 
Legal explanations draw, firstly, on Higgins’ notion of civic actor participation 
in international legal process that eliminates the need for a subject/object distinc-
tion. Furthermore, expanded possibilities in the exercise of administrative review, 
which emerged from the post-1994 democratic and constitutional dispensations (as 
described above) have made it possible for civic actors to hold the South African 
government directly accountable, in particular in terms of Article 33 of South Af-
rica’s constitution. This has been reinforced by the Promotion of the Administration 
of Justice Act 2000 and public law jurisprudence. I reflect on developments in 
South African constitutional and administrative law, drawing on the work of Jona-
than Klaaren and Cora Hoexter. This study reflects on the three main types of sanc-
tion available to resolve administrative law disputes, namely: judgements, court-
ordered settlements and (structural) interdicts. 
Chapter three traces the history of legal advocacy in South Africa, particularly 
pertaining to refugee protection. It puts the book’s study of civic advocacy for refu-
gees into context by explaining the history of South Africa’s migration policy, and 
in particular the four pillars upon which it was based prior to 1994. This is followed 
by a history of civic advocacy in South Africa, which eventually became organised 
to protect refugee rights. The significance of post-1994 dispensations, and in par-
ticular the emergence of South Africa’s constitution and its provision for unprece-
dented powers of judicial review, is explained. Finally, this chapter explains how 
this history of migration and civic advocacy involved well-co-ordinated civic struc-
tures to assist refugees and asylum seekers and to lobby for their protection. 
Chapter four offers the first illustration of civic-state interactions through civic 
involvement in the development of South Africa’s refugee policy, culminating in the 
Refugees Act of 1998. This illustration shows how the policy emerged from com-
peting forces within government and among civic actors. The chapter also explains 
how refugee policy process fell into two distinct ‘tracks’, one of which led to the 
Refugees Act of 1998. Though the other did not, it did provide important secondary 
input to the 1998 Act. Both tracks illustrate, in different ways, how civic actors 
compromised in favour of, or resisted against, initiatives to change government-led 
efforts to reform its policy. 
Chapter five presents the second illustration of civic-state interactions, drawing 
on similar theoretical positions to those used in the previous chapter. This chapter 
reviews civic collaboration in the implementation of a project to regularise the legal 
status of former Mozambican refugees from 2000 to 2002. This project involved 
multiple civic actors, national and international, as well as national and provincial 
                                                        
32  Section nine of the (South African Constitution 1996) provides for the establishment of institutions 
to monitor the government‘s compliance with the provisions of the Constitution, and to hold the 
government horizontally accountable by conducting investigations, holding public hearings, and 
producing reports that show areas where the government falls short. 
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government officials. The chapter presents illustrative examples in which civic 
agency was severely constrained, and indeed badly compromised, by state-created 
structural factors that were ineffectively addressed by the participating civic actors. 
Chapter six presents the third illustration of civic-state interactions, exploring 
civic efforts to hold the South African government directly accountable to its na-
tional and international obligations. This chapter demonstrates the dynamic nature 
in which human rights are mobilised and claimed through legal and administrative 
structures. It surveys key cases during a ten-year period of litigating refugee rights 
via administrative channels in the Department of Home Affairs, and through the 
South African courts, by way of administrative and judicial review. I argue that the 
use of public administrative law is, essentially, the only formal means of holding 
states accountable. Further, brief examples show other confrontational advocacy 
strategies, namely public shaming and mass mobilisation. 
Chapter seven brings the narrative of legal advocacy in South Africa full circle. 
It addresses the underlying normative question addressed in this book, namely how 
the dynamics of civic interactions in advocating state accountability for promoting, 
protecting and fulfilling refugee rights in South Africa could be strengthened; the 
circumstances under which civic-state interactions lead to structural change; and 
what these interactions teach us about their potential to realise rights in general. 
Weaknesses in the structural base of government institutions and the normative 
framework, as well as in the agency base of civic advocacy, will be subjected to 
critical examination, though the emphasis will be on structure-based change. Fur-
thermore, the concluding chapter shows that while the situation in South Africa is in 
many respects unique, drawing on a long heritage of civic resistance and confronta-
tional advocacy, the experiences of refugee rights advocacy in South Africa are 
relevant to global refugee protection studies generally, and can serve as general, 
instructive examples of civic efforts to protect human rights. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ADVOCATING FOR ACCOUNTABILITY  
THROUGH CIVIC INTERACTIONS 
 
 
 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW 
Civic interactions to advocate for accountability (what might be called civic 
agency) for a state’s obligations to promote, protect and fulfil human rights obliga-
tions principally take two forms: co-operative and confrontational. Co-operative 
civic interactions aim to promote state accountability by having civic actors work 
together with government structures in an advisory or facilitative role. Confronta-
tional civic interactions aim to hold states directly accountable for their human 
rights obligations, primarily by way of legal intervention, but also through public 
shaming and mass mobilisation. 
Civic agency is not unbounded in its interaction with state structures. Indeed, 
state-prescribed structures condition civic agency in civic efforts to influence the 
formation of law, to participate in the implementation of law and to advocate the 
enforcement of law. Civic interactions do not necessarily alter the relationship be-
tween state and civic actors, although they do clarify the roles of both, aimed re-
spectively at promoting a more credible government and at preserving a critical 
civic society. In some cases, interactions between civic actors and state structures 
can lead to structural change, or what Archer regards as structural ‘elaboration’.1 
Both civic and state actors can benefit from a more sophisticated understanding of 
the nature of these boundaries and by acknowledging the state’s central role as 
holder of legal or social obligations. 
While the impact of civic interactions in influencing state behaviour should not 
be exaggerated, such interactions can still be highly significant. Understanding why 
some interactions have more impact than others can serve as an important means of 
clarifying the potential impact and limitations of civic participation in the forma-
tion, implementation and invoking of human rights policies, as it does in the study 
of civic advocacy for refugees in South Africa. A clearer understanding of the dy-
namics observed in the course of civic-state interactions can also help civic actors 
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determine how their roles might be strengthened. In this chapter, I first explain the 
capacity of civic actors to co-operate with – or confront – states with their obliga-
tions to protect human rights, which are derived from international and national 
norms, as well as being the product of a ‘human rights revolution’. I then explain 
the importance of recognising structural boundaries, how this recognition condi-
tions civic agency, and what the implications are for civic legitimacy. Finally, I ex-
plain how civic actors translate global human rights into their locally relevant con-
texts, which have the potential to lead to structural change. These three dimensions 
of civic advocacy – capacity, structural conditioning and the potential of civic ac-
tors to contribute to structural change – are framed by Archer’s analytical dualism 
approach, and have guided me in the formulation of three theoretical propositions. 
2.1.1 Exercising civic capacity: shifts in the political context 
As Valerie Hunt has emphasised, ‘context matters because context frames how an 
issue is understood’,2 and shifts in a political context are shaped by specific histori-
cal circumstances. The political context of human rights and social justice struggles 
invariably has both international and national dimensions. National human rights 
struggles draw inspiration from international human rights norms and support from 
international solidarity movements, while the development of international human 
rights norms is informed by experiences at the national level. As the political con-
text shifts in these multi-dimensional social justice struggles – for example, as an 
authoritarian regime gives way to a just alternative – civic actors that once had 
more legitimacy than the government they confronted may shift their focus to sup-
porting government when it acquires structures for enhancing democratic account-
ability. 
Human rights are the product of groundbreaking institutional and normative de-
velopments originating from the end of the Second World War, in particular from 
the creation of the United Nations and the capacity of civic actors to participate in 
international policymaking processes and to enforce direct claims against states for 
their violation of individual and collective rights. At the national level, human 
rights are promoted, for example through participation in the process of law-
making. They are enforced through court challenges, either as a ‘shield’ to protect 
individuals against governments that violate human rights, or as a ‘sword’ to ad-
vance human rights.3 
As a truly global phenomenon that addresses many levels of state responsibility, 
and involves states, international organisations and civic actors, the field of refugee 
rights provides good examples of multi-dimensional social justice struggles. Inter-
national treaties prescribe the principal human rights that refugees have, including 
the right to ‘seek and enjoy’ asylum from persecution, while demanding that states 
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are primarily responsible for protecting these rights.4 While states are the most im-
portant source of protection for refugees, they are also the principal perpetrators of 
the violations of rights that cause people to become refugees.5 The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the principal international agency 
established to monitor states’ compliance with the international treaties protecting 
refugees, has also intervened in the protection of refugees, through diplomacy, as-
sistance to states and humanitarian assistance.6 And finally, civic actors actively 
participate in policymaking processes at the international and national level, support 
states in meeting their human rights obligations towards refugees, and challenge 
states to respect their human rights obligations to refugees.7 
2.1.2 Structural boundaries and the issue of legitimacy 
How do civic organisations – translators of global rights into their locally relevant 
contexts – derive their legal, political and social legitimacy to advocate on behalf of 
a marginalised community, as was the case in the study of civic advocacy for refu-
gees in South Africa examined in this book? Civic organisations often define their 
legitimacy with reference to presumed and often self-defined constituencies. Devel-
opment theory and practice still tends to define the legitimacy, or ‘credit-
worthiness’, of these organisations in a highly technocratic way, on the basis of so-
called ‘best practice’. Is the legitimacy of civic actors principally derived from be-
ing ‘accountable’ representatives of a certain civic political landscape,8 in represent-
ing civic ‘alternatives’ to mainstream, state-led development approaches?9 Should 
civic actors be seen as independent of government, as being the primary generators 
of what some refer to as ‘civic driven change’?10 
When assessing the protection of human rights and the advocating of account-
ability, it is generally assumed that the roles of civic actors are ‘important’. How-
ever, few studies have been undertaken to assess their effectiveness in holding 
states accountable. Most assessments of civic human rights advocacy are descrip-
tive accounts of civic actors’ contributions, and are mainly at the level of global 
advocacy.11 My approach is somewhat different. I believe that the legitimacy of 
civic actors, vis-à-vis their constituencies and in relation to other civic actors, is 
derived from the structural changes that take place as the result of civic-state inter-
actions performed to advocate human rights and hold states accountable. These 
                                                        
4  Of particular note are: (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951); (OAU Refugees Con-
vention 1969). 
5  (Bayefsky and Fitzpatrick 2000). 
6  (Loescher 2001); (Steiner et al. 2003). 
7  (Ferris 1993). 
8  (Jordan and Tuijl 2006). 
9  (Bebbington et al. 2008). 
10  (Fowler and Biekart 2008). 
11  (Korey 2003); (Welch 1995); (Welch 2001); (Keck and Sikkink 1998); (Weiss and Gordenker 
1996). 
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structural changes come about either through co-operative endeavours, involving 
civic actors and a government that is willing to move in a more progressive direc-
tion, or through confrontational measures by civic actors. 
The legitimacy of civic advocacy, therefore, relates to whether a particular stra-
tegic interaction has the capacity to deliver structural change. Some civic interac-
tions require a certain distance or high level of autonomy from government, 
whereas other interactions require a very close relationship. In most cases, it will be 
necessary to interact with state-created structures. For example, ending the deten-
tion of refugees could be achieved by changing legislation (requiring a close col-
laboration with lawmakers), by bringing a case through the court system, or by a 
public campaign to shame the government on its treatment of refugees. It may also 
require a combination of these strategies. Ending the corrupt practices of govern-
ment officials responsible for handling immigration matters, for instance, may re-
quire an aggressive campaign of public shaming through the media. By contrast, 
promoting education and awareness could be achieved by working closely with in-
dividual law enforcement officials, as well as with local and national government.12 
Once again, the field of refugee rights presents an instructive study in examining 
the relationship between global rules and their translation in a national context. As 
Tazreiter argued in her comparative study of the German and Australian refugee 
policy regimes, refugee policy is very much the outcome of a political process 
which, though guided by international rules, often leaves room for interpretation.13 
As Tazreiter does, I conclude that civic participation in making human rights 
claims against the state on behalf of refugees has social implications for both refu-
gees and the citizens of the host country in which they claim asylum, and creates 
attendant obligations on the part of the state.14 I would agree that the role of civic 
actors in this process has had a ‘marked impact’,15 but there are diverse explana-
tions for this. I am more reluctant to conclude that the interventions of civic actors 
necessarily determine state behaviour, what Fowler and colleagues describe as 
‘civic-driven change’.16 Yet I do share Shirin Rai’s argument, that interactions by 
civic actors with state representatives in seeking to bring about change are most 
strategic when they involve a conscious ‘risk assessment’.17 Furthermore, most 
changes that take place over a longer period of time are subject to multiple causes, 
and usually follow repeated civic interactions; in other words, change is both struc-
tural and cumulative in nature, and cannot be ascribed to a single actor. 
                                                        
12  For example, as confirmed by the (‘Braamfontein Statement’ 1998), various civic organisations 
have worked closely together with the South African Human Rights Commission, police and immi-
gration officials and local and national government departments in a campaign to ‘roll back xeno-
phobia’. 
13  (Tazreiter 2004). 
14  (Tazreiter 2004: 57-81). 
15  (Tazreiter 2004: 58-59). 
16  (Fowler and Biekart 2008). 
17  (Rai 2008). 
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2.1.3 Civic participants as translators 
Can local and transnational civic participation in the realisation of rights be theo-
rised? Groundbreaking research by Risse, Ropp, Sikkink and others on trans-
national civic mobilising or ‘socialisation’ of international human rights norms in 
domestic politics provides a partial explanation.18 For example, Risse and Sikkink’s 
notion of the ‘spiral model’, which proposes a five-phase spectrum for analysing 
human rights mobilisation, from a state of repression, to a state that consistently 
applies the rules for human rights protection, explains how human rights become 
structurally incorporated into a state’s norms and institutions through trans-national 
civic interactions.19  
Merry contends that it is possible to characterise the interface between global 
and local legal, social and political cultures in terms of three broad processes with 
transnational elements: consensus-building, program transplants and localisation of 
knowledge.20 While I agree with this contention, Merry also argues that human 
rights form a voluntary, non-enforceable system, which is ‘adopted, rather than im-
posed’.21 While this may explain the potential of co-operative interventions by civic 
actors to lead to structural change where the state is encouraged to meet its obliga-
tions voluntarily, it does not adequately explain the potential for confrontational 
civic interventions to do the same. There are opportunities, though limited, at both 
international and national levels for civic actors to confront states in meeting their 
international human rights obligations. Consequently, as will be elaborated in more 
detail below, I also draw on Kidder’s integrated theory of ‘imposed law’, which 
provides a structure-based explanation of how the imposition of law by civic agents 
can achieve ‘structural elaboration’, which, according to Archer, takes place in a 
structurally conditioned, historically specific context.22 
Fowler argues that there is an inter-dependent, though relatively fluid, relation-
ship between the civic agents of change and the structures in which change takes 
place, and that this relationship is very complex and context-specific.23 While I do 
not dispute that structural incorporation of human rights norms is possible, or that 
such an inter-dependent, ‘complex’ relationship exists, I tend to agree with Merry, 
who argues that the complex nature of these interactions is precisely why it is 
worthwhile focusing on ‘specific places where transnational flows are happening’.24 
This is especially important when civic participation is subject to diverse global 
                                                        
18  (Risse et al. 1999). 
19  (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 17-37), although (Black 1999) has urged caution in treating countries 
such as South Africa as an archetypal representation of the model. He argues (page 79) that the spi-
ral model can explain both the emergence of socially progressive policies as well as how a human 
rights struggle can become ‘de-radicalised’ by over-reliance on a liberal rights framework. 
20  (Merry 2006b: 19-20). 
21  (Merry 2006b: 225). 
22  (Archer 1996). 
23  (Fowler 2007). 
24  (Merry 2006b). 
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(transnational) as well as local (national) pressures and, correspondingly, multiple 
layers of interaction. While Merry focused her study on the concept of gender vio-
lence, albeit in different national and local contexts, her theory is also applicable to 
other rights issues. 
For all the institutions examined in this study, strategic efforts by civic actors to 
hold the state accountable, both horizontally (indirectly promoting institutional ac-
countability through ‘self-correcting’ mechanisms) and vertically (accountability as 
a direct consequence of civic interventions), will be measured against externally 
grounded reasons for each actor’s interest in the outcome of a given interaction. 
2.1.4 Three theoretical propositions 
Assessing the nature, context and legitimacy of civic-state interactions to hold states 
accountable has led me to three theoretical propositions, which are discussed in the 
remainder of this chapter. Firstly, the capacity of civic actors to promote and im-
pose state accountability is shaped by developments in the normative international 
and national legal framework. Civic participation in legal process therefore requires 
clarity regarding the roles and responsibilities of civic and government actors, and 
the establishing of a nexus between international law and domestic public law. Sec-
ondly, boundaries that define the structural relationship between civic actors and the 
state have shifted in very specific ways that must be respected by civic actors 
(agents) if they want to be strategic in their efforts to promote or enforce state ac-
countability. Strategically, this demands a clear appreciation by civic agents of the 
structural conditioning that takes place in any civic-state interaction, as well as a 
critical assessment of the possibilities for civic agency to achieve structural elabora-
tion, through legal translation and/or legal imposition. Thirdly, civic actors play a 
crucial role in mediating the translation of international legal norms into local con-
texts in a narrow, but significant, space. Holding states accountable involves the 
state voluntarily changing its behaviour on the basis of international obligations, 
often at the insistence, and sometimes with the assistance, of civic actors. Being a 
structurally conditioned relationship, the interplay between civic and state actors, 
and their corresponding motivations, can be explained in terms of divergences in 
meanings, interests and political positions. 
2.2 THE CAPACITY OF CIVIC ACTORS TO HOLD STATES ACCOUNTABLE IS A 
PRODUCT OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES 
The first theoretical proposition I discuss in this book is this: the capacity of civic 
actors to promote and impose state accountability is shaped by structural changes 
in the normative international and national legal framework. At the global level, 
these structural changes can be seen as the product of a significant ‘human rights 
revolution’, according to Ignatieff, involving extensive participation by civic and 
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state actors.25 At the national level of policymaking and enforcement, implementa-
tion often derives from multiple legal systems. 
The international legal context has nurtured a steadily evolving field for making 
human rights claims; it has also provided an important primary legal, social and 
political normative context in which contemporary national human rights claims 
have taken place. While this book focuses principally on the national dimension of 
civic promotion and enforcement of state accountability, such interactions do not 
take place in a vacuum. The cumulative efforts of civic struggles to hold states ac-
countable have not only emerged over a long period of time; they have also cut 
across multiple legal boundaries. In international law, clarification on individual 
and collective (civic) legal capacity owes a great deal to Rosalyn Higgins’ concept 
of civic actor participation in international legal process eliminating the need for a 
subject/object distinction.26 Individual and collective civic actor participation in 
international legal process includes the forming of state obligations as well as moni-
toring state compliance, and in some cases, even launching direct claims against the 
state to promote and enforce its legal obligations. 
In demanding compliance from the state by challenging and discouraging im-
proper official behaviour, civic actors have progressively invoked national legal 
institutions, leading to the possibility that international human rights could be en-
forced in a national legal context. In South Africa, human rights claims by way of 
administrative review, practically non-existent prior to the 1994 democratic and 
constitutional dispensations, are now a visible part of public law. The guarantee of 
just administrative action and the concept of ‘justiciable rights’ contained in section 
33 of South Africa’s constitution have made it possible to launch direct civic chal-
lenges against of the government of South Africa. This has been reinforced by the 
Promotion of the Administration of Justice Act 2000 and public law jurisprudence 
in South Africa’s courts. With the courts’ willingness to negotiate what Klaaren and 
others have termed a ‘delicate balance‘ in the relationship between judicial and ex-
ecutive powers,27 civic actors have been able to sanction government successfully 
through court-ordered settlements, structural interdicts and judicial orders. 
                                                        
25  (Ignatieff 1999). In 1998 and 2001, the United Nations made great fanfare about, respectively, the 
fifty-year anniversaries of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, reiterating global commitments to human rights and protection against 
oppressive regimes. For the commemoration of the 1951 Convention, the UN invited civic experts 
and organisations to make contributions to the Global Consultations on International Protection. 
This, in turn, led to an Agenda for Protection, which was ceremoniously adopted by the second-
ever Ministerial Meeting of State Parties to the Refugee Convention, the first meeting having taken 
place fifty years earlier. 
26  (Higgins 1994). 
27  (Klaaren 2006b). 
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2.2.1 Human rights revolutions: a historical context 
From a global perspective, civic advocating of state accountability has taken place 
in what Ignatieff has termed a historically significant human rights revolution, with 
juridical, advocacy and enforcement dimensions.28 Accordingly, making a claim 
against a state has become possible, regardless of national boundaries, and not only 
by government-appointed officials or elected representatives, but also by civic ac-
tors, both as individuals and as part of collectivities. This revolution, which has had 
wide-ranging implications for the relationship between civic actors and the state, 
took place in two distinct phases. The first phase of the revolution, which took place 
between 1945 and 1951, involved four key, normative developments in interna-
tional law. The second phase, which took place in the 1960s, consolidated the inter-
national human rights regime and created binding enforcement mechanisms that 
were accessible to civic actors. 
The first normative development was the establishment of the United Nations as 
an internally accountable, supranational institution. In 1945, in the aftermath of the 
horrors of the Second World War, the United Nations was founded with a clear hu-
man rights mission. The United Nations Charter stated in its preamble: 
We the peoples of the United Nations determined … to reaffirm faith in fundamen-
tal human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights 
of men and women … to establish conditions under which justice and respect for 
the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be 
maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom, and for these ends … to employ international machinery for the promo-
tion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, have resolved to com-
bine our efforts to accomplish these aims.29 
The second normative development came a short time afterwards, in 1948, when 
the UN Charter was joined by the equally historic Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The Declaration, which became the founding document of a global ‘human 
rights charter’, affirmed the important role of non-state actors as recipients of rights 
and as participants in the process of claiming those rights. The UN General Assem-
bly proclaimed the Declaration as: 
a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that 
every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in 
mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and 
freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their 
universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of 
Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdic-
tion.30 
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29  (UN Charter 1945: Preamble). Note that the “peoples” clearly referred to states. 
30  (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948: Preamble). 
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Both the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were 
passed in the post-war context of a world deeply traumatised by violent conflict and 
large-scale reconstruction. These documents were complemented a year later by a 
third normative development: the consolidation of laws governing the conduct of 
war and treatment of civilians in armed conflict, contained in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions on the laws of war. The Geneva Conventions governed the humanitar-
ian treatment of civilians and combatants in times of conflict. They built on earlier 
efforts, in particular the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, to govern the actions 
of combatants during armed conflict. Together, these instruments have laid the basis 
for an international regime of individual accountability for perpetrators of war 
crimes. 
The fourth normative development came in 1951, with the United Nations Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees; this was the direct successor to the In-
ternational Refugee Organisation, which had co-ordinated efforts to assist hundreds 
of thousands of forcibly displaced and/or stateless persons. Following the 1951 
Convention, the General Assembly established the Office of the UNHCR, referred 
to earlier, which was given an explicit mandate to protect the rights of refugees. 
One of the principal roles accorded to the UNHCR was to monitor states’ compli-
ance with their responsibilities under the 1951 Convention. 
This initial civic protection charter thus comprised four main components: 
global governance, human rights protection standards in times of conflict and 
peace, humanitarian protection standards in times of conflict, and the protection of 
individuals and groups whose rights were, or were potentially, at risk of being vio-
lated. This intensive period of six years of human rights and humanitarian policy-
making was a truly collective effort, described by Eleanor Roosevelt as the product 
of a ‘curious grapevine’ of interests that involved extensive participation by states 
as well as civic actors.31 Civic actors were especially active in framing the language 
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Meanwhile, regional hu-
man rights conventions emerged in Europe, Latin America, and eventually in Africa 
as well. 
The second phase of this revolution, which began in the 1960s, at the United Na-
tions and in different regions of the world, produced covenants on civil and political 
rights, as well as on economic, social and cultural rights. However, for decades the 
Cold War dynamic blocked international consensus on these rights. States tended to 
favour one set of rights over the other, which impeded their effective implementa-
tion. A Protocol that extended the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention to the 
rest of the world was agreed in 1967.32 Other international treaties came into being, 
accompanied by administrative structures that banned racial discrimination, as well 
as torture and inhuman and degrading punishment or treatment. Treaties also 
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emerged to promote women and children’s rights. As Welch and Korey have ar-
gued, civic actors played important roles in the development of these human rights 
instruments, in the same way they contributed to the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights.33 
Changes have also occurred within the domestic legal systems of states, both in 
the industrialised global North and the newly-liberated global South, especially fol-
lowing the end of the Cold War. States have ratified so-called Optional Protocols to 
international human rights treaties, which have made rendered these treaties directly 
enforceable in a country’s national court system. These normative developments 
have been accompanied by a growing consciousness among civic actors, and espe-
cially lawyers, about the utility of drawing on international human rights obliga-
tions in domestic legal argumentation. A further change has been the weakening of 
the nation-state as notions of state sovereignty have become challenged by the po-
rous nature of borders, universally binding legal principles and the hegemonic na-
ture of global economic relations. Spurred on by this globalisation of human rights 
norms, states have gradually permitted direct challenges to their human rights 
commitments by civic actors. 
The human rights revolution, according to Ignatieff and others,34 has been 
groundbreaking for human rights advocates in three significant areas. In each of 
these areas, individuals and civic organisations have played key roles: (1) in the 
forming of juridical standards, (2) in human rights advocacy, and (3) in human 
rights enforcement.35 
The ‘juridical revolution’ represents not only the norms that have been created 
to protect both majority and minority interests, but also the capacity to hold states 
accountable to these norms by way of ‘naming and shaming’, and in some cases, by 
mechanisms to enforce certain norms against states. 
Guidelines and enforceable norms that can (in some cases) be invoked against 
states owe much to the efforts of individuals and civic organisations who have pre-
cipitated an ‘advocacy revolution’. International NGOs such as Amnesty Interna-
tional and Human Rights Watch have been amongst the most prominent, but 
smaller international and national NGOs have also played key roles. The efforts of 
civic organisations have complemented the work of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Human Rights. 
They have also assisted the review mechanisms of various treaty bodies estab-
lished to review a state’s compliance with a particular Convention, and have con-
tributed to the work of various independent experts or ‘special rapporteurs’ on a 
wide range of human rights issues. Furthermore, civic organisations have contrib-
uted to the work of the permanent Human Rights Council, formerly the Human 
Rights Commission, empowered to publicly review state behaviour. In all these 
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mechanisms, civic participation has been widely recognised as having been key to 
their functioning, in particular the receiving of complaints against states that are 
parties to a particular Convention.36 
The ‘enforcement revolution’ refers to the capacity of states to be held directly 
accountable by civic actors through the individual right to petition, including the 
use of mechanisms established by individual human rights treaty bodies, which may 
include bodies established on a regional basis. States can also be held indirectly 
accountable through the prosecution of individual holders of public office in ad hoc 
criminal tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.37 In 2002, the In-
ternational Criminal Court was established by 120 member states, following a draft-
ing process that was led mainly by ‘southern’ countries, and which received much 
input from civic organisations. The Court is intended to receive complaints against 
individuals for international crimes,38 and operates in a complementary fashion 
alongside state-based mechanisms that permit the prosecution of individual viola-
tors of international crimes by way of the Universal Jurisdiction Principle. 
As Ignatieff observes, ‘these three aspects … have given human rights real 
power in the international political arena’.39 This human rights revolution has in-
deed provided myriad possibilities, to individuals and collectivities, for enforcing 
international human rights standards, even by way of directly invoking human 
rights against a state. Individuals and collectivities no longer rely merely on the 
benevolence of states, but have begun to claim rights through domestic and interna-
tional mechanisms, against states and even private parties. 
The Refugees Convention, in particular, has provided an important base of pro-
tection for individuals suffering actual or threatened violations of their human 
rights. The Convention incorporated the principle of non-refoulement. Now consid-
ered a principle of international customary law, and therefore binding on all states, 
this principle prohibits a state from returning a person with a well-founded fear of 
persecution to a country where they would suffer such persecution or other serious 
violations of human rights. The principle therefore operates both as some guarantee 
of protection against tyranny, and as legally enforceable rights against a state that 
has violated the principle. 
2.2.2 International law as process: individual and collective civic actor 
participation 
Since the 1960s, Rosalyn Higgins has been advocating a practical approach to un-
derstanding the nature and function of international law. Rather than a system of 
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rigid rules characterised by an erroneous subject/object distinction,40 she argued that 
international law ought to be seen more appropriately as a process in which multiple 
stakeholders fulfil overlapping functions. To a sociologist, anthropologist or politi-
cal scientist, such an explanation may seem starkly obvious, but for decades, inter-
national lawyers had stubbornly refused to abandon what Higgins aptly referred to 
as a self-imposed ‘intellectual prison’.41 
As Higgins argues, the ‘key to admission’ in the international legal system by 
both states and international organisations is ‘pragmatism’,42 whereby active mem-
bership and participation is more decisive a factor than specific recognition by other 
states. By the same token, the participation of civic actors also reflects a pragmatic 
choice by states and international organisations to permit individuals and collectiv-
ities ever-greater access to, and participation in, international decision-making 
processes. 
Ultimately, as Higgins acknowledges, the respective functions of state and civic 
actor participants in international decision-making processes are determined by 
matters of procedure that relate to what Higgins identifies as the ‘realities of 
power’.43 Since civic actors – as legal ‘individuals’ – are participants in interna-
tional law alongside states and international organisations, and are the principal 
beneficiaries of human rights, the process of articulating human rights claims is a 
matter of ‘according priority to the decision-making process’.44 Goodwin-Gill lo-
cates this discussion in the context of refugee law standards, which he explains have 
been the outcome of a ‘process of interaction’ in which ‘the status of the refugee 
has developed from the beneficiary of a paternalistic system of certification to the 
                                                        
40  (Brownlie 2003: 430-432) argued that the object theory was harshly criticised around the time of 
the 1949 Reparations Case as ‘illogical’, ‘unreal’, ‘immoral’, based on ‘erroneous premises’ and, 
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41  (Higgins 1994). (Manner 1952) had provoked a decades-long debate by stipulating not only that 
individuals did not benefit from rights and duties under the law, but also that states alone were em-
powered to protect their interests. The debate was picked up in the 1970s when (Obilade 1974: 90) 
argued that, through various international law developments, including the law of war, human 
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of human rights. 
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44  (Higgins 1994: 104). 
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claimant of rights’.45  
As discussed in the next sections, during the course of the last few decades, civic 
actors, through both single-handed and collective efforts, have increasingly been 
engaged in closing the gaps in rights protection, participating in international legal 
process. In doing so, they have fulfilled various roles. Firstly, civic actors have 
helped frame the content of rights in international law by participating in interna-
tional policy-making processes, and have monitored the enforcement of rights. Sec-
ondly, they have made direct claims against states through increased possibilities of 
locus standi (the right to represent a case before the courts), particularly through the 
regional systems. Thirdly, civic actors have clarified their roles and responsibilities 
vis-à-vis other participants in international legal process. These roles have, in turn, 
strengthened the linkages between international legal norms and claims at the do-
mestic level. 
Civic framing and mobilising of rights through international institutions 
In the past few decades, individuals have played an increasingly prominent role in 
international processes that have framed the content and enforceability of rights in 
international law, both on their own and through civic society groups.46 Korey has 
characterised this involvement by referring to the panoply of different actors, in-
cluding state, UN and civic society representatives, who participate in both formal-
ised processes and informal exchanges.47 This may include involvement in national 
legislative processes and tribunals, as well as participation in international meetings 
and assistance in the work of the special rapporteurs. Human rights organisations 
operating at the international level have thus evolved, from being sources of infor-
mation on international law standards and obligations to becoming actively engaged 
in norm-standard-setting processes.48 
A far more contentious level of involvement has been the means by which civic 
actors mobilise rights, asserting them against states through various monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms in international law. These mechanisms include the Hu-
man Rights Council (formerly Commission), Human Rights Committee, and vari-
ous treaty body mechanisms, as well as the ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
established in the aftermath of violent conflicts, during which war crimes are al-
leged to have taken place. The work of these human rights mechanisms has been 
reinforced by the increasing attention paid to human rights by the International 
Court of Justice in its Judgements and Advisory Opinions.49 
A good example of civic participation in these international processes and hu-
man rights mechanisms is the use of so-called shadow reports during the periodic 
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reviews of a state’s compliance with a particular human rights treaty. These parallel 
reports, produced by civic actors, usually contain a very different narrative to that 
presented by the state. They question the validity of a state’s assertion that it is in 
compliance with its treaty commitments. While the principal participants in these 
mechanisms are states, their effective functioning demands close involvement with 
civic organisations. The enforcement of a state’s international law obligations is 
enabled by the mechanisms of individual petition against the state in an interna-
tional court, otherwise known as individual jus standi.50 Mole explains that to use 
this mechanism effectively demands sustained human rights advocacy, and litiga-
tion in particular.51 Nevertheless, she is optimistic regarding individual legal per-
sonality, arguing that the development of individual locus standi has ‘profoundly 
changed the relationship between the individual and international law’.52 
Accordingly, civic actors have acquired a limited, though potentially significant, 
role in holding states accountable through claims lodged in international account-
ability mechanisms.53 Direct claims, such as those made through international 
committees, hold states accountable; indirect claims, such as those made through an 
international criminal tribunal, hold the official representatives of states accountable 
for violating international law. 
Civic use of international courts, and the emergence of individual jus standi 
While committees, commissions and special rapporteurs often have ample latitude 
to address human rights issues, they rarely have the capacity – or ‘teeth’ – to en-
force obligations against states. The only sanctions they tend to impose on states are 
made by way of observations and recommendations. Such sanctions may have in-
fluence,54 but they are not legally binding. Courts, on the other hand, have the ca-
pacity to issue judgements, which, on the basis of consensus, are binding on the 
parties to a given dispute. While regionally-based international human rights 
mechanisms in Africa, Europe and Latin America offer significant possibilities for 
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in the African regional human rights system, which arguably operates on the basis of consensus 
more than any other system, states tend to take observations and recommendations seriously when 
made by the ACHPR. Acknowledging this tendency, the ACHPR frequently appeals to states to co-
operate with the Commission in order to promote ‘African solutions for African problems’. 
 Advocating for accountability through civic interactions 
 33 
civic actors to lodge complaints against a state,55 it is only the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) that permits a civic actor to invoke its authority directly, 
either as a directly interested party or as an amicus curiae (friend of the court). Al-
ternatively, civic actors must invoke a ‘screening mechanism’, usually a Commis-
sion composed of state-appointed representatives, or obtain the assistance of a 
(third) member state.  
Provided an applicant can satisfy the court that he or she has exhausted the pos-
sible remedies at the domestic level, the ECtHR permits civic actors unrestricted jus 
standi to bring cases directly to its attention.56 Following the now groundbreaking 
Lawless case,57 the Council of Europe finally agreed to extend the right of civic 
actors to approach the ECtHR directly by granting them full jus standi through Pro-
tocol No. 11, which came into being on 1 November 1998.58 A similar development 
is emerging in the Inter-American system.59  
Trindade refers to these developments as a ‘realization of international justice’,60 
while Plender and Mole argue that developments in case law, in national courts and 
in the ECtHR, ‘impose substantial restraints on the liberty of states’, particularly 
with regard to non-citizens – for example, refugees.61 While Trindade argues that 
the international law of human rights is ‘grounded on fundamentally distinct prem-
ises’ and should be distinguished from the ordinary relations between states,62 he 
                                                        
55  (Protocol to the Banjul Charter 1998), (Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 1979) 
and (European Convention on Human Rights 1950). The Inter-American system offers individuals 
limited locus standi. The African Court, however, only allows the Commission or a state to lodge a 
complaint (Protocol to the Banjul Charter 1998: Article 5(2)). 
56  (Muchlinski 1985: 382) hoped fervently for this possibility in 1985, highlighting the ‘necessity for 
a fuller recognition of (individual) capacity’. 
57  The (Lawless Case 1960) involved an application by an individual to make representations on his 
own behalf or through his legal representative. While stopping short of according individual capac-
ity, the court nevertheless permitted a ‘measure of involvement’, as noted by (Muchlinski 1985: 
378). 
58  (Protocol 11 1998: Article 34) of the European Court of Human Rights provides that: 
‘The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group 
of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of 
the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties un-
dertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.’ 
59  Following the precedent set by the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights granted partial capacity to individuals to approach the court – a limited form of lo-
cus standi – once an application had been submitted by a member state. The (‘Rules of Procedure’ 
2001: Article 23(21)) of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights provide that: 
‘When the application has been admitted, the alleged victims, their next of kin or their duly ac-
credited representatives may submit their pleadings, motions and evidence, autonomously, 
throughout the proceedings.’ 
 For claims by multiple alleged victims, Article 23(2) of the Rules provides that a ‘common interve-
nor’ be appointed to take legal actions on behalf of the group. 
60  (Trindade 2003: 886) makes a distinction between jus standi, represented by Protocol No. 11, and 
locus standi, represented by the 2001 Rules of Court. 
61  (Plender and Mole 2001: 105). 
62  (Trindade 1999: 526). 
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also acknowledges that certain limitations exist that prevent civic actors from ob-
taining direct access to these systems, explained by his later jus standi/locus standi 
distinction.63 In short, there is little doubt that the evolution of individual locus 
standi (the capacity to appear before a particular commission or court) and jus 
standi (to actually invoke its authority) represent the most significant developments 
in conferring upon civic actors the capacity to make claims in international law. 
Participation in international legal process 
Recognition that civic actors can exercise some level of legal capacity in interna-
tional legal process must be accompanied by a clear distinction between the roles 
and responsibilities of states, civic actors and the UN. On one hand it cannot be de-
nied that civic actors, acting on their own and through collective efforts, increas-
ingly fulfil important roles in areas that have traditionally been the sole responsibili-
ties of states and international institutions.64 International law (and its decision-
making processes) requires the participation of a wide range of stakeholders. Each 
has overlapping responsibilities that relate to a shared interest, though the degrees 
of political power wielded by international organisations, states and civic actors are 
by no means equal. On the other hand, it is ultimately the state, and not civic actors, 
that is empowered and legally obliged to intervene or otherwise ensure the protec-
tion of individuals. Recognition that the responsibilities of states and non-states are 
fundamentally different is therefore important. 
For example, civic actors participate actively in the protection of refugees, as 
noted by Anker, Ferris and others.65 Civic actors assist government in developing 
national policies to protect refugees, they monitor a state’s compliance with its ob-
ligations under international refugee treaties, and they participate actively in inter-
national meetings where the obligations of the state are being examined. Further-
more, civic actors train immigration officers, police, judges and other officials to 
promote better compliance with international and national laws for protecting refu-
gees. But the role of civic actors and international organisations can also be damag-
ing to refugee protection, particularly when they fulfil what are normally state func-
tions, such as refugee status determination, as noted by Verdirame and Harrell-
Bond.66 
Consequently, seeing all stakeholders – the state, international organisations and 
civic actors – as participants in international legal process recognises that there are 
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64  For example, the (‘LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America)’ 1999), confirmed that 
individuals have a right to demand consular protection as nationals of their state. Some commenta-
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exclusive domain of states. 
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certain shared interests. At the same time, it is also important to maintain a distinc-
tion between public and private responsibilities. 
As Higgins argues, international law and its decision-making institutions func-
tion partly because of the long-standing principle of consent, especially in relation 
to treaty obligations. Institutions function because of a widespread perception on 
the part of all participants, but particularly states, that there is an inherent interest in 
complying with international law, including human rights legislation. 
While it is much easier to examine this shared stakeholder interest in the context 
of international politics, rather than international law, Slaughter argues that it is 
preferable to understand them as operating in tandem. In an attempt to build an ‘in-
tegrated theory of international law and international relations’, Slaughter argues 
that both ‘cohabit the same conceptual space’.67 On a similar path to Clapham,68 
who speaks about the enforceability of human rights in the private sphere, Slaugh-
ter’s motivation for doing so is the traditional public/private distinction: 
If, for instance the primary actors in the system are not states, but individuals and 
groups represented by state governments, and international law regulates states 
without regard for such individual and group activity, international legal rules will 
become increasingly irrelevant to state behaviour.69 
Thus, while the distinction between civic actors and states may be qualified in hold-
ing individual rights violators to account, it is clearly essential to maintain the dis-
tinction in preserving the legitimacy of international law. Just as in the case of 
stakeholders’ interests, overlapping accountability does not mean that the rights and 
obligations of states and civic actors are the same. 
The link between national and international claims 
The emergence of civic participation in international legal process has also perme-
ated the national legal process. As Halliday has argued, states that have emerged 
from decades, if not centuries, of colonial rule – such as South Africa – offer some 
of the most promising examples of both civic participation and principled state 
commitments in the development of domestic human rights standards, including 
those regarding the protection of refugees.70 
Civic participation in human rights claims often involves collaborative efforts 
between international and national or ‘local’ civic actors; this can sometimes lead to 
tensions, if the interests between international and local civic actors are not neces-
sarily the same. For example, international human rights organisations – which are 
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mainly North American and European in their social and political orientation – gen-
erally subscribe to the view that human rights are universal and should be respected 
in spite of cultural distinctions.71 However, the political agenda – and corresponding 
priorities – of local human rights organisations may not necessarily be the same as 
those of international human rights organisations.72 
The relationship between the international and national dimensions of civic 
promotion and enforcement of state accountability also highlights the relationship 
between international and national accountability mechanisms. For example, inter-
national accountability mechanisms generally require that an individual claim for 
reparations suffered as the consequence of human rights violations should exhaust 
local remedies before the claimant is able to approach international mechanisms for 
redress. In other words, the ‘lowest’ level of enforcement ought to be the first 
course of action, otherwise known as the subsidiarity principle.73 
Although some states persistently refuse to set up any mechanism to protect 
and/or promote human rights at the national level, the domestic legal systems of 
most states provide some mechanisms that allow civic actors to assert their rights as 
prescribed in international law. In South Africa, for example, rights can be invoked 
through civic interventions in legislative processes, representative or amicus curiae 
petitions in judicial proceedings, representations at independent commissions, and 
other processes. 
In emphasising the increasing ability of civic actors to protect their human rights 
through both domestic and international law, Trindade refers to the ‘emancipation 
of the individual from the state’.74 Accordingly, Trindade insists that states are obli-
gated to provide ‘national measures of implementation’ to give effect to their inter-
national law obligations.75 It is this national level of human rights protection that we 
turn to in the next section. 
2.2.3 National law as process: civic promotion and enforcement of state 
accountability 
As discussed in the preceding section, the role of actors, acting on their own or 
through collectivities76 in an international legal process, is the achievement of sev-
eral decades of human rights and national liberation struggles. As Merry puts it, the 
emergence of broadly recognised, universal human rights norms created a ‘political 
space for reform’.77 However, in order to realise the ‘emancipatory potential’ of 
human rights, Merry argues, it is important that they become translated as part of a 
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75  (Trindade 1999: 522). 
76  (Berting et al. 1990). 
77  (Merry 2006b: 4). 
 Advocating for accountability through civic interactions 
 37 
national ‘legal consciousness’, or ‘vernacularised’ in a way that is consistent with 
local norms and context78. As Merry explains elsewhere, the form that this takes can 
either ‘replicate’ global norms, promoting a more ‘transnational model’, but allow-
ing local context to provide ‘distinctive content’ or interact with various local con-
texts at global and local levels, resulting in what Merry refers to as a ‘hybrid’ ap-
proach.79 
Vernacularisation by legal civic actors can be accomplished in various ways 
through either co-operative forms of civic participation; for example, in a policy-
making or legislative process, as Merry has illustrated. However, it can also be ac-
complished through confrontational interactions such as legal interventions in the 
courts, which draw more on a legal imposition approach, as reflected in Kidder. Co-
operative forms of civic participation would resemble more of an interactive or ‘hy-
brid’ ‘form of vernacularisation, while confrontational interactions would resemble 
more of a ‘replication’ of global norms through legal imposition, though still draw-
ing on local context. 
The capacity to participate actively in a national legal process and even make di-
rect and indirect claims in national legal systems is by definition context-specific, 
but also the most important way in which civic actors – both individuals and collec-
tivities – assert rights contained in international law. The types of indirect legal 
claims available to civic actors include criminal claims against former political 
leaders for international law crimes,80 and civil claims against corporations for vio-
lations of international law in connection with their activities abroad.81 As men-
tioned earlier, the ‘exhausting of local remedies’ through national legal claims is 
usually a pre-requisite for launching legal claims at the international level. 
The principal type of direct claims available to civic actors in enforcing a state’s 
accountability for its international legal obligations is the judicial review of a gov-
ernment‘s constitutional and administrative obligations. For example, administra-
tive review has been an effective tool for South African citizens and foreigners 
alike, and in diverse ways.82 
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National human rights institutions 
According to the UN-brokered ‘Paris Principles’, states are urged to establish na-
tional human rights institutions, which should be ‘vested with competence to pro-
tect and promote human rights’.83 The responsibilities of national institutions envis-
aged include, among others, advising government independently (including 
proposing legislation), taking up allegations of human rights violations, and gener-
ating awareness of human rights.84 National institutions are also expected to co-
operate with civic actors, including NGOs, trade unions, professionals, religious 
leaders and qualified experts, as well as the country’s government departments and, 
in the framing of policies, the legislature.85 
National human rights institutions in democratic countries have taken a keen in-
terest in ensuring that their country’s legislation and practices accord with interna-
tional human rights standards. National human rights institutions, which include 
offices of the ombudsman, national human rights commissions, courts, parliaments, 
independent police complaints bodies and court users’ committees,86 have played an 
important mediating role between the political and legal arenas. These institutions 
have also formed an important component in the practice of human rights at the 
global level, for example by contributing to meetings of regional human rights bod-
ies.87 
Cardenas argues that the emergence of national human rights institutions – espe-
cially from the 1990s – cannot be disengaged from the existence of institutions of 
global governance, in particular the United Nations. Accordingly, national human 
rights institutions owe a great deal of their credibility to the standard-setting and 
capacity-building efforts of international organisations, usually with the involve-
ment of civic actors. Cardenas also argues that this validation by non-state actors 
can also have ‘perverse’ consequences, in which states determine the conditions 
under which these institutions are funded and operate, and dilute the role of civic 
actors in monitoring human rights compliance and participation in policymaking.88 
The concerns raised by Cardenas are to some extent reflected in what Human 
Rights Watch has described as a ‘mixed picture’ of national human rights institu-
tions in Africa: 
Many (national human rights institutions) have indeed been formed by governments 
with dismal human rights records, weak state institutions, and no history of 
autonomous state bodies. Some appear largely designed to deflect international 
criticism of serious human rights abuses. They have been formed with flawed man-
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dates and weak powers that limit their ability to effectively investigate, monitor, or 
make public statements. Others have been staffed with commissioners who are un-
willing or unable to protest abuses because they are either beholden to the executive 
or fearful of reprisal.89 
Assessing the credibility of any national human rights institution must be done with 
due regard to the specific local context in which the institution operates. It may be a 
very good thing for a national human rights commission to carry out certain types 
of human rights monitoring once fulfilled by civic actors alone. If a government can 
hold itself accountable through horizontal structures, then human rights organisa-
tions can focus on other aspects of human rights compliance, such as the role of 
corporations in human rights abuses. In any event, there is no reason why civic ac-
tors cannot continue to be engaged in human rights advocacy, either promoting 
government accountability through co-operation in a policy process, or holding a 
government directly accountable through the courts. While there is always the po-
tential for government co-option – whether of a national human rights institution, or 
a civic organisation – the role(s) of national human rights institutions and civic ac-
tors should be perceived as complementary to, rather than in contradiction with 
each other. 
Monitoring and enforcement of government policies – administrative review 
While mediating organisations – whether they be national human rights institutions 
or civic organisations – offer possibilities for informing government policy, the ex-
tent to which they actually influence the direction of policy and promote account-
ability for adhering to national or international human rights norms is unpredictable. 
An alternative mechanism and process often available to civic actors is administra-
tive review. This provides an opportunity to make legal claims against states, first 
through departmental channels and – ultimately – the national courts. 
A primary task of courts in reviewing decisions made by an administrative au-
thority is deciding whether they are consistent with the powers available to that ad-
ministration; in other words, whether they are objectively lawful. Two other, more 
subjective, evaluations by courts in reviewing the lawfulness of administrative deci-
sions concern whether a decision is procedurally fair and/or reasonable. Establish-
ing a test for ‘reasonableness’ is a particular challenge.90 In countries with a robust 
rule of law culture, courts face difficulties in finding a ‘delicate balance‘ between, 
on one hand, giving due deference to the executive, and, on the other, scrutinising 
the decisions of administrative officials who overstep their authority. Hoexter ar-
gues that the principles of ‘rationality and proportionality’ ought to guide a deter-
mination of ‘reasonableness’ in administrative decision-making. The former, she 
argues, analyses (i) the information that is available to the administrator at the time 
of making a decision, (ii) the reasons for making that decision, and (iii) whether 
                                                        
89  (Nowrojee 2001). 
90  (Hoexter 2007: 293-323). 
Chapter 2 
 40 
such a decision is ‘objectively capable of furthering the purpose’ intended by the 
granting of a particular power to that administrative official. Determinations of pro-
portionality seek to avoid a situation in which an ‘imbalance’ is created between the 
beneficial and adverse effects of a decision, or a situation in which ‘less drastic or 
oppressive means’ were available in order to accomplish the task given to the ad-
ministrative official.91 
In resolving the tensions that may arise in the relationship between the judiciary 
and the executive, and in considering the role of civic interventions in holding gov-
ernments accountable by way of administrative review, the level of ‘intensity’ that 
such a review could have can also be a point of analytical departure. Klaaren argues 
that judicial review has been characterised, at one extreme, by an ‘inherent variabil-
ity’ very much dependent on the approach taken by a particular judge. At the other 
extreme is a rigid structuralism created by the deterministic nature of a country’s 
legal regime, and especially its constitution, with marginal space for judicial scru-
tiny if the government has consulted widely in making a decision; for example, by 
way of a legislative committee. Klaaren goes on to explain that the middle ground 
between these two extremes involves both a certain deference to the executive (or 
rather, recognition of the principle of separation of powers), as well as critical con-
sideration of the type of subject matter and the nature of jurisdiction. In other 
words, the court would be expected to make a distinction between actions taken by 
a Minister (executive action) and actions taken by that minister’s department. A 
court would also be expected to take more forceful action in circumstances where a 
civic actor’s constitutional rights were affected.92 
2.2.4 Civic claims in international and national legal process 
Higgins has argued that civic participation in international legal process by way of 
invoking human rights claims against violating states has challenged state sover-
eignty and provided a forum that, in less than a century, has dramatically expanded 
the number and scope of stakeholders influencing this process. But, while Higgins 
acknowledges that the civic-state relationship has shifted, both from a legal and a 
political perspective, she also reaffirms that the principal responsibility for human 
rights protection still lies firmly with the state, and that the impact of civic partici-
pation will therefore always be weighed against a state’s willingness to carry out its 
obligations. 
Whether human rights can be seen as a forum for expanding civic influence in 
international legal process, a ‘revolution’, or what Ramcharan has referred to as a 
‘renaissance of international law’,93 the emergence of a global human rights regime 
has had permanent consequences for the nature of state sovereignty. These conse-
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quences have yet to be realised fully, but are already causing noticeable shifts in the 
relationships between states and civic actors. 
The roles and responsibilities of civic actors and states may in some cases over-
lap, but they are also markedly different from each other. Firstly, civic actors have 
the ability to hold states or inter-governmental institutions to account in carefully 
defined circumstances when they fail to live up to their stated obligations, or violate 
an individual right. Secondly, civic actors – whether individuals or collectivities – 
have amply demonstrated their capacity to assist states and inter-governmental in-
stitutions in realising their obligations in international law. Thirdly, government 
officials who violate international criminal law may be held criminally liable for 
their individual acts. And finally, the ability to make international claims nearly 
always follows efforts to make a claim at the national level, in accordance with the 
subsidiarity principle. 
The developments of the past few decades that have led to the capability of civic 
actors to exercise legal capacity, or jus standi, illustrate three things. Firstly, they 
emphasise the value of Higgins’ reinvigorated participation approach to critically 
interpreting the interaction of civic actors and states as parties with often contesting 
interests in international legal process. Secondly, they clarify the roles and respon-
sibilities of states and civic actors. Thirdly, they emphasise the distinctly judicial 
character of human rights enforcement, which is increasingly being emphasised in 
national law systems. 
Civic participation in national legal process, and particularly the ability of civic 
actors to invoke national law and legal institutions, has shifted the civic-state rela-
tionship, though by no means replaced it. The roles of the state and its structural 
institutions are still of primary significance. Civic legal interactions have affirmed 
the capacity of the government‘s own institution, the courts, to hold government 
accountable for carrying out its human rights obligations, thus negotiating a ‘deli-
cate balance‘ between court-sanctioned interventions and government decision-
making. 
2.3 THEORISING THE IMPORTANCE OF STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES  
As described earlier, civic-led accountability has its political origins in what Ig-
natieff has characterised as a human rights ‘revolution’. This revolution has resulted 
in structural changes that define the boundaries of the international and national 
legal orders, and has created space within both for civic participation in promoting 
and imposing state accountability. 
The structural boundaries created by states condition the extent to which civic 
actors are able to exercise their agency in holding states accountable for carrying 
out their human rights obligations. At the same time, recognising the conditioning 
nature of these structural boundaries enables civic actors to be more strategic in 
discovering the space available to influence or ‘elaborate’ these structures. Accord-
ingly, the second theoretical proposition in this book is that boundaries which de-
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fine the structural relationship between civic actors and the state have shifted in 
very specific ways that must be respected by civic actors (agents) if they want to be 
strategic in their efforts. This section examines in more detail some of the structure 
and agency-based explanations for, and implications of, this major relational shift. 
The conceptual use of agency in this study is modest. References to agency have 
assumed a range of different and often vague meanings, including the idea of 
agency as a broad ‘synonym for resistance’, accompanied by only a limited critical 
understanding as to whether such acts of resistance may simply involve a mainte-
nance of the status quo or result in actual, structural changes.94 There is also limited 
differentiation between individual and collective agency, since the outcome is gen-
erally similar.95 
2.3.1 The limits of structuration theory 
Analysts applying a conception of agency to the work of civic actors have tended to 
over-emphasise the role of agency on the basis of ‘structuration theory’, which is 
attributed to the work of Anthony Giddens.96 In essence, this theory avoids an over-
reliance on either agency or structure, claiming that the two are mutually constitu-
tive; structure is composed of rules and resources that agents may relate to, while 
agency, according to Giddens, is the human capacity to interpret and act. Giddens 
argues that neither agency nor structure should be deterministic of the other. 
Structuration theory has provided the basis for ‘complexity theory’, which 
Fowler has applied to what he terms ‘civic-driven change’.97 
Structuration is a dynamic arrangement that is continually enacted by learning-
based reiteration of transactions by agents. Successful repetition implies and rein-
forces desired predictability. Society becomes itself as a never ending process. In 
this respect, social structures’ are not like a building. They are created and held to-
gether by patterns of continuous exchange that people learn to assume will persist 
and hence that they can rely on.98 
As Fowler argues, the perceived desirability of structuration theory is that its malle-
able approach allows for multiple interpretations, on one hand suggesting that 
agents are formed by their social structures, on the other concluding that agents are 
capable of constructing the social structures they are subject to; in other words, that 
structure and agency are ‘mutually constitutive’. Shilling argued that such an ap-
proach can artificially conflate issues.99 As an alternative, he argued that if the rela-
                                                        
94  (Ahearn 1999). 
95  (Ahearn 1999: 13). 
96  (Giddens 1987). 
97  (Fowler 2007). 
98  (Fowler 2007: 21). 
99  (Shilling 1999) advocates what he terms the ‘interaction order’ as a mechanism for ‘mediating’ 
associated tensions. Criticising what he terms a ‘relatively disembodied’ understanding of agency 
that neglects the ‘emotional dimensions’ (p. 544), he argues that a prioritisation of structure or 
 Advocating for accountability through civic interactions 
 43 
tionship between structure and agency were understood on the basis of ‘interac-
tions’, it would be possible to assess the impact of civic organisations as ‘em-
bodied’ agents in seeking to hold government accountable.100 These approaches, 
which are essentially variations of structuration theory, lead to almost limitless in-
terpretations, which is not especially helpful in seeking to characterise at least some 
general elements of the roles of civic actors in holding states accountable. 
Another source of agency- and structure-based explanations is Hay and Wincott, 
who argue that individuals are ‘knowledgeable and reflexive’ and, as such, they 
‘routinely (often intuitively) monitor the consequences of their action’.101 Their 
analysis of structure and agency provides a more categorical explanation of civic 
interactions to hold governments accountable than Shilling’s. However, their exten-
sive list of subjective interpretations (for example, cognitive filters) still makes it 
difficult to come to any general conclusions. Consequently, I have chosen to avoid 
structuration theory altogether in favour of adapting Margaret Archer’s analytical 
dualism approach. 
2.3.2 Exploring the interplay: adapting an analytical dualism approach 
Expressing concern that the structure/agency debate has favoured one of these two 
mutually exclusive extremes, but also deliberately engaging theory with practice 
and rejecting the ‘ontological security’ offered by conflating the two,102 Archer of-
fers an alternative. She argues that conflation of structure and agency is ‘always an 
error in social theory … it merely throws a blanket over the two constituents (and) 
… prevents investigation of what is going on beneath it’.103 Instead, she explains, it 
is far more useful to explore the ‘interplay’ between the two.104 Put more simply, 
Archer argues that humans clearly form society, but through their activities humans 
are also shaped by society. Consequently, there is value in distinguishing between 
the ‘parts’ and the ‘people’ that form a society.105 
What she terms ‘analytical dualism’ provides a clear framework for explaining 
civic interactions involved in holding states accountable. Archer describes interac-
tion between structure and agency as a chronological process involving a sequential 
                                                                                                                                  
agency, for example the idea that decisions are taken by agents on the basis of ‘rational choice’, re-
sults in an inability to explore the ‘casual significance’ between structure and agency. 
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relationship between: (1) specific temporal sequences of structural conditioning, 
which leads to (2) social interaction; followed by (3) structural elaboration (pre-
ceded by previously-arising sequences and post-dated by subsequent ones).106 
In explaining the role of civic interactions, the principal objective of which is to 
hold the state accountable and result in structural changes, the structure is a more 
significant variable than an open-ended understanding of the nature of civic agency. 
This is well illustrated through civic participation in policymaking. The task of 
forming laws and policies for the implementation of government policies is clearly 
that of government, although it may call on civic actors to advise on their content. 
For civic actors or agents interested in influencing policy in a particular direction, 
the types of interactions they make at a particular moment are conditioned by gov-
ernment-determined structures. And yet, as a result of civic-state interactions, for 
example civic participation in a government-led policymaking process, it is possible 
for civic agents to elaborate on that same structure. 
This analytical approach to structure/agency relationships provides a more 
grounded means of exploring the interplay between civic actors and state institu-
tions. Consequently, it provides a clearer basis for assessing the narrow, but signifi-
cant, space available to civic actors in exercising their agency, either with a view to 
promoting state accountability, or confronting states with their human rights obliga-
tions. 
This book cautions against overly broad notions of agency, which Ahearn 
rightly argues must be clearly defined; rather than being seen as a ‘synonym of re-
sistance’, agency can more appropriately be termed the ‘human capacity to act’.107 
The lack of agency definition has perhaps lent itself to over-inflated notions of civic 
capacity to hold states accountable, and unrealistic expectations of the degree to 
which they really influence state behaviour. Accordingly, the following sections 
explain what is meant by civic agency in this book, as well as describing the struc-
tures that condition civic agency. 
2.3.3 Types of civic agency 
Two forms of civic agency are explored in this book to explain the nature of civic 
interventions in South Africa in encouraging or enforcing state accountability: co-
operative and confrontational interactions. Further efforts to promote government 
compliance in a democratic environment, not dealt with comprehensively in this 
book, but which Belvedere and others address to a considerable extent,108 include 
civic efforts to form public opinion through public advocacy that fall short of public 
shaming, as well as analysis of government policies and practice through applied 
social or policy research. 
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Co-operative interactions (promoting compliance) 
Co-operative interactions by civic actors are the most diverse form of civic agency 
in advocating for accountability, with two main dimensions that are explored in this 
book. Firstly, civic agents participate in the development of policy, whether in ad-
vising internal government-led policy processes or by making contributions to pub-
lic hearings in parliament. Secondly, civic agents provide advice and assistance in 
the training of government officials and the more complex forms of policy imple-
mentation. In both dimensions (policymaking and policy implementation), the 
structural limitations of civic interactions are defined by the state, which is ulti-
mately responsible, and democratically accountable. However, in neither of these 
other types of civic intervention can there be much expectation that the government 
will be influenced, although it may decide of its own volition to adopt recommenda-
tions made by civic actors. 
Confrontational interactions (enforcing compliance) 
The confrontational form of civic agency is more limited in scope than co-operative 
interaction, but potentially has great value in elaborating a state-created structure. In 
fact, there are only three variants of confrontational civic agency that aim to enforce 
government compliance. The first variant, which is explored in greater detail in this 
book, is legal review through internal administrative mechanisms and through the 
courts. The second variant of confrontational civic agency involves various efforts, 
often in conjunction with the media, aimed at publicly shaming the government for 
a particular act or omission. The third and final variant is essentially an extension of 
public shaming: mass mobilisation – openly confronting government through large-
scale protest. 
The specific forms of civic agency involved in public shaming and mass mobili-
sation include acts of civil disobedience, large-scale demonstrations, well-organised 
civic boycotts and other highly visible campaigns. No other methods exist for civic 
actors to enforce government compliance within a democratic framework. 
State institutions (primarily the courts, but also other elements of government) 
may for various reasons define structural limitations to the expression of civic 
agency, and even suppress civic actors, particularly if they are confrontational. For 
example, police may refuse permission for a picket line, demonstrators may be ar-
rested, and media portrayals of such interactions may be subject to government cen-
sorship. However, government efforts to suppress civic interventions may them-
selves be subject to civic legal challenge, leaving the courts (which are of course 
state-constructed institutions) to have the final say. 
2.3.4 State-created structures 
In democratic, accountable countries that tend to have greater respect for the rule of 
law, I have identified four principal structures – partly overlapping – that tend to 
condition co-operative and confrontational forms of civic agency to hold govern-
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ment accountable for realising its human rights obligations. According to Archer’s 
model, these structures also allow for structural elaboration, through which the gov-
ernment may be sanctioned for its failure to promote, protect and fulfil human 
rights. 
In the first type, the administrative structure, governments hold themselves ac-
countable, in particular by way of self-corrective mechanisms. The scope for civic 
agency in administrative structures is wholly prescribed by the state and, with the 
exception of internal administrative review, is entirely at the discretion of the state. 
The types of (self) sanctions available to frame or correct government agency in-
clude internal policy reviews and administrative review mechanisms, such as inter-
nal appeal procedures for individuals whose applications for refugee status have 
been rejected at first instance. However, civic agency can ensure that decisions are 
subject to external review, since most acts of an administration are potentially re-
viewable by a court. 
The second type, the legal structure, is composed of national legislation, inter-
national obligations that are of ‘direct effect’, and a judiciary that interprets a state’s 
obligations. The courts in particular provide the greatest scope for confrontational 
civic agency, by way of judicial review. The possibilities for exercising civic 
agency that test the limits of the country’s national and international legal obliga-
tions are illustrated by cases brought by civic actors that have been settled by 
judgement, by negotiated settlement or by way of (structural) interdicts. 
Direct and indirect accountability mechanisms comprise the third type: the de-
mocratic accountability structure. This structure emerges from democratic elections 
to determine the composition of a country’s legislature, often the head of govern-
ment and, indirectly, the government’s administration. Both legislative members 
and, often, government departments are allowed to propose legislation. Legislative 
committees or departments may invite individual civic experts and organisations 
(independently of each other) to make representations on policy matters under con-
sideration. Furthermore, a legislative committee may have the authority to make 
recommendations, including proposed amendments to legislation, and to review the 
practices of a government department. Civic participation may also be possible in 
(horizontal) committees responsible for the nomination of key government repre-
sentatives or the nomination of judges. 
The fourth type, the constitutional monitoring structure, provides for an addi-
tional level of ‘horizontal accountability’, through independent commissions that 
monitor government behaviour and often derive their mandate from a country’s 
national constitution. These mechanisms, which can sanction government through 
the publishing of critical reports, based on in-depth investigations, often work 
closely with civic actors. A country’s constitution or supreme law, sometimes in-
cluding a Bill of Rights and usually stipulating the structure of government and its 
principal institutions, generally provides for these national institutions. These insti-
tutions fulfil various functions, such as reviewing public accounts or allegations of 
corruption, as well as focusing special attention on women, for example, or on the 
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conditions of an election. One such example is the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC), established in terms of section 9 of South Africa’s constitu-
tion. The SAHRC is not only mandated to review, but also to ‘take steps to secure 
appropriate redress’,109 which in some cases has drawn the SAHRC into bringing 
judicial review claims in the courts, often together with civic organisations. 
2.3.5 Media structures – sanctions by way of public shaming  
A further structure that I address in this book, which is partly independent of gov-
ernment, but still conditions civic agency, is the media structure. This includes 
various avenues open to influencing public opinion on human rights issues. Here 
there is much potential scope for agency to promote government accountability, to 
make it easier for human rights advocates to promote a particular cause, to expose 
specific human rights violations, and to increase awareness about human rights in 
general. 
However, whether it is employed in co-operating with government or confront-
ing it on its human rights obligations, civic agency is still heavily conditioned by 
the state, since print media, radio and television, and even the internet are all subject 
to some form of state regulation. Commercial media tends to be profit-driven, and 
will strive to increase its circulation by appealing to what it perceives to be the de-
mands of its public and of advertisers. Commercial media therefore tends to be 
more open to critical civic perspectives of the government. State-owned media 
tends to present a less critical position on the activities of government. 
Issues of ownership and government control often prove to be substantial barri-
ers to human rights advocacy, particularly on controversial issues such as the treat-
ment of foreigners. For example, according to Danso and McDonald, most newspa-
pers in South Africa have traditionally been owned and/or controlled by a ‘handful 
of syndicates’ representing mainly minority white interests.110 While in recent years 
they have tended to be critical of the government, on the whole they have not been 
very sympathetic towards issues concerning foreigners. Their treatment of such is-
sues has not been very encouraging. Danso and McDonald examined 1 200 clip-
pings from English-language newspaper published between 1994 and 1998; in these 
clippings, with some exceptions, coverage of issues concerning foreigners and im-
migration tends to be overwhelming negative. 
(C)overage of cross-border migration issues by the English-language press in South 
Africa leaves much to be desired. Highly sensationalised, Africanised and negative 
reporting of migration issues is generally in the form of superficial, statistics-happy 
articles that do little to inform the reader about the complexities of migration or 
how it fits in with broader social, political and economic developments in the coun-
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try/region. Readers are all too often left with little more than incriminating innuen-
does and sensational accounts of what migrants are alleged to have done. 111 
Another example in Southern Africa, representing an increasingly powerful alterna-
tive to conventional media, is the growth of so-called ‘community media’. Commu-
nity-owned media outlets encourage greater media accountability to the general 
public. The transmission of radio broadcasts to South Africa by the African Na-
tional Congress formed an important part of the liberation struggle. More recently, 
the growth of community radio in Zimbabwe has shown that it is a significant alter-
native source of public information to other (often state-owned) media, and is less 
afraid to tackle controversial issues, though it is also hugely vulnerable to govern-
ment interference.112 
With the growth of information technology, and especially internet-based media, 
civic human rights advocates have acquired a medium of expression that is poten-
tially very significant, with very exciting potential possibilities for holding govern-
ments accountable by way of public shaming. Human rights advocates have inter-
acted not only with conventional, mainstream media sources, but also with 
alternative media sites,113 blogs114 and ‘social-networking’ websites115. By the same 
token, some governments have shown a desire to regulate internet-based media 
more closely, with the complicity of giant commercial internet operations such as 
Yahoo and Google.116 
2.3.6 Motivations for civic agency 
Every participant in civic-state interactions has specific motivations for exercising 
their agency, or what Kidder terms ‘externally grounded reasons’ for being inter-
ested in a particular outcome, and this is measured by divergences in meanings, 
interests and political positions. The reasons that civic actors raise for exercising 
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their agency to hold the government accountable are rarely the same. For example, 
civic actors may be motivated by the funding provided by external donor agen-
cies.117 A civic organisation may also be compelled by its membership or constitu-
ency to respond to demands in a particular way.118 
Civic participation in policymaking, discussed in chapter four, may generate 
very different, and even conflicting positions. One civic agent may feel it is desir-
able to be part of a government-led policy development task team, so that it may try 
to influence its outcome, while another may consider any kind of involvement to be 
an unacceptable compromise, and that efforts to influence the direction of govern-
ment policy must always come through external lobbying or public shaming. 
For the civic agent engaged in the process of policymaking, such a role may not 
unduly affect their independence, so long as the distinctions are clear. For the civic 
agent playing no role in a policymaking task team, government policymaking must 
be solely a government exercise, that civic organisations can only challenge through 
external, democratic mechanisms. 
There may be externally grounded reasons for government actors to allow for 
civic participation; these relate to the often limited capacity of government admini-
strations to implement newly imposed legal obligations, including human rights 
obligations. For example, the new South African government was highly dependent 
on United Nations officials and civic actors in interpreting its international legal 
obligations during the initial years of its introduction of ad hoc individual asylum 
determination procedures, between 1993 and 1998. As chapter four illustrates, de-
spite prevailing tensions between the South African government and civic actors, in 
finalising the Refugees Act the government still depended on the input of civic ac-
tors, and it requested civic actors to participate in a policymaking ‘task team’. 
The nature and purpose of legal advocacy organisations also plays a role in de-
fining a civic actor’s externally grounded reasons for being interested in a particular 
outcome. Some organisations not only advocate for rights-regarding policies; they 
also represent individuals as clients. In these circumstances, the (perceived) danger 
of compromise from co-operating with government is higher than for a civic actor 
who does not play a role in representation. 
If critically examined, the externally grounded reasons of civic agents should 
ideally define the scope that state-constructed structures permit for civic participa-
tion and the (sometimes hidden) motivations driving some civic actors. In such 
cases, they become the theoretical boundaries that guide both civic and government 
agency and, as such, it is important that they be exposed to illustrate the nature of 
civic-state interactions. 
Taking into account the externally grounded reasons of civic and government 
agents, and adapting Archer’s analytical dualism approach to a process of account-
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ability through civic interaction, the framework used in this book for assessing civic 
advocacy interventions is as follows: 
1) Specific historical events create state-created structures with which civic 
organisations interact in seeking to hold a government accountable for its 
normative obligations, and which condition the nature of civic interactions. 
2) The interaction of civic organisations with state-created structures, through 
either co-operative or confrontational measures, may lead to tangible re-
sults. 
3) The nature of these tangible results, which amount to an elaboration of 
those structures, and may include amendments to the legislation and policy 
as well as changes in the nature of policy implementation. 
It is the interaction, or what Archer terms ‘interplay’, between structure and 
agency that provides more of an explanation than the nature of either structure or 
agency. I now turn to the nature and consequences of these interactions. 
2.4 CIVIC ACTORS MEDIATE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL 
AND NATIONAL NORMS 
The first and second assumptions, that the structural boundaries between civic ac-
tors and the state are both the product of tangible shifts in the civic-state relation-
ship and also important to respect, lead to the third and final assumption, namely 
that civic actors play a crucial role in mediating the translation of international 
legal norms into local contexts. 
For example, Albie Sachs, a South African lawyer and law professor, wrote in 
the 1970s about how he and his colleagues aimed to ‘liberate the law’ in reforming 
Mozambique’s law and policies.119 Sachs argued that this approach of ‘liberating 
the law’ was taken in the context of a legal system rooted in Portuguese colonial-
ism, which was later challenged by a popular political ideology aiming to dramati-
cally advance social justice, and promote a deeper political consciousness, for the 
people of Mozambique. In other words, advancing the interests of the Mozambican 
people required their direct involvement in the process of social and political devel-
opment. Similarly, policy reform in South Africa involved ‘liberating’ South Africa, 
and its laws, from apartheid, another process in which Sachs played a key role.120 
It is a virtually limitless task to explain the scope for civic advocacy, and espe-
cially legal advocacy, to promote human rights and to hold states – through their 
governments – accountable, reflecting a long-fought ontological struggle to critique 
the nature of law and the nature of society as inter-relational rather than opposi-
tional. Roger Cotterrell, a leading socio-legal scholar, argues very clearly that ‘legal 
ideas are a means of structuring the social world’.121 
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The field of law and society (or the emergence of socio-legal concepts) offers a 
robust, yet multi-disciplinary, way of assessing the scope of legal mechanisms and 
processes beyond their doctrinal significance, and measuring the real space civic 
interventions have to hold states and their governments accountable. 
Building on the basic agency and structure-based explanations of the previous 
section, this book applies Merry’s thesis of civic actors translating global obliga-
tions into their local, vernacular context, as well as Kidder’s notion of externally-
imposed law. Understanding what Kidder refers to as the externally grounded rea-
sons why civic organisations may be interested in a particular outcome makes it 
easier to appreciate law as process; in other words, that law evolves through differ-
ent types of co-operative or confrontational interactions. 
2.4.1 Law as process: human rights and socio-legal theory 
A socio-legal perspective on human rights offers greater possibilities for under-
standing the potential and limitations of human rights, and the legal process through 
which human rights are advocated. 
Echoing Ehrlich’s earlier contention that there is both ‘law in the books’ and a 
‘living law’, and having been shaped by a background in legal realism,122 from the 
1970s Moore argued that ‘law and the social context in which it operates must be 
inspected together’.  
In order to do this, she argued, it is important to use anthropological tools, tak-
ing what she termed the ‘semi-autonomous social field’ (SASF) as being capable of 
producing its own internal ‘rules and customs’, but ‘also vulnerable to rules and 
decisions and other forces emanating from the larger world by which it is sur-
rounded’. 123 Society and law have their own, separate characteristics, each of which 
must be thoroughly understood before their relationship is analysed. 
Moore bemoaned the fact that most lawyers in the 1970s understood law to 
amount to little more than a ‘complex aggregation of principles, norms, ideas, rules, 
practices and the agencies of legislation, administration, adjudication and enforce-
ment, backed by political power and legitimacy’.124 The reality, she argued, was 
quite different. Law was merely ‘one of a number of factors that affect the decisions 
people make, the actions they take and the relationships they have’.125 These con-
sisted of two different types, namely intentional norms and evolving norms. Moore 
claimed that was in the nature of rules to ‘evolve’,126 but took the analysis further in 
the context of ‘intentional norms’, breaking them down into their legislated, judicial 
and administrative components. The legislated norms in particular, she argued, 
amounted to ‘attempts to shift the relative bargaining positions of persons in civic 
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organisations’ dealings with one another’.127 In other words, they were conscious 
attempts at social direction. Judicial and administrative norms were, by contrast, 
much more malleable. 
As Cotterell later argued, ‘an understanding of the nature of law requires not 
only systematic empirical analysis of legal doctrine and institutions but also of the 
social environment in which legal institutions exist’.128 In other words, Cotterell has 
insisted that we must simultaneously understand what are broadly understood to be 
the characteristics of law as well as the characteristics of society. This departure 
from the conventional, instrumentalist, top-down notion that law serves to regulate 
societies on the basis of its content alone has been thoroughly rejected. For exam-
ple, Griffiths refers to such an approach as ‘sterile’, explaining the impact or effec-
tiveness of legal rules in influencing behaviour as the ‘social working paradigm’.129 
But the reverse also holds true. Moore has critiqued the conventional assumption 
of society as amounting to simply ‘social arrangements susceptible to conscious 
human control’ through the ‘instrument’ of the law.130 Moore added that in addition 
to legal rules, societies were subject to binding ‘social rules’, which were not neces-
sarily legally enforceable, but no less effective in forcing compliance.131 While the 
intention of law was to change the social relationships in existence, she argued that 
this is difficult to do with legislation alone.132 The ‘essential difference’ between 
legal rules and other kinds of rules, Moore explained, ‘lies in the agency through 
which ultimate sanctions might be applied’. She went on to argue that while the 
enforcement of legal rules relied mainly on the state mobilising the ‘coercive force 
of government‘, a society still has the capacity to ‘make law its custom’.133  
Put another way, all societies should be understood as complex, whether in a ru-
ral or urban setting,134 and yet still capable of mobilising government, depending on 
their degree of independence and whether they are ‘sufficiently organised’.135 This 
position is well reflected in the South Africa study in this book; in South Africa, 
social norms and institutional inertia have proven to be very enduring, and yet civic 
organisations have proven themselves to be highly adaptable, mobilising global 
knowledge in local contexts. In making a socio-legal analysis of civic-state interac-
tions, this book draws principally on Merry’s substantial contributions to socio-
legal scholarship, which have developed Moore’s concept of ‘intentional norms’ 
and proposed a sophisticated way of understanding the relationship between rights 
and culture that explains the ways in which civic actors mediate this relationship. 
                                                        
127  (S.F. Moore 1978: 78). 
128  (Cotterrell 1992: 3). 
129  (Griffiths 2003). 
130  (S.F. Moore 1978: 54). 
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2.4.2 Translating human rights in a local context 
The mobilisation of rights by civic actors has a global or transnational aspect that, 
according to Merry, is translated into local contexts. Understanding the operation of 
rights in a multi-cultural, highly malleable, legal, social and political culture pro-
vides a more sophisticated way of explaining civic-state relationships and what may 
be, as Merry puts it, the ‘political possibilities’ of claiming rights.136 
Leaving behind the highly polarised discourse on universalism and cultural rela-
tivism of the 1990s, principally driven by the ‘universalists’,137 Merry argued that 
culture should not be ‘essentialised’. Instead, she argued, culture should be under-
stood both as a ‘contested’ notion and as a means by which power and claims to 
legitimacy are made.138 In other words, not all cultural interactions referred to as 
traditional, cultural or indigenous are necessarily so; to the contrary, those seeking 
to maintain a hegemonic hold on society generally construct them. By the same 
token, those who want to challenge this hegemonic hold try to ‘reconstruct’ cultural 
assumptions. At the transnational level, this includes what human rights advocates 
now commonly refer to as a culture of rights, or what Risse and Sikkink refer to 
more specifically as a process of ‘human rights socialisation’ by way of civic inter-
actions.139 At the local level, mention is often made of the need to develop a ‘na-
tional human rights culture’.140 
Rather than seeing human rights as essentially universal or culturally relative, 
translating human rights into a local, vernacular context realises their full ‘emanci-
patory potential’.141 This process of ‘translating’ human rights demands what Merry 
has identified as three kinds of changes. Firstly, human rights should be framed in a 
way that is consistent with local (community) interests. Secondly, the product of 
translation should be consistent with structural systems of a political, economic or 
similar nature. Finally, those who are to be the object of a human rights protection 
must be clearly defined.142 
As Merry cautions, and this book illustrates in chapters four, five and six, trans-
lation does not necessarily mean that a system has been ‘transformed’. Indeed, a 
number of practical obstacles, or what Merry identifies as ‘conundrums’, militate 
against this happening.143 The most interesting of these conundrums, for the pur-
poses of this book, is that the effectiveness of human rights is related to structural 
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changes put into place by a state in committing itself to a given international human 
rights norm. 
For example, in undertaking a normative human rights obligation, through ratifi-
cation of a treaty, it is expected that a state will set up concrete institutions for en-
forcement. In doing so, the norm becomes supported by civic actors and develops 
the rights consciousness of state actors as well. The types of changes, and the corre-
sponding challenges that emerge, are relevant in explaining the role of civic actors 
in shaping and enforcing human rights protection. As elaborated further in chapters 
four and five, civic actors interact with the state in the context of policy-forming 
processes and other, locally-developed forms of co-operative civic-state interac-
tions, in which translation takes a more ‘hybrid’ form. 
Different dynamics arise in confrontational interactions, for example in litigating 
human rights, where translation of international legal norms takes what Merry 
would identify as a more ‘replicating’ form, albeit by reference to local context.144 
In these circumstances, human rights are not only translated, they are also imposed. 
2.4.3 Legal process is interactional 
Since Robert Kidder, together with Burman and Harrell-Bond,145 presented an inte-
grated theory to understanding different legal cultures and legal process as essen-
tially interactional, there has been a noted tendency in the scholarship on legal plu-
ralism to adopt a mutually constitutive approach to the relationship between 
different legal, social and political cultures, based on structuration theory.146 Merry 
quotes Freeman’s critical review of the literature on legal pluralism, stating that it 
comprises ‘simple reductionist views of law as the product of the ruling class’ and 
that such a position ‘ultimately ends in immobilization, since if everything is com-
plex and variable, just as if everything is a matter of interpretation, how can one say 
anything?’147 Consequently, this book adopts a critical approach that considers the 
nature of law, both in its historical context and as the product of a dialectical ap-
proach, in understanding the nature of state law in its relation to civic actors. As 
Merry argues: 
The dialectical analysis of relations among normative orders provides a framework 
for understanding the dynamics of the imposition of law and of resistance to law, 
for examining the interactive relationship between dominant and subordinate 
groups or classes. It offers a way of thinking about the possibilities of domination 
through law and of the limits to this domination, pointing to areas in which indi-
viduals can and do resist … Indeed, state law is plural.148 
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Measuring the impact of ‘alien law’, otherwise known as non-indigenous or ‘im-
posed’ law, has often been situated in the post-colonial context, and more particu-
larly in the context of challenges to colonial legacies. As Kidder explains, ‘the pro-
totype of imposed law (is) … a colonial situation where legal systems are imported 
from dominant cultures and forced on indigenous populations’.149 The reality, he 
explains, is quite different, particularly in pluralist legal systems that draw on mul-
tiple sources, from the observance and constitutional protection of indigenous, cus-
tomary law, to obligations created by the ratification of international treaties. 
Kidder’s interactional model of understanding contesting legal cultures offers a 
flexible, yet dynamic and historically contextualised framework for measuring 
whether the instrumentalisation of a human rights norm can be regarded as legiti-
mate and effective. Kidder’s framework both measures the degree of influence 
through (positive) participation in a policy process on the direction of a policy 
norm, and assesses the impact of a direct (negative) challenge to that norm. The 
assumption is that any attempt to change the direction of an existing norm or policy 
is, by definition, ‘alien’ to that process, and that change comes through interaction. 
Contrary to most conventional (i.e. juridical) assumptions on the nature of law, 
Kidder’s legal pluralist approach assumes that norms are anything but static and so 
their intended results can be externally influenced. This framework is directly rele-
vant to understanding the nature of civic-state interactions for promoting state ac-
countability. 
The interactional model that Kidder introduces takes issue with the ‘command’ 
model of law as the product of colonial law imposition. He rightly states that, in 
contrast to what law has conventionally believed, not all societies allow themselves 
to be subjugated by laws imposed upon them.150 Furthermore, Kidder argues that an 
‘intention to subjugate’ need not exist in order to be considered as ‘imposed’. As he 
puts it, ‘public stances often do not correlate with private purposes’.151 
Kidder’s ‘interactional model’ involves an assessment of ‘the role and sources 
of power at different levels of externality’,152 and assumes that ‘anything that in-
creases the power of external legal actors to offer alternatives thereby increases the 
vulnerability of the internal system’.153 In other words, measuring whether there has 
been social-normative compliance must also consider the degree of ‘externalisation’ 
that takes place as the result of making such a claim. 
Adapting Kidder, I measure externalisation by way of the social distance that 
always exists between lawmakers (most often an administrative official) and the 
civic actor making a claim (for example, the civic actor making a claim). Social 
distance is, according to Kidder’s integrated theory, measured by divergences in 
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meanings, interests and political positions.154 This approach more clearly explains 
civic-state interactions. On the one hand, explaining civic-state interactions in terms 
of social distance can expose the potential danger to civic actors who abandon their 
critical independence and blur the relationship between themselves and govern-
ment. On the other hand, social distance can explain how opportunities can arise for 
civic actors to support government, when government has disclosed a willingness to 
move in a progressive direction; in these circumstances, a narrowing in social dis-
tance can be exploited by civic actors who are able to recognise shared meanings, 
interests and political positions. 
In countries where great disparities exist, particularly on the basis of gender, 
race and class, finding these divergences is generally not a difficult task. The chal-
lenge arises in finding some level of consensus, however marginal, concerning the 
meaning, interests and political positions of government, on the one hand, and civic 
society, on the other. South Africa, for example, has made very deliberate efforts to 
bridge the country’s formidable social and economic disparities; in an almost un-
fathomably diverse, multi-layered society, the government has actively involved 
civic organisations in the formulation of human rights-based policies. The South 
African government has made public consultation a core aspect of good govern-
ance, from involving civic actors in the appointment of judges155 to engaging civic 
actors in the formation and implementation of government policies. South Africa’s 
hybrid legal culture recognises multiple sources of law, from English rules of evi-
dence and legal procedure, to Roman Dutch codification of civil law obligations, 
and even an explicit recognition of traditional or customary law. Also, South Af-
rica’s national constitution has enshrined non-discrimination as the basis for pro-
moting equality of citizens and other residents, and national courts have drawn on 
international law in interpreting constitutional obligations. 
2.4.4 An integrated socio-legal framework for assessing civic-state interactions 
In explaining civic-state interactions to encourage a state to live up to its obligations 
to promote, protect and fulfil human rights, this book shares Kidder’s assessment 
that explaining whether law is imposed involves an examination of ‘interacting in-
terests’ and that these are in turn ‘affected by structural constraints and resource 
imbalances that determine strategies’ in which civic actors assert their interests.156 
This description of the nature of law is consistent with both Archer’s analytical du-
alism approach157 and with what Higgins characterises as ‘legal process’. 
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Furthermore, Kidder’s interactional model, which assesses the nature of law in 
relation to its level of externalisation and the social distance between the respective 
interests of civic and state actors, fits well with Merry’s understanding of transla-
tion, which takes on a more ‘replicating’ form. This hybrid approach critiques the 
process of how global norms find resonance in local contexts, and in which civic 
actors become subjective ‘translators’ of the human rights obligations of the state. 
Together, these frameworks of legal translation and legal imposition provide a 
comprehensive basis for assessing the nature of civic interactions; in the case of 
legal translation, for promoting state accountability through co-operative interac-
tions, and in the case of legal imposition, for holding states directly accountable 
through confrontational interactions that mobilise the legal and social enforcement 
of rules. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Explaining the potential and limitations of civic interactions to enhance state ac-
countability for promoting, protecting and fulfilling their human rights obligations 
by way of co-operative and confrontational interactions, and considering how these 
interactions might be strengthened, requires a multi-layered analysis. This book 
adopts a critical analysis of the process and mechanisms that exist to mobilise these 
interactions. Explaining how civic interactions enhance state accountability is not 
only instructive to civic organisations aiming to be more strategic in their ap-
proaches; it also has important implications for assessing the external legitimacy of 
civic actors.  
Accordingly, this book makes three theoretical propositions. Firstly, the ability 
of civic actors to promote and impose state accountability is possible because of 
structural changes in the normative international and national legal framework. 
Secondly, understanding structural boundaries in the relationship between civic 
actors and the state, and how these boundaries shift in very specific ways, must be 
respected by civic actors (agents) if they want to be strategic in their efforts. And 
thirdly, civic actors play a crucial role in mediating the translation of international 
legal norms into local contexts. 
The juridical, advocacy and enforcement ‘revolutions’ in advancing human 
rights characterised by Ignatieff lead to the first theoretical proposition: the capacity 
of civic actors to promote and impose state accountability is shaped by structural 
changes in the normative international and national legal framework. These nor-
mative changes have shifted the relationship between state and civic actors, creating 
much political space in which civic actors can now participate in international and 
national legal forums, both in framing human rights norms and in seeking state 
compliance with these norms. Individual and collective participation in interna-
tional legal process has involved civic organisation in the formation of international 
human rights policies at United Nations meetings, and particularly during treaty-
making processes. Civic actors have also played key roles in monitoring state com-
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pliance with international human rights norms, and enforcing those norms through 
various state-created structures. Civic actors have even begun to acquire legal 
standing, invoking international courts to hold states accountable. However, while 
the increase in political space has permitted greater civic participation, the relation-
ship between states and civic actors is essentially the same, and, as this chapter has 
also explained, the distinction between their respective roles and responsibilities is 
important for strategic reasons. 
Developments at the international level relate to developments at the national 
level, where political space has also expanded. Civic actors promote states in be-
coming more accountable through co-operative measures, for example by partici-
pating in government-led policy processes to give legal effect to international obli-
gations, and in helping governments in their implementation of these policies. Civic 
actors also seek to enforce state accountability by way of confrontational measures, 
in particular by way of judicial review. 
The second proposition, that civic agency must respect structural boundaries, is 
of strategic significance, and is consistent with Archer’s approach to structure and 
agency, which recognises the importance of this distinction. This book provides 
structure- and agency-based explanations in seeking to explain how civic-state in-
teractions promote or enforce state accountability. Civic agency interacts with a 
range of different state-created structures: administrative structures, legal structures, 
democratic accountability structures and constitutional monitoring structures, as 
well as the media structure. In each of the structures with which civic agents inter-
act, externally grounded reasons exist that explain both the motivations for civic 
participation and the desirability of a particular outcome. 
The third proposition is that civic actors play a key role in mediating the rela-
tionship between international human rights norms and their translation in domes-
tic law. Various explanations can be made on the basis of socio-legal theory. For 
example, Merry’s characterisation of translating human rights in the local context as 
a process of ‘vernacularisation’ is helpful in understanding the importance of con-
text and the tremendous scope there is for civic organisations to advance human 
rights in a national context. Kidder’s interactional model of assessing the nature of 
‘imposed law’ is helpful, not only in completing a picture of voluntary and imposed 
structural changes as the outcome of civic-state interactions, but in dismissing the 
conventional, ‘command-model’ notion that law necessarily prescribes social be-
haviour. This is particularly helpful in South Africa’s highly pluralistic legal cul-
ture, in which measuring the level of externalisation and social distance caused by a 
particular type of civic interaction can determine whether civic organisations are 
maintaining a healthy balance between, on one hand, holding government account-
able, while on the other, supporting government when it is moving in a progressive 
direction.  
To explain how these three theoretical propositions relate to the practice of ad-
vocating refugee rights in South Africa, in chapter three I have mapped the histori-
cal context in which refugee rights advocacy has taken place. This context relates to 
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the historical circumstances under which civic organisations emerged in South Af-
rica to mobilise human rights in local and national contexts. It also relates to the 
political circumstances from which policy emerged and which, in 1994, was in 
radical need of reform. Finally, it relates to the way in which civic actors have or-
ganised themselves in collaborative networks at local, regional and national levels 
to advocate refugee rights. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MAPPING THE CONTEXT:  
POLICY SHIFTS, POLITICAL STRUGGLE  
AND CIVIC CO-ORDINATION 
 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to assess the capacity of civic advocacy in South Africa to promote or en-
force state accountability for national and international legal obligations, we must 
investigate the historically specific circumstances that have framed the structural 
landscape in which civic actors have exercised their agency. The history of the 
South African anti-apartheid movement has profoundly shaped the interactions be-
tween civic advocates and the state structures that were eventually mobilised to ad-
dress refugee rights, both in policymaking and enforcement processes. 
The struggle against apartheid and colonialism in South Africa dates back to the 
period of Jan van Riebeeck, who arrived from the Netherlands in 1652 and founded 
a trading colony in the Cape peninsula on behalf of the Dutch East India Company 
(VOC). The establishment of this colony by the VOC began an era of racist coloni-
alism that lasted nearly 350 years. During this time, British colonialists took over 
the colony, laying the basis for confrontation with white Afrikaners (the descen-
dants of van Riebeeck and other Dutch settlers), many of whom eventually moved, 
or were forced to move, eastwards into the country. As the British expanded further 
into the Afrikaner settlements, numerous conflicts erupted, culminating in what 
became popularly known – albeit misleadingly – as the “Anglo-Boer wars”, and are 
known contemporarily as the South African wars.1 
Neither the Afrikaner, nor the British, nor any other European settlers and their 
descendants recognised the rights or interests of indigenous Africans. African lands 
were confiscated and people were forced into slavery and compulsory military ser-
vice. After the turn of the twentieth century, and in the aftermath of the last South 
African War, Pixley Ka Izaka Seme founded the South African Native National 
                                                        
1  As historians, including (Omissi and Thompson 2002), (Meredith 2007), (I.R. Smith 1996) and 
many other scholars have confirmed – although rarely from the perspective of indigenous Africans 
– the wars that took place in South Africa were not simply between Afrikaners and the British co-
lonialists. These wars were, in fact, part of a long history of – and African resistance to – settler-
colonial domination, and a scramble for the country’s rich natural resources. 
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Congress (SANNC) in 1912. The SANNC, which later became the African National 
Congress (ANC), was initially formed as a civic organisation, and became a politi-
cal movement later. The organisation was established in direct response to the Na-
tives Land Act in 1913, which expropriated land for the use of white colonial set-
tlers.2 The ANC took a careful approach in the beginning, engaging with the British 
colonial administrators and sending delegations to London. However, these early 
efforts proved to be unsuccessful, and in 1919 the ANC organised its first demon-
stration against the Pass Laws, which required Africans to carry a pass, and regu-
lated where they could live and work.3 
As the laws in South Africa became progressively more rigid, resistance to the 
government increased, and by the 1950s – as explained below – the ANC began to 
organise civic resistance on a very large scale, through a defiance campaign. As the 
government’s response became more violent, another political resistance movement 
– the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) – was formed in 1959 by Robert Sobukwe, 
with a more confrontational stance and an Africanist perspective, in contrast to the 
ANC’s multi-racial perspective.4 
Resistance to white domination precipitated even more violent responses from 
the government. The notorious Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 – in response to a 
civic anti-pass law demonstration by the PAC – and the June 1976 massacre of pri-
mary and high school students in Soweto, who demonstrated against compulsory, 
apartheid-language education, shocked the world, as these events were reported by 
the foreign press. Largely in response to these massacres, the international anti-
apartheid solidarity movement in Europe and North America gathered steam from 
the 1960s onwards.5 While the government banned political movements such as the 
ANC and the PAC, other civic organisations were formed as important focal points 
of civic resistance. These organisations ranged from the Congress of South African 
Students (COSAS) – founded by Steve Biko, Barney Pityana and others – to vari-
ous trade unions, and, in particular, the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU), as well as liberal-minded non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
Eventually, many of the civic organisations owing their origins to the defiance 
campaign came together to form the United Democratic Front (UDF), which played 
a crucial organising role in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and paved the way for 
the un-banning of the ANC and the transformation of South Africa into a democ-
ratic state.6 
According to Reddy, the defiance campaign in South Africa accomplished sev-
eral different things, in addition to dramatically increasing the membership of the 
ANC. The campaign led directly to the establishment of the Legal Aid and Defence 
Fund, and an international solidarity movement that mobilised awareness of apart-
                                                        
2  (Thema 1953). See also: (Lodge 1983). 
3  (Posel 1991). 
4  (Lodge 1983). 
5  (Fieldhouse 2005). 
6  (Kessel 2000). 
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heid around the world, and generated considerable sums of money to advocate for 
accountability through the legal system in South Africa. While the campaign re-
vealed the unwillingness of the United Nations, by way of the Security Council, to 
put pressure on South Africa to abolish its racist policies, it did inspire the General 
Assembly to call for international action and, eventually, sanctions against South 
Africa.7 
Many major political, legal and institutional changes in the South Africa of the 
early 1990s – which also paved the way for a refugee policy – were the outcome of 
a political negotiations process. The outcome of these negotiations was the Con-
gress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), a broadly representative process 
involving the (recently unbanned) political movements, the nationalist-led govern-
ment, and various representatives from civic organisations. The agreements made 
during CODESA marked a major policy shift away from a colonial and authoritar-
ian regime, based on ethnic divisions, to a democratic government established on 
the basis of universal franchise, accountability and social justice. 
This policy shift was therefore not only the product of formal negotiations be-
tween political movements and the white-minority government. It was the culmina-
tion of a long-fought political struggle involving multiple civic actors who had been 
mobilising for progressive change in an organised way, both within South Africa 
and at the international level, since at least the beginning of the 20th Century. Policy 
shifts and participation by civic actors in political struggle in South Africa framed 
the conditions for civic participation in protecting refugees between 1996 until 
2006. Human rights (and by extension refugee rights) advocacy in South Africa has 
been characterised not only by challenges to the existing legal normative frame-
work, but by the pursuit of a strategy of ‘correcting’ the normative framework 
through reference to administrative law and international law. 
This chapter first explains how a racialised migration policy in South Africa 
shifted, and made way for a human rights-based refugee policy. The chapter then 
elaborates on the history of political struggle in South Africa, from which refugee 
advocacy organisations emerged, and finally, it explains how civic advocacy net-
works gradually co-ordinated their responses to promote the protection of refugees. 
3.2 POLICY SHIFTS: ABANDONING RACIALLY-BASED CONTROL OF PEOPLE 
This section explains how South Africa’s government policies rapidly transformed 
as the country emerged from three and a half centuries of racial domination; this 
involved major policy shifts, including a shift from racially-based immigration poli-
cies and border controls, to human rights-based refugee policies. In other words, 
within a relatively short space of time, South Africa went from being a refugee-
producing country to a refugee-hosting country. 
                                                        
7  (Reddy 1987). Reddy was head of the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid for over twenty 
years, during which time the UN General Assembly called for international sanctions against South 
Africa. 
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With the Native Lands Act of 1913 and Native Urban Areas Act of 1923, the 
white minority government of South Africa institutionalised nearly three centuries 
of racist dispossession and brutal control of the country’s indigenous population. 
These laws gradually developed into what became known as South Africa’s policy 
of internal influx control that restricted the movement and association of people on 
the basis of race. Known as ‘apartheid’ – or separation – the racist ideology that 
informed these policies was entrenched at nearly every level of government policy 
until these policies began to shift in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As this section 
explains, South Africa’s refugee policies emerged from policies that were rooted in 
this same ideology. 
3.2.1 Influx control (internal and external) 
Influx control closely regulated two of the most important aspects of civic associa-
tional life, namely where one could live and work, on the basis of race.8 The gov-
ernment‘s extensive security apparatus, in particular the South African Police, en-
forced influx control. Cawthra has described the role of the police as ‘always in the 
front line in the enforcement of apartheid … (and) ensured that black South Afri-
cans were kept in their places in segregated and inferior institutions’.9 The far-
reaching powers granted to the police substantially reduced their accountability, 
turning them into a greatly feared institution. Countless human rights advocates 
were murdered or ‘disappeared’ by government security agencies. 
South Africa’s exclusionary immigration policies can be characterised as ‘exter-
nal influx control’. Just as with the country’s internal policy of influx control, the 
country’s immigration and border control policies were influenced by notions of 
white supremacy, and denied opportunities to non-white migrants and immigrants. 
South Africa’s handling of individuals who had fled persecution or conflict was 
formulated along similar principles, acknowledging the humanity of some and de-
nying the humanity of others.  
In 1986, following a recommendation by a presidential commission the previous 
year, former South African president P. W. Botha announced the scrapping of the 
country’s notorious pass laws or ‘influx control’. The historic announcement did 
not mention anything about the prospect of democratic participation for the coun-
try’s majority. On the contrary, it reinforced Botha’s belief that the future of the 
country still depended on apartheid or ‘separate development’ by way of a white 
minority-controlled State, tri-cameral parliament,10 and separate Bantustans. Indeed, 
as a New York Times journalist acknowledged, while the pass laws had come to an 
                                                        
8  (Posel 1991). 
9  (Cawthra 1993: 1). 
10  The tri-cameral parliament model, which gave highly restricted ‘autonomy’ to members of the (1) 
coloured and (2) Indian communities in two separate parliaments, and which was totally subservi-
ent to the main, white-controlled parliament, was explicitly rejected by the ANC and other libera-
tion movements, though it remained in existence on paper from 1984 until the country’s first de-
mocratic elections in 1994. 
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end, the ‘spirit’ lived on in the form of what Botha referred to as ‘orderly urbaniza-
tion’.11 
As the social and political crisis in South Africa deepened, and Botha waged a 
militarised policy of ‘total onslaught’ against the liberation movements, both inside 
South Africa and within the region, massive forced displacement of people took 
place. This displacement was of three different kinds. South Africans who were 
dispossessed of their land and property for the use of whites were forced to live in 
townships or in far-flung Bantustans; they became internally displaced within South 
Africa’s internationally recognised borders.12 Other South Africans fled the country 
for various reasons, as persecuted students, academics, army defectors, community 
activists and members of political movements, and became refugees.13 Thirdly, and 
directly related to South Africa’s policy of regional de-stabilisation,14 countless 
numbers became forcibly displaced in their efforts to flee armed conflicts. In par-
ticular, hundreds of thousands of people fled civil wars in Mozambique and Angola. 
South Africa played an important, facilitating role in these brutal conflicts.15 
Meanwhile, South Africa’s migration and border control policies, formulated 
along similar lines to influx control, remained. The principal legislation that guided 
South Africa’s discriminatory migration policy was the notorious Aliens Control 
Act. 
3.2.2 The Aliens Control Act 1991: arbitrary and unchallengeable 
Similar to the Pass Laws, the Aliens Control Act 1991 not only provided sweeping, 
arbitrary powers to the Minister of Home Affairs and his administrative officials; 
before 1993, decisions taken under the Act were virtually unchallengeable in a court 
of law. The Act was the final, ‘omnibus’ version of legislation that – from the 
1920s, when it initially sought to restrict entry to the families of Indian labourers – 
had as a core objective the active promotion of white immigration, and an almost 
total ban on formal non-white immigration. The Act therefore had undeniably racist 
origins, both in form (the policy norms themselves) and in implementation (the 
                                                        
11  (Battersby 1988). 
12  South Africa regarded the Bantustans as foreign entities, and they were recognised as if they were 
states. It maintained this fiction despite the lack of these entities’ basic pre-conditions for the exis-
tence of a state, and the fact that no other state extended recognition to them. Indeed, these entities 
were the subject of a unique response from the United Nations, which acknowledged collective 
non-recognition on the basis of South Africa’s racist policies, and considered the Bantustans to be 
part of South Africa. 
13  Tens of thousands were recognised as refugees and granted residence, mainly in neighbouring 
countries and within the region, in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Swaziland and Tan-
zania. These countries eventually became known as the ‘front-line states’ in the regional and global 
struggle against South Africa’s apartheid regime. 
14  South Africa carried out military incursions and actively supported right-wing insurgents in Zim-
babwe, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and what eventually became Namibia. 
15  (Armon et al. 1998). 
Chapter 3 
 66 
ways in which the Department’s discretion was exercised).16 However, the racist 
nature of South Africa’s immigration policy was highly nuanced, and characterised 
by specific criteria for inclusion or exclusion. As discussed in the next section, these 
criteria changed frequently, reflecting the constantly changing political situation in 
the country.17 
Until a 1995 parliamentary amendment to the notorious Aliens Control Act 
(ACA)18, it was virtually impossible for civic actors to challenge what were often 
decidedly arbitrary decisions taken under the Act. The ACA, which regulated all 
entry and residence in the Republic, provided an ‘ouster clause’ that stated: 
no court of law shall have any jurisdiction to review, quash, reverse, interdict or 
otherwise interfere with any act, order, or warrant of the Minister … issued under 
this Act and which relates to the restriction or detention, or the removal from the 
Republic, of a person who is being dealt with as a prohibited person.19 
In other words, if the Minister (for example, acting through an immigration officer), 
decided that one had no legal grounds for residing in South Africa, that person 
could be declared a ‘prohibited person’ and detained and deported accordingly. A 
court could review neither the decision to declare a person as ‘prohibited’, nor any 
decision to detain and/or deport them. The sole limitation placed on this otherwise 
limitless power, which drew on a long history of non-interference by the courts in 
the workings of the government in South Africa, concerned the aspect of detention, 
which the Act provided ‘shall not be for a longer period than is under the circum-
stances reasonable and necessary’.20 
3.2.3 Four pillars of South Africa’s old migration policy 
Crush and McDonald wrote of South Africa’s migration policies as having ‘rested 
on four pillars: (1) racist policy and legislation on the basis of whether one was 
‘easily assimilable’; (2) the exploitation of migrant labour from neighbouring coun-
tries; (3) tough enforcement legislation, and (4) the repudiation of international 
refugee conventions’.21 
The first two of these pillars have also been characterised as a ‘two gates’ pol-
icy. In general, South Africa encouraged immigration to ‘virtually anyone with a 
white skin’ (gate one), including certain ‘honorary whites’ from Asia and else-
                                                        
16  (S. Peberdy and Crush 1998) argued that South Africa’s immigration policies during the country’s 
extended period of white minority rule were ‘rooted in racism’. 
17  (Sally Peberdy 1999: 8). 
18  The (Aliens Control Act 1991) was an ‘omnibus’ piece of legislation, its origins dating back to the 
turn of the 20th Century and was particularly notorious for its racialised nature. See (S. Peberdy and 
Crush 1998). 
19  (Aliens Control Act 1991): section 55(1). 
20  (Aliens Control Act 1991): section 55(2). 
21  (Crush and Mcdonald 2001: 2-4). 
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where.22 However, it also made some exceptions to this, notably the exclusion of 
Jews during the first part of the 20th century. Furthermore, while the country’s ra-
cialised policy generally excluded immigration to all non-whites, it made temporary 
provisions for migrant labourers (gate two). 
First Pillar: ‘easily assimilable’ 
For decades, the South African government encouraged white migration through a 
racialised set of immigration laws aimed at persons who an Immigrant Selection 
Board determined would be ‘easily assimilable’. Both the Unionist government in 
the 1930s and the Nationalist government that came to power in 1948 were inter-
ested in white immigrants from countries that were perceived to be sympathetic to 
its polices, such as Great Britain (for the Unionists) or Germany and The Nether-
lands (for the Nationalists). 
In the 1930s, the racial criteria that had long regulated admittance to South Af-
rica was amended by religious criteria as well. Reflecting the blatantly anti-Semitic 
views within government that Jews were dominating the professions and business 
sector, the government introduced the Quota Act of 1930. According to whether or 
not one came from a ‘scheduled’ or ‘unscheduled’ country, the Act successfully 
limited the numbers of Jewish immigrants coming from Eastern Europe. According 
to Peberdy, who based her conclusions on available official statistics, ‘Jewish im-
migration fell from 2,788 in 1929 to 1,881 in 1930 and to 885 in 1931’.23 
With the rise of fascism in Germany came a rapid increase in the numbers of 
Jews wishing to emigrate elsewhere. The government of South Africa was faced 
with a dilemma; it wished to encourage immigration from Germany, while at the 
same time limiting the number of Jews wishing to immigrate to the country. The 
response was to introduce the Aliens Act of 1937, which, as mentioned earlier, built 
upon legislation originally introduced by the British colonial administration in the 
1920s to restrict the immigration of families of Indian migrant labourers brought 
over to build railways. Over the years, the legislation was amended or reworked 
entirely, several times, and formed the basis of the country’s immigration policy. In 
terms of the 1937 Act, decisions on whether or not to accept an application to im-
migrate to South Africa would be taken by the newly-created Immigrant Selection 
Board.24 
Peberdy argues that anti-Semitism was for some time a significant feature of 
South Africa’s immigration policy and border regime, under both the Unionist and 
the Nationalist governments. Under the Unionists, for example, the principal crite-
rion for immigrating to South Africa was that an applicant was a ‘natural-born Brit-
ish subject or a Union National’, while under the Nationalists, the principal criteria 
related to the ‘absorptive capacity’ of South Africa, in other words, whether an ap-
                                                        
22  (Crush and Mcdonald 2001: 2). 
23  (Sally Peberdy 1999: 160). 
24  (Sally Peberdy 1999: 159). 
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plicant was ‘likely to be readily assimilated’. By their interpretation of these crite-
ria, according to Peberdy, the Immigrants Selection Board excluded large numbers 
of Jewish immigrants. 25 
According to Giliomee, Hendrik Verwoerd, leader of the National Party (NP) 
and architect of apartheid, was of the view that economic considerations were prin-
cipally at stake in constructing a quota system, but that anti-Semitic factors also 
played a role in reinforcing such a policy. 
According to Verwoerd … the problem was of an economic kind, namely Jewish 
over-representation in key economic sectors. Yet he failed to identify a reason why 
Jewish dominance was more dangerous than that of any other ethnic group. Neither 
did he attempt to make a case that there was a common Jewish agenda in South Af-
rica.26 
Making a somewhat unconvincing distinction between anti-Semitism and official 
support for the Nazi regime in Germany, Giliomee questioned how much the gov-
ernment‘s immigration policy was in fact directly influenced by the ideology of that 
regime, with which the Unionist Government of South Africa was, in any event, at 
war. While not in any way denying that anti-Semitism was a core consideration of 
the government’s policies, and indeed had been for some time, Giliomee was keen 
to point out that, with the exception of one NP leader,27 the National Party, at least, 
was not necessarily influenced by Nazi ideology. Calling the government’s anti-
Semitic quota policies ‘opportunistic rather than deep-rooted’, Giliomee partly re-
vealed his own sentiments when he wrote: 
Its sources were not German anti-Semitism but local stereotypes of the Jew out-
smarting everyone and profiting at their expense. … Anti-Semitic sentiments were 
fuelled by Afrikaner frustration over their lack of economic progress in the city.28 
By contrast, Peberdy’s extensive archival research exposed a wide-ranging conspir-
acy in seeking to prevent Jewish immigration, extending to South Africa’s ambas-
sadors in Europe, who communicated back to their government in Pretoria. 
The ambassadors agreed that “Jewish immigration is dangerous [‘n gevaar is] to 
South Africa” and that it should be discouraged and if possible be completely 
stopped. The only doubt expressed was whether they could be accused of anti-
Semitism by not strictly following immigration regulations. They were certainly not 
                                                        
25  (Sally Peberdy 1999: 166). 
26  (Giliomee 2003: 417), quoting an article by Verwoerd in Die Transvaler, 1 September 1937. 
27  (Giliomee 2003: 418), referring to Eric Louw, a prominent leader in the National Party, who ‘spoke 
of a world Jewry exerting a malignant political influence, the language of Hitler.’ Giliomee later 
argued that Louw abandoned such an overtly anti-Jewish stance when the National Party came to 
power in 1948. 
28  (Giliomee 2003: 418) 
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worried about the legitimacy of side-stepping the regulations, only the possibility of 
confrontation.29 
There seems little doubt that, at least for a while, the government‘s policy was 
tinged with a decidedly anti-Semitic flavour and whether economic considerations 
were a principal factor or not was, in fact, irrelevant. The tragic consequence of 
these short-lived policies was that during a crucial period in Germany’s much-
documented persecution of the Jewish people and other groups – including mentally 
handicapped persons, Roma and Sinti, homosexuals and others – it became almost 
impossible for Jews fleeing this persecution to immigrate to South Africa. 
On the other hand, the fact that the Jewish Board of Deputies raised objections 
to the quota policy only and not, it would seem, to the government‘s wider efforts 
to restrict non-Whites, illustrates how this discourse took place entirely within the 
confines of this first ‘pillar’. In other words, there was at least tacit acceptance, 
within the mainstream Jewish community in South Africa, of a racially segregated 
immigration policy. While the overt anti-Semitism of the South African govern-
ment’s immigration policy was short-lived, as the government developed strong ties 
with the State of Israel,30 the racialised nature of the policy remained entrenched. 
The ‘easily assimilable’ criterion raised numerous dilemmas for officials tasked 
with interpreting it. As Peberdy discovered during the course of her extensive ar-
chival research, doubts were raised amongst members of the Immigration Advisory 
Board about certain nationalities, including Portuguese. 
Italians and Portuguese “were questionable” but could be assimilated if they were 
“from good ‘stock’,” not least because some Afrikaners had Portuguese and Italian 
surnames. However, he doubted whether “a Spaniard, a Pole, a Magyarian, or 
Czech (to name only a few) could assimilate.”31 
Nevertheless, the principal target of this first ‘pillar’ or ‘gate’ of the South African 
immigration policy was to maintain a white population and, particularly after 1948, 
a population sympathetic to the political programme of the National Party. Accord-
ingly, the government saw utility in opening its doors to former white colonialists in 
newly-liberated Angola, Mozambique, and other countries, as well as from Eastern 
Europe. 
From the 1960s the government recognised that those leaving Angola and Mo-
zambique in advance of independence in these Portuguese colonies, and anti-
communist ‘defectors’ from Eastern Europe, were likely to be sympathetic to its 
policies, and therefore opened its doors to them. Special concessions were made for 
these ‘refugees’32 to emigrate to South Africa, apparently in terms of a separate pol-
                                                        
29  (Sally Peberdy 1999: 162-163). 
30  (Mcgreal 2006). 
31  (S. Peberdy and Crush 1998: 37). 
32  The term ‘refugees’ for this group must be qualified, since no proper status-determination took 
place to assess their reasons for claiming refugee status, or whether such a person might be ex-
cluded on the grounds of having committed a serious non-political crime. 
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icy, which remained confidential. Several were reportedly excluded from South 
African citizenship on the basis of their maintaining Portuguese citizenship.33 
Second pillar/second class: the exploitation of African migrant workers 
An exploitative system of migrant labour was the goal of the second of Crush’s 
‘two gates’, and the second ‘pillar’ of the government‘s overall policy. On behalf of 
South Africa’s giant mining and agricultural industries, the system permitted mi-
grants from neighbouring countries, principally Mozambique and Lesotho, to work 
in South Africa, often in appallingly bad conditions. Their contracts (and temporary 
entry permits) were negotiated through semi-privatised agencies. 
As Crush and Tshitereke have written, this form of exploitative migration was 
mainly provided for in terms of bi-lateral treaties between South Africa and the 
countries of which the migrants held nationality.34 Numerous migrants from Mo-
zambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland and elsewhere, gained temporary resi-
dence in South Africa in this way, although their residence was very uncertain.  
The appalling labour conditions for African migrant workers were firmly rooted 
in the government‘s policy of apartheid, and therefore consistent with the general 
lack of labour protections for black South African workers. In a 1970 article, Fre-
derick Johnstone summed up the fundamental unjustness of the government’s pol-
icy on African migrant workers from the nominally independent South African 
‘homelands’, officially regarded as labour reserves by the South African govern-
ment through its policy of influx control: 
The whites want the continued use of African labour without the continued residen-
tial presence of African people in the ‘white’ areas. Thus non-essential Africans are 
removed, while essential African workers are shuttled about, deprived of rights in 
the places where they live and work, and without jobs in the ‘homelands’ where 
they are told to exercise their rights. Through this migrant labour system the whites 
secure their supposedly contradictory goals of prosperity and white supremacy and 
racial separation, at the expense of the Africans, on whom it inflicts permanent in-
stability, the destruction of family life, and other serious disabilities.35 
Notwithstanding the almost total lack of labour protection, many migrants through-
out the region took advantage of this exploitative labour arrangement, since the op-
portunities for earning a living were still preferable to the conditions in their own 
countries. With the eruption of civil war in Mozambique, it became increasingly 
difficult to distinguish between migrants who had fled the violence of the war and 
those who had come for work reasons.36 Many of these migrants who had remained 
in South Africa by the early 1990s were permitted to vote in the country’s first, 
                                                        
33  (‘Interview with C. Schravesande’ 2006). 
34  (Crush and Tshitereke 2001). 
35  (Johnstone 1970: 128). 
36  (Johnston 1999). 
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general election in 1994.37 Many of these migrants – including former Mozambican 
refugees – were granted permanent residence, either through an amnesty for former 
mineworkers, announced in October 1996, or as part of a general SADC Amnesty, 
announced in June 1996.38 
Pillar three: dehumanised border enforcement 
The third ‘pillar’ of South Africa’s immigration policy, during the period of white 
minority rule, was characterised by a dehumanised, unforgiving approach to border 
enforcement. As mentioned, the policy was deeply racialised; influx control was 
effectively transferred to the borders.39 
The unforgiving nature of the country’s border control policy extended to all 
black foreigners who entered the country unannounced, whether they were refugees 
from the war in Mozambique, or migrants in search of casual employment. Refu-
gees and migrants went to great lengths in their desperation to avoid border control 
officials and reach relative safety in neighbouring South Africa. Mozambican refu-
gees suffered especially. After having fled some of the worst post-independence 
violence seen on the African continent, refugees braved additional horrors; they 
were confronted by dangerous wild animals in the Kruger National Park, which 
bordered both countries, as well as a fence that generated a lethal electric charge. 
The desire to avoid border control officials was clear. When officials managed to 
intercept foreigners entering the country, they carried out a range of dehumanising 
practices that, as Crush and McDonald put it, were ‘reminiscent of the pre-1986 
pass laws era’.40 
Serious bureaucratic challenges also caused problems. In terms of the Aliens 
Control Act and associated regulations, there were three separate government agen-
cies with authority to handle border control issues: immigration officials of the De-
partment of Home Affairs, border police officers, and the South African military. 
This led to overlapping jurisdictions and serious inter-departmental conflicts.41 
Pillar four: repudiation of international refugee law 
The racially tainted implementation of South Africa’s immigration policy and bor-
der enforcement was matched, predictably enough, by the fourth pillar: the govern-
ment‘s stubborn unwillingness to develop refugee policies in line with international 
law. As mentioned, the lack of a refugee policy had a predictably harsh impact on 
the several hundred thousand Mozambicans who did manage to flee the civil war 
and find their way to South Africa in the 1970s and 80s. While South Africa mostly 
                                                        
37  (Polzer 2007: 24-25). 
38  (Crush and Williams 1999). 
39  (Handmaker and Parsley 2001), and alluded to by (Crush and Mcdonald 2001). 
40  (Crush and Mcdonald 2001: 3). 
41  (Handmaker and Singh 2002) The lack of proper co-ordination between border enforcement agen-
cies continued throughout the 1990s until at least 2002. 
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tolerated Mozambicans living in the nominally independent ‘homelands’ of 
Gazankulu and Venda, the government regarded them, legally, as ‘prohibited per-
sons’. The government furthermore refused to allow the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) to operate in the country and provide humanitarian assis-
tance to the tens of thousands of refugees from war-ravaged Mozambique.  
As Polzer noted, ‘Mozambicans in South Africa have never been subject to or 
protected by an established and structured refugee law’ although Mozambicans 
have been subject to ‘official and semi-official frameworks’ that have ‘shaped in-
teractions between Mozambican refugees and state actors and have enabled or con-
strained the acquisition of legal status’.42 While, on the whole, these types of infor-
mal relationships with the former homeland authorities, chiefs, and (more recently) 
local government have had more direct impact on former Mozambican refugees 
than the formal laws, these former refugees have always been vulnerable to exploi-
tation by farmers as well as apprehension and deportation under the South African 
government’s immigration laws. Left without international protection, or an interna-
tional agency to oversee their protection, the country’s border enforcement policies 
resulted in a particularly precarious situation for former refugees.43 
In 1991, the government eventually permitted the UNHCR to operate in the 
country for the joint purposes of formally recognising the former Mozambican 
refugees, in lieu of repatriation, and for facilitating the return of South African ex-
iles. As discussed further in chapter five, in 1993 the South African government 
signed a Tripartite Agreement with the UNHCR and the government of Mozam-
bique, and a separate Basic Agreement with the UNHCR, to facilitate the formal 
recognition of status for former Mozambican refugees, based on the definition of a 
refugee contained in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. 
3.2.4 Paving the way for a refugee policy 
Attempts to resolve the Mozambican refugee crisis from the early 1990s onwards 
laid the basis for a formal policy of refugee status determination, which allowed 
applications for asylum on an individual basis. As it became more widely known 
throughout the world, and particularly on the African continent, that the country 
was undergoing a negotiated transition to democracy, further underscored by the 
release of Nelson Mandela in 1990, South Africa became seen as a potential place 
of refuge for persons fleeing persecution and war. 
One of the earliest claims for refugee status came in 1991, when three Russian 
women who worked at the Russian embassy approached the South African govern-
ment and declared their intentions to ‘defect’ from their country and apply for po-
litical asylum. Claude Schravesande, a senior official in the immigration section of 
                                                        
42  (Polzer 2007: 23). 
43  This situation did not ease until 2000, when a project for regularising the status of former Mozam-
bican refugees finally began to be implemented, as discussed in chapter five. 
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the DHA, was requested to deal with the matter. The women were granted political 
asylum in late 1991 or early 1992.44 
Following years of international isolation, in 1991 South Africa finally permit-
ted the UNHCR to set up an office in the country to assist Mozambican refugees. 
That same year, South Africa brought into force what became the last version of the 
Aliens Control Act. The Act was problematic in many respects; preserving the ex-
tensive discretion of the Department of Home Affairs in determining entry and resi-
dence, maintaining the odious policy of declaring individuals without legal resi-
dence to be ‘prohibited persons’, and reincorporating the notorious ‘ouster clause’ 
that shielded any decision of an immigration officer from judicial scrutiny. How-
ever, it still represented a break with the country’s racialised past, by removing ex-
plicit references to race. 
With the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the 
UNHCR and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1997, 
South Africa committed itself to collective approaches on border control issues, 
including refugee movements. Among other measures, this provided for co-
operation in the areas of: 
refugees, forced population movements into and within the region, migratory 
movements (and the) establishment and development of mechanisms for managing 
and addressing the root causes of the movements.45 
As this MoU confirmed, from a country that had faced decades of international iso-
lation, South Africa emerged as a key global player in the Southern African region, 
in the Organisation of African Unity, and at the United Nations. Guided principally 
by South Africa’s first interim constitution in 1993, the result of political negotia-
tion, the new policies that came into being all aimed to reflect the country’s democ-
ratic, constitutional culture, including its re-engagement in international affairs and 
legal process, and ending the country’s long period of international isolation.46 A 
key aspect of these national and international dispensations was the country’s em-
bracing of international human rights law – including refugee law – through the 
adoption of the 1993 Interim Constitution. The framing of the Constitution, which 
was the product of negotiations between the political movements and the nationalist 
government, and explicitly recognised South Africa’s international legal obliga-
tions, featured a great deal of involvement by civic actors.47 
However, in framing a rights-based refugee policy in accordance with the con-
stitutional imperatives posed by the 1993 Interim Constitution, the South African 
government faced two main initial challenges. First, there was the obvious need to 
                                                        
44  (‘Interview with C. Schravesande’ 2006). 
45  (Gabarone Memorandum 1996). 
46  For twenty years, from 1974 until democratic elections in 1994, South Africa was excluded from 
participating in the debates of the UN General Assembly, which routinely condemned the govern-
ment‘s policies of apartheid. 
47  (Spitz and Chaskalson 2000). 
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reform the highly problematic and unconstitutional normative framework repre-
sented by the Aliens Control Act. The second main challenge was to provide a du-
rable solution for the several hundred thousand Mozambicans who had obtained 
refuge in former ‘homeland’ areas of South Africa, although their legal residence 
had never been formally recognised. 
This normative commitment on the part of the South African government, to be 
governed not only by its national constitution, but also by international refugee law, 
laid the structural basis for the expression of civic agency that sought to interact 
with government and either (1) frame a particular policy, (2) support its implemen-
tation, or (3) hold the government accountable to this policy through the courts. But 
this is only part of the picture. As the next section explains, civic actors that inter-
acted with the South African government emerged from a history of political strug-
gle. 
3.3 POLITICAL STRUGGLE: THE ORIGINS OF CIVIC ACTORS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The South African anti-apartheid struggle, through its primary protagonist, the Af-
rican National Congress, was a political struggle, supported by a network of inde-
pendent civic organisations that exercised their capacity – or agency – against the 
oppressive South African regime on a collective, co-ordinated basis.48 From the 
politics of struggle, civic actors in South Africa later became involved in the poli-
tics of transition, playing key roles in political negotiations that ushered in an in-
terim constitution and, finally, accountable government and administration, with 
democratic elections in 1994. Immediately following the elections, South Africa 
ended many decades of international isolation, once again taking up its seat in the 
UN General Assembly and in other UN bodies, including the Security Council, and 
becoming engaged in helping to resolve other international conflicts. 
Transition to a democratic, accountable government in South Africa brought 
with it the politics of transformation. Civic actors had to redefine their roles in rela-
tion to government, even though this had been anticipated to some extent. As 
Khehla Shubane argued in 1992, following the hasty reconstruction of the liberation 
groups following their unbanning by the apartheid regime, there existed ‘no consen-
sus’ amongst those involved in the anti-apartheid struggle and negotiations process 
regarding ‘the role of civil society in constructing a post-apartheid democracy … 
other than on the need to move away from apartheid.’49 
This section describes some of the key pressures that led to the demise of white 
minority rule, and the roles fulfilled by civic actors that capitalised on these pres-
sures. It then explains how civic actors in South Africa trace their origins to two 
distinct types of civic actors from the political struggle against white domination, 
particularly its policies of influx control. One set of civic actors, mainly black, and 
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many of whom were inspired by Steve Biko‘s ‘black consciousness’ philosophy, 
had been engaged in political struggle both inside and outside South Africa, resist-
ing the government‘s racist and oppressive policies mainly through international 
advocacy and acts of civic disobedience in South Africa. Another set of civic actors, 
mainly white, had mobilised in indignant reaction to the government’s policies 
through mainly legal interventions; what Abel terms ‘politics by other means’.50 
Finally, this section explains how civic actors shifted from their anti-apartheid 
stance to becoming partners in South Africa’s transition from authoritarianism to a 
democratically accountable government. 
3.3.1 Pressures that led to the demise of white minority rule 
As explained earlier, leaving aside African resistance to white minority rule 
throughout 250 years of colonial domination and pressures between the British co-
lonialists and the Afrikaner community, organised black civic resistance began at 
the turn of the 20th century with the founding of the ANC. This resistance culmi-
nated in the 1950s, with the launch of the Defiance Campaign. Finally, coinciding 
with the emergence of additional civic groupings in the 1970s, the whites-only 
South African government found itself confronted with three principal sources of 
pressure, which ultimately led to the demise of white minority rule. First, the gov-
ernment’s policies of rigid control on the internal and external movement of people, 
and associated repressive security policies, were being openly flouted by civics that 
had organised large-scale acts of defiance; and were, moreover, hugely expensive to 
administer. Second, the country faced noticeable emigration of whites, who felt that 
better opportunities lay elsewhere. Finally, there was pressure from an increasing 
number of individual states, the United Nations and an internationally mobilised 
civic anti-apartheid movement, which insisted that South Africa renounce its apart-
heid policies or face continued international isolation. 
Initially, the apartheid regime responded to this pressure with a new strategy that 
aimed to entrench the unequal position of whites in South Africa in a manner that 
would be seen as acceptable to Western states and the United Nations. The intended 
impact of this new strategy externally was meant to convey the impression that sig-
nificant political concessions were being made, while internally the intended impact 
was to divide the political movements by encouraging nominal self-rule by the 
country’s black majority. 
Four main programmes were developed to maintain the country’s apartheid re-
gime in a manner that the government hoped would be supported by the West. The 
first programme set up a so-called tri-cameral parliament, the main component of 
which was composed of whites and vested with principal law-making authority; two 
other ‘parliaments’ were composed of Indians and coloureds51 respectively, and had 
                                                        
50  (Abel 1995). 
51  This term was both a racial category under the apartheid regime, and a self-designation by descen-
dants of the mostly Muslim, Malay-descended community in South Africa. 
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more limited law-making authority. The second programme envisaged that political 
representation for Africans was to be vested in the leaders of so-called ‘Homelands’ 
or ‘Bantustans’; these were argued to be legally autonomous of South Africa, and 
supported through ‘development assistance’ by South Africa, but were in fact only 
nominally independent. The third programme revamped South Africa’s migration 
policies to actively encourage, rather than passively allow, white immigrants from 
Europe, the USA and former colonies such as Australia and New Zealand; a hand-
ful of ‘honorary whites’ from the Far East were also permitted to immigrate to 
South Africa under certain conditions. Africans were generally excluded from im-
migrating to South Africa, and active efforts were taken to prevent solidarity activ-
ists from entering the country. The final programme re-equipped South Africa’s 
security agencies in order to strengthen their hold on the country by vigorously 
clamping down on political dissent and reinforcing the powers of the police, includ-
ing in matters of border control. 
For a while, the government‘s four-pronged strategy worked. The United States, 
Britain and other economically powerful countries continued to support the South 
African government. Leaders of the political movements were routinely labelled as 
‘terrorists’. Even pressure from the United Nations withered.52 Internally, it became 
almost impossible to organise politically, as the government murdered or impris-
oned activists, or forced them into exile. Externally, South Africa pursued a policy 
of regional destabilisation, supporting dissident right-wing regimes, particularly 
against what they regarded as communist regimes in Mozambique and Angola. 
However, many years of co-ordinated, internal mass mobilisation, and growing 
international political isolation, began to have an impact. Even as P.W. Botha 
launched his policy of ‘total onslaught’ in the 1980s, white minority rule had al-
ready begun to crumble. The fate of these policies was to be sealed in a strategic 
shift of emphasis on the part of the political and resistance movements, under-
ground and in exile, as well as by anti-apartheid solidarity activists in South Africa 
and abroad. Without abandoning political organising, armed resistance and spec-
tacular acts of sabotage, the ANC placed more emphasis on mass civic resistance 
through trade unions, social movements and other civic network structures that the 
government had not (yet) banned. The political movements were supported by gov-
ernments in the ‘front-line states’, especially Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania, who 
provided political and logistical support to the ANC. Further support came from 
solidarity activists in Europe and North America, who mobilised a worldwide boy-
cott and put increasing pressure on their own governments to isolate South Africa’s 
apartheid regime. Mass mobilisation culminated in the forming of the United De-
mocratic Movement, and eventually the release of Nelson Mandela and other long-
term political prisoners in 1990, ushering in a formal process of negotiation and 
political transition to a democratic government. 
                                                        
52  This is evidenced by a relative silence in the 1980s that followed a wave of applications in the 
1970s, under the so-called 1503 confidential review mechanism of the UN. 
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3.3.2 New forms of civic expression 
Ironically, the government‘s formal efforts to suppress freedom of expression led to 
new and highly creative forms of civic expression. As mentioned previously, the 
white minority government’s policies not only controlled movement, but restricted 
civic association along racial lines, and stifled freedom of expression. Efforts by the 
government to control movement and civic association along racial lines generated 
different types of responses, which activists adopted in challenging the government. 
While formal opportunities for civic participation in these restrictive conditions 
were almost non-existent for non-whites in South Africa, it was possible for black 
activists to organise outside South Africa and ‘underground’. Political movements 
and civic organisations were formed, aimed at challenging the legitimacy of the 
government’s apartheid system. 
Building on the precedents set by the ANC and PAC, which were banned in 
1960, and most of their leaders imprisoned following the notorious Rivonia trials in 
1963 and 1964, numerous civic organisations were formed.53 These civics repre-
sented oppressed constituencies, and were established in opposition to the South 
African government from the 1970s through to the 1980s. They operated at the 
grassroots level, both legally and outside the law. While the civics took root in po-
litical struggle, they also aimed to provide services that were denied by the govern-
ment, such as proper education, health care and other basic services.54 These or-
ganisations included: the Western Cape Relief Fund, the National Association of 
Democratic Lawyers, the Black Lawyers Association, various civic associations 
organised under the banner of the South African National Civics Organisation 
(SANCO), and township-based Street Committees. 
In addition to the ANC and PAC, a further, important source of inspiration to the 
civic organisations was the black consciousness movement. Not being part of any 
formal political association, the movement drew much of its inspiration from the 
work of the late Steve Biko and fellow founder Barney Pityana. The movement 
formally established the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO), but its 
powerful ideology also inspired the establishment of other ‘grassroots’ civic struc-
tures. 
Referring to a ‘dangerous vacuum’ that had been created by the government‘s 
banning of African political parties such as the ANC and PAC, yet rejecting the 
notion of ‘working with the system’, Biko recognised the leadership of imprisoned 
political activists such as Mandela, Sobukwe, Kathrada and others. He emphasised 
the need for oppressed communities to organise themselves. Biko encouraged the 
                                                        
53  The Rivonia trials aimed to undermine the ANC by prosecuting several members of its leadership 
for acts of treason, which led to long prison sentences. In fact, as (Mandela 1994: 467-469) ex-
plains, the concentration of leaders in prison strengthened its resolve. Robben Island, where many 
of the ANC’s political leaders were imprisoned, became known as the ‘university’. 
54  (Botha 1992: 62-66). 
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formation of a broad-based coalition of interests, addressing the fragmentation that 
various South African governments had long fostered.55 
Explicitly rejecting the notion of ‘coloured’, ‘Indian’ and ‘native’ peoples, Biko 
insisted that all oppressed peoples should properly refer to themselves as ‘black’ in 
making much-needed contributions to their local and national communities in the 
national struggle against apartheid. 
There is a lot of community work that needs to be done in promoting a spirit of self-
reliance and black consciousness among all black people in South Africa. … Fur-
ther operation within the system may only lead to political castration and a creation 
of an “I-am-a-coloured” attitude which will prove a setback to the black man’s pro-
gramme of emancipation and will create major obstacles in the establishment of a 
non-racial society once our problems are settled. … Thus in an effort to maintain 
our solidarity and relevance to the situation we must resist all attempts at the frag-
mentation of our resistance.56 
Although South African police interrogators murdered Biko on 12 September 
1977,57 his ‘black consciousness’ ideas formed a hugely motivating ideology for 
generations of political leaders, activists, progressive academics and social reform-
ers. 
3.3.3 Court challenges – politics by other means 
Meanwhile, efforts by (mainly white) liberal South Africans during the anti-
apartheid struggle, particularly through a series of court challenges, were also sig-
nificant. Organised opposition to the apartheid regime by liberal, progressive and 
largely white organisations initially took root in the 1950s, in opposition to the gov-
ernment‘s removal of ‘coloured’ people from the voting role, and then grew in the 
late 1970s and 80s. 
The emergence of these liberal organisations reflected a growing indignation by 
an important constituency of white middle-class professionals – as well as clergy 
and some politicians – against the government‘s racist policies, or at least the man-
ner in which they were implemented. These organisations included: Black Sash, 
Legal Resources Centre, Lawyers for Human Rights, Detained Persons Support 
Committee (later the Human Rights Committee), Institute for a Democratic South 
Africa, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and the Trauma Centre 
of Cape Town. Faith-based NGOs made similar contributions, and included: the 
South African Catholic Bishops’ Conference, South African Council of Churches, 
Jewish Board of Deputies and the African Muslim Agency. 
                                                        
55  From an article entitled ‘Fragmentation of the Black Resistance’, first published in the SASO 
Newsletter of June 1971 and reprinted in (Steve Biko and Stubbs 1996). 
56  (Steve Biko and Stubbs 1996: 38-39). 
57  (Burns 1977). Although the government tried to cover up Biko‘s murder, the police officers in-
volved later applied for amnesty to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission for 
their roles in his death. 
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The mainly individual legal claims launched by liberal South Africans against 
the government were not necessarily designed to achieve a concrete outcome. 
Rather, they were a form of what Abel termed ‘politics by other means’ that sup-
ported the civics and political movements. As Abel acknowledges: 
Law was by no means the only or even the most important factor in the struggle 
against apartheid. The legal victories of the 1980s were part of an intensified wave 
of resistance in a cycle of challenge and repression dating back to World War II: the 
Defiance Campaign, women’s refusal to carry passes, the treason and Rivonia tri-
als, Sharpeville, black power, and Soweto … The legal battles … did not win the 
war by themselves. But they empowered the masses while offering some protection 
from state retaliation.58 
In other words, the legal challenges by white liberal organisations and their lawyers 
aimed to correct the normative framework through remedial measures, and eventu-
ally through an accumulation of individual legal challenges that undermined the 
basis of the government‘s apartheid system. Accordingly, challenges were brought 
against a whole range of policies, from the Group Areas Act, forced removals and 
censorship, to acts of state terrorism. 
3.3.4 Civic partners in political transition 
By the time democratic changes became visible in the early 1990s, civic actors pre-
viously in opposition to the South African government became partners in the proc-
ess of transition, particularly following the country’s first, democratic elections in 
1994. As the relationships between state and civic actors were redefined, what for 
decades was a civic-led struggle for social justice against an illegitimate govern-
ment was transformed into a legitimate, state-led process of nation building. Many 
of those formerly with civic groups began to fulfil various roles in government, 
from mid-level and senior civil servants to parliamentarians, judges and human 
rights commissioners. Civic actors became engaged in the framing of policies to 
address South Africa’s significant political, social and economic challenges. Par-
ticularly notable was the development of an interim Constitution, which involved 
considerable civic input and was viewed as ‘a major stepping stone towards a full 
constitutional democracy in South Africa’.59 
While democratic changes in South Africa from the 1990s onwards initially had 
a disorienting impact on civic organisations, which had to re-organise themselves to 
a very different political context, the benefits of an accountable government also 
became apparent. The ‘struggle’ continued, but with different priorities. In addition 
to consolidating democracy and addressing grinding poverty, both the new govern-
ment and civic actors were immediately confronted with a range of new issues that 
neither had seriously dealt with before, if at all. 
                                                        
58  (Abel 1995: 548-549). 
59  (Spitz and Chaskalson 2000: 2). 
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One of these new issues in the context of South Africa’s transformation con-
cerned South Africa’s policy and treatment of asylum seekers and refugees. Politi-
cal changes in South Africa meant that the country began to be seen as a safe place 
of refuge. Furthermore, the economic opportunities in South Africa were much bet-
ter, comparatively, than in other African countries. This combination of factors led 
to increasing numbers of individuals who had fled persecution and conflict arriving 
in South Africa to apply for political asylum. South Africa went from being a refu-
gee-producing to a refugee-hosting country, but lacked policies and implementation 
structures, let alone an institutional knowledge of how to respond to these new chal-
lenges. The government was forced to draw upon not only its own ‘home-grown’ 
constitutional culture, but also from international law and institutions in developing 
a refugee law and policies of implementation. 
However, as important as new policies and legislation were in ‘correcting’ exist-
ing norms, including legislation to protect refugees, in the first decade of South Af-
rica’s ‘new’ democracy, it became clear that policy reform on its own was not 
enough. As the next section explains, policy formation and implementation form 
part of a larger and ongoing process requiring constant ‘maintenance’ through good 
civic co-ordination, persistent and proactive monitoring and advocacy efforts, as 
well as training at all levels, research and finally litigation, drawing on administra-
tive law and human rights principles.  
3.4 CIVIC CO-ORDINATION: THE EMERGENCE OF A REFUGEE RIGHTS 
ADVOCACY NETWORK 
This section explains how the history of policy transformation and civic mobilisa-
tion in South Africa is tied to the present, and in particular how civic actors co-
ordinated their efforts and formed a refugee rights advocacy network that helped to 
frame and enforce refugee protection norms in South Africa. Policy inputs by civic 
actors were initially made in co-operation with the Department of Home Affairs 
(DHA). 
While interactions between civic actors and national government agencies to 
promote a rights-based approach to refugee policy were initially conciliatory, and 
policy proposals were openly discussed and debated, tensions eventually emerged 
and conciliation gave way to the courts as the principal platform upon which refu-
gee rights were mediated. Furthermore, when their relationships with national gov-
ernment agencies soured, civic actors began to develop co-operative relationships 
with local or municipal government. 
Co-ordinated inputs to the framing of new refugee policies, assisting in policy 
implementation and litigating for policy enforcement are covered in chapters four, 
five and six respectively. These co-ordinated inputs have relied on well-organised 
civic networks. Organisations first co-ordinated their interventions on a regional 
basis. This was followed by the emergence, in 1996, of a national advocacy plat-
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form. By 2006, greater efforts were taken by civic organisations to direct their ad-
vocacy to local government. 
3.4.1 Regionally-based structures 
Once the UNHCR was permitted to operate in South Africa in 1991, it began to 
identify local implementing partners and to set up structures at the regional (provin-
cial) level. Part of this strategy was to set up provincially-based “Refugee Forums”, 
initially in Cape Town and eventually also in Durban, Gauteng and Port Elizabeth. 
Regionally-based NGO structures, once termed ‘refugee forums’, emerged – and 
dissolved – leading in some cases to serious gaps in assistance, the failure of advo-
cacy and, in the worst cases, the actual marginalisation of refugee communities. In 
other cases they led to innovative, new ways of organising assistance as well as lo-
cal and national advocacy. 
All of these Forums eventually collapsed, mainly because of two principal fac-
tors. The first was the failure to understand and acknowledge existing structures of 
civic mobilisation. The second, even more significant factor was the tendency of 
South African NGO service-providers to ignore refugee voices. 
One of these regionally-based networks was the Gauteng Refugee Forum 
(GRF), established in the mid-1990s by the UNHCR, and seeking to incorporate the 
work of service providers and refugee advocates in Johannesburg and Pretoria.60 By 
1999, at a meeting held in Johannesburg to ‘elect’ new refugee representatives, 
refugees and service providers actually physically came to blows with each other. A 
few months later, the GRF no longer existed, after most of its members withdrew 
their membership. In the vacuum that was created, refugees began to organise 
themselves seriously. The Co-ordinating Body of Refugee Communities (CBRC) 
was one of the more successful initiatives. The CBRC set up volunteer advisory and 
referral services, especially to newly-arrived asylum seekers, through an office in 
Johannesburg. It also monitored the activities of the DHA, facilitated access to bank 
accounts and intervened when an asylum seeker or refugee was arrested.61 
Similar problems plagued the Durban Refugee Forum (DRF), which was also 
founded and funded in part by the UNHCR, but which collapsed in 2000 after its 
main sources of funding were withdrawn. Refugees were unhappy with the way in 
which they were treated,62 and under the impression that the Forum was gathering 
money on behalf of refugees with nothing to show for it. According to Pierre 
                                                        
60  Minutes of meetings held by the GRF between 1997 and 1999 exposed a growing rift between the 
South African service providers and refugee community leaders. At one memorable meeting I at-
tended at the offices of the South African Red Cross Services in August 1997, invited refugee rep-
resentatives were asked for their input by the chairperson. When the input amounted to criticism of 
the manner in which they were being treated by the South African NGOs, the chairperson yelled 
that the refugees ‘should not bite the hand that feeds them’. 
61  (‘Interview with D. Ndessomin’ 2006). 
62  The existence of serious tensions between the refugee community and the Durban Refugee Forum 
was confirmed in a report by (Tlou 2000). 
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Matate: ‘refugees felt marginalised by its existence. There was no forum to bring 
refugees together with the DRF. Many fights erupted … Much money was in-
volved. Money was not reaching the refugees’.63 
There were violent incidents at the DRF’s advice office64 as well, and allega-
tions of corruption on the part of at least one of its Board members, although these 
latter allegations were difficult to substantiate independently.65 
The Eastern Cape, where Nelson Mandela and Steve Biko were born, had long 
been a centre of civic mobilisation and resistance. And yet Refugee Forums here 
also faced problems, although this was due more to opportunism and apathy than to 
the conscious exclusion of refugees. In East London, a Refugee Forum was created 
that operated on a small scale, and did not pay anyone a salary. However, according 
to Masha, ‘the moment the money came, that’s when things went wrong’.66 After 
lengthy disputes over payment for small-scale projects, the co-ordinator of the Fo-
rum eventually left the country with the Forum’s chequebook. The Forum was im-
mediately blacklisted by other NGOs. Reflecting on the problems faced by the Fo-
rum, Tony Masha summed it up as a problem common to civic organisations 
established after 1994: ‘there is a perception that if you set up an NGO, you can 
make money’. In Port Elizabeth, it was reported that refugee communities viewed 
the Forum as ‘catering for the NGOs only’.67 Although the Port Elizabeth Refugee 
Forum collapsed in 2000, civic organisations continued to provide services. Multi-
ple correspondents interviewed in 2006 confirmed the existence of a ‘referral cul-
ture’, where NGO representatives were more likely to refer a client to someone else 
than to address the problem themselves.68  
The Cape Town Refugee Forum was reported to be the most successful of the 
region-based forums, establishing various sub-programmes on education, emer-
gency assistance and shelter.69 However, it too faced internal divisions and was 
eventually collapsed into a single NGO, the Cape Town Refugee Centre.70 
By 2006, NGOs in Durban and Cape Town seemed to have overcome many of 
the problems faced earlier, establishing more informal networks that seemed to op-
erate more effectively. In Durban, following the short-lived existence of the Durban 
                                                        
63  (‘Interview with P. Matate’ 2006). 
64  A Dutch volunteer on an exchange programme at the Durban Refugee Forum in 1999 was threat-
ened with a knife, but fortunately was not physically injured. Security issues had not improved ac-
cording to (Tlou 2000). Neither had a procedure been put in place to regulate the entry of refugee 
clients, nor had provision been made to secure the privacy of client consultations. 
65  Nevertheless, the unsolicited allegations of corruption were communicated to me by numerous 
correspondents I interviewed in Durban during March and April 2006 who were directly or indi-
rectly involved in the operations of the Durban Refugee Forum and who wished to remain anony-
mous in regard to this issue. 
66  (‘Interview with A. Masha’ 2006). 
67  (Tlou 2000). 
68  (‘Interview with T. Lembethe’ 2006); (‘Interview with A. Lane’ 2006); (‘Interview with Somali 
Community Reps.’ 2006); (‘Interview with the SAHRC (Port Elizabeth)’ 2006). 
69  (Tlou 2000). 
70  (‘Interview with F. Khan’ 2006). 
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Refugee Network, which had never called a public meeting, an ‘Indaba’ (meeting) 
was called by Durban refugee service-provider NGOs in 2003. With the purposes of 
‘sharing information’ with the refugee community, the ‘Indaba’ reportedly broke 
new ground in the hitherto strained relations between refugees and service provid-
ers. As Matate explained: ‘At the meeting, service providers explained that we are 
not the refugee network, we are the service providers and we should be accountable 
to you (the refugees) … it is your right to know what we are doing’.71 
The Durban Refugee Service Providers Network (DRSPN) was established as a 
direct outcome of this meeting, and drew on the experiences of past activism in 
South Africa. According to Matate, ‘We made contact with refugee country repre-
sentatives, student leaders, tribal leaders, church leaders. Some refugees began de-
veloping a new refugees’ network, called the KZN Refugee Council.’72 
The loose-knit DRSPN involved well-established organisations such as the 
Mennonites, who developed a ‘facilitative’ social advisory programme informed by 
their years of experience and networks in Durban, and forming their own guidelines 
for service provision, rather than those established by the UNHCR.73 Activities for 
refugees were independently undertaken by others, such as the women’s empower-
ment organisation Bukani Bafazi (‘Women Awake’), a well-established NGO 
within the Durban South African Muslim community.74 
In Cape Town, the Tutumike network was established, involving a broad range 
of organisations, many of whom had been disenchanted with the experiences of the 
Cape Town Refugee Forum. Tutumike confined its activities to exchanging infor-
mation on what NGOs were doing, organising public awareness activities to combat 
rising xenophobia, and determining ways in which refugees could be better as-
sisted.75 
3.4.2 Working outside the structures 
Not all service providers and refugee advocates operated on a collaborative basis, 
and at times some were more effective as a result. For example, seasoned activists 
such as Ghadija Vallie preferred to operate outside the formalised regional and na-
tional structures. Informed by her long experience working as a paralegal and com-
munity organiser, as former head of the Western Cape Relief Fund, she worked on 
the basis of the same principles that informed her earlier work. She summed up her 
approach as follows: ‘The only expectation of those working in the (Fund) was to 
break down apartheid. We didn’t always think about the consequences; we just 
did.’76 
                                                        
71  (‘Interview with P. Matate’ 2006). 
72  (‘Interview with P. Matate’ 2006) 
73  (‘Interview with Y. Rajah’ 2006). 
74  (‘Interview with S. Francis’ 2006). 
75  (Handmaker 2006) and (‘Interview with F. Khan’ 2006). 
76  (‘Interview with G. Vallie’ 2006). 
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Rather than work for government when the ANC came to power in 1994, Vallie 
continued her community-based development work and activism, with women’s 
empowerment programmes and various community-development initiatives that she 
had helped to establish. She also operated a local business and consciously em-
ployed refugees. Beyond offering several refugees and asylum seekers a job, Vallie 
organised evening classes for them at local colleges, as well as affordable accom-
modation and, in some cases, food and living items from other businesses and or-
ganisations. All of these efforts were possible because of Vallie’s long-developed 
network, that traced itself back to her activism of the 1980s. If it were reported to 
Vallie that a refugee or asylum seeker was being mistreated, she would phone up 
the DHA, within which she had identified contact persons and obtained their cell 
phone numbers. Alternatively, Vallie would head directly to the Refugee Reception 
Office to lodge a complaint. If someone were arrested, often in the middle of the 
night, she would head directly to the police station. Vallie also maintained contact 
with local NGOs to whom she would refer matters.77 
As with her previous work, Vallie ‘did’ what had to be done at that particular 
moment, and with a keen knowledge of the surrounding politics. This high level of 
commitment and personal involvement became well-known, and was much valued 
by the refugee community, who would often come to her first for advice.78 
3.4.3 National advocacy 
As Vallie’s work illustrates especially, the history of the South African anti-
apartheid struggle, from the forming of political movements to social movements 
and civic networks and later NGOs, laid the foundations for national advocacy, re-
alising hard-won democratic dispensations. The adaptability of these organisations’ 
approaches provided the context for civic society initiatives to address ‘new’ issues, 
such as refugee and migrant rights protection, although not all shared Vallie’s ex-
ceptional experience. 
A critical analysis of national civic advocacy, as contained in chapters 4, 5 and 6 
of this book, emphasises the importance of looking beyond policy norms, and the 
importance of well-informed and organised structures for monitoring and advocacy. 
In 1997, for example, organisations came together in a loose-knit initiative known 
as the Refugee Rights Consortium (RRC). The RRC lobbied the DHA as well as the 
Department for Correctional Services (Prisons) and Police for better treatment to 
refugees and asylum seekers at a national level. It also came together with regional 
                                                        
77  (‘Interview with G. Vallie’ 2006) 
78  The role of Vallie in the past, and the continued regard that organisations and individuals had for 
her, was reiterated by several others with whom I spoke. These included a High Court Judge, Par-
liamentarians, staff of the Legal Resources Centre, Black Sash, National Association of Democratic 
Lawyers, UCT Legal Aid Clinic, the Trauma Clinic and Bush Community Radio Station, as well as 
farm workers, members of the refugee community and countless others. Former solidarity activists 
working for the Holland Committee for Southern Africa also confirmed that Vallie was a highly re-
spected figure, both locally and internationally. 
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networks (Forums) of service providers to refugees. The aim of all concerned was 
to be more structured in their approaches to advocacy and service provision. The 
civic society initiative on refugee issues that eventually emerged from these efforts, 
still aimed at engaging government, refugees and the UNHCR, became known as 
the National Consortium on Refugee Affairs (NCRA). 
Much could be said about the work of the NCRA that goes beyond the scope of 
this study. While it originally embarked on a more confrontational advocacy strat-
egy that sought to change the policy and treatment of refugees, in the last few years 
of its existence it tended to focus less on advocacy and more on awareness activities 
and maintaining communication with the DHA, with whom it collaborated in a 
backlog-reduction programme in 2001 and 2002. However, in 2006, under pressure 
from its members, the NCRA began to return to a more advocacy-oriented role. It 
issued a report that comprehensively assessed current failings within the refugee 
status determination procedure, including lack of access to refugee reception of-
fices. Furthermore, it addressed issues concerning access to recognisable identity 
documents, access to livelihoods, arrest and deportation and the situation of unac-
companied refugee minors.79 
In fact, it was openly recognised by 2006 that advocacy was a weakness of 
NGOs in South Africa. A survey by the University of the Witwatersrand on behalf 
of the Atlantic Philanthropies foundation identified advocacy as a major gap.80 In 
any event, by 2007 the NCRA had dissolved, and was replaced by the Consortium 
on Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA), which produced a regular 
newsletter and appeared to return to a more proactive approach to civic advocacy. 
CoRMSA owed much to the efforts of researchers at the University of the Wit-
watersrand, which as a member of the NCRA had been one of the most vocal con-
cerning the lack of a collective national advocacy strategy. 
3.4.4 Research centres 
Research and teaching on migration, forced migration and refugee studies in South 
Africa and the region grew to be a major focus of universities, in South Africa and 
internationally, between 1996 and 2006. One of the earliest research programmes to 
be developed was the Centre for Migration Studies at the University of the Western 
Cape. The University of Cape Town’s Faculty of Law began teaching refugee law 
in 1996, and conducted policy research on migration and refugee issues. This was 
followed by a similar programme established in the School of Law at the University 
of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. A Forced Migration Studies Programme 
(FMSP) was also established at the University of the Witwatersrand in 1997, and 
grew to be a major research and teaching programme on forced migration studies in 
South Africa. Furthermore, the Child Law Project at the Centre for Human Rights 
                                                        
79  (Ncra 2006). 
80  (Palmary 2006). 
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in the Faculty of Law at the University of Pretoria began taking on a number of 
cases concerning refugee children, establishing some important legal precedents. 
Other research centres and think tanks involved in migration and refugee issues 
during the period 1996-2006 have included the Community Agency for Social En-
quiry, the Institute of Security Studies in Pretoria, the Centre for Policy Studies, the 
Centre for Development and Enterprise, the South African History Archive and the 
Human Sciences Research Council. The Institute for Democracy in South Africa 
(IDASA), a Cape Town-based NGO, set up a major programme with Queens Uni-
versity of Canada called the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP), but 
by 2006 the Programme had begun to scale back its activities substantially. 
Other international organisations concerning themselves with migration and 
refugee matters in South Africa included the Amsterdam-based Association of 
European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), the New York-based organisation 
Human Rights Watch, and Washington D.C.-based organisations US Committee for 
Refugees and Migration Policy Institute. The Refugee Studies Programme at Ox-
ford University and Centre for Refugee Studies and Osgoode School of Law at 
York University in Canada also took a considerable interest in South African migra-
tion and refugee issues. 
Research dialogues were facilitated by a series of (mainly) policy-oriented con-
ferences between 1996 and 2006, mostly organised by SAMP. Lawyers for Human 
Rights organised a policy conference in March 1998, as did other research organisa-
tions such as the Human Sciences Research Council. The NCRA, with funding 
from the European Union Foundation for Human Rights in South Africa, commis-
sioned a number of important research papers that addressed key policy issues. Fur-
thermore, researchers within South Africa and abroad participated in the South Af-
rican Immigration (SAIMMIG) e-mail list-server, established by Jonathan Klaaren 
at the School of Law of the University of the Witwatersrand in 1996, and the 
shorter-lived LHR-Refugees list-server, established in 1997 but disbanded two 
years later. The SAMP also circulated information, including a compiled listing of 
related news articles, to a list of subscribed e-mail addresses. The list-servers be-
came an important platform for information-sharing and co-ordinated responses by 
lawyers, either in respect of individual cases or more generally on policy issues. 
3.4.5 Lawyers’ networks: policy feedback, advice and representation 
Lawyers’ networks emerged between 1996 and 2006, focusing on policy reform 
and direct assistance to asylum seekers and refugees. A legal and policy sub-
committee of the NCRA (and its predecessor, the Refugee Rights Consortium) pro-
vided an important platform for discussing policy issues. The lawyers who led these 
clinics were principally from the Legal Resources Centre in Cape Town and Law-
yers for Human Rights, as well as University-based law clinics. There was also a 
handful of independent lawyers willing to handle refugee cases on a pro bono basis. 
However, their capacity to handle individual cases on an ad hoc basis was limited, 
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despite growing demand from asylum seekers and refugees who claimed their rights 
had been violated. 
A key development came in 2000 when the UNHCR decided to fund a network 
of independent legal advice offices for asylum seekers and refugees, while simulta-
neously closing its direct advisory function. With funding from the UNHCR, Law-
yers for Human Rights eventually established refugee law clinics in Pretoria, Jo-
hannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban.81 The UCT Legal Aid clinic, which had a 
long track record of advising and representing asylum seekers and refugees, ex-
panded its services to this community at the University of Cape Town with funding 
from the UNHCR.82 The Wits Law Clinic at the University of the Witwatersrand in 
Johannesburg also expanded its services to refugees and asylum seekers. Even para-
legal advisors handled some cases involving asylum seekers and refugees. In par-
ticular, the South African women’s rights organisation Black Sash became particu-
larly active through its Johannesburg office.83 As discussed in chapter five, advice 
offices connected with the National Paralegal Association became involved in a 
project to advise former Mozambican refugees in 2000.  
As the numbers of asylum seekers and refugees in South Africa increased, law-
yers’ networks began to rely increasingly on refugee networks for information 
about alleged violations. 
3.4.6 Refugee networks 
Refugees began to organise themselves in formal and informal structures to provide 
services and advocate on specific issues, particularly following the collapse of re-
gionally based Refugee Forums. These structures included the Co-ordinating Body 
of Refugee Communities (CBRC), the Somali Association of South Africa, and the 
Union of Refugee Women in Johannesburg, as well as Refugee Pastoral Care in 
Durban. Through these networks, refugees became involved in national advocacy, 
established links with politicians and, together with lawyers’ networks, initiated 
litigation. Furthermore, according to one, prominent refugee leader, refugee net-
works were among the first civic actors to have made contact with local government 
officials.84 
3.4.7 Working with local government 
In 2006, with relations between national government and civic organisations re-
garded by South African lawyers to be at an ‘all time low’ since 1994,85 local gov-
ernment and local police forces became increasingly important counterparts for 
civic actors keen to improve the living conditions of asylum seekers and refugees 
                                                        
81  (‘Interview with J. Van Garderen (1)’ 2006). 
82  (‘Interview with F. Khan’ 2006). 
83  (‘Interview with A. Lane’ 2006). 
84  (‘Interview with D. Ndessomin’ 2006). 
85  (‘Interview with W. Kerfoot’ 2006). 
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and their treatment by police officers and the public. Reflecting these new devel-
opments, the FMSP had published an important collection in 2004 on the prospects 
for working together with local governments.86 The collection addressed the many 
challenges faced by the city of Johannesburg, NGOs and broader South African 
society in welcoming, accommodating and indeed actively integrating (or not) 
forced migrants into the community. 
Partnerships between civics and local government emerged, including a Local 
Government Working Group set up by the FMSP at the University of the Wit-
watersrand in 2005, together with Johannesburg-based NGOs. By 2006, civic net-
works such as Tutumike had negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
City of Cape Town on how the municipal government should treat asylum seekers 
and refugees living in the city. A similar agreement has been made with the Johan-
nesburg municipality. These agreements on ‘city citizenship’ and collaborative fo-
rums have gone much further than statements by national government departments 
in declaring the civil rights of migrants and refugees and their access to social and 
economic rights by the various municipal agencies.  
3.5 FROM POLITICAL STRUGGLE TO SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 
As this chapter has illustrated, South Africa’s refugee policy, and the civic actors 
that lobbied for it, have emerged from a history of political struggle; with democ-
ratic elections and the emergence of an accountable government in 1994, civic ac-
tors have shifted their focus to social transformation. This transformation has in-
volved efforts not only to address massive social and economic inequalities in 
South Africa, but to engage with the African continent and the rest of the world. As 
South Africa has emerged from international isolation, it has opened its doors to 
refugees, the victims of persecution in other countries, shifting – as mentioned ear-
lier – from being a refugee-producing to a refugee-hosting country. 
Social transformation has not been easy. Institutionalised racism and the brutal 
methods of enforcement that were once sanctioned by the government have proven 
to be some of the greatest challenges that South Africa’s government has had to 
contend with in its post-democratic period. This was illustrated in 2000 by a deeply 
disturbing episode, reported in the local and international press, of Mozambicans 
being used in live ‘training exercises’ for South African police dogs. Film clips 
showed terrified Mozambicans desperately trying to avoid the dogs, held by white 
police officers who appeared to be entertained by the experience. Mario Sevene, the 
Mozambique Minister of Labour, responded to these attacks, saying they were: 
‘abominable, horrible … an assault against human rights’,87 and the South African 
Police Services, fully aware of how the incident rekindled memories of South Af-
rica under apartheid, responded with similar sentiments.88 
                                                        
86  (Landau 2004). 
87  (‘Condemnation of SA Police Brutality’ 2000). 
88  (Belvedere 2006: 217). 
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As previously indicated, and with an open acknowledgement that there are gaps 
in national advocacy, civic actors have been engaged in a process of reflection on 
what roles they can constructively fulfil through civic-state interactions, either in 
assisting the government to meet its human rights obligations, or in holding the 
government accountable for its failure to meet these obligations. Accordingly, the 
following three chapters explore interactions in which civic actors helped to frame 
the content of a government-proposed refugee policy, assisted the government in 
the implementation of a policy, or confronted the government when its policies or 
practices fell short of its national and international obligations towards refugees in 
South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 4  
NO EASY WALK:  
CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN REFUGEE 
POLICYMAKING 
 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the book’s first example of advocating state accountability 
through co-operative interactions by civic actors in order to promote the rights of 
refugees in South Africa; more specifically, it focuses on the co-operative interplay 
between civic actors and the government in the process of policy development. I 
contrast this example of co-operative interplay against the book’s three theoretical 
propositions: (1) The capacity of civic actors to hold states accountable is shaped by 
structural changes in the normative framework. (2) Boundaries that define the struc-
tural relationship between civic actors and the state must be appreciated if they want 
their interventions to lead to structural change. (3) Civic actors play a crucial role in 
mediating the translation of international legal norms into a locally relevant context; 
legal process is interactional. 
The analysis in this chapter draws on Archer’s analytical dualism approach to 
explain the interplay between civic actors and the South African state in order to 
promote the state’s human rights obligations towards refugees. This approach sees 
civic agency as heavily conditioned in its interplay with state-created structures that 
civic agency ultimately seeks to elaborate.1 This approach is relevant to examining 
not only the process of refugee policymaking, but also the process of policy imple-
mentation, as discussed in chapter five. In both cases, civic agency is conditioned in 
how it can respond to the government‘s legal and administrative implementation 
structures; and yet, as the illustrative examples in this chapter show, there is still 
some scope for elaborating these administrative structures and, in so doing, promot-
ing structural change. 
According to this approach, civic participation at both international and national 
levels – whether in state or government-led processes – has a limited, but poten-
tially significant, impact in policymaking and enhancing state accountability to 
promote, protect and fulfil internationally-constructed human rights obligations. 
                                                        
1  (Archer 1996). 
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Perspective plays a significant role in examining the interplay between civic ac-
tors and the government. Trans-national elites who participate in global policy 
process (including the NGOs and academics mentioned in this chapter) have a very 
different perspective to national or local civic actors. As Merry argues, ‘national 
and local actors who participate in transnational events and bring home what they 
learn … are the key players negotiating the divide between transnational actors and 
local activists’.2 Accordingly, civic actors fulfil the role of what Merry describes as 
‘translators’, mediating the process of applying global rules to local contexts.3 
Clearly, the relative remoteness of a civic actor is also linked to how legitimate a 
translator will be regarded by local constituencies. Kidder’s notion of externalisa-
tion, or social distance between the government lawmaker and civic actors, also 
explains how a given civic intervention has the potential both to lead to structural 
change and to impact on a civic actor’s critical independence. Social distance be-
tween the lawmaker (in this case the government of South Africa) and various local 
and transnational civic actors is revealed by divergences in meaning, interests and 
political positions. These divergences, which emerged during the framing as well as 
the implementation of refugee policy in South Africa, are partly revealed in the ex-
ternally-grounded reasons that civic actors and the government had for participating 
in the refugee policymaking process. 
The first part of this chapter explains how a political space emerged – interna-
tionally and in South Africa – for civic actors to participate in policymaking proc-
esses. The second part explains the context in which a formal refugee policy 
emerged in South Africa, but was regarded by civic actors as unconstitutional. The 
third part of this chapter traces civic involvement in the development of South Af-
rica’s first comprehensive refugee policy, explaining how the policy emerged from 
competing forces within government and among civic actors. The outcome was that 
the refugee policy process fell between two ‘tracks’, one of which led to the Refu-
gees Act of 1998, and the other becoming a hotly-contested debate over two very 
different visions of what a refugee policy ought to contain. The final part of this 
chapter evaluates the refugee policymaking process and the corresponding roles of 
civic actors and other external actors in this process, followed by an explanation of 
the principal challenges that emerged once the refugee policy finally came into 
force in April 2000. 
4.2 AN EMERGING SPACE FOR CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN POLICYMAKING 
The political space that emerged for civic actors to participate in policy processes in 
the 1990s in South Africa can be seen as part of what Ignatieff has characterised as 
a global human rights advocacy revolution.4 Higgins has provided a similar expla-
                                                        
2  (Merry 2006b: 20). 
3  (Merry 2006a). 
4  (Ignatieff 1999). 
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nation, in international law terms, as a space in which civic actors participate in 
international legal process alongside states and international organisations.5 The 
fact that international legal process involves multiple participants, all of whom have 
capacity to influence the outcome of the process, is similar to the potential that civic 
actors have to enhance state accountability at the national level, which is principally 
where social justice aspirations are realised.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, up until 1994 the government of South Af-
rica was closed to civic interactions, especially in the area of human rights; al-
though at the international level, civic actors were key players, mobilising for the 
isolation of the country’s former apartheid regime, regionally and in the United Na-
tions. Once South Africa resumed its functions within the United Nations and nor-
malised its diplomatic relations with countries that had long isolated it, the role of 
civic actors in the country also shifted dramatically. Having resisted, challenged or 
shamed the previous, authoritarian government, civic actors could then play an im-
portant role in bolstering the democracy-building efforts of the new government. 
There are two dimensions to civic participation in the area of human rights poli-
cymaking – and, by extension, refugee rights policymaking. First, civic actors par-
ticipate in international legal process, enhancing state accountability where global 
rules are made, and bringing a local context to this process. Second, civic transla-
tors assist government in formulating locally relevant policy responses and adminis-
trative structures to reflect these global rules.  
4.2.1 Participation in international legal process 
Civic participation in international legal process is mainly facilitated through the 
acquisition of formal, accredited status with international organisations.6 The inter-
national structures that civic agents interact with to promote state accountability 
include legal and political mechanisms that oversee state implementation of interna-
tionally binding obligations. 
A growing literature7 has illustrated the multi-dimensional participation of civic 
organisations promoting state accountability on the basis of international human 
rights law. The most well-known examples are the international human rights or-
ganisations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.8 South African or-
ganisations established to defend human rights nationally have also participated in 
                                                        
5  (Higgins 1994). 
6  For example, consultative status through the Economic and Social Council in the United Nations 
system and observer status at the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
7  (Korey 2003); (Welch 2001) and (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
8  Discussed by (Brown 2001) and (Winston 2001). Other human rights organisations include the 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), International Human Rights Federation (FIDH) and In-
terrights. Organisations have also gained prominence advocating for the defence of international 
human rights through regional mechanisms. These include the African League for the Defence of 
Human Rights (RADDHO), International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Derechos, Asian 
Human Rights Commission and Statewatch. 
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international meetings, fulfilling the roles of ‘upward’ translators of the local South 
African context during these meetings. 
Whatever their geographical area of focus, the agency wielded by civic organi-
sations to promote state accountability is always conditioned by legal and political 
structures and institutions established by states, either individually or as part of in-
ternational and supra-national institutions such as the United Nations. One relevant 
example of the interplay between civic agents and the state-established structures 
they seek to elaborate and reform is the work of the Executive Committee of the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (ExCom).9 
The ExCom is the principal global structure promoting legal and political ac-
countability of states who are state parties to the 1951 Convention (and 1967 Proto-
col) Relating to the Status of Refugees. It is also mandated to ‘advise the High 
Commissioner, at (his) request, in the exercise of (his) functions under the Statute 
of his Office’.10 This mandate includes the formulation of policies for refugee pro-
tection and humanitarian responses. While the principal participants in the ExCom 
are representatives of states that have ratified the Convention and Protocol, other 
states and international organisations (including those on a regional basis) are in-
vited to attend and participate as observers.11 Civic organisations are permitted not 
only to attend meetings, but to make interventions, although these are generally 
limited to one collective intervention per agenda item. At each annual meeting of 
the ExCom, conclusions on International Refugee Protection are drafted.12 These 
conclusions are much cited by civic actors and regarded by many courts as defini-
tive statements of international refugee law. 
South African NGO Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) began participating ac-
tively in meetings of the ExCom from 2000, and was especially active in 2001 dur-
ing the ‘Global Consultations on International Protection’ of the United National 
                                                        
9  Unsubstantiated assertions in this section are based on the author’s many years of experience work-
ing within the UN system, and particularly at meetings of ExCom. ExCom organises its consider-
able agenda through a steering committee, which each year holds two Standing Committee meet-
ings in the first and second quarters of the year, and an annual meeting, usually held in the last 
quarter of the year. 
10  (Statute of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 1957: Section 5(b)). 
11  Examples include states not party to the 1951 Convention, but who still participate actively, such as 
Pakistan, as well as the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the World Health Organisation, 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Palestine Liberation Organisation. 
12  NGO participation is co-ordinated by the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), 
which comprises a network of several hundred international and national organisations representing 
every continent. Civic actors have not only contributed to the formulation of policy guidelines, such 
as ExCom Conclusions. They have also drafted treaty language. The drafting of treaties is princi-
pally the responsibility of states as guided by the (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
1980). However, from the earliest work of the United Nations system, NGOs have participated ac-
tively in state-led policy debates, particularly within the United Nations system. (Welch 2001: 88) 
refers to the role of Amnesty International in proposing treaty language at UN meetings as ‘the or-
ganization’s area of most lasting impact (and) show that AI was a leader rather than a follower on 
the normative front’. 
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High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).13 The South African National Consor-
tium on Refugee Affairs (NCRA, now CoRMSA) has also attended ExCom and 
Pre-ExCom14 meetings. Despite their relative lack of experience within the UN sys-
tem, South African NGOs have played a prominent role in these consultations. For 
example, LHR made multiple submissions to the 2001 Global Consultations on 
socio-economic rights,15 on the Article 35 supervisory mechanism,16 and on the 
migration-asylum nexus.17 This was thanks to a close and amiable relationship be-
tween LHR staff and the NGO Liaison Officer of the UNHCR, and with the Chair 
of the Executive Committee, who in 2001 happened to be the first secretary of the 
South African High Commission in Geneva. LHR also built strategic and amiable 
relationships with large and experienced NGOs such as Amnesty International, Jes-
uit Refugee Services, Human Rights Watch, UN Quakers Office, Lawyers Commit-
tee for Human Rights, International Catholic Migration Commission and Interna-
tional Council of Voluntary Agencies, as well as prominent regional networks, 
including the Senegal-based pan-African Human Rights NGO RADDHO. The or-
ganisation has since also been actively involved in a global network on asylum and 
migrant detention issues.18 
Beyond the value of networking with similarly-minded organisations, attending 
meetings such as the ExCom has allowed South African civic organisations to ac-
quire relevant knowledge and skills regarding how international legal process oper-
ates, which has increased their level of legal consciousness. Furthermore, when in-
formed about the local perspective in which these global rules are to operate, the 
‘double consciousness’ that they possess has given civic actors the capacity not 
                                                        
13  This initiative of the UNHCR Division of International Protection, which was chaired by the gov-
ernment delegation from South Africa, coincided with the 50th Anniversary and meeting of State 
Parties to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention as well as the Agenda for Protection in December 
2001. 
14  Meetings of the ExCom are preceded and often paralleled by a series of preparatory meetings or-
ganised by NGOs and UNHCR. Known as Pre-ExCom, these meetings provide an opportunity for 
NGOs to formulate or consolidate their positions on key refugee protection issues, and to meet, in-
teract and debate with each other, with state delegates and especially with the UNHCR, particularly 
on issues that are to arise in the course of the committee’s agenda. 
15  NGO Statement: Social and Economic Rights, Written and oral submission drafted by Lawyers for 
Human Rights. Presented to the UNHCR Standing Committee, Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Programme, Paleis des Nations, Geneva, 25-28 June 2001. 
16  African Perspectives on Article 35 Supervision of the 1951 Refugee Convention and Complemen-
tary Monitoring Mechanisms, Written submission to the UNHCR Global Consultations on Refugee 
Protection (Third Track, Cambridge Round), produced by WARIPNET and RADDHO (Senegal), 
Africa Legal Aid (Ghana) and Lawyers for Human Rights (South Africa), 9-10 July 2001. 
17  NGO Background paper on the Refugee and Migration Interface, Written submission produced by 
several NGOs and presented to the UNHCR Global Consultations on International Protection, Pal-
ais des Nations, Geneva, 28 – 29 June, 2001. 
18  Confirmed by (‘Interview with J. Van Garderen (1)’ 2006).Van Garderen was co-ordinator of the 
Refugee Rights Project of Lawyers for Human Rights from 1999 – 2006. 
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only to inform global processes, but also to strengthen the translation of these rules 
into locally relevant policy responses.19 
4.2.2 Locally-relevant policy responses 
Just as South African human rights organisations have participated in meetings at 
the international level, alongside international human rights organisations such as 
Human Rights Watch, both South African and international organisations have been 
involved in monitoring violations and policy issues at the national level. In this 
way, civic actors have fulfilled the role of ‘downward’ translators of globally estab-
lished rules into locally relevant policy responses. 
States tend to feel constrained in terms of what implementing national legisla-
tion can encompass. Civic organisations fulfil a crucial role in ensuring that domes-
tic laws are translated in order to reflect a State’s treaty obligations. Civic organisa-
tions monitor whether national laws conform to treaty language, sometimes 
adopting the very same language, word for word,20 but they also seek to ensure that 
national laws reflect local realities. However, civic organisations do not always take 
a progressive position. They can also be highly protectionist, taking a very restric-
tive position on a country’s international obligations regarding human rights in gen-
eral and refugee rights in particular. 
For example, Schrag has illustrated civic society and state interaction in the re-
alisation of international refugee rights norms through a process of law-making in 
the United States.21 In the USA, the role of civic society has been polarised by pro-
gressive22 and protectionist23 elements. These contradictory roles have sought to 
steer legislation in one direction or another. Civic organisations and individuals 
advocating for a rights-regarding refugee policy in the USA have had to compete 
against other civic organisations advocating for stronger borders and annual limits 
on the number of immigrants,24 as well as corporate25 and media26 interests. The 
                                                        
19  (Merry 2006b: 217). 
20  For example, (Achieng 1999), of the NGO Foundation for Human Rights International (FHRI), 
explains how this was achieved in Uganda in the area of penal reform. 
21  (Schrag 2000), passim. 
22  These included organisations which insisted that the United States incorporate language consistent 
with the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, as interpreted by several decades of national and interna-
tional jurisprudence and state practice. 
23  These included organisations which insisted that the policy incorporate a restrictive approach that 
aimed at a largely white (i.e. European-descended) population, and generally aimed to reduce over-
all migration to the United States. 
24  (Schrag 2000: 41-42). These included interventions from an organisation calling itself the Federa-
tion for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and the Pioneer Fund, which operated from the 
1920s.  
25  (Schrag 2000: 41, 55) illustrates the roles of airline companies who were motivated to reduce pas-
senger waiting times and the costs of detention of undocumented migrants. 
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process of policymaking has also involved extensive input from experts27 and 
NGOs28 who have supported their arguments by reference to international human 
rights law and international refugee law. 
A very similar dynamic has existed in South Africa, where civic society has 
played a progressive role in translating a broad range of international human rights 
norms into binding legal and social norms at the national level. But civic organisa-
tions in South Africa advocating on immigration, refugee, and border control issues 
have also represented protectionist elements. Protectionist organisations in South 
Africa have to some extent been a product of the apartheid era. For example, the 
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), an independent research institute, pro-
duced a report in 1993, based on dubious research methodologies, which suggested 
that millions of immigrants were flooding into the country, and recommended that 
South Africa strengthen its borders as a matter of national security.29 The Institute 
of Security Studies, another South African organisation founded by former South 
African military officers, referred to this report as ‘one of the best books on the sub-
ject of undocumented population movements in Southern Africa’.30 While both the 
HSRC and Institute of Security Studies have since undergone significant changes 
and produced more robust research with a stronger focus on South Africa’s interna-
tional and domestic human rights obligations,31 some organisations, including the 
Helen Suzman foundation, a self-professed liberal organisation, have remained 
deeply xenophobic, as summed up in a 2004 article that argued: 
With illegal aliens streaming across our borders at the rate of one million per an-
num, we are literally importing “Africa” into our country. Logically, within twenty 
to thirty years, the quasi-Western experiment known as South Africa will be no 
more, and Johannesburg or Pretoria will look like Nairobi, Lagos or Luanda.32 
Progressive organisations in South Africa dealing with immigration, refugee and 
border control issues have tended to outnumber protectionist organisations, both in 
terms of number and their degree of influence on policy issues. As discussed in 
chapter three, progressive organisations on refugee and migrant issues have grown 
in number since 1996, encompassing a diverse range of legal, social services, aca-
                                                                                                                                  
26  (Schrag 2000: 40-43) explains the role of a popular US news programme called 60 minutes, which 
‘transformed asylum procedure from an arcane subject of interest only to those who followed ad-
ministration of the immigration laws into a hot political issue’. 
27  (Schrag 2000: 46-50) refers to individual experts, many based at US law schools and familiar with 
the functioning of the UN and with considerable knowledge of international law, who provided ex-
tensive inputs to the policy process at multiple stages in the legislative process. 
28  (Schrag 2000: 34, 38, 45, 49, 55) describes the efforts of multiple NGOs, including the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, American Bar Association, American Civil Liberties Union and oth-
ers, drawing reference for their arguments from an extensive knowledge of international law. 
29  (Minaar et al. 1996). 
30  (Solomon 1998: 1). 
31  (Hadland 2008) and (Steinberg 2005). 
32  (Roodt 2005: 4). 
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demic and religious perspectives. Of particular interest are two organisations dis-
cussed later in this chapter; Lawyers for Human Rights, and the UCT Legal Aid 
Clinic at the University of Cape Town. From the mid-1990s, both organisations 
developed a combination of legal advice services for asylum seekers and refugee 
capacity-building programmes for lawyers, NGOs, police officers and other offi-
cials, and applied policy research and advocacy on refugee and migrant rights at 
both national and international levels. Furthermore, both organisations were active 
from an early stage in the development of a comprehensive refugee policy, as dis-
cussed in the following sections, and – as they both have a ‘dual consciousness’ – 
became important translators of global rules on refugee protection in the South Af-
rican process of refugee policymaking. 
4.3 AN EMERGING SPACE FOR CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN REFUGEE 
POLICYMAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA (1991-1996) 
While chapter three discussed the origins of South Africa’s immigration, refugee 
and border control policies, this section explains more specifically how a political 
space emerged for the participation of civic actors in a refugee policymaking proc-
ess. South Africa’s wide-ranging Constitution laid the normative basis for a partici-
patory democracy, and became a guide for civic participation in policy formation, 
policy implementation and policy enforcement interventions. The Constitution in-
corporated long-standing universal values,33 and the process of forming it involved 
numerous civic translators. These translators advocated strongly that the document 
not merely repeat the texts of its predecessors,34 but reflect the challenges the coun-
try faced in overcoming centuries of institutional discrimination and oppression, 
which also had universal resonance. 
However, South Africa’s constitutional dispensations prepared neither the state 
nor civic organisations for the myriad human rights challenges they faced as they 
began to interact in collaborative efforts to build South Africa’s nascent democracy. 
One of the most significant challenges faced, from the early 1990s, was how to deal 
with a sizeable population of former Mozambican refugees, as well as individuals 
and groups who began to arrive in South Africa in growing numbers to apply for 
refugee status, shifting the country’s position as a refugee ‘producing’ to a refugee 
‘hosting’ country. As with the process of Constitution-drafting, efforts to form a 
policy on refugees was guided by a small, but significant, group of civic translators, 
who drew upon international guidelines and policies to protect refugees, as well as 
referring to South African constitutional and administrative law. 
                                                        
33  (Sachs 1990); (Sachs 1992) and (Spitz and Chaskalson 2000), passim. 
34  The former colonial administrators drafted most of the Constitutions of newly liberated countries in 
Africa. 
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4.3.1 South Africa’s nascent refugee policy 
South Africa developed a basic policy on refugees in the early 1990s. As it became 
more widely known throughout the world, and particularly the African continent, 
that South Africa was undergoing a negotiated transition to democracy, confirmed 
by the well-publicised release of Nelson Mandela in 1990, South Africa’s reputa-
tion as a potential place of refuge for persons fleeing persecution and war was se-
cured. In fact, South Africa had already assessed applications for refugee status as 
early as 1991 when – as mentioned in the previous chapter, three Russian women 
who worked at the Russian embassy declared their intentions to ‘defect’ from their 
country and approached the South African government for political asylum. 
With increasing numbers of persons applying for refugee status in South Africa 
from the mid-1990s, it became clear that South Africa’s ad hoc approach was in-
adequate, and the government was obliged to formalise its policy. The first objec-
tive of the government was to clarify which department was to be designated as 
responsible for asylum determination and liaising with the UNHCR.35 Secondly, 
formal procedures were put in place to deal with individual applications for political 
asylum. 
Clarifying departmental responsibility 
As the numbers of asylum applicants increased, the government identified the need 
for a single department to take responsibility for the processing of individual appli-
cations. According to the former head of the refugee affairs section, at some stage 
there was consideration given to the idea that it would be more appropriate for For-
eign Affairs to be responsible for handling the applications of asylum seekers.36 
However, having handled the case of the Russian defectors and, more significantly, 
being responsible for immigration control, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) 
was a more obvious choice. 
A further proposal that was discussed, and which was approved in principle by 
then-Director-General of Home Affairs Piet Coleyn, involved NGOs playing a role 
in making status determinations.37 Claude Schravesande of DHA approached the 
Legal Resources Centre (LRC), a South African NGO established in the late 1970s, 
with such a proposal. However, aware of its independent and critical role, LRC 
swiftly made it clear to DHA that ‘we are not here to work with government, we are 
here to ensure government toes the line’.38 According to Schravesande, the proposal 
                                                        
35  Up until 1993, there was considerable overlap between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Home 
Affairs. 
36  (‘Interview with C. Schravesande’ 2006). 
37  (‘Interview with C. Schravesande’ 2006) This would have been consistent with the prominent role 
being played by NGOs in various consultative forums that supported the negotiated transition, most 
encapsulated within the context of negotiations at the Conference for a Democratic South Africa or 
CODESA, as discussed in (Spitz and Chaskalson 2000), passim. 
38  (‘Interview with C. Schravesande’ 2006). 
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was eventually ‘scuttled by the Department’ and the DHA developed internal pro-
cedures for the handling of asylum applications. 
Schravesande, tasked by Director-General Coleyn to develop institutional capac-
ity on individual asylum status determinations in advance of the Mozambican vol-
untary repatriation, and liaising with the UNHCR (acting in its advisory capacity), 
set up what became the Refugees Directorate at DHA. The Directorate immediately 
began drafting a formal policy on refugee status determination. 
A formal policy on refugee status determination emerges 
South Africa’s formal policy on refugee status determination emerged from ad hoc 
policy measures issued in terms of the notorious Aliens Control Act of 1991. From 
1993 until 2000, the legal normative framework for administering status-
determination procedures in South Africa consisted of ad hoc, internal departmental 
policy circulars and passport control instructions issued in terms of the notorious 
Aliens Control Act of 1991. 
Although South Africa’s pre-1991 migration policy was explicitly racist, based 
on the government‘s policy of apartheid, it remains debatable whether South Af-
rica’s post-1991 migration policy should be seen as explicitly racist, although it was 
undoubtedly unconstitutional.39 However, the nature of South Africa’s enforcement 
of the 1991 policy most certainly was racist, reflecting institutionalised, xeno-racist 
attitudes within South Africa.40 The discretionary powers provided by the Aliens 
Control Act allowed for ad hoc procedures for refugee status determination. How-
ever, this same discretion also led to arbitrariness, which the Constitution prohib-
ited. 
As discussed in chapter two, the guidelines that the Department of Home Affairs 
(DHA) developed to make a retrospective recognition of Mozambican refugees 
through a ‘Basic Agreement‘41 provided the DHA with a template for making indi-
vidual status determinations on asylum applicants from other countries. In consulta-
tion with and on behalf of the Director-General of Home Affairs, and advised by the 
UNHCR, the DHA’s new Refugees Directorate built on the Basic Agreement tem-
plate and introduced a series of passport control instructions, department circulars 
and amendments to the passport manual. All of these policy instruments were is-
sued in terms of the Aliens Control Act. Passport Control Instruction numbers 20 
and 23 of 1994, accompanied by various forms, laid down the main procedures for 
individual status determinations,42 while other policy measures provided procedures 
                                                        
39  (Klaaren 1998), passim. Government restrictions on migrants are a global phenomenon, and South 
Africa was not unique in this regard. Common to many states, the 1991 policy favoured restriction-
ism above humanitarianism, reflecting the position most states continue to hold. 
40  (Handmaker and Parsley 2001), passim. 
41  (Basic Agreement 1993). 
42  DHA, Passport Control Instruction No. 20 of 1994 (“Guidelines for Refugee Status Determination 
of Mozambicans in South Africa”) and DHA Passport Control Instruction No. 23 of 1994 
(“Amendment to … No. 20 of 1994”), DHA Forms BI-1590 (“Eligibility Determination Form”), 
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on how to deal with ‘stowaways’ who smuggled themselves into the country.43 
Measures were also taken to enable recognised refugees to be provided with travel 
documents.44 
The Aliens Control Act, which was accompanied by an almost indecipherable 
mass of regulations, policy circulars and passport control instructions, was still fun-
damentally oriented around security and control, and provided no guarantee of just 
treatment for migrants and refugees. While there was talk in 1994 of new legislation 
being introduced as a result of discussions between the DHA and the UNHCR,45 a 
serious initiative to produce a comprehensive refugee policy did not emerge until 
years later. 
The Aliens Control Act of 1991, which provided for the ad hoc policy on status 
determinations, was amended in 1995 by South Africa’s democratically elected Par-
liament. The intention was to eliminate some of the Act’s more extreme measures, 
such as a bar on judicial review of the Department’s decisions. 
However, as Ramjii and Klaaren argued, ‘the amendments were minor and the 
structures introduced have failed to make any significant impact’.46 The two signifi-
cant changes were removal of the ‘ouster clause’ that prevented courts from review-
ing decisions of administrative officials taken under the Act, as well as section 
55(5), which mandated periodic judicial review of persons in detention. 
4.3.2 Constitutionality questions 
The collection of ad hoc measures that formed South Africa’s nascent refugee pol-
icy in terms of the Aliens Control Act raised serious questions about its constitu-
tionality, even in its amended form.47 Furthermore, as the numbers of individual 
asylum applicants in South Africa began to increase significantly, the administrative 
capacity of the government quickly became overwhelmed. 
To some extent, the policy incorporated internationally recognised legal termi-
nology in the recognition and treatment of persons seeking asylum. However, the 
policy still fell short of international standards in numerous respects, most funda-
mentally the lack of clear guidelines on status determination, and the lack of due 
process guarantees. The absence of a comprehensive refugee policy became more 
                                                                                                                                  
BI-1594 (“Information Leaflet”), BI-1595 (“Status Determination Questionnaire”) and DHA 
Guidelines BI-1596 (“Status Determination - Mozambican Refugees in South Africa”). 
43  DHA, Passport Control Instruction No. 63 of 1994. 
44  DHA, Passport Control Instruction No. 33 of 1995, which also included an amendment to the Pass-
port Manual. 
45  (‘Legislation on Refugees Pending’ 1994: 4). 
46  (Klaaren and Ramji 2001: 35). 
47  (Klaaren 1996); (L. De La Hunt 1998) and (Klaaren and Sprigman 2008), passim. 
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apparent after the government of South Africa acceded to the two major interna-
tional refugee conventions, by January 1996.48 
But despite these formal commitments, lawyers and other refugee rights advo-
cates made it clear that nothing less than new legislation would satisfy, and the De-
partment of Home Affairs agreed with them, at least initially. This mutual recogni-
tion led to various policymaking processes. As discussed in the following section, 
from 1996, various civic actors participated in policy task teams, and in other ways, 
to develop policy and legislation on refugees. By invoking South Africa’s interna-
tional obligations, civic actors fulfilled a key mediating role in helping to translate 
the government‘s ratification of key international instruments protecting refugees – 
and, generally stated, human rights commitments – into locally relevant policies. 
The contributions of civic actors in formal, government-led task teams were paral-
leled by civic workshops and seminars to debate and clarify civic positions on refu-
gee protection issues, and to lobby for their incorporation. 
4.4 CIVIC CO-OPERATION IN FORMING A REFUGEE POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
(1996-2006) 
The refugee policy-making process in South Africa’s constitutional democracy il-
lustrates how civic-state co-operative interactions sought to ‘correct’ the normative 
framework in forming a comprehensive and rights-regarding refugee policy. Civic 
actors invoked the rights of foreign nationals in international law and, in particular, 
the rights of refugees, which was implicit in the South African government having 
assented to the two major international refugee Conventions. In addition, civic ac-
tors appealed to the broad remit of South Africa’s constitution.49 
The process of forming a new refugee policy involved multiple stakeholders. 
These included various government departments, and in particular the Department 
of Home Affairs (DHA). Inter-governmental organisations such as the UNHCR 
were also involved, as were ‘section nine institutions’, such as the Human Rights 
Commission.50 Civic participation included lawyers, academics, social workers and 
NGOs, both South African and from abroad, and other civic organisations, includ-
ing representatives from within the refugee community in South Africa. 
                                                        
48  This was the (OAU Refugees Convention 1969), acceded to by South Africa on 15 December 1995 
as well as the (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951) and the (Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees 1967), both acceded to by South Africa on 12 January 1996. 
49  Nearly all rights in the Bill of Rights of the (South African Constitution 1996) refer to ‘everyone’, 
with the exception of political and citizenship rights, Articles 19 and 20; the right to enter, remain 
and reside, Article 21(3); the right to a passport, Article 21(4), and the right to freely choose a 
trade, occupation or profession, all of which are reserved for ‘citizens’. 
50  This refers to section nine of South Africa’s Final Constitution (1996), which provided for various 
supervisory agencies to promote and protect the constitution. Beside the Human Rights Commis-
sion, other agencies referred to in section nine include the Commission on Gender Equality, the 
Auditor-General, and the Public Protector (Ombudsman). 
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Efforts to form a new refugee policy were initially conciliatory. South African 
NGOs established the Refugee Rights Consortium in September 1996. Government 
officials showed a willingness to engage with civic actors in open and critical policy 
debates. While the South African government‘s early attempts to assist refugees in 
its territory were very much ad hoc, they did provide a basis of co-operation with 
the UNHCR and, to some extent, civic partners in the collaborative policy-making 
initiatives that emerged. This mutual recognition of the need for a new refugee pol-
icy led to a process that was divided roughly into two separate tracks. 
The first track, driven by the government‘s draft policy proposals, led to a work-
shop in 1996 at the South African Human Rights Commission, and was followed by 
the formal appointment of a government-led policy task team and, eventually, de-
bates in parliament. Civic inputs into this first track formed direct inputs into the 
government-driven policy-making process that produced the Refugees Act in 1998, 
although the Act did not come into force until 2000. 
The second track comprised various parallel debates that formed an important 
indirect contribution to the first track policymaking process. The second track in-
cluded the South African government delegating co-ordination of what became 
known as the Green Paper process51 to an NGO. This almost completely parallel 
process fed into an academic discussion that bore little substantive relation to the 
refugee policy that ultimately emerged. Nevertheless, the outcome of the Green 
Paper process did make a significant local contribution to a hotly contested debate, 
which had been going on at the global level for some time. One side of this debate 
argued that refugee law ought to be ‘reformulated’ in order to meet the interests of 
states. The other side argued that refugee law be pragmatically ‘reinvigorated’ 
through principled enforcement of South Africa’s administrative laws and human 
rights, in order to realise the original intentions of the Refugees Convention, and 
South Africa’s constitutional obligations to all residents of the Republic.52 
Particularly in the first track, but to some extent also in the second, government-
determined structural boundaries emerged that conditioned the degree to which 
civic agency could influence the outcome of the policy process and therefore 
‘elaborate’ the structure itself. Furthermore, all stakeholders in both tracks had ex-
ternally grounded reasons for participating in the policymaking processes. Diver-
gences between the civic and state actors in their respective interests, meanings and 
political positions characterised the ‘social distance’ between them and other key 
external actors in the policymaking process, such as section nine institutions and 
representatives of the UNHCR. 
                                                        
51  A ‘Green Paper’ is a discussion document that could potentially become government policy at a 
later stage. 
52  A further ‘track’ beyond the scope of this book concerned (limited) inputs by civic actors in the 
development of the South African government‘s ‘Collective Approach to Border Control’ in the 
mid-1990s. See (Schneider 1997), passim. 
Chapter 4 
104 
4.4.1 Early debates on DHA’s draft policy and the first Refugee Bills (track 1, 
phase 1) 
As early as 1995, debates took place on a ‘first draft Refugee Bill’, which was re-
leased by the DHA to limited public comment. It was discreetly circulated to na-
tional and international institutions as well as to a selected number of civic actors, 
and resurfaced in 1996. Ghaith Al-Omari of the Refugee Studies Programme at Ox-
ford University provided some minor feedback on the draft. Additional feedback 
was provided by Lee Anne De la Hunt, a practising attorney in Cape Town; Cana-
dian law Professor James Hathaway; and Dennis McNamara and Kemal Morjane, 
both of the UNHCR.53 
The first draft bill was reworked by the DHA and presented as a ‘second draft 
bill’, in time for two workshops in November 1996. While the second draft bill did 
not present a substantial departure from the ad hoc policy that had been imple-
mented in terms of the Aliens Control Act 1991, the willingness of the DHA to en-
gage with civic organisations came as a welcome surprise. The workshops took 
place at the offices of the then-recently established South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC).54 The workshops were organised by LHR and the Wits 
Refugee Research Programme, in collaboration with the SAHRC, under the banner 
of the Refugee Rights Consortium. 
The DHA sent mostly high-profile representatives to the meeting, including 
then-Director of Refugee Affairs Claude Schravesande, as well as the drafters of the 
Refugees Bill, Chief Director of Legal Services Attie Tredoux and DHA lawyer 
Michael Hendrickse. Schravesande later acknowledged that these meetings pro-
vided unique opportunities for the DHA to form policy in direct consultation with 
NGOs.55 
Also attending were representatives from the Departments of Correctional Ser-
vices and Safety and Security, as well as from Lawyers for Human Rights, Legal 
Resources Centre, Cape Town Refugee Forum, Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
and Refugee Research Programme of the University of the Witwatersrand and the 
UNHCR. At the time the workshop took place, the relationship between civic or-
ganisations and the DHA was so positive that the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs 
sent a letter to Lawyers for Human Rights and other civic participants in the work-
shop, stating that: 
I am particularly glad that finally the NGO‘s and the Department of Home Affairs 
are in the process of working out a partnership to deal with this very important mat-
ter. I need to assure you of my genuine appreciation for the work your Consortium 
                                                        
53  (Al-Omari 1996). On the second draft, see (Hathaway 1996); (L.A. De La Hunt 1996), and (Mcna-
mara and Morjane 1996), passim. 
54  As mentioned above, in terms of section nine of South Africa’s constitution, the SAHRC is man-
dated to monitor government policies and practices and their compliance with South Africa’s con-
stitution. 
55  (‘Interview with C. Schravesande’ 2006). 
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is doing and I hope that the Government of the Republic of South Africa can render 
all the assistance possible. As for my part, I will ensure that I lobby my colleagues 
in Government for their support.56 
The objectives of the workshop were to ‘engage the Department of Home Affairs’, 
among others, in order to ‘identify existing deficiencies … determine what steps 
need to be taken to correct these … (and) determine which role the participants 
should play’. Related objectives were to clarify discrepancies between policies and 
practice, improve co-ordination and communication, and improve access to the pro-
cedure.57 
Following presentations by the DHA and civic actors, the workshop discussed a 
range of different concerns. These included the situation of unaccompanied chil-
dren, excessive delays in processing applications, concerns over the composition of 
a one-man ‘appeal board’, language difficulties that inhibited communication with 
asylum seekers, the detention of asylum seekers and refugees, and the role of the 
UNHCR in all these matters. ‘Task groups’ were to be set up by civic actors on a 
wide range of issues, from administrative justice and detention, to social welfare 
issues.58 
Smith claimed that that a certain official at the November workshops was ‘out of 
his depth’,59 which in a sense was true. However, by the same token this criticism 
could have applied to nearly all who were present at the workshops, civic actors and 
government representatives alike. No one, with the exception of Pia Prütz Phiri, a 
senior lawyer from the UNHCR, had extensive knowledge or experience in interna-
tional refugee law issues. Consequently, the workshop – and the policy discussions 
that followed – focused on human rights and, especially, the administrative justice 
concerns of the refugee policy then in existence. Some, in particular the reformula-
tion advocates, disputed whether this was the ‘proper approach’, as discussed later 
in this chapter.  
The workshops did allow for open and critical exchanges, and in September 
1996 there was an optimistic feeling among civic participants that a refugee policy 
was imminent as part of a new phase in the country’s democratic period to which 
these same civic actors had already made substantial contributions. As discussed in 
chapter three, the measures taken by the pre-1994 government had been far-
reaching, involving many different civic organisations and forcing government to 
develop new strategies and approaches. In summary, these measures included: the 
unbanning of political movements in 1990, agreement over an interim constitution 
in 1993, and the holding of the country’s first democratic elections in 1994.60 In the 
                                                        
56  This was confirmed in a letter to LHR in 1996 from Lindiwe Sisulu, Deputy-Minister of Home 
Affairs, entitled: ‘Statement of support, Workshop: ‘asylum and naturalisation: concerns regarding 
policy and practice’, included in the (RRC Workshop Document 1996: ii). 
57  (RRC Workshop Document 1996: iii and iv). 
58  (RRC Workshop Document 1996: 12-15). The task groups never emerged. 
59  (T. Smith 2003: 8). 
60  (Abel 1995) and (Kessel 2000), passim. 
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view of civic participants attending these workshops, refugee policy was another 
progressive step in the same direction.  
However, in 1996, two years into the country’s new democracy, relations be-
tween government and civic organisations were still being formed. Government was 
unaccustomed to consulting with civic actors on matters of policy, and many senior 
members of government – most of whom were white – were in the process of being 
replaced, as part of the new government’s efforts to transform the country’s bu-
reaucracies and be more representative of all South Africans. For their part, many of 
the civic structures that existed prior to 1994 had either disappeared completely or 
been subsumed within government structures. New groupings emerged that ad-
dressed issues such as privatisation as well as access to shelter, water and other re-
sources.61 
An advocacy approach rooted in both human rights and administrative law 
formed the background to the November workshop, and emerged as the dominant 
discourse that ultimately framed the country’s refugee policy. However, the Minis-
ter of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, was leader of the Inkatha Freedom 
Party, a political party in opposition to the ruling ANC, which appointed the Deputy 
Minister of Home Affairs and eventually also the Director-General. Although both 
parties formed a Government of National Unity,62 political tensions were evident 
throughout the refugee policymaking process.63 While those who participated in the 
November workshop represented senior and middle-level officials of the former 
administration, Minister Buthelezi decided to appoint a separate Green Paper Task 
Team, which became a distinctly parallel process. The combination of all these fac-
tors, and particularly the Green Paper Process, meant that the Track 1 policy proc-
ess that eventually produced a Refugees Act was effectively put on hold for nearly 
one and a half years. 
4.4.2 The draft Green Paper on International Migration (track 2, phase 1) 
In contrast to the government-led and co-ordinated track 1 process, the Green Paper 
on International Migration Task Team was chaired by Wilmot James, director of the 
South African NGO IDASA, although it was formally appointed by then-Minister 
of Home Affairs Buthelezi. Co-ordination of the Task Team was provided by both 
the DHA and the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP), a research project of 
IDASA and Queen’s University of Canada. SAMP also provided the secretariat 
(administrative support) to the Green Paper Task Team, and commissioned policy 
research. 
                                                        
61  Examples include the Anti-Privatisation Forum, as discussed by (Mckinley and Naidoo 2004), 
passim as well as the Landless Peoples’ Movement, Khulumani Trust and others. 
62  The National Party also participated in the Government of National Unity at the outset, but with-
drew in May 1996. 
63  (Crush and Mcdonald 2001: 8-10). 
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The Task Team released a ‘Draft Green Paper on International Migration‘ in 
1997. Chapter four of the Draft Green Paper was exclusively devoted to refugees, 
and was heavily influenced by the work of Canadian Professor James Hathaway, 
who was head of the Reformulation of Refugee Law Project at York University in 
Canada at the time.64 The proposals it contained were a radical departure from the 
type of policy frameworks being discussed up until that point, notably its controver-
sial proposal for temporary protection. 
Efforts were undertaken by Hathaway to explain the ‘reformulation’ model, in a 
briefing paper published by SAMP and debated at a conference organised by LHR. 
These explanations and debates were important, since two key publications explain-
ing the ‘reformulation thesis’ that emerged from the project at York University 
were still unpublished at the time the Draft Green Paper was being debated.65 
4.4.3 Debates over chapter four of the draft Green Paper (track 2, phase 2) 
In his paper, delivered at a conference organised by Lawyers for Human Rights in 
Pretoria in March 1998, in which chapter four of the draft Green Paper was debated, 
Hathaway acknowledged the concerns referred to above, but questioned whether 
temporary protection of refugees should be seen as ‘threat or solution’.66 Hathaway 
argued in favour of a ‘decisive and practical reinvigoration of refugee law,’ for a 
more collective and ‘solution oriented’ approach, and a more deliberate distinction 
between immigration and refugee protection. He emphasised that: 
The refugee protection system was never intended to be a mechanism that generates 
solutions, but is instead a palliative regime that protects desperate people until and 
unless a fundamental change of circumstances makes it safe for them to go home.67 
Vigorously arguing against ‘routine admission of all refugees to permanency,’ 
Hathaway maintained that such a view ‘holds refugees hostage to a major project of 
social transformation.’68 He also stated that ‘the basic protective role of refugee 
protection should not be a captive’ in debates over whether refugees ought to be 
entitled to permanent residence. Hathaway felt that the South African civic advo-
cates arguing in favour of permanent residence were ‘absolutist’ in their orienta-
tion.69  
                                                        
64  Hathaway was a consultant to the Green Paper Task Team. 
65  As the Green Paper acknowledged, the model as proposed in the Green Paper was strongly influ-
enced by the work of Hathaway and the ‘Reformulation Project’, which was funded by the Ford 
and MacArthur Foundations and based for its duration at the Centre for Refugee Studies, York 
University, Canada. Two important works, published after the Green Paper was drafted, explained 
the ‘reformulation thesis’ in more detail, namely (Hathaway and Neve 1997) and (Hathaway 1997). 
66  (Hathaway 2001). 
67  (Hathaway 2001: 44). 
68  (Hathaway 2001: 44) 
69  (Hathaway 2001: 46-47). 
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At the 1998 conference, Hathaway argued, and later reaffirmed, that the model 
in chapter four of the Green Paper was ‘seriously misunderstood.’70 However, that 
was neither a fair nor an accurate assessment of the detractors to the Green Paper’s 
reformulation proposal, who engaged with the Green Paper’s rationale behind tem-
porary protection as well as with its resistance to integration. In contrast to the ‘re-
formulation’ advocates, the approach adopted by most South African-based com-
mentators, conditioned by newly introduced, democratic accountability and 
constitutional structures, was to develop the administrative structure. Goodwin-Gill 
characterised such an approach as a ‘reinvigoration’ of the refugee determination 
regime.71 In South Africa, this approach was taken both to increase efficiency and 
to deliberately force the South African government to engage with its international 
and domestic human rights obligations. 
According to Smith’s interview with the DHA’s then-government legal advisor, 
Tredoux, the origins of the Green Paper Task Team were ‘more an idea of IDASA’s 
than of the Government’s, and that the Government simply acquiesced in the proc-
ess’.72 Such scepticism on the part of government explains why the official response 
of the government to the proposals contained in the Draft Green Paper on Interna-
tional Migration was, in the end, to shelve them. 
Whatever the reasons for the government‘s scepticism, ultimately the Green Pa-
per Task Team‘s proposals for a ‘reformulated’ refugee policy were not adopted by 
the government. As mentioned, the Track 1 deliberations were put on hold, but re-
sumed in May 1998, once the South African government again took principal con-
trol of the process by appointing a Task Team to produce a White Paper and Refu-
gee Bill.73 In any event, the policymaking process was always DHA’s to lead, a 
factor that was not readily acknowledged by civic actors at the time, being of the 
view that civic actors ought to be more central to the process. 
4.4.4 The White Paper Task Team (track 1, phase 2) 
With the formation of the Refugees White Paper Task Team in May 1998, the proc-
ess of forming a refugee policy regained the momentum that, as Human Rights 
Watch pointed out, had been lost since the meetings at the South African Human 
Rights Commission in 1996.74 Whether it was on the basis of positive interactions 
in 1996 and/or in response to extensive lobbying by members of the increasingly 
well-organised refugee advocacy lobby, or simply because the DHA recognised it 
                                                        
70  (Hathaway 2001: 47). 
71  (Goodwin-Gill 1999). 
72  (T. Smith 2003: 8). 
73  A White Paper is a government policy document which, normally following cabinet approval, is 
presented to Parliament for debate. Depending on the political importance attached to a White Pa-
per, it is developed into a bill, the final step before it becomes a law. In this case, a Draft Bill was 
already attached to the White Paper, which helped accelerate the process. 
74  (Hrw 1998: 137-140). 
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could not produce the policy on its own, the DHA ensured that the Task Team was 
broadly representative. And yet, as government took the lead by forming the White 
Paper Task Team, the structural boundaries that conditioned the agency of civic 
actors in seeking to influence the outcome of the policymaking process became 
more clearly defined. 
As was to be expected, deliberations within the White Paper Task Team were 
contentious. Meanwhile, the National Consortium on Refugee Affairs (NCRA) had 
by this time formed a well-developed legal and policy sub-committee, two members 
of which were also on the Task Team. The sub-committee was an active network, 
much of its success attributed to the recent use of e-mail.75 Therefore, alongside the 
formal deliberations, civic actors also discussed and formed positions on various 
policy proposals in parallel meetings of the sub-committee. This section critically 
examines, firstly, the composition of the Task Team and the expertise of individual 
members. Secondly, it explains three variables that affected the work of the Task 
Team. 
Composition of the White Paper Task Team and their expertise 
The Refugees White Paper Task Team was diverse in its composition. It included 
two civic representatives; one from LHR, the other a practising attorney and aca-
demic. Two representatives from so-called ‘chapter nine institutions’76 also partici-
pated, those being the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and the 
Commission on Gender Equality (CGE). As in the September 1996 Workshop, a 
representative from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) took part, 
as well as several senior representatives of the DHA. Unlike the Green Paper proc-
ess, which involved substantial civic co-ordination, the DHA chaired the Refugees 
White Paper Task Team. In doing so, the DHA asserted its authority to determine 
the direction of government policy, but in a way that engaged outside expertise. 
With some notable exceptions, most of the individual representatives on the Task 
Team – civic and government alike – still had little or no experience with either the 
theory or the practice of refugee law. 
LHR had first critiqued South Africa’s immigration control laws in 1992,77 and 
had been actively involved in refugee issues since 1996. However, as the result of 
an acrimonious conflict between LHR and the DHA, the invitation by the DHA to 
participate in the White Paper Task Team was specifically addressed to LHR’s 
                                                        
75  While on the surface these parallel meetings organised by the sub-committee could be seen as an 
extension of a broader track 2 process, as discussed later, in a structural sense these particular meet-
ings were directly in response to government-led proposals, in contrast to the civic-led proposals 
that emerged from the Green Paper process. 
76  These are semi-autonomous, state-funded institutions established in terms of chapter nine of the 
(South African Constitution 1996) to supervise and promote the government‘s compliance with the 
provisions of the Constitution. 
77  (Ramasala 1992). 
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newly-hired assistant co-ordinator, who had very little experience in refugee law.78 
Strategically, LHR’s management chose not to make an issue of this and to partici-
pate mainly from the outside, being of the view that it was important to have at least 
some form of participation inside the government-led process, and especially to 
have access to various draft policy documents that were to emerge from the Task 
Team’s deliberations. 
The representative from the CGE also had virtually no experience in refugee 
matters and, in fact, rarely attended the meetings of the Task Team. While the rep-
resentative from the SAHRC, Barney Pityana, had been engaged in civic advocacy 
and human rights issues for decades,79 he did not have a background in refugee law. 
Meanwhile, the DHA representatives were also relatively new to refugee mat-
ters, although one had been involved in producing the second Draft Refugee Bill, 
and had participated in the policy workshop at the SAHRC in 1996.80 
Those who did have substantial expertise numbered three: Tredoux, then Chief 
Director for Legal Services at the DHA, who also chaired the Task Team; De la 
Hunt, an attorney in Cape Town and senior lecturer at the University of Cape Town; 
and Geddo, who was a lawyer and senior refugee protection officer at the 
UNHCR.81 As Smith rightly acknowledged, these three held ‘the most experience 
and knowledge … [and] drove the process forward’.82 De la Hunt and Geddo, in 
particular, became key translators of South Africa’s global obligations towards pro-
tecting refugees to a form that was locally relevant. 
As Belvedere noted, civic experts became more engaged in defending ‘key pro-
visions that had been safeguarded from early on’,83 advancing refugee protection 
standards beyond the debates that took place in the 1996 workshops. Furthermore, 
the civic members of the Task Team were part of a well-organised legal and advo-
cacy network. The Legal and Policy Sub-committee of the National Consortium on 
Refugee Affairs (NCRA) organised several workshops in parallel to the Task 
                                                        
78  He had, however, previously worked as a junior researcher at the Centre for Migration Studies at 
the University of the Western Cape. 
79  Dr. Barney Pityana has been a leading figure and human rights advocate in the formation of civic-
led protests against the apartheid regime in South Africa, and elsewhere in the world. As a close 
colleague of Steven Biko, he helped develop the black consciousness ideology and co-founded the 
South African Students Organisation (SASO). Later, after being forced into exile, Pityana headed a 
major programme at the World Council of Churches in Geneva to boycott the apartheid regime. 
Eventually he returned to South Africa and became the first chairperson of the South African Hu-
man Rights Commission, as well as South Africa’s first representative to the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
80  Another (senior) DHA representative, who was notorious for his hostility to civic participation, 
attended some meetings of the Task Team. 
81  Tredoux was a seasoned DHA bureaucrat mostly responsible for drafting the final version of the 
Aliens Control Act. De la Hunt had not only commented on the first Draft Refugees Bill; she also 
taught refugee law, and had advised and litigated in numerous refugee matters. Geddo had many 
years of experience with UNHCR, both in Geneva and from various postings in Africa. 
82  (T. Smith 2003: 13). 
83  (Belvedere 2006: 156). 
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Team’s deliberations. In between, members of the sub-committee were frequently 
in touch with each other, particularly through two e-mail list-servers.84 
Drawing on external linkages that the civic members of the Task Team had, 
these parallel debates of the NCRA legal sub-committee fell within Track 2 of the 
process of refugee policy development. These debates had considerable impact, 
though indirect, on the Task Team’s track one deliberations, which can be regarded 
as the official process. In addition to those represented on the Task Team, partici-
pants in this broader, track two discourse included international specialists on refu-
gee protection,85 local experts in administrative law and politics,86 and local civic 
organisations involved in advocacy to refugees.87 
Key factors affecting the work of the White Paper Task Team 
Apart from the Task Team members’ relevant areas of expertise, three key factors 
emerged early on that would characterise not only the final results of the official 
process, but how these results were to be reached, who participated in their out-
come, and finally, to what extent these discussions would influence the implementa-
tion of the Refugees Act. 
The first of these factors was a clear renunciation of the main thrust of the Green 
Paper model. By this time it was clear that the track two policy debates had more or 
less abandoned the ‘reformulated’ model as contained in chapter four of the Green 
Paper. Instead, the White Paper Task Team adopted a ‘decentralized, hearings-
based refugee determination system’ along the model drafted by Klaaren and 
Sprigman, the main outline of which was sent to civic participants as well as the 
UNHCR and SAHRC representatives in the White Paper Task Team.88 
                                                        
84  These were the SAIMMIG-CALS list-server, set up by Jonathan Klaaren at the Centre for Applied 
Legal Studies, and the shorter-lived LHR-Refugees list-server, set up by Lawyers for Human 
Rights. 
85  These included Guglielmo Verdirame and Barbara Harrell-Bond who both worked at the Refugee 
Studies Programme at Oxford University; Harrell-Bond was its founder and, for many years, direc-
tor. Also involved was Bonaventure Rutinwa, who also worked and studied at Oxford and taught 
refugee law at the Centre for the Study of Forced Migration at the University of Dar-Es-Salaam. 
Chris Sprigman was a visiting lecturer at the School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand. 
Bronwen Manby, who became Deputy Director in the Africa programme of Human Rights Watch, 
also made numerous important contributions. 
86  These included Jonathan Klaaren, then senior lecturer in the School of Law, University of the Wit-
watersrand; Femi Naidoo, who taught politics at the University of Durban-Westville; and Marion 
Sinclair, who founded the Centre for Migration Studies at the University of the Western Cape 
(UWC). Vernon Seymour, who taught international relations at UWC, and Professor Tiya Maluwa, 
who taught refugee law in the law faculty at the University of Cape Town, also made contributions. 
87  These included legal advice and advocacy NGOs, such as Black Sash, Lawyers for Human Rights 
and Legal Resources Centre. Service providers included the Refugee Forums in Cape Town, Dur-
ban and Gauteng, religious organisations such as the Catholic Diocese of Johannesburg, Africa 
Muslim Agency and Jesuit Refugee Services, as well as some refugee representatives, particularly 
from Cape Town. 
88  Klaaren, J. and Sprigman, C. ‘Refugee status determination procedures: terms of reference for a 
decentralized, hearing-based refugee determination procedure, including procedures for manifestly 
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The second factor was DHA’s (re)asserting of its authority as chief policy 
drafter. As acknowledged by both Smith and Belvedere, once the White Paper and 
Refugee Bill were drafted, there were last-minute changes made by what Smith 
termed ‘conservative forces’.89 These changes were immediately challenged by 
NGOs who took part in the White Paper Task Team,90 and were corrected, to a 
large extent, once the draft bill reached the parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
Home Affairs (Portfolio Committee). While civic actors were perfectly entitled – 
and indeed expected – to protest, and many civic actors made representations to the 
Portfolio Committee, the product of the Task Team was always going to be one in 
which government, not civic actors, had the final say. In other words, it was gov-
ernment, not civic actors or the UNHCR, who held responsibility for forming an 
effective and rights-regarding refugee policy in South Africa, although it is undeni-
able that many within the refugee advocacy movement felt some personal responsi-
bility for the end result. Any other position on this matter is in danger of misreading 
what are, essentially, different functions of government and civic actors. 
The third key factor was the very tight timeframe in which the Task Team was 
expected to produce a Refugees White Paper and accompanying Draft Refugee Bill. 
The Task Team was forced to produce these documents within just over a month of 
deliberations.91 Nevertheless, civic organisations managed to organise parallel 
meetings to debate various aspects of the proposals, including a workshop in Preto-
ria on 29 May 1998, followed by a seminar in Cape Town, later in 1998. While the 
Draft Refugees White Paper and Bill that was circulated for public comment on 19 
June 1998 provided only a month for written feedback, at least thirteen organisa-
tions responded.92 
4.4.5 Parliamentary debates (track 1, phase 3) 
Although they were brief, the parliamentary debates that took place on 5 November 
1998 on the Draft Refugees Bill provided a clear reflection of where civic actors 
and the government stood in relation to each other. The level of ‘externalisation’ or 
social distance that had emerged, as well as the rationale for introducing refugee 
legislation, illustrated divergences in meanings, interests and political positions be-
tween civic actors and the DHA, as well as the potential for civic influence in the 
policy process. The debate that took place in South Africa’s parliament on the Draft 
Refugees Bill explicitly recognised both the considerable contributions of civic ac-
                                                                                                                                  
unfounded applications’, Facsimile sent 3 June 1998. These ideas were elaborated in (Klaaren and 
Sprigman 2008). 
89  (T. Smith 2003: 3). 
90  (Belvedere 2006: 149-156). 
91  As (Belvedere 2006: 140) noted, this pressure was due to political factors at play; the White Paper 
and Draft Refugee Bill needed to be completed before the end of that year’s parliamentary session, 
otherwise new elections and a possible cabinet reshuffle would have delayed the process even fur-
ther. 
92  (Klaaren et al. 2008: 52). 
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tors to the policymaking process, as well as the role of NGOs in promoting refugee 
protection. As chairperson of the Portfolio Committee Desmond Lockey noted: 
There are many NGOs and churches which are dedicated to promoting refugee in-
terests, to providing welfare assistance and to meeting the most basic needs of refu-
gees in our society. We must make use of this opportunity to salute their unselfish 
service.93 
A very different message came from the then-Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, 
Lindiwe Sisulu. In introducing the proposed legislation, Sisulu emphasised that re-
lations between civic actors and the government at the time were less than comfort-
able. Referring to ‘newly arrived academics’, the Deputy Minister openly expressed 
her irritation that, on some issues, such persons ‘have no clue what they are talking 
about’. She disputed the argument that South Africa had a duty to ‘reciprocate’ on 
the basis that many South Africans themselves were once refugees. Making a dis-
tinction between refugee status provided by the proposed legislation, and status 
based upon a ‘commitment to the eradication of apartheid’, she argued that such 
references to reciprocal treatment amounted to a ‘cheap type of emotional black-
mail’. 94 
While the Deputy Minister’s irritations may to some extent have been under-
standable at the time, reflecting a general deterioration in the relationship between 
the DHA and civic actors since the September 1996 workshop, her denial that South 
Africa had a ‘reciprocal’ duty to refugees may have been an over-reaction. In any 
event, this view was not shared by the Deputy Minister’s fellow ANC (and other) 
parliamentarians. Lockey, for example, commented that: 
Our country has, over many decades, forced thousands of our own citizens to flee 
the repressive order of the former NP regime, and to seek refugee status all over the 
world. Today, with this Refugees Bill before Parliament, we are reaching yet an-
other decisive milestone in entrenching a culture of fundamental human rights in 
our society … creating a legislative framework to meet our moral and international 
human rights obligations.95 
Sikakane,96 Chauke97 and Bam98 made similar references to South Africans’ own 
experiences of being refugees. Harsh comments about ‘reciprocal’ treatment aside, 
the Deputy Minister did confirm that the basis upon which her government had in-
troduced refugee legislation was a ‘matter of principle’, rooted in South Africa’s 
‘constitutional and international obligations’ and that the Refugees Bill aimed to 
                                                        
93  (Hansard 1998: 7756). 
94  (Hansard 1998: 7751). It is not clear to whom Sisulu was referring, although the fact that the Draft 
Bill rejected most elements of the Green Paper’s reformulation model, which was mainly drafted 
by foreign academics, could be related. 
95  (Hansard 1998: 7754). 
96  (Hansard 1998: 7765). 
97  (Hansard 1998: 7769). 
98  (Hansard 1998: 7771). 
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provide refugees with ‘dignity’.99 This was virtually the same position advocated by 
most South African civic organisations. In other words, while on the surface the 
relationships between certain civic actors and the government were problematic, 
and their respective interests were very different, as far as the ideological basis 
upon which the Refugees Bill was rooted is concerned, there were fewer differences 
in meanings and political positions than either side may have been willing to ac-
knowledge at the time. 
4.4.6 Towards a new administrative order 
The combined outcome of tracks one and two of the refugee policymaking process 
laid the framework for a new administrative order to process and receive refugee 
applicants, on the basis of international law and South Africa’s domestic constitu-
tional and administrative legal order. 
Laying the basis for this new administrative order did come at a cost. There was 
much confusion created among civic organisations and the government alike by 
having two separate policy tracks. This was coupled with an even more destabilis-
ing, large-scale replacement of senior staff within the DHA’s administrative struc-
ture. These factors impacted significantly on the relationship between civic organi-
sations and government. The exceptionally open and critical exchanges experienced 
in the 1996 policy workshops between NGOs and government were never repeated, 
and tensions began to grow in the midst of the Green Paper process. 
Forming refugee policy in South Africa on the basis of the Green Paper’s ‘re-
formulated’ model was considered, and rejected, in favour of a pragmatic approach 
based on South African constitutional and administrative law, as well as on interna-
tional human rights principles. In the absence of legal or any other kind of represen-
tation for most asylum applicants, it was felt by locally-based refugee advocates and 
academics that the system needed, first and foremost, and as a matter of urgency, to 
include adequate checks against administrative unfairness, particularly concerning 
the possibility of refoulement. 100 The consequences of a wrong decision in the pro-
cedure could very well amount to serious human rights violations if rejected claim-
ants were returned to their countries of origin.101 
As the next section evaluates, government-created structures conditioned the re-
sponses by various civic actors, but also permitted structural elaboration. The 
clearly delineated roles and strategic positions taken by civic actors – which were 
rooted in South Africa’s international and constitutional obligations – show that, 
despite the policy process being primarily driven by state interests, there were am-
                                                        
99  (Hansard 1998: 7751). 
100  This key principle of international refugee law, which is widely considered to be a jus cogens pro-
hibition and thus part of international customary law, prohibits states from sending someone to a 
country where they would face a well-founded fear of torture, or persecution on various grounds. 
101  (L.A. De La Hunt and Kerfoot 2008), passim. 
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ple opportunities to engage in the process. Engaging did not necessarily mean com-
promising; on the contrary, most civic actors still maintained a critical distance. 
4.5 ANALYSING CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN POLICYMAKING 
This section analyses civic participation in the refugee policymaking process in 
South Africa, which in turn reveals the narrow (but significant) scope for civic in-
fluence in government-led efforts at policy reform, yet also the crucial role that 
civic actors play as translators of global norms in local contexts. Beyond the tense 
debates on the reformulation model contained in the Green Paper, critiques on refu-
gee policy making and its implementation in South Africa have often amounted to 
moralistic arguments that the government must do what it promises, supported by 
little more than legal rhetoric stating that the law says what the government must 
do. The highly doctrinal discussion that has followed these arguments has offered 
limited possibilities for critical reflection. Few, apart from Belvedere, have criti-
cally examined the social and political context in which the refugee policymaking 
process took place, let alone the interplay between civic agents and mainly state-
created structures involved in framing these policies, focusing instead on the sub-
stantive content of the policy.102 
A critical look at the impact of civic advocacy in advocating for the Refugees 
Act reveals advocacy strategies steeped in administrative law and human rights 
principles. The process through which refugee policies came about showed a so-
phisticated understanding of the need to develop the administrative law structure, 
rather than simply challenging that structure by way of legal challenges in the 
courts. 
This section evaluates civic participation in the refugee policymaking process in 
South Africa. Firstly, the clear tensions between, on one hand, a proposal to refor-
mulate refugee law and, on the other, advocating pragmatic enforcement (in terms 
of South African public law) that engages directly with the country’s international 
law obligation, has revealed that the capacity of civic actors to hold states account-
able is shaped by structural changes in the normative legal framework. Secondly, 
this section shows how the conditioning nature of state-created structures in the 
refugee policymaking process have defined the structural relationship between civic 
actors; this section explains how these structures have shifted in very specific ways 
that must be respected by civic actors if they want to be strategic in their advocacy 
                                                        
102  (Belvedere 2006) has looked beyond the legal doctrine and situated the refugee policymaking proc-
ess in a local and global political discourse. By contrast, (Solomon 2002: 61) has suggested that 
problems in policy implementation could be overcome by accepting the existing policy regime and 
not getting caught up in legal definitions, although these definitions have tended to be the most 
contested issues of all. (T. Smith 2003) usefully addressed the process of refugee law-making as 
highly contested, and identified some of the various organisations and personalities involved, yet 
offered little critical prospective as to the externally grounded reasons why NGOs participated in 
the policymaking process, and how this related to a broader social and political context. 
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efforts. Thirdly, the refugee policymaking process illustrates the crucial role of civic 
actors in mediating the translation of international legal norms into locally relevant 
contexts. The capacity of civic actors to influence government policy can thus be 
understood in terms of social distance, as measured by divergences in interests, 
meanings and political positions, which are partly revealed in the externally 
grounded reasons for civic and state participation in policymaking. Finally, this sec-
tion comments on the long delay in implementing the new refugees policy. 
4.5.1 Civic capacity and refugee policy making: choosing reinvigoration over 
reformulation 
The capacity of civic actors to participate in international and national legal process, 
and the degree to which this is shaped by changes in the normative legal frame-
works, led civic actors to advocate the reinvigoration of refugee law over its refor-
mulation. The refugee policy discussions that took place within the framework of 
the 1996 workshop, and which were resumed by the NCRA legal sub-committee 
during the White Paper process, adopted a reinvigorated approach to refugee poli-
cymaking. This reinvigorated approach drew upon global developments in interna-
tional human rights103 and recognised the importance of public administrative law 
as the principal means of translating human rights obligations in a national context. 
For its part, the reformulation model presented in the framework of the Green Paper 
process was a radical approach, not to simply ‘translate’, but to reorient South Af-
rica’s refugee law obligations according to what the government was (presumably) 
more likely to accept. 
From the outset, it was always going to be a challenge for proponents of the ‘re-
formulation thesis’, reflected in chapter four of the Draft Green Paper, to explain 
both its unconventional content and approach. It was an even greater challenge to 
explain the direct relevance of the reformulation model to South African policy-
makers, academics, NGOs and other civic society stakeholders concerned with 
refugee protection in South Africa.104 Indeed, this has proven to be a global chal-
lenge; the reformulation model has been met with scepticism from widely respected 
scholars in international refugee law.105 
There appeared to be a tendency amongst proponents of the reformulation model 
to unduly essentialise the political culture of South Africa as being fundamentally 
the same as that of any other government. As one of the more vocal proponents of 
the reformulation thesis, and a commentator on the process of refugee policymaking 
in South Africa, Barutciski argued that there was a conceptual link between a lim-
ited rights regime and the liberalising of asylum procedures, which applied to South 
Africa as it would to any other country. 
                                                        
103  Here reference is made to Ignatieff’s human rights ‘revolution’, discussed in chapter two, with its 
juridical, advocacy and enforcement dimensions. 
104  Argued elsewhere in (Handmaker 1999: 301-306) and (Handmaker 2001: 97-101). 
105  (Rutinwa 2001); (Chimni 1998: 363) and (Anker et al. 1998). 
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Clearly the rights regime accompanying refugee status is crucial to a Government’s 
decision to allow entry. Limited rights apparently encourage a more liberal admis-
sion policy in situations of mass inflow, while elaborate rights that may lead to in-
tegration tend to discourage Governments from allowing refugees to access their 
territories.106 
In other words, Barutciski argued, by constraining access to rights, the government 
would be more inclined to admit refugees. Such an argument has, however, been 
difficult to maintain in the South African context. Before 1993, challenging admin-
istrative decisions in South Africa was only possible in circumstances in which 
rights were highly constrained, and the possibilities for administrative review ex-
tremely limited. Despite an expansion in rights provided by the 1993 interim Con-
stitution, until 1995 it was technically impossible to challenge any decision of an 
immigration officer. This changed slightly with the 1995 Amendments to the Aliens 
Control Act, which were in direct response to the country’s emerging constitutional 
obligations, and were expanded further in section 33 of South Africa’s 1996 Final 
Constitution. An expanded rights regime provided by the Constitution has therefore 
been followed, with greater possibilities in terms of administrative justice, and, on 
the whole, has led to more liberal asylum procedures. 
Put another way, efforts to bring refugee policies into line with global standards 
of refugee protection have been the outcome of a highly contested human rights 
advocacy revolution. This has been strongly complemented at the national level by 
an expansion of judicial review in South African public law, which has promoted a 
culture of constitutionalism, with international and national dimensions. 
4.5.2 Recognising structural boundaries in constructing a refugee policy 
The recognition by civic actors of the structural boundaries that defined their rela-
tionship with the government, and the degree to which civic actors took this into 
account in formulating their positions, made them more effective advocates in the 
refugee policymaking process.  
At the international level, where civic participation is possible, these structural 
boundaries are defined by the self-corrective mechanisms that are in place. These 
include protocols to international (human rights) treaties, as well as the develop-
ment of new guidelines and recommendations for the behaviour of states and inter-
national organisations in the furthering of their international obligations.107 Self-
corrective mechanisms also extend to the national level, whether in the form of con-
stitutionally mandated oversight bodies such as the South African Human Rights 
Commission, or the Law Commission, which has regularly solicited civic input and 
advice. 
                                                        
106  (Barutciski 1998: 714). 
107  In the case of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, there is a very specific self-corrective mechanism, 
namely the Article 35 monitoring function of member states’ compliance with their obligations 
und,er the Convention and in particular concerning non-refoulement. 
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States take the comments of civic actors seriously, whether they are from NGOs 
with a prominent global presence, such as Amnesty International, or from national 
pressure groups. As mentioned earlier, as far back as the 1940s Eleanor Roosevelt 
observed that civic actors had formed part of a broader set of interests in developing 
credible universal human rights standards through a succession of treaties, declara-
tions, guidelines and recommendations from treaty bodies and special rapporteurs. 
South African organisations have joined the efforts of international human rights 
organisations by contributing to international policy debates taking place at the 
UNHCR‘s ExCom or in assisting the DHA to develop a credible national policy to 
protect refugees. 
In the course of refugee policymaking in South Africa from 1996-2006, the 
boundaries that conditioned civic agency were established by the DHA’s adminis-
trative and democratic accountability structures. Civic actors, exercising their 
agency, tested these structures, and questioned the extent to which they translated 
(or not) the government‘s ratification of international human rights treaties. Al-
though civic actors who participated in the White Paper Task Team were condi-
tioned in the contributions they could make – depending entirely on the discretion 
of the DHA to include civic actors in the first place, let alone accept their recom-
mendations – there remained openness on the part of government to engage in a 
critical discussion. This critical discussion – or interplay – led to an elaboration of 
these structures, or structural change. 
Following the end of unusually close interactions between civic actors and the 
DHA in refugee policymaking in 1996, by the time the White Paper Task Team was 
put together, it was understood by most of those involved in the policymaking proc-
ess that the DHA needed to take the lead. At the same time, the DHA – and even 
more so the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs – demonstrated a willingness 
and even enthusiasm to listen to critical civic perspectives and explicitly acknowl-
edge civic contributions to the policymaking process. The fact that key elements 
from within the government were willing to listen to civic actors meant that the 
normative structure that would emerge from this process, namely the Refugees Act, 
benefited in a significant way from elaborations by these civic agents, who drew on 
extensive parallel networks of interests and expertise. 
4.5.3 Mediating the translation of international legal norms in the refugee 
policymaking process 
Civic actors have played a key role in translating South Africa’s international legal 
obligations to protect refugees into the Refugees Act of 1998. The form in which 
this mediation took place revealed the social distance between civic actors and the 
government, or the extent to which both parties diverged in terms of interests, 
meanings and political positions. 
A comparison between the Green and White Paper processes is particularly re-
vealing in this regard. In contrast to the tense discussions taking place in the context 
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of the White Paper process, civic actors became almost entirely co-opted in the 
Green Paper process by co-ordinating the process, and even drafting entire sections 
of the Green Paper. As the DHA lacked the central role it had in the 1996 workshop 
and White Paper process, it could more easily reject the findings of the Green Paper 
Task Team, although political tensions between the Minister and senior Departmen-
tal Officials clearly also played a role. The model of refugee protection contained in 
chapter four of the Green Paper ultimately bore little resemblance to the policy ac-
tually adopted by the government. 
While the White Paper Task Team was very much a government-led process, it 
involved a number of external actors, namely an NGO representative, an academic 
or practitioner, and representatives of the UNHCR, the Gender Commission and the 
South African Human Rights Commission. In other words, the DHA engaged civic 
actors and others in forming a new refugee policy, while rightly retaining ownership 
over the process. 
Assessing the externalised nature of the refugee policymaking process is useful 
in determining whether the policy emerged as the outcome of consensus, or as the 
result of a predominantly government-led initiative. Kidder’s criteria for measuring 
the social distance that emerges from such an interaction relates to corresponding 
divergences in meanings, interests and political positions, in other words the exter-
nally grounded reasons of each actor to participate in a policy process. As the fol-
lowing section explains, the strategic decisions taken by civic actors and others, 
such as the UNHCR, revealed the clear interests that were at stake. The social dis-
tance between civic actors and the government widened or narrowed, depending on 
the extent to which their respective interests, meanings and political positions were 
consistent with each other. 
Reasons for participation by the DHA in refugee policymaking 
Since 1994, the DHA had been struggling to develop a policy that would appropri-
ately meet the administrative demands placed on it by a growing number of applica-
tions for refugee status. At the same time, the DHA was compelled to respond to 
multiple pressures from: (1) civic organisations, in terms of the DHA’s constitu-
tional and international obligations, (2) the UNHCR, in terms of the DHA’s interna-
tional obligations, and (3) section nine organisations, in terms of the DHA’s consti-
tutional obligations. 
The fact that the DHA took control of the refugee policymaking process in set-
ting up the White Paper Task Team was an important reassertion of its central role 
in making policy, which the Green Paper process had diluted somewhat. That the 
DHA chose to involve civic organisations in the Task Team, despite some tensions, 
was indicative of its desire to try to resolve as many issues of fundamental dis-
agreement as possible in the formation of a new administrative system, rather than 
continue solely on a path of confrontation, in which its policies were constantly 
subject to judicial challenge. One particular issue that the DHA wished to resolve 
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was that of legal meanings, including key definitions contained in the international 
refugee conventions. While political positions and interests may have been differ-
ent, by involving multiple interests, DHA aimed to reach some level of consensus 
on the meanings attributed to certain refugee law terms. 
Reasons for civic participation in refugee policymaking 
The two civic organisations represented in the White Paper Task Team to form a 
refugee policy were Lawyers for Human Rights and UCT Legal Aid Clinic. As one 
of the first civic-society organisations in South Africa to focus serious attention on 
refugee protection matters, and with an almost 20-year history of fighting injustice 
and intolerance, LHR was motivated by a strong desire to promote human rights 
and advance the social justice aspirations of South Africa’s Constitution. LHR had a 
number of clients who had claimed refugee status and the organisation was con-
fronted on a daily basis with stories of how the DHA, other government authorities, 
the media, companies and the general public had been treating asylum seekers and 
refugees. Despite facing hostility from certain government officials at the time the 
White Paper Task Team was operating, LHR always recognised that policy was the 
responsibility of the DHA. LHR also recognised that the DHA’s administrative 
structure needed considerable strengthening, but anticipated that – for the meantime 
– they would continue to challenge decisions taken by the DHA on judicial review. 
LHR‘s principal reasons for becoming involved in the refugee policymaking 
process were therefore twofold. Firstly, LHR wanted to underscore their support for 
a DHA-led policy process that bolstered the department’s capacity to fulfil the de-
mands placed on it by growing numbers of applications for refugee status. Sec-
ondly, LHR calculated that the DHA would put in place a refugee policy that 
would, as explicitly as possible, reflect South Africa’s international treaty obliga-
tions, as well as the provisions of South Africa’s Constitution. A third and related 
reason for involving themselves in the White Paper Task Team was to ensure that 
there would be opportunity to review policy proposals in a more critical setting 
through the NCRA‘s legal sub-committee and, later, in representations before the 
Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs. 
In short, LHR recognised the need to bolster the administrative capacity of the 
DHA, while still preserving space for judicial review of an administrative decision 
of the DHA. This approach acknowledged that lawyers ought to pay more attention 
to the broader administrative law framework regulating government departments in 
South Africa, beyond simply permitting the capacity for judicial review. 
As an experienced practising lawyer and director of UCT Legal Aid Clinic, De 
la Hunt witnessed (on a daily basis) how the DHA’s policy was being implemented. 
Further, she helped establish the first university-level course on refugee law, and 
was therefore – as mentioned earlier – one of the representatives on the White Paper 
Task Team best versed in refugee law. Her reasons for participating in the Task 
Team were, therefore, similar to those of LHR; to ensure that the daily realities of 
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policy implementation were being taken into account, but also to contribute her 
knowledge of refugee law and practice. 
Reasons for participation in refugee policymaking by the UNHCR 
Guided by an international mandate, the UNHCR‘s formal reasons for participating 
in the Task Team‘s deliberations were more closely aligned to states. However, the 
UNHCR was also guided by Article 35 and by its general mandate to protect refu-
gees, and to monitor state compliance in terms of the state’s obligations under the 
UN and OAU Refugee Conventions. 
Similar to the civic representatives, the UNHCR wanted to see in place a policy 
that reflected South Africa’s obligations under the international refugee conven-
tions. In promoting this objective, the UNHCR played a ‘diplomatic’ role, as a close 
advisor to the DHA. At the same time, the UNHCR supported the principle that 
civic actors should be involved in the refugee policymaking process. Accordingly, 
the UNHCR confronted a certain tension between these two roles, embarking on 
what Loescher has characterised as a ‘perilous path’.108 By participating in the Task 
Team, the UNHCR felt it could promote an environment in which civic actors and 
government debated key policy issues. At the same time, the UNHCR could bring 
its considerable knowledge of refugee law and comparative state practices to the 
Task Team. 
Reasons for participation by section nine organisations in refugee policymaking 
The Gender Commission and the South African Human Rights Commission both 
derive their mandates from section nine of South Africa’s constitution, which 
obliges them to monitor government in complying with its obligations under the 
constitution. Their reasons for participating in the Task Team were therefore princi-
pally guided by their desire to ensure that the provisions of the constitution were 
being appropriately reflected in the formation of a new administrative regime to 
process applications for refugee status, as well as in the rights that asylum seekers 
and refugees would enjoy in South Africa. At the same time, these Commissions 
recognised that it was the DHA’s responsibility to develop policy, not theirs. 
4.5.4 Further delays, from policy to implementation 
Once the Green Paper model was effectively abandoned by the White Paper Task 
Team in May 1998, it was only a matter of a few months until the Refugees Act of 
1998 came into existence in December of that year. But, the much-vaunted policy 
did not come into force until 1 April 2000, once the DHA issued administrative 
Regulations to the Refugees Act.109 
                                                        
108  (Loescher 2001), passim. 
109  (Regulations to the Refugees Act 2000). 
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In contrast to the White Paper process that produced the Refugees Act, civic ac-
tors were not publicly consulted with regard to the Regulations, which precipitated 
more confrontational approaches by civic actors.110 The United States government, 
that had long been assisting the South African government in border control infra-
structure, training and policy advice,111 also played a considerable role in drafting 
the Regulations. It was not surprising, therefore, that civic actors perceived the 
Regulations ‘more as a product of government to government (as well as the 
UNHCR) drafting efforts than as the fruit of a public consultation service’.112 
It was not only civic actors who received the new policy, as further articulated 
by the Regulations, with surprise; the DHA was also unprepared for implementing 
the new Regulations. This lack of preparedness manifested itself in two main re-
spects. The first area in which the DHA found itself unprepared concerned an ad-
ministrative backlog of more than 25 000 unresolved applications that had built up 
under the old system of asylum determination, established under the Aliens Control 
Act of 1991; this issue is not discussed in this book. Secondly, although the South 
African government had agreed long before to consider granting permanent resi-
dence to former Mozambican refugees who, for various reasons, had decided not to 
take part in a UNHCR-led repatriation programme, this policy had lain dormant 
ever since. These former refugees were thus left in a situation of administrative 
limbo, once the repatriation programme came to an end and the South African gov-
ernment publicly declared a ‘cessation of hostilities’ in Mozambique. Consequently, 
they no longer qualified as refugees under the old administrative system and were 
ineligible for consideration under the new administrative system provided for by the 
Refugees Act. How the government eventually responded to this issue, together 
with considerable involvement from civic actors, is discussed in the next chapter. 
And so, from the process of policymaking, I now turn to an even more hazardous 
area of civic-society interactions in the context of policy implementation. 
                                                        
110  On concerns about the Regulations and their impact, see (Klaaren et al. 2008: 55-56); (L.A. De La 
Hunt and Kerfoot 2008: 99-100), and (Belvedere 2006: 163-170). 
111  See (Handmaker and Singh 2002: 6-7). 
112  (Klaaren et al. 2008: 55). 
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CHAPTER 5 
WHO’S RESPONSIBLE?  
CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN  
REFUGEE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This second illustration of advocating state accountability through co-operative 
civic interactions focuses on policy implementation.1 More specifically, this chapter 
examines a project, the legal and political basis for which was established by a tri-
partite commission in the early 1990s to provide a durable solution for former Mo-
zambican refugees (hereinafter referred to as FMRs) in South Africa, by regularis-
ing their status in South Africa.2 This regularisation project, which was essentially 
an ‘amnesty’ for the FMRs’ lack of residential status, was finally implemented be-
tween 1999 and 2000. The project required co-operation between national civic 
actors and government officials at the national and provincial levels, and extensive 
co-ordination by an international NGO. 
As was done in the previous chapter, this example of co-operative civic-state in-
teractions is tested against the book’s three theoretical propositions. Firstly, in the 
specific historical context that this regularisation project took place, the capacity of 
civic actors to hold the government of South Africa accountable has been shaped by 
structural changes in the national and international legal framework. Secondly, the 
boundaries that define the structural relationship between the civic actors involved 
in this project and the government have shifted in specific ways; civic actors should 
respect these boundaries if they want to be strategic. By the same token, a failure by 
civic actors to respect these boundaries can lead to compromises in the independ-
ence of civic actors, and in their capacity to have strategic influence. Thirdly, civic 
actors have a crucial role to play in mediating the translation of international legal 
norms into local contexts. The possibilities for fulfilling this role are illustrated by 
                                                        
1  On refugee policy implementation, see also (Tuepker 2002), passim, (Belvedere 2006: 174-262) 
and (Handmaker et al. 2008: 89-166). 
2  The term ‘durable solution’ is a much-used refugee policy term, referring generally to one of three 
options, namely: return/repatriation to a refugee’s country of origin, integration/regularisation of a 
refugee in the host country, or resettlement of a refugee in a third country. 
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the level of social distance between civic actors and the government, or divergences 
in their respective interests, meanings and political positions. 
Reflecting on the implementation of the civic-led regularisation project presents 
instructive, if not unsettling examples of how civic collusion with government can 
have alternately positive or negative outcomes in protecting refugee rights. The po-
tential for the civic-state collaboration to regularise the status of tens of thousands 
of FMRs was seriously undermined by the highly unsatisfactory way in which the 
project was designed. While over sixty per cent of FMRs who applied for regular-
ised status were approved, the remainder were left with continued uncertainty in 
terms of their legal status. Of principal concern was the lack of a clear distinction 
between civic and state responsibilities, the absence of due process in the process-
ing of applications, and the lack of an effective and independent monitoring pres-
ence. 
This chapter begins by briefly addressing the historical reasons why FMRs 
ended up in South Africa, why previous efforts to provide them with a durable solu-
tion to their plight were grossly inadequate, and how it is that many ended up with-
out any form of legal residence status. Second, this chapter explains and analyses 
the particular roles civic actors fulfilled in the regularisation project – from prepara-
tion to implementation, between 1998 and 2000 – alongside government actors 
from the South African Department of Home Affairs (DHA). Finally, this chapter 
assesses the impact of civic participation in the FMR regularisation project, in light 
of the book’s theoretical propositions. 
5.2 A TENUOUS PLACE OF REFUGE 
Despite its past history of racist and authoritarian policies, and current problems of 
xenophobia, South Africa has long served as a tenuous place of refuge for many 
hundreds of thousands of people from Mozambique.3 During the 1980s, many refu-
gees arrived in South Africa as a direct consequence of the violent civil war in Mo-
zambique. Their reception in South Africa has been described by Jonny Steinberg 
as follows: 
Of the 1.7 million people who fled Mozambique, between 250,000 and 350,000 
came to South Africa. Most … crossed the border in a steady stream between 1985 
and 1987 … The reception the refugees received was shaped by an extraordinarily 
subtle and variegated cocktail of national apartheid politics and local interests and 
sensibilities … From the arrival of the first refugees in 1984 until its demise a dec-
ade later, the apartheid government did not offer Mozambicans forced to leave their 
country by war refugee status. The government did, however, in principle permit 
refugees to settle in the homeland territories scattered across the northeast of South 
Africa … Permission to settle in KwaZulu and Lebowa was nominal and meaning-
                                                        
3  (Hrw 1998) and (Dolan 1995a), passim. 
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less, for the homeland government of Lebowa banned Mozambican settlement out-
right, and in KwaZulu refugees were barely tolerated.4 
In addition to its direct and indirect involvement in the war,5 the South African gov-
ernment (fearing cross-border raids by Umkhonto we Sizwe cadres6 who, the mili-
tary believed, had training camps in Mozambique) was keen to secure the border at 
all costs. The South African military, which had principal responsibility for border 
enforcement, introduced draconian measures to prevent entry, most notoriously an 
electric fence many kilometres long that could be set to lethal voltage.7 Kruger 
Park, the country’s largest wild animal reserve, and filled with lions and other dan-
gerous animals, also served as a deterrent to entry. But despite these dangers, tens 
of thousands of Mozambican civilians made their way into the country in search of 
refuge and work. While the Bantustan authorities governing the semi-autonomous 
territories in the Northern and Eastern parts of South Africa received many of these 
Mozambican refugees, they were not formally recognised.8 
Despite the very large numbers of Mozambicans who ended up in South Africa 
as refugees, there was no international organisation – UN or civic – providing hu-
manitarian assistance to the FMRs.9 The South African government would not al-
low it.10 As a consequence, these refugees became ‘self-settled’, relying on the gen-
erosity of ordinary South Africans and the limited assistance provided by traditional 
leaders, churches and the Bantustan authorities. 
5.2.1 The UNHCR establishes an office in South Africa 
With a gradual softening in policies of the apartheid government from the late 
1980s, South Africa agreed to negotiate with the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) concerning the establishment of an office in the 
                                                        
4  (Steinberg 2005: 3). 
5  The war was to a large extent fuelled by the interests of the former apartheid government in South 
Africa, which pursued a policy of regional destabilisation. The government provided the right-wing 
opposition RENAMO forces fighting the left-wing FRELIMO forces with ammunition, training 
and occasionally back-up. 
6  Umkhonto we Sizwe, ‘Spear of the Nation’, also known as “MK”, was the armed resistance move-
ment of the African National Congress. 
7  This was known as ‘the snake’ and required a Ministerial order to be switched to lethal mode. 
8  As explained later, Mozambicans registering for the UNHCR-led voluntary repatriation programme 
in the early 1990s were given a form of temporary, ‘retrospective’ recognition of their refugee 
status. 
9  (Polzer 2004: 7) relates this to South Africa’s ‘national rejection of responsibility’, effectively shift-
ing responsibility to the Homeland authorities. 
10  Due to its suspension from the General Assembly of the United Nations, the South African gov-
ernment did not allow any UN Agency to operate in the country, even on a humanitarian basis. 
UNHCR‘s repeated requests to provide humanitarian assistance to these refugees were flatly re-
fused by the government. 
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country.11 In 1991, the UNHCR was given a formal mandate by the South African 
government to set up operations in South Africa. This was an historic development, 
marking the first concrete steps by South Africa to (1) develop a refugee policy 
based on universally accepted norms, and (2) lay the administrative structure for 
assessing the legal status of refugees and providing for a durable solution, including 
the unresolved situation of several hundred thousand FMRs. 
The UNHCR‘s mandate to conduct operations in South Africa was officially 
confirmed by the signing of a Basic Agreement12 governing the UN organisation’s 
relationship with the South African government. Upon acquiring its mandate, the 
UNHCR immediately gave priority to a programme aimed at providing a ‘durable 
solution’ for several hundred thousand Mozambican refugees who had resided in 
South Africa, but had never been formally admitted.13 In its ongoing negotiations 
with the South African government, the UNHCR also stressed the need for a tripar-
tite framework to administer a voluntary repatriation programme, based on other 
country programmes in which the UNHCR had taken part. In its role as advisor to a 
Tripartite Commission between the governments of Mozambique, South Africa and 
itself, the UNHCR proposed two solutions for the Mozambican refugees, both of 
which were ultimately adopted by the Commission, in the form of joint recommen-
dations. 
The first recommendation was for a voluntary repatriation programme, to be im-
plemented in terms of a ‘Tripartite Agreement’ between the two governments and 
the UNHCR. The second was for a form of regularised status to be granted to for-
mer Mozambican refugees who had decided to settle in South Africa and had cho-
sen not to return. In order to give the voluntary repatriation programme a legal ba-
sis, the UNHCR and DHA facilitated a project of initial registration, which 
essentially granted refugee status retrospectively. 
                                                        
11  (‘Statement by Prütz Phiri’ 1996), in which she remarked that these early meetings were somewhat 
surreal affairs, with the South African government represented mainly by uniformed military offi-
cers. 
12  (Basic Agreement 1993). This Agreement later formed the basis of a bizarre court challenge by 
Kgama Baramoto, a former general and commander of the Garde Civil in Zaire, together with two 
other senior government officials, Mudima Mavua and Ngbale Nzimbi, all of whom had fallen out 
of favour with then-president Mobutu Sese Seko, and had fled the country. The (Baramoto case 
1998) is discussed in chapter six. 
13  Another programme developed by the UNHCR, around the same time as the consequence of politi-
cal negotiation, concerned the return of South African exiles, on the basis of agreements reached 
between the South African government and numerous liberation groups, including the Pan African-
ist Congress (PAC), African National Congress (ANC), and other previously banned groups, in-
cluding the End Conscription Campaign (ECC). For a study on the return of (white) war resisters, 
see (Israel 2002). According to (‘Interview with G. Vallie’ 2006), social movements and civic or-
ganisations such as the Western Cape Relief Fund were instrumental in the implementation of this 
programme, acting as crucial mediators between UNHCR and groups in South Africa, as well as 
assisting with their various social, economic and psychological needs. 
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5.2.2 Assessing the Mozambican voluntary repatriation programme 
Ray Wilkinson reported in the UNHCR‘s widely-distributed magazine Refugees 
that the Mozambican voluntary repatriation programme was a ‘remarkable success 
story’.14 The South African press also reported the repatriation programme to be a 
big success.15 However, independent assessments of the UNHCR’s programme, 
including by Chris Dolan and Alan Simmance, paint a different picture, particularly 
concerning the programme in South Africa.16 Out of an initial planning figure of 
240 000 (which the UNHCR later revised to 120 000, inexplicably), only around 20 
000 persons were voluntarily repatriated between March 1994 and January 1995. 
This figure was far exceeded by forcible deportations (over 70 000 persons in 1994 
alone) by the South African border control authorities.17 
Dolan explained that the repatriation programme was woefully unsuccessful in 
South Africa because, at the time, no efforts were taken to regularise the status of 
the remaining FMRs. In other words, the ‘voluntary’ nature of repatriation was illu-
sory; there was no alternative offered. Dolan further explained that NGOs – which 
in some cases received very large sums of money for being implementing partners – 
had become complicit in the failings of the Mozambican repatriation programme, in 
particular through their failure to ensure an independent and effective legal advo-
cacy presence, which in turn allowed for inappropriate behaviour.18 Furthermore, 
while the repatriation programme from South Africa proved to be largely unsuc-
cessful (on the basis of the UNHCR‘s own statistical predictions), a promise by the 
tripartite commission, that the Government of South Africa would put in place a 
mechanism to regularise the status of Mozambicans, remained unfulfilled. 
The critiques of the ‘voluntary’ repatriation programme made by Dolan and oth-
ers19 highlighted the structural challenges that civic actors face when participating 
in government policy implementation. These critiques also served as pointed warn-
ings regarding the importance of civic advocacy in monitoring government behav-
                                                        
14  (Wilkinson 1998). The magazine’s cover story focused almost entirely on UNHCR‘s reintegration 
programme. In other words, it reported on the experiences of those who participated in the repatria-
tion, paying no attention to those who chose not to return to Mozambique. 
15  (‘UN Mission Widely Praised’ 1995). 
16  (Dolan 1995c) and (Simmance 1996). 
17  (Dolan 1998: 92-98). 
18  As an example of this, (Dolan 1995c) describes UNHCR and NGOs literally lining Mozambicans 
up in a row and asking them whether they wished to return to Mozambique. But despite many cau-
tionary messages from numerous analysts, there were still efforts to assist Mozambicans to return 
to Mozambique voluntarily, including by the Wits RRP. Having later amended its views on 
whether former Mozambican refugees who continued to reside in South Africa desired to ‘return 
home’, Wits RRP began implementation from 1997 of what were known as ‘assisted voluntary re-
turn’ programmes, both on its own and in collaboration with other local and international organisa-
tions and agencies. (Simbine and Johnston 1997). 
19  (Simbine and Johnston 1997); (K.B. Wilson and Nunes 1994) argued that failings in the voluntary 
repatriation programme were the consequence of not taking into account the refugees’ own flight 
and return movements. 
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iour. Unfortunately, almost none of these factors were taken into consideration in 
the development and implementation of the regularisation project. 
5.2.3 Lack of legal documentation for those remaining 
When, in 1996, the UNHCR applied the cessation clause to FMRs remaining in 
South Africa,20 with no corresponding effort to regularise their status inside the 
country,21 their already uncertain legal status in South Africa became even more 
doubtful. Lack of any formal recognition of their status meant that they were vul-
nerable to abuse and deportation.22 Official reluctance to integrate Mozambicans 
into South Africa was particularly resented by those who had voted for the ANC in 
the 1994 elections.23 By the late 1990s, when international NGOs began to take a 
serious interest in FMRs, an estimated several hundred thousand former Mozambi-
can refugees were believed to be in South Africa without legal documentation.24 
The plight of FMRs in South Africa eventually attracted the attention of the As-
sociation of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), an ambitious and 
well-funded Dutch NGO. As discussed in the following section, implementation of 
the project combined the efforts of AWEPA, local NGOs and the South African 
government. During the planning and implementation of this project, the civic-state 
distinction as to who was ultimately responsible for its implementation became 
blurred. In the process, the project seriously limited the agency of local civic actors 
involved, and severely curtailed the legal protection of a highly vulnerable group of 
forcibly displaced persons. 
5.3 CIVIC CO-OPERATION IN THE STATUS REGULARISATION PROJECT 
Civic co-operation in the project to regularise the legal residential status of former 
Mozambican refugees had its origins in a meeting held at a conference centre in 
Amsterdam in February 1996. A Dutch organisation called Refugiado organised the 
meeting to discuss the plight of refugees from Mozambique, some of whom had 
returned to their country, but many of whom remained in the countries where they 
had sought refuge. Apart from the claim that such experiences in Southern Africa 
apparently held ‘lessons’ for Europeans, it seemed an unlikely gathering place to 
discuss matters of refugees and reconciliation, or to try and appreciate the perspec-
tive of Mozambicans seeking to rebuild their lives after several decades of war. 
                                                        
20  This was, in itself, an unusual move. Having just acceded to the two major Refugee Conventions, 
this was something that the government of South Africa ought to have decided, not UNHCR. It 
seemed, therefore, that the intention of UNHCR in applying the cessation clause to FMRs was sim-
ply to relieve itself of any continuing legal obligations towards this group. 
21  This is notwithstanding two other regularisation programmes, known as the Miner’s Amnesty and 
the SADC Amnesty, which did benefit some FMRs. See (Crush and Williams 1999). 
22  (Johnston 1999). 
23  (Dolan 1995b). 
24  (Johnston 2001). 
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Amsterdam was the headquarters of Refugiado, whose Board was headed by 
Dutch former politician and anti-apartheid campaigner Jan Nico Scholten. The or-
ganisation shared an office with two other organisations that Scholten had estab-
lished and headed, including AWEPA and the African European Institute (AEI).25 
Scholten was fond of referring to his network of organisations as part of a ‘fam-
ily’. He referred to the Dutch Refugee Council (DRC) as the ‘mother’ of Refugiado 
and the African-European Institute (AEI) as Refugiado’s ‘father’. He further re-
garded the AEI as a ‘full sister’ of AWEPA.26 Scholten served as, respectively, 
Chair of the Refugiado Board, Chair of the DRC Board, AEI President and 
AWEPA President. With the exception of the DRC, these organisations were all 
managed by the same general staff, and often shared the same letterhead.27 The 
AWEPA ‘family’ wanted to make a concrete contribution to help the FMRs, be-
yond political lobbying and awareness activities. As Scholten declared at the con-
ference in 1996:  
the organisations I represent are committed to human dignity and justice; our work 
is based upon partnership and solidarity. We are dedicated to the consolidation of 
democracy and peace … Let us join forces in our struggle for human rights, African 
and Europeans together.28 
Notwithstanding its lack of experience, either in funding or in co-ordinating large-
scale refugee or any other humanitarian assistance projects in Africa,29 AWEPA 
identified just such an opportunity to ‘join forces’ in South Africa. This opportunity 
                                                        
25  These organisations were products of high-level anti-apartheid political activism in the 1980s. At 
the time, Scholten was a member of the Dutch parliament, and had formed the Association of West 
European Parliamentarians for Action Against Apartheid (AWEPAA), to mobilise other parliamen-
tarians in Western Europe, and politically isolate the South African apartheid government. With the 
demise of political apartheid and the thawing of the Cold War in the 1990s, AWEPAA re-
orientated itself and became the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA). 
The substantial funds for Scholten’s network of organisations came mainly from European gov-
ernments and the European Union. Refugiado, registered by Scholten as a foundation two years 
previously, in the spring 1994, had ambitious plans to try and help the refugees of Southern Africa, 
beyond the organising of conferences, high-profile delegations of Europeans to Southern Africa, 
and conference publications. 
26  (Scholten 1996). 
27  According to independent experts in (‘University of London Evaluation’ 1998), the organisation 
was ‘over-identified’ through the AWEPA president. The experts recommended a ‘fixed term’ for 
the position of president. For all these reasons, it is reasonable to conclude that there was no effec-
tive separation between them. For the sake of consistency, therefore, ‘AWEPA’ here refers to the 
activities of all three organisations. 
28  (Scholten 1996). 
29  The report of independent experts from the (‘University of London Evaluation’ 1998: 169) con-
cluded that, beyond ‘institution building projects within government structures’ or political lobby-
ing in Europe, AWEPA was discouraged from undertaking ‘specific, discrete projects’ that ad-
dressed, among other things, refugee issues, in which it had no expertise. Although this report long 
pre-dated the implementation of the regularisation project, AWEPA carried out the project regard-
less. 
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came just four months after the 1996 meeting in Amsterdam, when, in early June 
1996, the tripartite commission, composed of the UNHCR and the governments of 
Mozambique and South Africa, announced that a cessation clause concerning Mo-
zambicans claiming refugee status in South Africa would come into effect as of 31 
December 1996. The legal implication of declaring a ‘cessation clause’ is that the 
hostilities in Mozambique were deemed to have ended, and it would no longer be 
possible to claim refugee status on this basis.30 
AWEPA proposed a project that was to be the third major post-1994 ‘amnesty’ 
in South Africa, otherwise referred to as the ‘Mozambican amnesty’ or ‘regularisa-
tion project for former Mozambican refugees‘.31 AWEPA’s project aimed to pro-
vide permanent residence to persons who had arrived from Mozambique as refu-
gees, but who wished to remain in South Africa and had therefore chosen not to 
take advantage of the UNHCR-sponsored repatriation programme. AWEPA offered 
to support the process by sourcing the funds as well as providing co-ordination to 
the regularisation project. Since it was reported that there were still persons who 
wanted to return to Mozambique, AWEPA also offered to support a limited number 
of ‘assisted return’ projects.32 
Since AWEPA itself had no background in humanitarian work, it had to hire ad-
ditional experts and find local partners in South Africa to implement these two pro-
jects, although it maintained ‘overall co-ordination’, particularly concerning politi-
cal matters.33 At a conference organised in Nelspruit, South Africa in June 1997, 
AWEPA laid out its agenda for future activities34 and began identifying local part-
ners for its ambitious regularisation project. Led by AWEPA, these organisations 
eventually formed what was termed a ‘Task Force’ to co-ordinate activities locally. 
On Human Rights Day, 10 December 1997, nearly one year after the cessation 
clause had had been formally put into place, the then-Minister of Home Affairs, 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, sent a letter to AWEPA confirming the South African gov-
ernment‘s agreement to grant an exemption to FMRs. The letter also acknowledged 
the ‘possibility of (AWEPA’s) kind assistance in providing financial and human 
                                                        
30  (‘Mozambicans to Lose Refugee Status’ 1996). As already mentioned, this announcement followed 
the conclusion of a mostly unsuccessful effort on the part of UNHCR and the government of South 
Africa to provide a durable solution for the several hundred thousand Mozambicans still resident in 
South Africa. 
31  Two previous amnesties focused on former mineworkers and nationals of SADC countries. See 
(Crush and Williams 1999). 
32  In (Awepa 1988), AWEPA misrepresented the figures provided to them by local organisations, 
making the erroneous claims that between one-half and a third of an estimated 300 000 former Mo-
zambican refugees in South Africa wished to return to Mozambique. In fact, according to (Johnston 
2001: 36), only 158 FMRs applied for assistance to return to Mozambique. 
33  This expression was repeated in several documents produced by the project, including minutes of 
meetings. 
34  The conference, organised by AWEPA, who also produced a report, was entitled ‘Prolonged Hospi-
tality or Return Home?’. 
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resource assistance in this regard’.35 The letter did not, however, confirm that an 
agreement was in place between AWEPA and the DHA. This was something that 
was to be negotiated. Furthermore AWEPA was still in the process of identifying 
local NGOs willing to contribute to the project. 
This section will first discuss the role of civic actors in the preparation of the 
regularisation project, and in particular, the formation of a joint civic-government 
Task Force. Next, this section will discuss how the implementation of the project 
was delayed, which is followed by a critical assessment of the project’s implemen-
tation. 
5.3.1 Preparations for the regularisation project 
Two South African organisations (that eventually became key partners in the regu-
larisation project) were involved from the preparatory stages of the regularisation 
project. These were the South African Council of Churches (SACC), principally 
through the Witbank Diocese in Mpumalanga, and the Refugee Research Pro-
gramme (RRP), which at the time was affiliated to the University of the Witwaters-
rand Rural Facility in Acornhoek, Mpumalanga.36 The SACC and the RRP brought 
a great deal of institutional experience in (respectively) humanitarian assistance and 
advocacy-oriented research, although both also had their limitations. In particular, 
neither organisation had a legal background. 
The SACC had long-developed contacts with exiled Mozambican communities 
through its member parishes, and had participated in the UNHCR repatriation pro-
gramme as an implementing partner. The SACC therefore had experience in large-
scale responses to refugees,37 but had limited knowledge of immigration policies, 
something which proved to be problematic at a later stage in the regularisation pro-
ject’s implementation. 
The RRP had been conducting research in the area since 1993. Dolan, the pro-
gramme’s founder, produced some of the most important early work concerning 
forced migrant communities in South Africa,38 although he had left the RRP by 
1997. After Dolan and other core research staff left, the RRP’s work was mainly 
limited to small-scale surveys of rural-based refugee communities. With much-
reduced research funding, its capacity was limited. Nevertheless, the RRP remained 
the only organisation in South Africa still conducting rural research of forced mi-
grant communities, and had the most institutional knowledge of any organisation in 
South Africa concerning the socio-economic conditions of former Mozambican 
refugees. 
                                                        
35  Letter from M G Buthelezi, Minister of Home Affairs, to Dr J N Scholten, AWEPA, 10 December 
1997. 
36  RRP also became the principal partner in the assisted voluntary return projects. 
37  (‘Spelling Relief for Rulani’s Refugees’ 1998). 
38  (Dolan 1995a); (Dolan et al. 1997) and (Dolan 1998). 
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The SACC and RRP together did not have the resources to implement the regu-
larisation project, and identifying other South African partners to form part of 
AWEPA‘s Task Force proved difficult. Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) contrib-
uted to some early Task Force meetings, but were reluctant from the very begin-
ning, particularly concerning the organisational structure,39 and a few months later 
withdrew from the Task Force altogether.40 The Southern African Migration Project 
(SAMP) initially agreed to contribute to the all-important information campaign, 
but its involvement was far less than was initially envisaged when AWEPA drasti-
cally cut the budget for awareness-raising activities, even though it had already 
raised hundreds of thousands of US dollars through various European donors.41 In-
deed, AWEPA’s lack of transparency, budget discrepancies and frequent manipula-
tions of local partners’ budgets proved to be a major source of discontent among 
South African partners.42 
                                                        
39  One document produced by LHR, ‘AWEPA Meeting, Pretoria’, 27 February 1998 outlined (at 
AWEPA’s request) the legal status of former Mozambican refugees in an international context, the 
consequences of their then-current legal status and, somewhat repetitively, the consequences of 
‘becoming illegal’, as well as the risks if their amnesty application was not approved. In the same 
document, LHR made known its multiple concerns regarding the AWEPA project proposal, which 
also requested clarification on the co-ordinating role AWEPA envisaged for itself as well as the or-
ganisational set-up in general, and questioned various assumptions specified in the proposal docu-
ment. AWEPA’s response to LHR’s concerns was not to discuss them in the meeting with other 
Task Force members, or to respond in writing, but to reserve such matters for ‘bi-lateral discus-
sions’. 
40  LHR, Letter to Task Force Members, 7 October 1998, in which it expressed ‘serious reservations 
over the Project’s ability to meet its stated objectives under the present circumstances’. In a sepa-
rate letter to Jan Nico Scholten of AWEPA dated 7 October 1998, LHR expressed frustration that 
‘though we have frequently made known our concerns, we do not believe that they are adequately 
being addressed’. 
41  In a letter to LHR dated 23 September 1998, AWEPA confirmed that donors to the project up until 
that point included the Swiss government, Swedish government, Bilance (Cordaid) Netherlands, 
Concern (Ireland) and the Dutch Refugee Council. This reluctance to honour funding agreements 
with its local partners, in addition to AWEPA’s erroneous claim that the shortfall for the education 
campaign was promised by DHA, eventually pushed AWEPA’s then South Africa-based co-
ordinator to resign from the project. Confirmed in an e-mail from Nadja Manghezi to Handmaker, 
J. dated 1 November 1999. 
42  Unbeknown to the local partners, AWEPA had been able to raise over one hundred thousand US 
dollars from the Dutch Refugee Council, and by July 1998 had declared, internally, an eight hun-
dred thousand dollar budget for the first phase alone. In a document by the Dutch Refugee Council, 
‘Rapportage van de Commissie van Drie’, July 1998, the budget was declared to be 793,427 US 
dollars. In letters to the Swedish government, however, AWEPA declared its budget to be 496,100 
US dollars, an astonishing 172,200 of which was reserved for ‘travel’. These figures do not include 
the budget and funds raised for the assisted voluntary return projects. By contrast, its message to 
the public was different. In (‘Refugees the Focus of New Aid Group’ 1998), it was claimed by 
AWEPA president Jan Nico Scholten that the budget for the first phase was ‘2 million Rand’ 
(equivalent to just over 200,000 US dollars at that time). In a later statement, however, AWEPA, 
‘Preliminary task force meeting South African partners’, minutes of a meeting in Pretoria, 18 June 
1998, claimed that ‘the budget for the first two phases of the project … almost US$ 800,000’. 
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The consequences of these complex factors are explained in the following sec-
tions, beginning with the creation of an implementation Task Force, followed by the 
project’s launch and a decision on the part of AWEPA, prior to implementation, to 
abandon a credible monitoring function.43 As argued in an earlier analysis of the 
project to regularise the status of FMRs,44 various assumptions AWEPA made in its 
proposal document were strongly contested by the South African organisations it 
approached as potential partners, notably LHR, but with little result. 
Task force meetings 
Meetings of the Task Force in preparation for the first phase implementation of the 
Mozambican amnesty/regularisation project were organised by AWEPA, mostly in 
Pretoria, South Africa.45 The meetings mainly addressed the Mozambican regulari-
sation project, but also referred to ongoing assisted voluntary return projects. In the 
minutes to these meetings, nearly always chaired and carefully controlled by 
AWEPA, the activities and inputs of the ‘local partners’ were carefully spelled out 
in ‘action points’, giving the impression of consultation. Furthermore, minutes of 
the Task Force preparatory meetings, also produced by AWEPA, often mentioned 
that recommendations were ‘shared’ by all participants to the meeting. 
For example, in AWEPA‘s minutes to a Task Force meeting on 27 February 
1998, it was recommended that: (1) training of police officers take place, (2) that 
there be a moratorium on deportations and (3) more detailed information be pro-
vided to the Task Force concerning the target group.46 None of these recommenda-
tions were ever implemented in any meaningful way. Police officers were never 
trained by the project. Furthermore, it was widely reported that the South African 
government‘s ongoing campaign of deporting Mozambicans was continuing,47 and 
had in fact increased dramatically since 1993. AWEPA took the position that ‘be-
cause a full moratorium is infeasible, there should be more clarified guarantees 
(sic)’.48 Finally, there was no further research commissioned to gather additional 
information about the target group. 
Although AWEPA held regular discussions with the DHA regarding prepara-
tions for the project, only cursory information was communicated back to the Task 
Force about what had actually been discussed, and what steps had been taken by the 
DHA towards preparation. Both the limited information provided to participants, 
                                                        
43  Extensive references are made to secondary or so-called ‘grey’ material provided by LHR, RRP 
and other participants to the regularisation programme, which is now located in an archive of the 
Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of the Witwatersrand. 
44  (Handmaker and Schneider 2002). 
45  The meetings were often personally attended by AWEPA president Jan Nico Scholten himself, 
coming from Amsterdam, and/or by Pär Granstedt of the AEI, coming from Sweden. 
46  AWEPA, ‘Task force meeting: action points’, Minutes of a meeting in Pretoria, 27 February 1998. 
47  Among many articles published in the major newspapers at the time, see: (Mugabe 1998); (‘4,500 
Illegal Held at the Borders’ 1998) and (West 1997). 
48  AWEPA, Minutes, 18 June 1998. 
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and the way in which disagreements with AWEPA’s agenda were carefully 
avoided, reflected what evaluators of AWEPA later criticised as an ‘out-dated’ 
management style.49 
In its feedback to the AWEPA proposal, LHR questioned several assumptions 
that the project organisers had made, none of which LHR felt were satisfactorily 
addressed by AWEPA. The first main concern raised by LHR concerned AWEPA’s 
vague reference to assuming ‘total co-ordination’ of the project rather than clearly 
explaining what roles it, the South African and Mozambican government authori-
ties, and local organisations were to assume. Such uncertainties dangerously blurred 
the responsibilities of – and the relationship between – government and non-
government organisations, raising serious questions concerning the perceived lack 
of compliance with administrative due process requirements. This lack of clarity on 
roles and responsibilities also meant that insufficient priority was given to the need 
for a competent, independent monitoring presence, which meant that participants in 
the regularisation project essentially monitored themselves and each other. LHR’s 
second major question was whether assurances had been obtained from all three 
border control authorities50 on whether a moratorium on deportations would be in 
place throughout the duration of the regularisation and assisted voluntary return 
projects.51 Despite the obvious threat that such deportations posed to the process, 
clear assurances were never obtained. 
In the meantime, in March 1998, at AWEPA‘s request, a background paper was 
produced by local NGOs and was ‘presented to the South African Department of 
Home Affairs’ by AWEPA’s President.52 This hastily-prepared document drew 
upon the research and experiences of SAMP and RRP in monitoring the implemen-
tation of the two previous amnesties, for miners and SADC nationals. The docu-
ment furthermore drew on the rights protection concerns of LHR, and included rec-
ommendations on how the amnesty ought to be defined, publicised, and 
implemented. At this stage, there was still no proposal from the DHA regarding the 
guidelines for implementing the regularisation project, including the determination 
criteria for regularisation. 
AWEPA launch of the regularisation project 
Despite continuing uncertainties as to what would be the criteria for regularisation, 
and without consulting its ‘partners’ in South Africa, AWEPA formally launched 
the regularisation project in London, England in the second week of April 1998. 
                                                        
49  (‘University of London Evaluation’ 1998). 
50  (‘Illegal Rampages by Home Affairs’ 1998). 
51  At the time these three border control authorities were the Department of Home Affairs (with prin-
cipal responsibility), together with the South African Police Services and the Department of De-
fence. 
52  (Handmaker et al. 1998). 
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The event drew the attention of the South African press, with two papers referring 
to a ‘four year project to support former Mozambican refugees‘.53 
Two months later, on 17 June 1998, and just one day prior to a Task Force meet-
ing in South Africa, AWEPA notified its local partners of the South African gov-
ernment‘s responses to the document produced by LHR, SAMP and RRP.54 Appar-
ently, the government had apparently also made known at this meeting that ‘there 
was no formal agreement between DHA and AWEPA’, despite the existence of the 
1997 letter from Minister Buthelezi referred to earlier.55 In another contradictory 
message, AWEPA claimed that the DHA had ‘agreed by letter to the 6 issues 
agreed on 7 May [sic]’, including, among other matters, that ‘the outreach pro-
gramme should start on 1 August 1998’. Finally, AWEPA assured the Task Force 
that ‘no money will go to the South African authorities’.56 
Abandoning a credible monitoring function 
Following the public launch, AWEPA came under increasing pressure to start im-
plementation of the project, and focused on eliminating obstacles to a launch; in the 
absence of active involvement by LHR, AWEPA decided to abandon a credible 
monitoring function. In other words, there was no organisation involved in the pro-
ject that had the capacity or legal knowledge to ensure that the implementation of 
the programme would be done in accordance with established international prac-
tices, or in terms of nationally established due process guidelines, as specified by 
the Constitution. Given the UNHCR‘s decades-long experience with durable solu-
tions,57 including the regional repatriation programme for Mozambican refugees 
and the setting up of the Tripartite Commission, it was surprising that AWEPA did 
not approach the UN organisation for advice or possible involvement. A representa-
tive of the International Organisation for Migration attended some meetings of the 
Task Force at the outset, but was only passively involved.58 
Once the UNHCR heard of the regularisation project, it communicated its con-
cerns directly to the then-Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, stating that it had nei-
ther been approached by AWEPA, nor did it agree with the ‘large numbers’ speci-
                                                        
53  (‘Solving the Refugee Problems’ 1998) and (‘Bulk of Mozambican Refugees Want to Remain in 
South Africa’ 1998). 
54  According to a letter to J. N. Scholten from A S Mokoena (then-Director-General of Home Af-
fairs), ‘Legalising the status of Mozambican former refugees’, (not dated), this followed a meeting 
between AWEPA and the Department on 7 May 1998. 
55  Referred to in AWEPA, Minutes, 18 June 1998. 
56  AWEPA, Minutes, 18 June 1998. 
57  The UNHCR also have extensive experience with regularisation/legalisation programmes in differ-
ent parts of the world. 
58  There was reference in the AWEPA Minutes, 18 June 1998 that ‘Discussions are going on with 
IOM to start a needs assessment in Mozambique to get more details on the needed resources for the 
returnees’. 
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fied in the proposal.59 Some of this concern was disingenuous;60 the UN agency 
never fully accepted criticisms of its 1993-1996 repatriation programme of Mozam-
bican refugees from South Africa. Furthermore, while the UNHCR did have a con-
tribution to make, given its extensive experience in implementing large-scale dura-
ble solution projects, and it was fully justified in insisting that it be consulted, its 
excessive concern over the ‘mixing of refugee issues with non-refugee migration 
matters’ seemed somewhat exaggerated.61 Nevertheless, one would still have ex-
pected AWEPA to approach the UNHCR for advice and possible monitoring in 
accordance with the agency’s mandate, which the UNHCR clearly stated it was 
willing to do. This option was never pursued by AWEPA. 
At a late stage in the planning of the project, and in the absence of active par-
ticipation in the Task Force,62 the National Paralegal Association (NPA) was ap-
proached and agreed to contribute to the project through their member branches in 
Northern Province and Mpumalanga. LHR was one of the very few organisations in 
South Africa at the time with the expertise and capacity to carry out what the Task 
Force had collectively emphasised was an ‘important’ monitoring function. But, as 
already mentioned, LHR had determined it could not accept this role in what it per-
ceived to be a dangerously compromised organisational structure. LHR was of the 
view that AWEPA‘s close and non-transparent relationship with the government 
would result in AWEPA prioritising this relationship over that with its local part-
ners, which is in fact what happened. 
While AWEPA‘s proposal was based on inadequately researched, vague or mis-
leading assumptions, at the same time AWEPA repeatedly displayed an unwilling-
ness to be guided by the experiences, concerns and perspectives of local organisa-
tions. For their part, NGOs were mostly reluctant to speak out against the 
authoritarian management style of AWEPA. In addition, the project struggled with 
endless delays as well as a lack of clarity concerning the roles and responsibilities 
of local civic actors and of the DHA, which also became a member of the Task 
Force. 
                                                        
59  UNHCR, ‘Repatriation of Mozambicans from South Africa’, letter to the South African Deputy 
Minister of Home Affairs, 24 February 1998. AWEPA claimed orally in a Task Force meeting I at-
tended that UNHCR had been approached, but had ‘chosen not to participate’. 
60  Up until its letter to the Deputy Minister in February 1998, the UNHCR had displayed little interest 
in pressing the South African government to address the plight of the several hundred thousand 
former Mozambican refugees who, in choosing not to repatriate to Mozambique, were left without 
formal legal residence in South Africa. 
61  Disagreement over the actual numbers of former Mozambican refugees (or AWEPA‘s designated 
term, ‘refugees during the period of destabilisation’) proved to be a problem throughout the pro-
ject’s planning and implementation. AWEPA maintained a figure of 300 000, while the RRP ar-
gued there were approximately 220 000. Meanwhile, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) 
claimed they estimated no more than 90 000 would apply for regularisation, a surprising conclusion 
since the DHA claimed it deported over 700 000 Mozambicans between 1990 and 1997 (Source: 
DHA). 
62  LHR later made a modest contribution to the training of volunteers and paralegals. 
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5.3.2 Delays in implementation 
After a written commitment from the Minister of Home Affairs, funding for the 
project apparently secured, and finally a public launch of the regularisation project 
in London in April 1998, it is unclear why implementation of the project was de-
layed for a year and a half. Since official guidelines on the implementation of the 
regularisation project had not been issued by April 1998, the Task Force requested 
LHR to provide further feedback to the Task Force on certain ‘legal issues’, even 
though LHR was not formally part of the project’s Task Force. Furthermore, 
AWEPA and other Task Force members requested SAMP to provide feedback on 
the information campaign and strategies. 
LHR‘s advice,63 presented in September 1998, concluded that there were many 
outstanding issues of concern, of a legal or administrative nature, that needed to be 
addressed. These included concerns over the proposed inclusion criteria, the docu-
mentation that applicants would be required to submit in support of their applica-
tion, access to the procedure, and whether assurances would be obtained against 
apprehension and deportation, both leading up to and including implementation of 
the regularisation project. The LHR document proposed that exceptions be made for 
‘survival fraud’; in other words, for applicants who would not otherwise have been 
eligible for regularisation of their status, but could reasonably explain that they had 
no option for obtaining documentation other than through illicit means, in order to 
avoid arrest and deportation. LHR furthermore recommended that the Departmental 
procedure draw on the previous practice of the Department, namely policy circulars 
that had been issued in 1994 in connection with the Mozambican repatriation pro-
gramme.64 The Task Force did not take up these recommendations during the pro-
ject’s implementation. 
SAMP’s report, presented early in 1999, proposed an extensive information 
campaign aimed at avoiding the mistakes of the first two amnesties, and utilising a 
wide range of media resources.65 The document advised that efforts should be un-
dertaken to reach women as a special target group, and measures were also pro-
posed to combat existing xenophobia and correct prevailing misperceptions among 
the South African public and opinion-makers. Additional training of government 
officials was also envisaged by SAMP. Virtually none of this advice was followed, 
and only a basic information campaign was implemented. 
On the 2 March 1999, the South African Director-General of Home Affairs sent 
a letter to AWEPA‘s office in Cape Town. The letter notified AWEPA that ‘prob-
lems (were) being experienced with the programme as the Department does not 
have personnel available to accompany the mobile units’. In view of the then-
forthcoming national elections, with which DHA staff would also be occupied, the 
                                                        
63  (Schneider 1998). 
64  These included Passport Control Instruction No. 20 of 1994, as amended by Passport Control In-
struction No. 23 of 1994. 
65  (Williams and Eyber 1999). 
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Department ‘suggested that the whole project be postponed until after the 1999 
elections’, which were to be held on 1 July 1999. 66 
The South African government finally issued ‘Draft Guidelines‘ for the imple-
mentation of the regularisation project; these Guidelines mentioned that ‘this De-
partmental Circular follows Departmental Circular no. 33 of 1999 which dealt with 
Authority to issue immigration permits (sic)’.67 Reference to this additional circular 
gave the DHA officials formal authority to grant permanent residence. However, 
neither these guidelines (which were never officially amended from the original 
draft), nor the eventual implementation of the Amnesty, took much from the rec-
ommendations by LHR or SAMP into consideration. They were also never offi-
cially gazetted (i.e. published by the official Government Printer) as required by 
law. 
5.3.3 Doing justice to the matter? Blurred roles and overlapping responsibilities 
When the regularisation project finally began to be implemented in September 
1999, many of the concerns raised by local civic actors had still not been addressed; 
in particular, the roles of the DHA, AWEPA and local civic actors blurred, and their 
corresponding responsibilities overlapped with each other. It is impossible to can-
vass all of the issues that arose during the implementation of the project. However, 
four issues stand out that illustrate both the degree to which local civic actors be-
came compromised in their relationships with the South African government, and 
the lack of due process for FMR applicants. These issues are: (1) AWEPA’s non-
transparent political lobby, (2) AWEPA’s financing and co-ordination of govern-
ment functions and disregard of due process and, finally, (3) the lack of an effec-
tive, independent monitoring presence. 
Non-transparent political lobby 
The lack of a transparent political lobby by AWEPA is the first issue. At various 
stages in the planning and implementation of the project, AWEPA made frequent 
assertions that it was involved in the establishment of multiple, high-level forums to 
ensure the smooth implementation of the project. For example, AWEPA had earlier 
promised the Task Force that the Minister of Home Affairs had given AWEPA his 
personal backing for the project. AWEPA’s minutes from the meeting of 18 June 
1998 promised the possible creation of a new ‘tripartite commission’ between the 
Mozambican and South African authorities and AWEPA, although it does not ap-
pear that anything ever came of this. In the same minutes, AWEPA claimed that 
‘the problems between the UNHCR and AWEPA had been solved’ by using the 
                                                        
66  Letter to J.N. Scholten from A.S. Mokoena, ‘Former Mozambican Refugee Project’, 2 March 1999. 
67  Department of Home Affairs, ‘Draft guidelines for the exemption for the Mozambican refugees in 
terms of section 28(2) of the Aliens Control Act, 1991, from the provisions of section 23(a) of that 
Act’, Departmental Circular No. 34 of 1999, dated 15 July 1999 and signed by Michael Tlhome-
lang on behalf of the Director-General of Home Affairs. 
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term ‘returnees’ rather than ‘repatriation’. It was further claimed that the UNHCR 
would ‘be present in the role of advisor’.68 Neither the idea of a further, tripartite 
commission, nor the involvement of the UNHCR ever materialised. 
In a further statement made in March 2000, AWEPA claimed that the regularisa-
tion project was ‘politically guided by DHA and AWEPA and coordinated by the 
Dutch NGO Refugiado’, thereby confirming that the project received joint political 
guidance. Without mentioning the considerable tensions between the DHA and par-
ticipating local NGOs, the March 2000 report by AWEPA claimed that: 
the project has proven to be a very valuable experience. Collaboration and under-
standing has been good and productive. In today’s South Africa the project can be 
held up as a good example of collaboration between government and civil society 
groups, a thing seldom experienced in the past.69 
Since AWEPA and Refugiado were the same organisation, AWEPA deliberately 
blurred the distinction between itself, a civic actor, and the South African govern-
ment, which made it very difficult to distinguish where the role of civic actors 
ended and where government accountability began. 
AWEPA’s promises and claims to the Task Force seemed intended to give the 
impression that its political lobby was crucial to the outcome of the project. Instead, 
these statements confirmed that the nature of AWEPA and its sister organisations 
were characterised, as two Dutch investigative journalists later concluded on the 
basis of various evaluation reports by AWEPA’s donors, by an ‘autocratic and se-
cretive’ nature.70 
AWEPA‘s financing and co-ordination of government functions and disregard of 
due process 
The second issue was AWEPA‘s financing and co-ordination of functions normally 
fulfilled by the DHA; many of AWEPA’s interventions amounted to a disregard of 
due process. As mentioned earlier, AWEPA declared on 18 June 1998 that, ‘no 
money will go to the South African authorities’.71 There were clearly some sensi-
tivities about this, including a statement from the Director-General of Home Affairs 
to the South African Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs, one 
month earlier, that: 
They [AWEPA] have indicated that they are willing to fund the exercise, but it now 
appears as if they intend to target persons who do not qualify in terms of the Cabi-
net decision and it may be necessary to fund the exercise departmentally. It is en-
                                                        
68  AWEPA, Minutes, Meeting, 18 June 1998. 
69  AWEPA Progress Report, 2000. 
70  (Asbeck and Meeus 1998). 
71  AWEPA, Minutes, 18 June 1998. 
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visaged that, if the state has to fund the project, it will cost approximately R1 m 
[Note: approximately USD 100,000]. This has not been provided for.72 
A day after confirming that ‘no money would go to South African authorities’, 
AWEPA issued a more cryptic statement that ‘Home Affairs is the lead agency … 
and that AWEPA/AEI, together with their partners, are assisting Home Affairs in 
this project’.73 Presumably, the reasons for maintaining this distinction were that the 
job of regularisation was the responsibility of government, not of NGOs. Indeed, 
local NGOs who were members of the Task Force had insisted on this. Yet, as the 
project got underway, AWEPA both funded numerous activities of government and 
– as mentioned above – took overall responsibility for the project’s co-ordination. 
In the run-up to a crucial inter-provincial meeting in October 1999, AWEPA ex-
plicitly acknowledged that it would do all it could to obtain funding for the DHA. 
There is a serious built-up [sic] of unprocessed files … The issue of unprocessed 
files was discussed with DHA while visiting the Daantjie Mobile Unit with Dr. Jan 
Nico Scholten. Personnel shortage was mentioned as the main problem for not be-
ing able to process files as they come in … Long delays will have a negative effect 
on the whole project … Dr. Scholten expressed his willingness to immediately con-
tact donor agencies for additional funds to allow for the cost of temporary transfer 
… of Immigration Officers from within the DHA to speed up the processing of ap-
plications. DHA will work out financial requirements and a proposal.74 [Emphases 
added] 
At another inter-provincial meeting, the DHA again requested funding from 
AWEPA. In response, AWEPA assured DHA that they were ‘taking this matter 
seriously and (had) asked for more money, but the matter (had) unfortunately not 
yet been finalised’.75 One month later, AWEPA announced in a meeting with the 
DHA that it had found the funds requested: 
AWEPA has raised the necessary funds to extend the contracts of the 19 DHA tem-
porary staff appointed to the project. During this same period, one Church Volun-
teer will remain in each of the district DHA offices where files are processed in or-
der to assist in the work and to link back information to the applicants.76 
                                                        
72  (Williams 1999: 85). 
73  AWEPA, Minutes, 19 June 1998. 
74  AWEPA, ‘Meeting of inter-provincial committee on the regularisation of FMR’s on 28/10’, Fax 
message from G. ten Velde, 25 October 1999. 
75  DHA, ‘Minutes of the inter-provincial meeting on the outreach project of former Mozambican 
refugees of the period of destabilisation held at Dwarsloop’, 25 November 1999. 
76  AWEPA, ‘Meeting with DHA, Pretoria’, Minutes of a meeting at DHA in Pretoria, 18 December 
1999. 
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This announcement was later confirmed at an inter-provincial meeting, where 
AWEPA announced that it ‘had made funds available for the extension of the con-
tracts of 19 temporary staff for a period of three months’.77 
AWEPA also funded certain activities of Mozambican diplomatic officials. 
Even though it was known as early as 15 September 1999 that the Mozambican 
consulate was ‘caught unaware in providing ID’s inside RSA’ and needed to estab-
lish a regional presence, it did not appear that much was actively done to insist that 
the consulate adopt a more proactive role. However, in March 2000 it was an-
nounced that ‘AWEPA has been able to raise additional funding to give support to 
the Mozambican Consulate for a three months outreach activity’.78 Though this in-
tervention came at a very late date in the implementation of the project, AWEPA’s 
funding enabled the Mozambican consular officials to travel to the areas where the 
regularisation project was taking place in order to certify applicants’ Mozambican 
identity, so that they would not have to travel long distances, and at considerable 
expense, in order to reach the Mozambican consulate in Nelspruit. 
The point to make here is not to argue whether AWEPA‘s funding of govern-
ment functions had a negative or positive outcome, but to question whether it was 
appropriate for a civic actor to fund and co-ordinate key functions of government. 
In June 1998 this seemed to be out of the question, but a year and a half later it 
seemed that AWEPA had changed its mind. 
On some occasions, AWEPA actually assumed some of the government‘s key 
functions. On 21 July 1999, AWEPA confirmed in a meeting with DHA in Pretoria 
that it was responsible for drafting a crucial official announcement of the starting 
date for the project. AWEPA confirmed that: ‘We agreed with Mr. Kruger that we 
will draft an official announcement. In order to publish this, again an official date 
has to be mentioned’.79 
Another intervention by the AWEPA co-ordinator in South Africa and an 
AWEPA staff member in Amsterdam proposed the setting-up of a proposed appeals 
board: 
In a meeting I had with Mijntje [AWEPA] and Mr. Zitha [DHA], the latter had an 
idea of establishing a kind of immigration board made up of one DHA official, one 
Volunteer and one Paralegal to deal with the application process. Could this possi-
bly be extended to the appeals process as well? Not only will it reduce the workload 
on DHA Immigration Officers but also has the advantage as mentioned by Mr. 
Zitha that ‘the right hand knows what the left hand is doing’.80 
                                                        
77  DHA, ‘Minutes of the inter-provincial meeting on the regularisation of former Mazambican (sic) 
refugees held at Wits Rural Facility in Accornhoek (sic)’, 13 January 2000. 
78  AWEPA, ‘Support to the Mozambican former refugees of the period of destabilisation progress 
report’, March 2000. 
79  AWEPA, ‘Support to the Mozambican former Refugees of the Period of Destabilisation’, Letter 
from J. N. Scholten to M. Tlhomelang (DHA), 21 July 1999. 
80  AWEPA, ‘Meeting of inter-provincial committee on the regularisation of FMR’s on 28/10’, Fax 
letter referring to the forthcoming meeting from G. ten Velde, 25 October 1999. 
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Such a proposal, if realised, would not only have been highly compromised by the 
direct role played by civic actors, it would most certainly have been an ultra vires 
construction, in other words formed without any legal basis. Though AWEPA‘s 
proposal for such a structure showed their willingness to develop administrative 
systems on behalf of the DHA, it also revealed a disregard for the FMR applicants’ 
rights to due process. While this particular proposal was eventually abandoned, no 
administrative appeals process was ever established, which was itself a violation of 
due process, since applicants were left with no clear recourse if their applications 
for regularised status were rejected. 
Due process was curtailed in other ways. In multiple documented cases, 
AWEPA staff – as well as AWEPA-paid paralegals and volunteers – fulfilled func-
tions that clearly fell outside their remit and severely compromised their role as in-
dependent advisors. In some cases, civic actors were virtually adjunct employees of 
DHA. In his reports, AWEPA’s co-ordinator echoed the position of DHA on issues 
such as ‘false’ documentation. In doing so, he ignored an earlier recommendation 
by the Task Force that such cases ought to be treated as ‘survival fraud’, since it had 
been virtually impossible in the past (i.e. prior to 1994) for many applicants to have 
obtained such documentation in a legitimate way.81 
More seriously, when an RRP monitor strongly criticised the behaviour of DHA 
officials in Northern Province on 29 September 1999, the DHA responded angrily.82 
The AWEPA co-ordinator, rather than supporting the independent role of RRP, or 
at least stepping back and letting the matter be argued, explicitly accepted the 
DHA’s position that the RRP had gone beyond their mandate. AWEPA not only 
took the position that RRP should apologise to DHA, but that RRP should amend 
its monitoring and evaluation procedures so that such ‘problems’ would never hap-
pen again.83 
As a consequence of AWEPA‘s financing and co-ordination of government 
functions, as well as its central role in negotiation of policy, NGOs and government 
officials alike frequently described the regularisation project as the ‘AWEPA pro-
ject’. In one case, discussed below, DHA Northern Province described the status 
that Mozambicans would receive as an ‘AWEPA exemption’.84 The media, too, 
frequently identified the project as a joint AWEPA/DHA initiative.85 Once again, 
blurred distinctions between the roles of civic actors such as AWEPA and govern-
ment made it very difficult to determine on what basis decisions were being taken. 
                                                        
81  (Handmaker and Schneider 2002: 22). 
82  DHA, ‘Comments to Draft report: Regularisation of Former Mozambican Refugees Monitoring & 
Evaluation Summary for weeks 1 & 3 (9-27 Aug 99)’, September 1999. 
83  AWEPA, ‘Meeting of inter-provincial committee on the regularisation of FMR’s on 28/10’, Ibid. 
84  DHA, ‘Comments to Draft Report’, 1999, Ibid. 
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Lack of an effective and independent monitoring presence 
During the early meetings of the Task Force, an effective and independent monitor-
ing presence was acknowledged to be a crucial aspect of the overall project. 
AWEPA confirmed its importance by making explicit reference to ‘two levels’ in 
the project. These were, firstly, ‘to assist Home Affairs in the outreach project’ and 
secondly, that ‘the monitoring of the project … will be independent from Home 
Affairs’. It was further stated, rather vaguely, that the ‘monitors will be responsible 
towards the former refugees’.86 AWEPA’s representative Pär Granstedt specified 
that monitors would have three ‘channels’ of recourse, namely: ‘the task force, the 
media and the donors’.87 No mention was made of the possibility of administrative 
and legal recourse. This proved to be a major issue once the project was terminated. 
Rather than putting in place an effective monitoring presence, monitoring due 
process was left to the poorly-defined, often overlapping roles played by RRP, the 
National Community Based Paralegal Association (NCBPA), and SACC Volun-
teers. These roles fell far short of what was required, and placed all three organisa-
tions in a structurally compromised position. Neither RRP nor the NCBPA pos-
sessed the capacity to effectively monitor issues of legal process, nor did they have 
the clout to hold the government accountable. Volunteers and paralegals fulfilled 
multiple roles, ranging from advising individual applicants to assisting in the proc-
essing of applications. 
Most importantly of all, there was no mechanism to allow for even a basic ad-
ministrative or legal challenge, which, according to the evidence available, was cer-
tainly needed. Several documented episodes illustrate the failings of what was gen-
erously termed the ‘monitoring and evaluation’ function of RRP, and the advisory 
roles of SACC volunteers and paralegals. 
In September 1999, the provincial office of the DHA Northern Province com-
plained about the behaviour of paralegals: 
the D.H.A. did not know the role of paralegals as they seem to be supervising in-
stead of working and they were also contradicting the whole procedure that DHA is 
using instead of legally correctly advising people accordingly. This led to the need 
of training paralegals in the line function of DHA with specifically reference to 
Alien Control Act and procedure. They were also trained in differences between 
Awepa and SADC exemption so that they can assist the people correctly.88 
In this case at least, it seemed that paralegals were doing exactly what they were 
supposed to do, though clearly not in a manner with which the DHA was comfort-
able. 
                                                        
86  LHR, ‘AWEPA pre-meeting’, Notes taken by J. Schneider, 18 June 1998.  
87  Ibid. These points were later independently verified by other NGO representatives present at this 
meeting. 
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On other occasions, it appeared that paralegals lacked knowledge of how the 
ACA operated, which DHA responded to by training the paralegals and volunteers 
themselves. Later in September, the RRP issued a report on how paralegals and 
volunteers were faring in Giyani. At one stage the report criticised volunteers for 
wanting to take up employment with the DHA. 
The regional Head is recruiting the volunteers and paralegals to apply for other 
temporary posts at the DHA. Volunteers seemed to be very much interested … Two 
of them completed the applications and went for interview on 24/09/99.89 
It was further reported that: 
Volunteers and Paralegals are not allowed to answer any questions asked by the 
Mozambicans. They are told that they know nothing except to complete the appli-
cation forms. If anyone (FMR) asks anything, they must be sent to the Home Af-
fairs Officials. Paralegals are not allowed to go around the offices especially where 
there are officials who are helping Mozambicans, they are told to stay in their office 
and that they have nothing to do in there.90 
While the concerns raised in RRP‘s monitoring report were understandable, given 
the highly unconventional roles that the volunteers and paralegals were fulfilling, 
the strong implication of RRP’s critique was that DHA’s behaviour in restricting 
their access to the DHA offices was wrong. However, while recruiting paralegals 
and volunteers emphasised how blurred their respective roles were, it was abso-
lutely correct, from an administrative law point of view, that the DHA take sole 
responsibility for the process and highly inappropriate that paralegals or monitors 
interfere with this, for example by answering questions about the process. 
A different kind of incident was reported by RRP concerning applications by 
FMRs in Elim, Northern Province: 
No appeals have been made yet. The para-legal does not believe there will be many 
appeals, since he, the volunteers and the immigration officer carefully interviewed 
all applicants who applied through the process to establish their genuine status.91 
This troubling report confirmed that the paralegals, volunteers and the DHA had all 
agreed that few appeals, if any, would take place. Hence, the FMRs were not of-
fered even basic administrative justice standards in the AWEPA project’s handling 
of their applications. However, the lack of due process was not acknowledged by 
AWEPA, which had already claimed in March 2000 that: 
Those FMR’s who have not made use of the opportunity to apply during the six 
months Outreach period and those that have been rejected will become illegal aliens 
in terms of the Aliens Control Act. The extensive publicity campaign around the 
                                                        
89  RRP, ‘Northern Province Weekly Monitoring Report’, 29 September 1999. 
90  Ibid. 
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Outreach project and the fact that the services were brought close to the target 
group in the designated areas has provided ample opportunity for genuine appli-
cants to come forward and register themselves and their families for resident status 
in South Africa.92 
Long after AWEPA disengaged from the project, the RRP recognised that due 
process had been denied to a large number of FMRs. The RRP approached lawyers 
in Johannesburg about the possibility of appealing rejected decisions.93 Most of the 
appeals are still pending. 
5.4 ANALYSING CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
The role of civic participation in policy implementation during the FMR regularisa-
tion project represents a second illustrative example of civic-state interaction de-
serving of critical analysis. The dual imperative of wanting to support government 
and maintain a critical distance was a particular source of tension in the FMR regu-
larisation project. By uncritically supporting the DHA and not giving due attention 
to the views of local NGOs, the co-ordination role fulfilled by AWEPA seriously 
compromised the independence of NGOs who took part.  
From the extensive archival data available, it appears that the RRP staff, parale-
gals and volunteers did as much as they could given the very constrained resources 
provided by AWEPA, and limited experience in dealing with immigration matters. 
At the same time, their uncritical involvement in the project made them partly com-
plicit in the project’s administrative justice failings in their duty to the FMRs. In 
particular, serious flaws in the planning and implementation of their roles led to 
countless instances of Mozambican applicants being denied basic due process 
rights. 
Rather than distinguish itself from government, AWEPA confirmed that its ‘po-
litical guidance’ in the project amounted to joint co-ordination on the part of 
AWEPA and DHA. Further, AWEPA allowed its ‘local partners’ to take the blame 
if their actions posed a threat to AWEPA’s relationship with DHA. A clear example 
of this was the episode that took place in September 1999, when AWEPA took the 
side of DHA’s Northern Provincial office against a complaint by an RRP staff 
member. 
AWEPA assumed ‘total co-ordination’ of the entire project. The project was 
frequently identified by NGOs as the ‘AWEPA-Refugiado project to assist former 
Mozambican refugees‘94 or by DHA as the ‘AWEPA Project’.95 In one instance, a 
regional co-ordinator was asked whether it was necessary for volunteers to wear 
Refugiado T-shirts at all times. In response, the co-ordinator: 
                                                        
92  AWEPA Progress Report, 2000. 
93  E-mail from J Klaaren to N Johnstone, re: ‘Legal Issues on Amnesty‘, 22 May 2000. 
94  Reference by SACC on the occasions that it took minutes of Task Force meetings in 1999. 
95  Reference by DHA-Northern Province (Giyani) and DHA- in their weekly and monthly reports. 
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informed volunteers that they do not have to wear the Refugiado T/Shirts during of-
fice hours. She authorized them to wear office attire with the Refugiado armbands 
[and that] this was approved by the Refugiado Coordinator.96 
There can be no doubt that the project was identified at multiple levels as an 
AWEPA or Refugiado project, which as explained earlier, essentially means the 
same thing. As such, just as AWEPA could legitimately claim some responsibility 
for the project’s successes, it must surely also be held accountable for its failings. 
In particular, the failure of the AWEPA project to ensure an effective monitor-
ing presence, its deliberate undermining of local NGOs in its relationship with the 
DHA, and its taking over of government responsibilities made it virtually impossi-
ble to distinguish what were government and and what were civic (AWEPA) re-
sponsibilities. As a result, basic administrative justice was denied to FMRs applying 
for regularisation of their status. 
As in relation to refugee policymaking, the dynamics of civic actors in relation 
to refugee policy implementation can be explained with reference to the book’s 
three theoretical propositions. Firstly, the capacity of civic actors to hold states ac-
countable is shaped by structural changes, which are rooted in specific historical 
circumstances. Secondly, the boundaries that define the relationship between civic 
actors and the state must be respected if civic actors want to be strategic in their 
efforts. And thirdly, civic actors play a potentially crucial role in mediating the 
translation of international legal norms into local contexts. 
5.4.1 Civic capacity in refugee policy implementation 
The capacity of civic actors to participate in refugee policy implementation has 
similar origins to the capacity of civic actors to participate in refugee policymaking. 
Drawing on the methodological approach introduced in chapter two, this chapter 
discussed specific historical events that led to a decision by South Africa, in the 
context of the tripartite commission, to regularise the status of FMRs and the many 
years of delay that transpired following a largely unsuccessful, UNHCR-led repa-
triation programme. These historical events conditioned the agency of civic actors 
who for many years had criticised the government for having been not only unable 
to resolve the long-term plight of FMRs, but also for wasting little time in declaring 
their presence illegal and deporting them back to Mozambique. 
These specific historical events also conditioned the agency of FMRs them-
selves, who had little choice other than to represent their status with fraudulent 
documentation in order to work and avoid arrest and deportation – what NGOs such 
as LHR termed ‘survival fraud’. Given these circumstances, the potential for a well-
financed NGO such as AWEPA to negotiate a positive role for itself and local 
South African NGOs through well-placed interactions was considerable. However, 
the failure of AWEPA to appreciate these specific historical events created a com-
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promising situation for the civic actors, who eventually became involved in the im-
plementation of the FMR regularisation project. 
5.4.2 The importance of structural boundaries in refugee policy implementation 
The AWEPA-led regularisation project emphasised the importance of clarifying – 
and respecting – structural boundaries when civic actors participate in the imple-
mentation of government policy. Lack of clarity in the structural boundaries be-
tween AWEPA and the South African government made it very difficult for local 
civic actors to exercise their agency and influence or ‘elaborate’ the structural con-
ditions under which the project was implemented. 
Civic co-operative interactions to assist the South African government to fulfil 
its obligation in the context of the AWEPA-led regularisation project reveal a com-
plex interplay of civic agency and government-defined structures. In contrast to the 
role of civic actors in the refugee policymaking process, where roles were clearer, 
those that participated in the AWEPA project experienced the negative pressures of 
being conditioned by (and even coerced into accepting) the excessive limitations of 
the state-created structure. As mentioned, it was virtually impossible to distinguish 
the externally grounded motivations of AWEPA from those of the South African 
government. As a consequence, opportunities for South African civic actors to in-
fluence the government’s implementation of its policy were very limited, and in 
some cases highly compromised their critical independence. Furthermore, the lack 
of distinction in the roles of civic actors and the government resulted in an adminis-
trative justice deficit for the Mozambican applicants whose applications were re-
jected. This could have been avoided, had sufficient attention been paid to the rec-
ommendations by South African organisations, had the roles been clear and had 
there been an effective monitoring presence. 
A critique of the interplay between South African civic actors and the adminis-
trative structure established by the DHA, following mostly private discussions with 
AWEPA, reveals four main structural variables that conditioned the agency of 
South African NGOs that participated in this large-scale civic-state co-operative 
interaction.  
First, AWEPA‘s hierarchical organisational structure shifted principal responsi-
bility for implementation from a collaborative enterprise with local partners in 
South Africa to a top-down structure led from AWEPA’s headquarters in Amster-
dam. NGOs were overwhelmed by AWEPA’s heavy-handed approach to ‘partner-
ship’, which tended to ignore local concerns; for example, concerning the continued 
deportation of Mozambican FMRs and the issue of ‘survival fraud’. Some chose to 
accept this situation and continued to participate, while others rejected the situation 
and withdrew. 
Second, AWEPA‘s non-transparent lobby of the South African government 
meant that South African NGOs played a subsidiary role to whatever AWEPA had 
agreed with the DHA. Any inconsistencies that emerged, between what AWEPA 
Chapter 5 
148 
had promised to its local NGO counterparts and the DHA, tended to be decided in 
favour of the DHA. One illustration of this was the legal and administrative basis 
for the project, namely the ‘draft’ guidelines that had only been informally distrib-
uted, were never officially gazetted and, apparently, never changed from their 
original ‘draft’ form. A further illustration involved AWEPA’s active support for 
the position of the DHA against concerns raised by an RRP monitor reporting on 
the operation of the project in the DHA’s office in the Northern Province. 
A third manifestation of the structural limitations that severely conditioned op-
portunities for civic agency during the implementation of the FMR regularisation 
project related to AWEPA‘s financing and co-ordination of government functions. 
Although AWEPA had earlier promised its South African NGO partners otherwise, 
a great deal of the DHA’s involvement (and to a more limited extent, that of the 
government of Mozambique) was made possible through funds secured by AWEPA 
from various back donors.97 While the DHA usually chaired meetings of the par-
ticipating civic organisations and the DHA, AWEPA took on ‘total co-ordination’ 
of the project, usually prepared the minutes of meetings that identified ‘action 
points’, and prepared regular operational reports. 
The fourth and most significant aspect of the administrative structural arrange-
ments that not only conditioned civic agency, but severely limited the ability to de-
liver administrative justice, was the lack of a credible, independent monitoring 
presence. Neither the two main local partners, the SACC and the RRP, nor the para-
legals brought on board subsequently, were able to monitor the DHA’s compliance 
with administrative law requirements effectively. There was no mechanism in place 
to provide for a basic administrative or legal challenge to any decision taken by the 
DHA. As a consequence, thousands of FMR applicants whose applications had 
been rejected were left without any remedy once the project concluded. Most of 
these persons continue to remain in South Africa without legal residence and are 
highly vulnerable to deportation, despite their long ordeal and many years of resi-
dence in the country. 
5.4.3 Social distance in refugee policy implementation 
As the AWEPA-led regularisation project revealed, the social distance between 
civic and state participants in the project was almost entirely absent. The externally 
grounded interests of AWEPA and government actors were virtually indistinguish-
able, and AWEPA was careful to avoid confrontation between the interests of local 
civic actors and the government; the local civic actors that were involved in this 
project had very little room to manoeuvre. Just as is the case with policymaking, the 
implementation of a policy is (or at least should be) a primarily state-led process, at 
least in relation to issues of accountability. 
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In the AWEPA-led regularisation project, the motivations of the DHA were the 
clearest of all. The DHA was responsible for the implementation of policy, which 
included a commitment to regularise the status of Mozambicans, which was first 
proposed in the context of the tripartite commission in the mid-1990s. The financial 
and administrative help offered to the DHA by AWEPA to put its tripartite com-
mitments behind them was a well-documented motivation. Connected to this were 
long-standing criticisms raised by civic actors such as the RRP and SACC, who 
pointed out the uncomfortable fact that the presence of the former Mozambican 
refugees was a direct consequence of apartheid policies by the former regime. By 
resolving at least one major issue, the DHA clearly also wanted to stem a growing 
tide of criticism against its policies towards migrants in general; criticism that was 
mounting as the Refugees Act came into force in 2000. To achieve these goals, the 
DHA was willing to permit extensive civic involvement in the project’s implemen-
tation, which in turn also meant narrowing its social distance to civic actors, since 
these interests so closely corresponded with those of AWEPA. 
AWEPA‘s motivations, apart from its stated ideological reasons (to ‘join forces 
in (its) struggle for human rights’) were not altogether clear. Certainly there were 
significant financial motivations. According to AWEPA’s own documentation, 
hundreds of thousands of dollars were spent on transport from Europe, project ad-
ministration and undisclosed amounts to support the DHA, while far less substantial 
sums of money were provided to support the roles of local civic actors. It can be 
presumed that AWEPA wanted to establish a reputation as not only a political lobby 
organisation, but also a provider of humanitarian assistance. While AWEPA had a 
long-standing reputation for solidarity with the governments in South Africa and 
Mozambique, it had never been involved in a project of this nature and scale. Con-
sequently, AWEPA tied its interests to those of the South African government; the 
resultant social distance between AWEPA and DHA was so narrow that the project 
was popularly known, in particular by the DHA, as the ‘AWEPA project’. 
The motivations of local civic actors in the AWEPA-led project, in particular the 
SACC and RRP, were also complicated. The SACC, RRP and later paralegals all 
supported this long-awaited project to regularise the legal status of FMRs. Both 
organisations had been confronted with allegations of abuse against undocumented 
FMRs, allegedly committed by the DHA, police and other border control authori-
ties. They had also observed mistreatment on the part of local farmers, who ex-
ploited Mozambicans either by under-paying them, or by not paying them at all and 
then reporting them to the immigration authorities as ‘illegal aliens’.98 These par-
ticipating civic actors were of the view that gaining regularised status or ‘amnesty’ 
would eliminate at least one major structural obstacle. Therefore, for SACC and 
RRP, who knew the situation of FMRs very well, the social distance or externalisa-
tion between their interests and those of the DHA (and, by extension, AWEPA) was 
less important than for other civic actors. The social distance narrowed even more 
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the closer they came to actually fulfilling certain roles of the DHA, which, as al-
ready mentioned, had serious due process consequences for the FMRs. 
By contrast, LHR‘s motivations for engaging in the Task Force, at least at an 
early stage, were to ensure that the project was implemented in accordance with the 
government‘s obligations in international and South African law. In this respect 
LHR certainly shared the motivations of SACC and RRP. However, as a legal ad-
vocacy NGO, a further motivation was that the project be monitored, especially in 
terms of administrative due process requirements. The lack of commitment on the 
part of AWEPA towards supporting a credible monitoring presence, coupled with 
the hostility to such a presence on the part of the DHA, explained why LHR de-
cided to withdraw from the project. To ensure that the project was credibly moni-
tored would, indeed, have required a greater degree of social distance or externali-
sation than it would have for other actors. On the basis of its private and public 
interactions with AWEPA, LHR was not satisfied this could be accomplished under 
the top-down and non-transparent structure proposed by AWEPA. 
The more disparate the motivations of state and civic actors are in implementing 
policy, the greater the level of externalisation. This doesn’t necessarily mean that a 
more external or ‘imposed’ process of policy implementation is worse than one 
upon which state and civic actors agree. As the AWEPA example revealed, there 
were mixed consequences. Out of a total of 130 748 applications received, 82 969 
FMRs did obtain legal status, which was a principal shared interest of both NGOs 
and the government.99 However, 16 772 FMRs were rejected, and the status of 32 
077 remained undecided in circumstances where due process was not adequately 
observed, whether in terms of the arbitrary nature of the process, the unfairness of 
the proceedings, or the degree of bias. Abandoning a credible monitoring role cre-
ated a serious administrative justice deficit that the other participants, because of 
their commitment to go ahead with the project regardless, did not make provision 
for until it was too late. 
5.5 BEYOND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS TO INCREASING LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
This chapter explained the historical circumstances that led to FMRs finding a 
tenuous place of refuge in South Africa, and to the failure of previous legal and ad-
ministrative structures to facilitate a durable solution to their long-term displace-
ment. In particular, it explained the joint efforts of government and civic actors to 
try to formally integrate FMRs by way of a regularisation project, and the opportu-
nities and pitfalls that arose for civic actors who were involved in the implementa-
tion of this project. This chapter argued that subsequent failings in due process to-
wards the FMRs can be explained by a critical assessment of the externally 
grounded reasons of the civic and government actors for participating in the project, 
as well as the lack of clarity in the structural boundaries that existed between gov-
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ernment and civic functions. Just as in the case of civic involvement in refugee 
policymaking, the social distance or externalisation variable provides a useful ex-
planation for the limited (but significant) influence civic actors can have on the 
framing and implementation of government policies and legal frameworks. 
However, to understand the real impact of legal frameworks requires us to look 
beyond the role of civic actors and the government, however critical such an as-
sessment might be. Building on Dolan’s earlier research on Mozambican refugees, 
Polzer has argued that the impact of legal frameworks and institutions also needs to 
be understood from the perspective of FMRs themselves, in other words, ‘from be-
low’.100 Such a perspective, she argues, questions the extent to which legal frame-
works actually relate to the lived reality of those they are intended to benefit, 
namely FMRs. This gap or ‘disjuncture’, Polzer argued earlier, provides an expla-
nation both for the failure of the repatriation and regularisation projects to live up to 
their own stated objectives, and for the continued lack of access to social services 
suffered by FMRs.101 
The gap between legal status and lived realities also relates to the (in)ability of 
FMRs to exercise agency in relation to state-created structures, although the picture 
is complex. At one level, Polzer argues, the informal relationships, established be-
tween FMRs and local communities are an expression of agency, a way of ‘crea-
tively adapting to, rather than merely accepting, policy-driven constraints’, leading 
to a sometimes surprising level of local integration outside formal state struc-
tures.102 At the formal level, however, their lack of legal status renders them outside 
the day-to-day protection of the state, severely constraining their access to social 
services and continuing to render them vulnerable to arrest and deportation. But 
even for those who had formal legal status, awareness among FMRs about how to 
benefit from this newly-acquired status, such as how to access basic services, was 
generally limited.103 
To conclude on a note of optimism, there is at least some evidence that increas-
ing FMRs’ awareness of the implications of having formal legal status, and the as-
sociated constitutional rights, or ‘legal consciousness’, would be one way of ad-
dressing the gap between legal frameworks and lived realities. The same goes for 
the local civic actors involved in the implementation of the regularisation project, 
who were not in a position to effectively monitor whether due process was being 
observed. 
It appears that the RRP at least has taken a lesson from this. Responding in part 
to their frustration that a number of FMRs who had been granted regularised status 
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were still being denied social services, the RRP set up the Wits Acornhoek Advice 
Centre (AAC) in 2002. Ever since, the AAC’s paralegal advisors have been increas-
ing the local community’s awareness of (or consciousness about) their legal rights, 
and in some cases intervening with the authorities. In two celebrated examples, the 
AAC brought the cases of two regularised FMRs, Khosa and Mahlaule,104 to the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, with the assistance of constitutional lawyers 
from the Legal Resources Centre. The Court responded positively, determining that 
the government‘s limiting of social grants to citizens was unconstitutional.  
Acknowledging the positive impact the case had among both South Africans and 
the FMR community in the rural Bushbuckridge area, who saw the judgement and 
subsequent increase in the number of social grants as ‘overall gain for the commu-
nity, rather than as a competition over scarce resources’, Polzer argued that, ‘it is 
one of several cases where civil society has used the courts to challenge the gov-
ernment on its immigration policy’.105 
Concluding with a reference to legal consciousness and the courts provides a 
useful transition to the next chapter. From civic participation in policymaking and 
policy implementation, I turn now to the role of civic actors in policy enforcement 
through litigating refugee rights. 
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CHAPTER 6 
LITIGATING AND SHAMING:  
CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN  
REFUGEE POLICY ENFORCEMENT 
 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the third illustration of advocating state accountability through civic 
interactions explains how civic actors have held states directly accountable for their 
obligations to protect refugees in South Africa through confrontational interactions, 
namely litigation. This chapter also briefly addresses certain non-legal measures 
taken in conjunction with litigation, such as public shaming in the media. 
After reflecting on the space that emerged in the 1990s for civic actors to advo-
cate refugee rights against the state, this chapter will explain how civic actors mobi-
lised refugee rights through the courts to advocate: (1) access to the refugee status 
determination procedure; (2) access to economic and social rights; and (3) enforce-
ment of these rights through judgements, settlements and structural interdicts. Next, 
this chapter will reflect – briefly – on the role of non-legal civic interactions, before 
offering some concluding remarks. 
As in the previous two chapters, the examples discussed in this chapter draw on 
the concepts elaborated on in chapter two, reflecting a complex interplay of indi-
vidual and collective interventions. These interventions can be explained from the 
point of view of South African public (constitutional and administrative) law, struc-
ture/agency relationships, and socio-legal theory. 
6.2 TOWARDS ACCOUNTABILITY: AN EMERGING SPACE FOR CIVIC 
CONFRONTATION WITH THE STATE 
Just as in the area of refugee policymaking and policy-enforcement, developments 
in the mid-1990s generated an emerging, democratic space for civic confrontation 
with the state. By mobilising their knowledge and resources, lawyers challenged the 
policies and practices of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) on the reception 
and treatment of refugees. These challenges were initially directed to the policy 
regime provided for on an ad hoc basis in terms of Regulations to the Aliens Con-
trol Act of 1991, and were later directed at the Refugees Act of 1998 and its imple-
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mentation. Challenges were also made to other laws affecting asylum seekers and 
refugees, notably to their discriminatory treatment in the formal security industry 
and regarding the provision of social services. 
Firstly, this section revisits the context in which civic actors in South Africa 
have been mobilising for progressive changes, with particular attention to their role 
in litigating rights. These developments enabled civic actors to bring direct claims 
against a state to enforce refugee and human rights policies as ‘translators’ in a 
government-endorsed ‘culture of constitutionalism’,1 guided by universal and South 
African constitutional values. Secondly, this section will explore the particular chal-
lenges faced by the courts in reviewing decisions of a democratically accountable 
government, as a key component of this emerging democratic space. Thirdly, this 
section will explain how this emerging democratic space created the structural cir-
cumstances that have both conditioned civic agency as well as provided opportuni-
ties for structural change. 
6.2.1 Two sources of civic organisation in South Africa 
As discussed in chapter three, present-day civic organisations and networks in-
volved in refugee protection in South Africa emerged from two sources. The first 
was comprised of political movements, trade unions and grassroots civic organisa-
tions representing various constituencies that organised a broad-based political op-
position and challenged minority white rule, mainly through mass mobilisation and 
direct action. The second source included liberal and progressive organisations that 
were formed by professionals (academics, lawyers, social activists, religious work-
ers and psychologists) and a small number of politicians, and their spouses,2 all of 
whom objected to the government‘s racist policies.  
After the apartheid government‘s banning of political movements in the early 
1960s, the movements’ operations went ‘underground’. Social movements and 
other civic organisations continued to operate, albeit under very difficult circum-
stances. Many working for these organisations were arrested and detained under the 
notorious section 29 of the Internal Security Act. Some, including courageous law-
yers such as Griffiths Mxenge and Bram Fischer, were either assassinated or died in 
detention. Many were quietly supportive of the liberation struggle and political 
movements, and notably the African National Congress (ANC), while others 
formed an active component of the struggle. Many civic organisations gained their 
own unique identity, developing strategies and building bases of legitimacy that the 
South African apartheid government found far more difficult to challenge or extin-
                                                        
1  (Monyae 2006: 132) argued that ‘the founding leaders of post-apartheid South Africa’s democracy 
enthusiastically seized the opportunity of promoting a culture of constitutionalism at home and 
abroad’. 
2  The women’s and anti-apartheid organisation Black Sash was founded in the 1950s by prominent 
women, including wives of prominent politicians, in protest at the government‘s requirement that 
all women be required to carry passes. 
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guish than was the case for the formal political movements. Meanwhile, lawyers 
and legal advocacy organisations, which engaged the apartheid government on its 
own terms by challenging the internal contradictions of laws that discriminated in-
stitutionally against black people, supported these political movements by engaging 
in a form of ‘politics by other means’.3 
Eventually, the efforts of the apartheid regime to subvert political dissent, im-
prison or assassinate its leaders and maintain strict divisions on the basis of ethnic-
ity failed to bring the liberation struggle to capitulation. On the contrary, the libera-
tion struggle thrived through various forms of civic organisation. 
Emergence of social movements and civic networks 
Although the formal political movements were banned, the visionary ideas of Ste-
ven Biko, Nelson Mandela and others endured, and the liberation struggle continued 
through the emergence of various social movements, civic networks and other 
grassroots organisations, until the political movements were once again permitted to 
operate. The particular strategies employed by civic actors deliberately measured 
the ways in which the apartheid regime was enforced through a comprehensive 
network of laws and legal institutions. 
One such civic organisation was the Western Cape Relief Fund (WCRF), which 
existed to assist, by way of both legal assistance and the co-ordination of social as-
sistance, those held under the notorious section twenty-nine of the apartheid re-
gime’s Internal Security Act,4 and other victims of political violence and state re-
pression. As Ghadija Vallie (former co-ordinator of the WCRF) noted, these 
organisations were forced to adapt to changes in the political situation: 
The situation changed and you had to adapt to that change. As things changed, you 
could no longer just look after the needs of people arrested under section 29 and 
their families. …organising protests, funerals, support in courts, visiting political 
prisoners, visiting death row prisoners, monitoring mass detentions … The Western 
Cape Relief Fund got people involved.5 
As she was based at a law firm, Vallie had to organise numerous legal matters, 
which involved dealing with the government directly, including with the notorious 
Security Branch. The well-known firm of Essa Moosa and partners handled numer-
ous cases of high-profile political leaders and activists under banning and detention 
orders. The firm acted in various ways for several of the Rivonia trialists (and their 
families) while they were serving time in prison, including for Nelson Mandela. But 
the work of community activists such as Vallie went far beyond simply ‘the for-
malities’ of dealing with the government. 
                                                        
3  (Abel 1995). 
4  (Internal Security Act 1982). 
5  (‘Interview with G. Vallie’ 2006). During the course of the interview, Vallie mentioned how much 
she was inspired and motivated by Biko. 
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Beyond legal representation 
In her official work as co-ordinator of the WCRF and paralegal to the lawyers in the 
firm, Vallie went beyond the organising of legal representation, ensuring that peo-
ple appeared in courts (for example, as witnesses). Vallie also collected family 
members of the accused to bring them to court for moral support, as well as many 
other tasks. 
I had to buy peoples’ clothes, collect their children from school, organise food for 
their families, pay rent, transport … some came from rich homes, but the majority 
from poor homes. I also had to deal with family disputes.6 
In addition, Vallie and others (unofficially) arranged for T-shirts to be printed (in 
the official ANC colours), and for placards to be held by protestors outside the 
court. She also helped organise marches, sit-ins and other forms of mass mobilisa-
tion. 
We demonstrated against the tri-cameral parliament. We went to the Progressive 
Federal Party in parliament about children in detention. We organised hunger 
strikes and a boycott campaign.7 
These activities, in support of litigation and in other, non-legal strategies, were very 
much connected. The government of the day was working very hard to undermine 
the political movements, and the efforts of their lawyers, by putting pressure on the 
social movements and civic networks. The government even deliberately provoked 
‘divisions’.8 
The government knew that the underground efforts of political movements were 
somehow connected with the work of the lawyers and civic networks, but lacked 
the evidence or sophistication to prove this. Consequently, the ‘cover’ of Vallie’s 
work as co-ordinator of the WCRF and paralegal in a law firm enabled her to do 
much more than just act as a representative of the firm; it also meant she had to 
carry out her ‘unofficial’ activities in a very discreet manner. 
There were no cell phones, so we used the ‘Bush telegraph’, linking through people 
with phones. People organised their neighbourhood, their organisations. Before you 
knew it, people were there.9 
Vallie also collected money from local businesses and raised funds from foreign 
donors, such as the Holland Committee on Southern Africa. Since the work she did 
was, of necessity, low key, publicly she was seen as someone to go to for legal as-
                                                        
6  (‘Interview with G. Vallie’ 2006) 
7  Ibid. 
8  An example of this, mentioned in (‘Interview with G. Vallie’ 2006), was the ‘Wit Doeke’ (white 
headscarf), which the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission later disclosed was a 
vigilante group, fully supported by the apartheid regime, aimed at stimulating violence, chaos and 
disorder in the townships. 
9  (‘Interview with G. Vallie’ 2006) 
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sistance. The political side of Vallie’s work was only known to very few individu-
als. 
In this sophisticated way, organisations such as the WCRF and individual com-
munity activists such as ‘Ma’ Mahlangu, Sophie Benge, Allan Boesak and many, 
many others were able to play highly effective, simultaneous roles as legal advo-
cates, political activists and social reformers. Furthermore, Vallie liaised with the 
(then, mainly white) liberal human rights organisations. 
Liberal human rights organisations 
Social movements and civic networks that took root after the banning of the politi-
cal movements in the 1960s were joined in the early 1980s and 1990s by a number 
of liberal human rights NGOs, including Black Sash, IDASA, Lawyers for Human 
Rights (LHR), Legal Resources Centre (LRC) and others. These organisations, 
mostly founded and supported by liberal-minded white South Africans (including 
some from the establishment, whom the government was reluctant to prosecute), 
played a very different but important role in the anti-apartheid struggle. 
LHR, for example, was formed as a project of the Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies (CALS) in the law faculty of the University of the Witwatersrand in Johan-
nesburg, in the late 1970s.10 LHR was originally conceived as a network of liberal-
minded lawyers who objected to certain policies of the apartheid regime, and were 
willing to make themselves available to represent individuals who were accused of 
politically-related crimes. In the late 1980s, the organisation established a National 
Secretariat in Pretoria, and became an NGO with permanent, paid staff-members. 
Shortly thereafter LHR established offices in the provinces, beginning with Pieter-
maritzburg, and eventually expanded their activities to provide much-needed legal 
advice and representation, to undertake human rights education for the public and 
officials, and to develop specialised projects on subjects from juvenile justice to 
prison reform issues. LHR also set up the country’s first comprehensive paralegal 
training programme, which later became an NGO in its own right. By 1993, LHR 
had grown to more than a dozen advice and project offices, with a presence in all 
provinces of the country.11 
Acting at times unwittingly12 as instruments of the (underground) political 
movements and the social movements and civic networks, who were often operat-
                                                        
10  The Legal Resources Centre, whose work is extensively documented by (Abel 1995), was also 
formed around this time. 
11  In addition to its head office in Pretoria, LHR established offices in the urban-centres of Johannes-
burg, Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth and East London as well as towns and more rural settings 
in Stellenbosch, Pietermaritzburg, Pietersburg, Umtata, Colesburg and Mafikeng. 
12  As (‘Interview with G. Vallie’ 2006) noted, there were occasions when it was not in the interests of 
either the political movements or the liberal lawyers or organisations, to know exactly what the 
other was doing. However, the liberation struggle, which was led by the political movements and 
operated through social movements and civic networks, recognised the ‘access’ that these liberal 
organisations had to the government and used this to their advantage. 
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ing on the margins of legality, these liberal organisations brought numerous legal 
actions to protect individual activists or challenge repressive policies of the apart-
heid state. Many within these organisations developed their own political con-
sciousness,13 and some played critical roles, including during the period of political 
negotiations in the early 1990s. This period saw new policies being formed – most 
notably an interim constitution, passed in 1993 – and the ‘correcting’ of other as-
pects of the legal system that fell far short of the country’s nascent constitutional 
and administrative law standards. Following South Africa’s first democratic elec-
tions in 1994, going from challenging a government culture that was distinctly au-
thoritarian, civic actors began to build on the post-apartheid government’s commit-
ment to a culture of constitutionalism.14 
Extending South Africa’s hard-won constitutional and democratic ‘dispensa-
tions’ of the early 1990s15 to refugees and other displaced persons has presented 
special challenges for South African civic organisations building on a post-
apartheid culture of constitutionalism. In addition to advocating for humane laws 
and policies to regulate (forced) migrants, civic organisations have had to confront 
both the historical roots and more contemporary causes of xenophobia within South 
African society and among government institutions, as well as developing strategies 
to confront and respond to that xenophobia. 
Legal consciousness and refugee rights translators 
Explaining the operation of refugee rights as part of a multi-cultural, highly malle-
able South African ‘culture’, and the role of civic actors as gaining legal conscious-
ness and becoming refugee rights ‘translators’ of global rules, is useful in under-
standing the potential for civic-state relationships to make human rights claims. As 
Merry puts it, the interactions of civic actors in a legal culture illustrate the ‘politi-
cal possibilities’ of changing the culture.16 
Merry contends that it is possible to characterise the interface between legal, so-
cial and political cultures, both at local and at global levels, as broad processes with 
transnational elements, including the ‘localization of knowledge’.17 Drawing on 
international legal norms and comparative state practice, lawyers in South Africa 
have proven to be effective civic translators, ‘localising’ global knowledge on the 
protection of refugees through strategic challenges to the DHA’s policies. 
                                                        
13  Members of LHR represented a wide spectrum of political interests, from the conservative party to 
the communist party. 
14  (Federico and Fusaro 2006). 
15  As mentioned earlier, these ‘dispensations’ included a progressive new legal order, democratic and 
accountable government and civic participation in the new, South African democracy. All of these 
developments were reinforced by the country’s constitution. The process of protecting and consoli-
dating these dispensations is popularly referred to in South Africa – notably the Constitutional 
Court – as an emerging ‘culture of constitutionalism’. 
16  (Merry 2006b: 216). 
17  (Merry 2006b: 19-20). 
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Since litigation essentially involves civic interactions of a more confrontational 
character, I also use Kidder’s integrated theory of imposed law18 to analyse how 
civic actors have petitioned for government accountability. As explained earlier, 
this involves measuring the social distance between the lawmakers (in this case an 
administrative official of the DHA) and the civic actors making a claim, as repre-
sented by a divergence in their respective meanings, interests and political posi-
tions. Kidder’s approach also explains how imbalances in power in South Africa 
can be rectified through litigation in the courts. As discussed in the next section, 
this also relates to a more refined understanding of how the judiciary have taken the 
concept of ‘reasonableness’ into consideration when making legal judgements.19 
6.2.2 Building credible administrative systems and convincing a reluctant 
judiciary 
Two of the greatest challenges faced in extending South Africa’s dispensations to 
refugees have been to build a credible government administrative system for admin-
istering refugee status, and to convince a conservative judiciary that has been his-
torically reluctant – or procedurally unable – to review decisions made by govern-
ment officials. Matters changed somewhat with the emergence of an Interim 
Constitution in 1993, which was finalised in 1996. 
While the South African government was highly inexperienced in asylum de-
termination, the courts were substantively prevented from reviewing government 
decisions. According to Hoexter, judicial latitude for interpreting the correctness of 
an administrative decision related to an assessment of the ‘difference between dia-
lectical and substantive reasonableness’.20 In other words, prior to 1994, the courts 
made an artificial distinction between the process of coming to a particular adminis-
trative decision, and a separate assessment of whether a particular administrative 
decision was, on the face of it, reasonable or not. Consequently, before the coun-
try’s progressive Interim Constitution in 1993 it was difficult to review any decision 
of a South African administrative official. As mentioned earlier, it was exception-
ally difficult to review government decisions by immigration officers taken in terms 
of the Aliens Control Act 1991 (ACA); these decisions were additionally shielded 
from review by an ‘ouster clause’, which was only removed in 1995 by way of a 
legislative amendment to the ACA.21 
These substantive challenges were largely resolved by Article 33 of South Af-
rica’s Constitution. In sub-section 1, Article 33 provided an unqualified right to 
‘everyone’ that the decision of an administrative official shall be ‘lawful, reason-
                                                        
18  (Kidder 1979). 
19  (Hoexter 2006: 63-64). 
20  (Hoexter 2007: 302). 
21  (Klaaren and Ramji 2001: 38). 
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able and procedurally fair’.22 Sub-section 2 provided a ‘right to written reasons‘ if 
their ‘rights have been adversely affected by administrative action’. Finally, sub-
section 3 required that national legislation be enacted ‘to give effect to these rights’, 
including the opportunity for judicial review in order to ‘promote an efficient ad-
ministration’. In giving effect to subsection 3, the Promotion of Administration of 
Justice Act (PAJA) was passed into law by South Africa’s parliament in 2000.23 
However, even with a robust constitution and clear promises on the part of the 
democratically elected government that it would pursue fair, rights-regarding and 
efficient administration of its affairs – and be held accountable for these promises – 
there remained a dilemma. As highlighted by Klaaren and others,24 though embold-
ened by their generous scope for reviewing administrative decisions, judges still 
saw their role as striking a ‘delicate balance‘. The balance was to be struck be-
tween, on one hand, an appreciation of the government’s position as it struggled 
with multiple administrative problems (many inherited from the previous regime), 
and on the other, a newly-acquired constitutional duty to vigorously scrutinise the 
decisions of administrative officials. Courts possessed virtually no precedent to 
guide them in striking this balance. 
Furthermore, unlike well-established and vigorously tested asylum determina-
tion regimes in North America, Europe and Australia, the administrative system for 
conferring refugee status in South Africa has struggled with its relative newness.25 
Following the country’s Interim Constitution in 1993, the democratic government 
of South Africa made a principled commitment to respect and promote international 
human rights by acceding to various treaties. These included the 1969 OAU Refu-
gee Convention, the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol to the UN 
Refugee Convention; by January 1996, South Africa had become a party to all three 
of these instruments. However, the government had no explicit legislation in place 
governing refugees until April 2000, and officials lacked both the training and the 
resources to fulfil their international obligations towards refugees. Maatla Hla-
polosa, a lawyer in Durban, explicitly referred to the DHA’s lack of due process in 
refugee status determinations, claiming that – on a regular basis – the DHA simply 
‘don’t apply their minds to decisions’, and issue arbitrary decisions on the basis of 
personal opinions they hold about a particular applicant, which is a serious violation 
of administrative due process.26 
In short, the lack of a dedicated refugee policy, as well as inexperience, poor 
training and other administrative challenges faced by the South African govern-
ment, coupled with a judiciary unaccustomed to challenging the decisions of the 
                                                        
22  (South African Constitution 1996), Article 33(1). The constitution was approved by the Constitu-
tional Court on 4 December 1996 and took effect on 4 February 1997. 
23  (Promotion of Administration of Justice Act 2000). See also (Currie and Klaaren 2001). 
24  (Klaaren 2006b). 
25  (Handmaker et al. 2008). 
26  (‘Interview with Hlapolosa and Slabbert’ 2006). 
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government, all represented the state-created structural circumstances that heavily 
conditioned the possibilities for civic agency to promote refugee rights. 
6.2.3 Civic agents and state structures 
Structure and agency explanations presented in this chapter to explain the interac-
tions between civic actors and state institutions again draw upon Margaret Archer’s 
analytical dualism approach.27 In line with this approach, specific historical events 
have generated legal and administrative structures that have both conditioned civic 
agency to protect on behalf of refugees in South Africa by way of confrontational 
interactions, but have also allowed for structural change (elaboration), primarily 
through the instrument of judicial review. 
In the context of litigating refugee rights, two main conditioning factors are ex-
plained in this section. Firstly, the legal and administrative structure in which appli-
cations for refugee status have been received, processed and adjudicated shifted 
from a basic asylum determination procedure, set up by way of ad hoc regulations 
in terms of the Aliens Control Act 1991, to a more formalised system, established 
through the Refugees Act 1998, which came into being in April 2000. Secondly, 
external influences by third states and international organisations – with particular 
interests in the direction taken by South Africa’s policy and its implementation – 
have profoundly influenced the administrative structure. 
Faced with these two conditioning factors, yet emboldened by the expanded 
possibilities of challenging government decisions, legal advocacy organisations 
such as LHR, LRC and university law clinics have exercised their agency. Increas-
ingly, legal advocacy organisations have worked closely with refugee-led organisa-
tions, representing constituencies within the refugee and asylum-seeker community. 
One such organisation has been the Union of Refugee Women (URW), established 
in Durban, but with outreach to other areas.28 As explained below, the URW 
brought a legal case challenging discrimination within the private security industry 
all the way to the Constitutional Court of South Africa, albeit with mixed results. 
In advocating for accountability through litigating refugee rights, usually in 
combination with other forms of (non-legal) advocacy, such as public shaming 
through the media, legal advocates have worked together in coalitions with multiple 
stakeholders, including refugee organisations. Through exercising their (combined) 
agency, using mainly the tool of judicial review, these civic actors have brought a 
number of cases aimed at both remedying the situation of individual clients and 
challenging refugee policies more generally. These cases have resulted in a number 
of decisions that have led to structural change (elaboration) within the legal and 
administrative framework for refugee protection in South Africa, whether in gaining 
                                                        
27  (Archer 1996). 
28  (‘Interview with S. Mukamana’ 2006). 
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access to status determination structures or in recognising social and economic 
rights. 
Legal and administrative structure for refugee status determination in South Africa 
The Basic Agreement, referred to in the previous chapters, was put in place in 1993 
as the initial legal and administrative structure to administer refugee status on an 
individual basis. The Agreement was accompanied by several ad hoc policy instru-
ments, mainly issued in 1993 in terms of the Aliens Control Act of 1991; together, 
these policy documents created and spelled out the role of the Standing Committee. 
According to the Basic Agreement, the Standing Committee was responsible for 
according refugee status and other functions, including the withdrawal of refugee 
status.29 The Basic Agreement also provided for an Appeal Board (for many years 
consisting of a single member), which was responsible for exercising a degree of 
internal oversight over the procedure.30 As discussed earlier in chapter four, this ad 
hoc procedure was fraught with problems, and its constitutionality was seriously 
questioned. It was therefore not surprising that lawyers challenged many aspects of 
the 1993 policy – mostly successfully – up until the Refugees Act came into being 
in April 2000. Cases discussed in the next section that were decided prior to April 
2000, therefore, relate to the old refugee status determination regime, while cases 
brought by civic actors subsequently were decided in terms of the post-April 2000 
refugee status determination regime. 
The Refugees Act limited the role of the Standing Committee largely to that of 
an oversight body and, in particular, to monitoring the refugee status determination 
process. This role included sufficient power to formulate procedures, regulate the 
work of Refugee Reception Offices and liaise with the UNHCR officials, as well as 
generally monitoring decisions of Refugee Status Determination Offices (RSDOs) 
and reviewing applications determined to be manifestly unfounded.31 
Under the Refugees Act, the Standing Committee’s former powers to consider 
and grant refugee status were assumed by dedicated refugee reception officers and 
refugee status determination officers. Refugee reception officers (RROs) were made 
responsible for the initial interview of asylum applicants.32 Furthermore, the RROs 
were required to issue the applicant with an asylum seeker permit, in terms of sec-
                                                        
29  (Basic Agreement 1993: section 3). 
30  (Basic Agreement 1993: section 4). 
31  (Refugees Act 1998: section 11). According to (‘Interview with J. Van Garderen (2)’ 2008), the 
Standing Committee’s designated powers as an independent monitor of the status determination 
process, or as a self-corrective mechanism within the structure of the Act, have not often been util-
ised. Further, the proposed Refugees Amendment Act (2008) incorporated the Standing Committee 
with the Refugees Appeal Board into a hybrid monitoring authority, although it removed these 
oversight powers. 
32  (Refugees Act 1998: section 21). 
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tion twenty-two. The matter was then handed over to the RSDOs, who were em-
powered to make decisions on individual applications.33 
The Refugees Appeal Board was retained, but given more autonomy. In particu-
lar, the Board was empowered to ‘determine its own practice and make its own 
rules’.34 Accordingly, the Board issued its Rules in September 2003, more than 
three years after the promulgation of the Refugees Act on 1 April 2000.35 The 
Refugees Act provided extensive powers to the Board to receive and consider ap-
peals, which – if an applicant were legally represented – involved hearings-based 
status determination procedures.36 
Finally, the Refugees Act provided a number of substantive guarantees that were 
useful to lawyers arguing on behalf of refugees. The Act explicitly incorporated the 
rights contained in terms of section two of South Africa’s Constitution, which in-
cluded the right to just administrative action that was ‘lawful, reasonable and pro-
cedurally fair’ and the right to be provided with ‘written reasons‘ for an ‘adverse’ 
decision.37 Accordingly, asylum applicants were to be given not only the right to 
written reasons for a refusal to be granted refugee status, but an opportunity to ar-
gue their claim in a hearings-based procedure before the Appeals Board. Article 
thirty-four of the Constitution gave ‘everyone … the right to have any dispute … 
decided in a fair public hearing before a court’. Refugee applicants thus had a fur-
ther opportunity to challenge decisions in court, if the Refugees Appeal Board up-
held an RSDO‘s decision to refuse them refugee status. 
External structures 
In addition to the legal and administrative structure created by the Basic Agreement 
and the accompanying policy regulations – and later, the Refugees Act – various 
external structures had a considerable impact on the implementation of the refugee 
status determination procedure. Through its ratification of international human 
rights treaties and by incorporating international law into its own constitution, 
South Africa made certain binding commitments, most of which were confirmed in 
the national policy instruments referred to. As South Africa ended its thirty-year 
exclusion from the United Nations and ratified various human rights treaties, the 
government also resumed full participation in the work of the UN General Assem-
bly and specialised organs. This included the Executive Committee of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which, in terms of the 1951 
Refugee Convention, provided a specific mandate to supervise states’ obligations 
                                                        
33  (Refugees Act 1998: section 24). 
34  (Refugees Act 1998): section 14(2). 
35  (The Refugee Appeal Board Rules 2003). 
36  (Refugees Act 1998: section 26). 
37  (South African Constitution 1996: section 33). 
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under the Convention and imposed concurrent obligations on states to co-operate 
with the UNHCR, including providing statistical data.38 
Furthermore, the South African government entered into various bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral agreements with third states, covering both technical co-operation and 
accepting ‘re-admission’ of nationals from pre-selected countries who were denied 
refugee status in a country.39 
South Africa was seen as a kind of testing ground for newly-formulated refugee 
protection models.40 The country also became the object of increasing attention 
from the USA, Australia and from European countries that advised or financed 
South Africa’s migration and border control policies and its mechanisms of en-
forcement. Furthermore, the government became involved in global discussions on 
migration policy, in particular in order to ‘combat’ so-called irregular migration. 
What these discussions have boiled down to is the need to introduce various restric-
tive policies and interdiction measures, to deter and intercept would-be ‘secondary 
movers’ when it would be possible to claim refugee status elsewhere, and particu-
larly in the region from which the asylum seeker had come. 
Finally, international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty Interna-
tional and the US Committee for Refugees took a considerable interest in refugee 
issues in South Africa. Their highly developed institutional knowledge on the 
global picture of state efforts to address ‘irregular migration’ was of considerable 
value to South African NGOs and – at times – of considerable annoyance to the 
government. International NGOs facilitated the participation of South African 
NGOs at international meetings. International and South African NGOs also col-
laborated in reports on the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees in South Af-
rica, including putting the developments in South Africa into a global perspective.41 
6.2.4 Litigating accountability 
Between 1996 and 2006, lawyers in South Africa brought multiple legal challenges 
in an effort to expose irregularities in the DHA’s decision-making process and to 
get clarity on what the DHA’s policy actually was. Early cases only marginally ad-
dressed international law, though as the jurisprudence developed, international law 
became ever more important to the argumentation put forward by lawyers. As 
judges gradually accepted this reasoning, international law formed a basis for pro-
gressive judgements on refugee rights. 
As the next section illustrates, administrative law has been the principal formal 
means of holding states accountable to their obligations to promote, protect and 
                                                        
38  (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951: Article 35). 
39  (Travis and Macaskill 2004) confirmed that the governments of South Africa and the United King-
dom signed such an agreement to strengthen South African border controls. 
40  (Hathaway 2001). 
41  Reports produced by international NGOs, in collaboration with South African NGOs, that address 
the situation in South Africa include: (Hrw 1998) and (Uscr 2000). 
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fulfil refugee rights, and human rights in general. The following two sections will 
explain how national civic actors, and especially lawyers, mobilised for the en-
forcement of refugee rights in South Africa between 1996 and 2006. The first area 
of litigating refugee rights principally addressed access to the refugee status deter-
mination procedure. The second area of litigation aimed to secure the rights of asy-
lum seekers and refugees to work, study and receive social grants in South Africa. 
The third area of litigation was to go beyond the recognition of refugee rights and 
enforce judgements against the government. 
The following overview of refugee rights litigation does not aspire to be a com-
plete record of all relevant cases. However, efforts by civic actors to enforce refu-
gee rights protection against the government of South Africa – through a combina-
tion of litigation and other (non-legal) advocacy – have resulted in some key 
judgements. These judgements represent both significant accomplishments and 
some disappointing failures in advocating for accountability through litigation. 
6.3 MOBILISING ACCESS TO REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATION PROCEDURES 
THROUGH THE COURTS 
Mobilising access to just refugee determination procedures – through the adminis-
trative system and the South African courts – has been the principal area in which 
civic actors have sought to advocate for accountability.42 This has arisen out of a 
common dilemma faced by refugee advocates: there is no positive international law 
obligation on the part of states to grant political asylum, or to recognise anyone as a 
refugee. Instead, states have a negative obligation not to return someone to a coun-
try in conflict, in relation to the OAU Refugees Convention, or where they would 
experience a well-founded fear of persecution, in terms of the UN Refugees Con-
vention. This is known as the non-refoulement principle.43 For countries with for-
malised national refugee status determination procedures, in order to determine 
whether this negative obligation might be violated, it is imperative to secure access 
to effective (and just) administrative procedures in order to determine an applicant’s 
refugee status. 
Accordingly, the main issue that civic actors have litigated in South Africa has 
been the initial reception of asylum seekers and refugees in the country, and in par-
ticular, their access to status determination procedures that respect due process in 
terms of administrative law. More specific problems frequently encountered by 
lawyers in terms of administrative due process have included blanket assessments 
on the basis of an applicant’s country of origin, vagueness, inconsistency and the 
lack of written reasons to refuse an applicant refugee status.44 
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This first aspect of ‘localising’ knowledge discussed in this section has four 
components: (1) promoting access to a fair procedure, (2) ensuring entry to South 
Africa to access the procedure, (3) providing for the special needs of unaccompa-
nied children in accessing asylum procedures, and (4) securing physical access to 
one of the five, urban-based refugee reception offices in South Africa.45 
6.3.1 Access to a fair procedure 
A groundbreaking judgement on litigating refugee rights in South Africa was João 
Pembele and others v. Refugees Appeal Board and others (Pembele case).46 Law-
yers from the Cape Town office of the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), acting on 
behalf of Mr. Pembele and other applicants, brought this 1996 case under the refu-
gee procedure that preceded the Refugees Act of 1998. The principal demand of the 
lawyers from the LRC was that the applicants be provided written reasons from the 
DHA for their decision to refuse them refugee status. Such a basic demand in terms 
of administrative justice was quite revealing of the DHA’s reluctance to subscribe 
to a culture of constitutionalism, as laid down in the country’s Constitution, pub-
licly supported by the new government47 and strongly promoted by human rights 
organisations in South Africa. 
The 1993 Interim Constitution provided an explicit requirement that ‘every per-
son shall have the right to be furnished with reasons in writing for administrative 
action which affects any of his or her rights or interests unless the reasons for such 
action have been made public’.48 This administrative due-process guarantee was 
made even stronger in the 1996 Final Constitution, which provided that ‘everyone 
whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to 
be given written reasons‘.49 However, despite this explicit requirement, for the 
DHA, it was ‘business as usual’. 
Although some of the applicants were alleged to have been responsible for in-
ternational crimes, the one-page consent order issued by the court, which confirmed 
the contents of a settlement, ordered the Refugee Appeal Board to provide written 
reasons for its refusal to grant refugee status. 
The Pembele consent order was closely followed by the judgement of Ka-
buika.50 This 1996 judgement, which was also brought by lawyers acting for the 
LRC, was an early example of South African lawyers ‘localising’ global knowledge 
by appealing to binding obligations in international customary law in their argu-
                                                        
45  Refugee Reception Offices (RROs), as they are referred to in terms of the Refugees Act 1998, have 
been established in the urban municipalities of Johannesburg, Pretoria (Tshwane), Cape Town, 
Durban and Port Elizabeth. 
46  (Pembele case 1996) 
47  (Monyae 2006: 132). 
48  Section 24(c) of the (Interim Constitution of South Africa 1993). 
49  Section 33(2) of the (South African Constitution 1996). 
50  (Kabuika case 1997) 
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mentation. The judgement confirmed that, despite the fact that South Africa had not 
yet ratified the international refugee conventions at the time the applicants’ claims 
were considered, the customary international law principle of non-refoulement ap-
plied, and was therefore binding on the government of South Africa as a principle 
of jus cogens.51 The court furthermore accepted the lawyers’ arguments that the 
Department made numerous factual errors and, in their failure to respect due proc-
ess, the DHA had misjudged the claims by Kabuika that the conditions in Zaire had 
not improved since they fled the country. 
Two years later, another major case came before the High Court, concerning a 
claim against the DHA by former generals and a senior government official of 
Mobutu’s regime in Zaire.52 After having resided for years on either special privi-
lege, medical or holiday permits (in some cases granted by the Minister of Home 
Affairs personally), they found that their ‘VIP’ status in South Africa had expired, 
and they were ordered by the DHA to leave the country, whereupon they applied for 
refugee status. The government refused to consider their applications for refugee 
status, insisting that they should have applied earlier. The generals and former offi-
cial brought a judicial challenge to this decision, taking the unprecedented step of 
immediately engaging senior legal counsel. 
The applicants hired well-respected senior legal counsel, Advocates Tuchten and 
Unterhalter, on a private basis. Although the senior counsel were not acting on be-
half of an NGO and had never handled a refugee case before, they consulted widely 
with refugee lawyers and academics, conducted extensive research on international 
refugee law and put forward exceptional argumentation. Even though, as in the 
Pembele case, the applicants would in all probability have all been excluded from 
refugee status on the basis of their previous activities in Zaire, the lawyers argued 
that their access to a fair refugee procedure ought still to be ensured. The lawyers 
further argued that Baramoto and his fellow applicants would not receive a fair 
hearing from the DHA’s Standing Committee, and asked the court to grant a ‘de-
claratory order’ recognising the applicants as refugees. 
The judge agreed that the applicants be permitted access to the procedure, but 
refused to accept that the applicants would not receive a fair hearing, and did not 
grant applicants refugee status over the heads of the department. The judge declared 
that ‘there is no reason for holding that the tribunals will merely rubber stamp gov-
                                                        
51  (Kabuika case 1997: 5) In coming to this conclusion, the court in Kabuika referred to academic 
commentary by South African Professors Christina Murray and John Dugard as well as the consti-
tutional court judgement in the (AZAPO case 1996) The court declared: 
‘The intention to legislate contrary to the jus cogens would, however, have to be clearly indicated 
by Parliament in the legislation in question because of the prima facie presumption that Parlia-
ment does not intend to act in breach of international law.’ 
52  The regime of Mobutu Sese Seko in the former Belgian Congo, which Mobutu renamed Zaire and 
is now the Democratic Republic of Congo, was one of the most brutal regimes of the last century. 
See (Wrong 2001). 
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ernment policy. At the end of the day, if all else fails, review to this court remains 
an option available to the applicants in this regard’.53 
In spite of the morally repugnant nature of the applicants’ claims – all three were 
alleged to have contributed to war crimes, torture or crimes against humanity, as 
part of Mobutu’s brutal regime54 – Baramoto and Others v Minister of Home Af-
fairs and Others became an important legal precedent, confirming the right of ac-
cess to asylum procedures. The case was also reported later. From a legal doctrinal 
perspective, the fact that this case did not concern the most ‘deserving’ of appli-
cants made the precedent that much stronger. 
6.3.2 Ensuring entry to South Africa 
The next aspect of litigating access to fair status determination procedures focused 
on entry to South Africa. Towards the end of 1999, civic actors and applicants were 
still waiting for the Refugees Act to be brought into force, a year after it had been 
passed into law.55 Meanwhile, the Durban Refugee Forum (the Forum) had been 
informed about the situation of two Iraqi men who claimed to have fled their coun-
try’s regime, and had smuggled themselves onto a ship that was due to arrive in 
Durban harbour in the third week of January. The men had expressed a wish to dis-
embark in Durban and apply for refugee status. The Department of Home Affairs 
refused to permit this, declaring the Iraqi men (in advance of their arrival) to be 
‘prohibited persons’ in terms of the Aliens Control Act 1991. In court papers, a 
DHA official was quoted as claiming that they ‘feared that they (the Iraqis) would 
be stranded in the Republic because, as he claimed, it is impossible to repatriate 
persons to Iraq because of what he referred to as the “no fly zone.” (sic)’.56 
After numerous unsuccessful interventions at the DHA’s refugee office in Dur-
ban, the Forum’s legal advisor, Sheldon Magardie, decided to bring a case, firstly to 
permit him and an interpreter to board the ship, once it arrived, to verify the Iraqis’ 
story. Secondly, Magardie asked the court to permit the two men to apply to the 
DHA for refugee status. The case became known as the Durban Refugee Forum 
case.57 
As a ‘translator’ of South Africa’s international obligations, Magardie spelled 
out the obligations of South Africa, in terms of the government having ratified the 
Refugee Conventions, in a comprehensive founding affidavit. Magardie referred to 
                                                        
53  (Baramoto case 1998) 
54  Their alleged involvement in international crimes was well documented by human rights organisa-
tions such as Amnesty International, for example as reported by the United Nations in (‘IRIN 
Emergency Update No. 45 on Eastern Zaire’ 1996). 
55  Much legislation in South Africa that is passed into law, including the Refugees Act 130 of 1998, 
requires the responsible government department to introduce Regulations before it becomes opera-
tional. Just as with the Act itself, such Regulations must be formally published in the official gov-
ernment ‘Gazette’. 
56  (Durban Refugee Forum case 2000) Founding Affidavit, paragraph 16a. 
57  (Durban Refugee Forum case 2000) Orders issued: 23 and 24 January 2000. 
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the disregard of the DHA towards its international obligations, the reasons for its 
refusal being the difficulty of deporting the Iraqis. Magardie referred extensively to 
South Africa’s international obligations in terms of the 1951 UN and 1969 OAU 
Refugee Conventions,58 and the DHA’s own policy concerning stowaways.59 Ma-
gardie also appealed to Article 33(1) of South Africa’s Constitution – referred to 
earlier in this chapter – which guarantees due process to asylum seekers in South 
Africa, arguing that ‘despite having acceded to the Convention it is clear that (the 
DHA) … does not wish to abide by the clear dictates of Art 33(1)’.60 
In a judgement issued on 23 January 2000, the court ordered not only that Ma-
gardie be permitted to board the ship,61 but that the DHA ‘take all such necessary 
steps’ to allow the applicants to apply for refugee status.62 In a further judgement, 
issued on 24 January 2000, the court ordered that the Iraqi applicants be provided 
with (extendable) residence permits for the duration of their application.63 Finally, 
in an extraordinary condemnation of the DHA, the court further ordered the de-
partment to ‘render full reasons to the Registrar for his decision declaring said (ap-
plicants) to be prohibited persons as contemplated in the Aliens Act 95 of 1991 
(sic).’64 
While the judgement in the Durban High Court was an embarrassment for the 
DHA, it meant that civic actors were able to confront the DHA, and hold it account-
able to its national and international obligations through the courts. However, rather 
than introduce policy concessions, the DHA chose to engage in further legal con-
frontations with civic actors on the operation of their refugee policy. In the next 
major case, LHR (2001), the confrontations became even more hostile. 
Immediately after the Refugees Act was finally brought into being on 1 April 
2000, the DHA introduced a new policy circular, which provided that anyone ap-
pearing spontaneously at a port of entry should be sent back.65 This policy was in-
troduced seemingly on the basis of a narrow understanding of the so-called ‘first 
country of asylum principle’, otherwise referred to as the ‘safe third country princi-
ple’.66 This principle, commonly invoked by countries in the European Union that 
share a partially-harmonised asylum system, provides that one should not be per-
mitted to claim asylum in one country if another country could potentially have of-
                                                        
58  (Durban Refugee Forum case 2000) Paragraphs 5, 20, 25, 26 and 30. 
59  Department of Home Affairs, ‘Stowaways who are or who claim to be refugees’, Passport Control 
Instruction No. 33 of 1995. Stowaways are to be permitted to apply for refugee status and, if neces-
sary, to disembark a ship for these purposes. 
60  Ibid. Paragraph 26. 
61  (Durban Refugee Forum case 2000) Paragraph 2. 
62  (Durban Refugee Forum case 2000) Paragraph 3(b). 
63  (Durban Refugee Forum case 2000) Paragraphs 6 and 7. 
64  (Durban Refugee Forum case 2000) Paragraph 8. It is not clear whether the DHA ever submitted its 
reasons. 
65  DHA (2000), ‘Influx of Asylum Seekers: First Country of asylum’, Departmental Circular No. 59 
of 2000. 
66  (L.A. De La Hunt and Kerfoot 2008: 97). 
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fered that claimant protection.67 The DHA claimed – accurately – that all applicants 
entering South Africa via a land crossing had passed through countries where it was 
possible to apply for refugee status. In response, LHR argued, somewhat provoca-
tively, that if such a policy were to be maintained, asylum seekers would have to 
‘parachute’ into South Africa in order to be permitted the opportunity to apply for 
refugee status.68 
As recorded by Belvedere, LHR made numerous efforts to resolve the matter 
amicably, arguing that the policy violated several international legal obligations as 
well as the Refugees Act and the South African Constitution.69 However, these ef-
forts led only to increasingly hostile exchanges. The media eagerly reported on 
these public confrontations. LHR strongly criticised the behaviour of the DHA, 
which responded by challenging LHR’s legitimacy. The Director-General of the 
DHA even publicly referred to LHR as ‘peacetime heroes’ and ‘fools’ if they dared 
challenge the Department on this matter.70 
During the course of these acrimonious exchanges, and having received count-
less complaints from individual asylum seekers who had struggled to enter the 
country, LHR formally launched a challenge to this policy in the case of LHR 
(2001),71 but the matter never went to trial. Reflecting simmering political tensions 
within the DHA, the Minister of Home Affairs publicly accused his own Director-
General ‘of implementing a legally questionable asylum policy without his knowl-
edge’,72 and the DHA policy was hastily set aside. While there have been more re-
cent, lingering doubts as to whether the practice has, in fact, been discontinued (at 
least in the case of Zimbabweans),73 the government‘s non-entrée policy has never 
been reintroduced in any formal way. 
It is interesting to note how, on one hand, in the LHR (2001) case, the mecha-
nism of litigation, in combination with civic actors’ use of the media, became a 
powerful political tool that eventually contributed towards the DHA retracting its 
policy. On the other hand, given the hostile nature of the confrontations between the 
Director-General of the DHA and LHR, it is doubtful whether the case would have 
been resolved as quickly as it did, had the Minister not stepped in to rebuke his own 
Director-General. The matter may well have gone to trial. 
In the Durban Refugee Forum and LHR (2001) cases, the meanings, interests 
and political positions of civic actors on one hand and the DHA on the other be-
came extremely polarised, leaving the corresponding social distance very wide. 
This made it extremely difficult for lawyers to localise global knowledge by appeal-
ing to South Africa’s international obligations to refugees, or even to appeal to the 
                                                        
67  See (Kjaergaard 1994); (Gil-Bazo 2006); and (Lavanex 1999). 
68  (‘Lawyers to Fight Asylum Policy’ 2001). 
69  (Belvedere 2006: 189-191). 
70  (Chothia 2001). 
71  (LHR case 2001) 
72  (‘Buthelezi Accuses Masetlha’ 2001). Also noted by (Belvedere 2006: 191). 
73  (Vigneswaran 2006). 
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country’s constitutional obligations towards refugees. In the LHR (2001) case, liti-
gation became unnecessary once political forces within the DHA shifted and the 
Minister intervened, reducing the social distance virtually overnight. But, yet again, 
the presence of shared interests was short-lived as civic actors and the DHA con-
fronted each other once again in the Centre for Child Law case. 
6.3.3 Special access needs of children 
The special access needs of children became the subject of another case brought in 
2005 by LHR and the Centre for Child Law at the University of Pretoria (Centre) in 
the Centre for Child Law case.74 LHR and the Centre brought this case after years 
of advocacy to try to persuade the government to recognise children as especially 
vulnerable, and to develop special procedures for assessing their eligibility for refu-
gee status, in accordance with existing policy in South Africa for the treatment of 
vulnerable children generally.75 
Until this time, child asylum seekers arriving in South Africa unaccompanied 
had been dealt with by the DHA in the same way as adults were. The lawyers from 
LHR and the Centre argued that the treatment of children as adults in the status de-
termination regime was in clear violation of long-standing policies laid out by the 
UNHCR and as practised by other countries in the world.76 The lawyers further ar-
gued that the lack of a special procedure was in contradiction to South Africa’s ob-
ligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which South Africa had 
ratified.77 Finally, the lawyers argued that the lack of a special procedure for chil-
dren was inconsistent with its own domestic legislation in terms of the Constitution 
and the Child Care Act.78 
The DHA objected to these special procedures, and the matter went to trial. In 
the judgement handed down in this case, the court accepted the argumentation of 
the Centre for Child Law, affirming that unaccompanied foreign children should 
first be dealt with under the provisions of the Child Care Act as ‘children in need of 
care’. This entailed having legal representatives assigned to them by the state, in-
cluding for assisting in the asylum determination procedure. 
6.3.4 Physical access to the refugee reception offices 
Another aspect in which civic actors have advocated for access to fair status deter-
mination procedures – in an increasingly acrimonious environment – has been to 
ensure physical access to Refugee Reception Offices (RROs). As referred to earlier, 
the RROs had been set up in terms of the Refugees Act 1998. As Belvedere and her 
                                                        
74  (Centre for Child Law case 2005) 
75  (Mayer et al. 2008). 
76  (Mayer et al. 2008: 198-206). 
77  (Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989). South Africa ratified the Convention on 16 July 
1995. 
78  (Child Care Act 1983). See also (Mayer et al. 2008: 189-195). 
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colleagues had determined in a 2003 nationwide survey commissioned by the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, access to these offices continued to be a major 
concern of refugees and asylum seekers over a period of many years.79 
The efforts made by civic actors to ensure physical access to the RROs were not 
only to ensure access to the refugee status determination procedure.80 Civic actors 
were also concerned that asylum seekers and refugees be provided access for the 
purposes of renewing or extending their residence permits. More serious related 
concerns, as documented by Belvedere and others, were the total closure of DHA’s 
office in Johannesburg – the largest RRO in the country – for a lengthy period in 
April 2005, and the introduction by the officials in other DHA RROs of a daily 
quota system that limited the physical numbers of applicants into the building. The 
end result was that hundreds, if not thousands of asylum seekers were being denied 
access to the RROs, either to have their applications for refugee status considered or 
to have their permits renewed. This also meant that countless asylum seekers were 
without any proof of formal status, and were therefore vulnerable to arrest and ex-
ploitation.81 
Once again, after numerous, unproductive exchanges between civic actors and 
the DHA, LHR launched court challenges in April and October 2005, insisting that 
the DHA improve its access to the RROs. Meanwhile, the Cape Town office of the 
Legal Resources Centre launched its own court challenge with regard to similar 
policies in place at the Refugee Reception Office there, in the case of Kiliko.82 The 
Kiliko case especially concerned a policy in terms of which DHA officials were 
ordered to process only twenty asylum seeker permits per day. This meant that doz-
ens, if not hundreds of would-be applicants were turned away on a daily basis. 
The DHA offered to settle the first LHR case in 8 May 2005, which LHR ac-
cepted; and the settlement was confirmed by a court order.83 The May court order 
had little effect in improving access. According to LHR attorney Fritz Gaerdes, who 
issued a press release, the situation became even worse in June 2005, when the 
DHA closed its Johannesburg office in Rosettenville, forcing asylum seekers and 
refugees to use other DHA offices, in particular the office in Pretoria: 
the High Court ordered the Department of Home Affairs to prepare and file a plan 
to facilitate all asylum applications by newly arrived asylum seekers. This plan re-
quired the Department to outline clear steps that it intended taking to solve the 
problems that asylum seekers experienced to access the asylum procedures … 
                                                        
79  (Belvedere et al. 2003). 
80  As more than one highly frustrated South African lawyer mentioned (in confidence) to me, the fact 
that lawyers had started with challenging the bureaucratic criteria for fair refugee status determina-
tion procedures and ended up, several years later, merely challenging access to the offices, repre-
sented a ‘backward slide’ in the behaviour of the DHA towards refugees and asylum seekers in 
South Africa. 
81  (Belvedere et al. 2003) and (Belvedere 2006: 191-278). 
82  (Kiliko case 2006) 
83  (‘Interview with J. Van Garderen (2)’ 2008). 
 Litigating and shaming: civic participation in refugee policy enforcement 
173 
Since June we have continually monitored the situation. What we saw was that the 
daily queues at the Pretoria refugee reception office were on average 250 persons 
long, whilst the Department on average only assisted 45 newly arrived asylum 
seekers daily. The longer queues were therefore not due to a greater influx of asy-
lum seekers in South Africa but, in our observations, rather due to departmental in-
action and inefficiency.84 
The High Court issued a further order in the form of a structural interdict on 11 No-
vember 2005, which among other matters required the DHA to employ the services 
of ‘an independent process engineer or other suitably qualified individual to inves-
tigate, assess and make recommendations to ensure that asylum seekers can imme-
diately access the asylum application procedures’.85 LHR expressed satisfaction 
with the judgement, and declared it would continue to monitor the situation.  
Judgement in the Kiliko matter was finally delivered on 16 January 2006. The 
Court judged the conduct of the DHA to be inconsistent with the fundamental rights 
of illegal foreigners as embodied in the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court also 
ordered a comprehensive structural interdict requiring the DHA to report on its pro-
gress in improving access to the Cape Town refugee reception office. 
6.4 MOBILISING REFUGEE ACCESS TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 
THROUGH THE COURTS 
Another aspect in litigating refugee rights in South Africa has been to ‘localise’ 
global knowledge by appealing to international legal norms and comparative state 
practice, addressing the economic and social rights of asylum seekers and refugees, 
including the right to work and study. 
Beyond securing the right to work, the conditions of employment have also 
needed to be addressed, in particular criteria that have been in place to preserve cer-
tain sectors of employment for South African citizens only. Finally, the denial of 
social grants, including access to food grants to refugees, has been challenged. Later 
cases have also been brought to secure disabled persons grants and childcare grants. 
6.4.1 Securing the right to work and study for asylum seekers 
While applicants await a decision on their status, for asylum seekers the right to 
work and study is not a luxury; for most it is a matter of survival.86 As mentioned, 
applications for refugee status in South Africa have tended to take a very long time 
to process. It is not at all unusual for an application to take several years, and the 
DHA has found itself with successive backlogs of applications for refugee status, 
including a backlog of 100 000 applications at the beginning of 2006.87 
                                                        
84  (‘LHR Press Release’ 2005). 
85  Ibid. 
86  See also (Landau 2006). 
87  (Handmaker 2008). 
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As mentioned earlier in chapter four, the Regulations that brought the Refugees 
Act 1998 into operation were produced with virtually no public consultation. Rather 
than involve civic actors in the framing of the Regulations – which would no doubt 
have ensured that the right to work and study was protected – a consultant, paid for 
by the US government, drafted the Departmental Regulations. The Regulations 
brought the Refugees Act into use on 1 April 2000.88 Regulation 7(1)(a) and corre-
sponding Annexure 3 prohibited the right of asylum seekers to work and study 
while their applications for refugee status were being considered.89  
A minor breakthrough in challenging the denial of the right of asylum seekers to 
work and study came about in 2001, following the so-called Mutambala letter. This 
was a letter from the Director-General of Home Affairs to the South African Human 
Rights Commission, confirming the Department’s position that children of asylum 
seekers had the right to study, pending a determination of their asylum claim. In 
administrative law terms, this created a ‘legitimate expectation’. 
However, asylum seekers were still routinely refused the right to work and 
study, and lawyers continued to object strongly to this exclusionary provision in the 
Regulations. It ultimately became necessary to litigate the matter. The case of 
Watchenuka90 was finally decided by the Supreme Court of Appeal, after DHA ap-
pealed the High Court decision in favour of the refugee applicants. The appeals 
court declared the policy denying asylum seekers the right to work and study to be 
unlawful on the grounds that it violated the conditions for having a dignified life. 
The Court ordered the DHA’s Standing Committee to consider the circumstances of 
each applicant when deciding on the prohibition on work and study, whether on a 
case by case basis or by formulating guidelines to be applied by Refugee Reception 
Officers. Since individual screening would have entailed impossible administrative 
burdens, the prohibition was set aside. 
6.4.2 Challenging discriminatory employment practices 
While the right of asylum seekers and refugees to seek work and employment was 
guaranteed by the Watchenuka case, numerous other official and social barriers 
have made it very difficult for asylum seekers to find a formal job or study-
placement, and civic actors have largely been unsuccessful in challenging these 
discriminatory employment practices. This is partly related to the fact that while 
South Africa’s Constitution preserves the right to fair labour practices for ‘every-
one’,91 the Constitution preserves the right to freely choose a trade, occupation or 
profession for ‘citizens’ only.92 Furthermore, this same ‘citizens only’ section in the 
                                                        
88  This was communicated to me, in confidence, by several well-placed individuals. 
89  Before the Refugees Act 1998 came into use, asylum seekers were generally permitted to work 
legally. The Regulations to the Refugees Act removed the right to work and study. 
90  (Watchenuka case 2004) 
91  (South African Constitution 1996: section 23). 
92  (South African Constitution 1996: section 22). 
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Constitution provides that ‘the practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be 
regulated by law’.93 
One of the few areas of employment where many refugees have successfully 
found work is in South Africa’s burgeoning security industry. Many of the informal 
jobs, such as car parking guards or uniformed security officers (for example, regu-
lating entry to an office or residential building) have been taken by refugees. It has 
been impossible, however, for refugees and asylum seekers to legally acquire a 
formal job in the security sector, because of a specific regulation determined by the 
Security Officers Board (the ‘Board’).94 This regulation has reserved formal secu-
rity jobs for South African citizens only. 
Over a period of several years, lawyers, together with the National Consortium 
for Refugee Affairs (a national network of civic organisations), and the URW – 
referred to earlier – have persistently challenged this discriminatory policy, arguing 
that it is unconstitutional. After efforts to settle the matter with the Private Security 
Industry proved unsuccessful, civic actors took up the matter in the courts. Assisted 
by LHR, the URW argued in the Security Industry case95 that exclusion on the basis 
of citizenship unfairly and unjustifiably infringed on refugees’ rights to non-
discrimination and dignity. The High Court found against them, declaring that the 
public interest, particularly viewed against the safety and security of the public, and 
the control of the security industry, justified the limits on the right of refugees to be 
registered as security service providers. 
The media reported that ‘the Security Industry Act which regulates the security 
industry does not unfairly discriminate against refugees and it is thus not in conflict 
with the Constitution’.96 Human rights lawyers representing the Union of Refugee 
Women, who brought the case against the Board, were frustrated to face another, 
very experienced and noted human rights lawyer, Wim Trengove, as their opponent 
in Court. In explaining the Board’s position, Trengove argued: 
that while the Act did favour citizens and permanent residents over non-citizens, it 
was not discriminatory. The mere fact that refugees had to comply with the Act did 
not mean they could not seek employment in other industries … The security ser-
vice industry was highly sensitive … and extreme caution was required to ensure 
only trustworthy persons were permitted to become members. There was thus a 
need for strict and proper control.97 
The URW appealed the decision of the High Court to the Constitutional Court on 
29 August 2006, the URW’s lawyers – as rights translators – making extensive ref-
                                                        
93  Ibid. 
94  The Security Officers Board is a statutorily-created entity that used to be part of the police structure 
before a successful challenge by the Transport and General Workers Union; it then acquired an in-
dependent status. 
95  (Security Industry case (lower court) 2006) 
96  (Venter 2006). 
97  (Venter 2006) 
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erence to South Africa’s obligations to refugees in terms of international law. The 
Constitutional Court was split on the matter.98 The majority of the Court, led by 
Justice Kondile, did not accept the main line of argument presented by the refugee 
applicants, namely that the legislation unfairly discriminated against refugees. On 
the other hand, the Court accepted that exemptions should be issued to refugees 
where there were ‘no high security interests’.99 
The reasoning by Sachs, which tried to find a middle ground, made extensive 
reference to South Africa’s obligations in international law, the ‘significance’ of the 
Refugees Act, the ‘historical and social setting in which the rights and entitlements 
of refugees have to be determined’ and finally the ‘constitutionally-mandated obli-
gation to counteract xenophobia’.100 Sachs referred to South Africa’s traditional 
culture of hospitality; as well as the special reasons why refugees found themselves 
in the country being the consequence of ‘instability and bloodshed in their home 
countries (that had) rendered life there intolerable’.101 However, ultimately Sachs 
agreed with Kondile that the discriminatory measure was not unconstitutional since 
there was still the possibility of granting an exemption: 
I see no reason why access to employment in the security industry by persons in 
their situation should not be permitted in relation to sectors such as these, where no 
high security interests are at stake. To bar them would be to discriminate against 
them unfairly. At the same time I would not regard it as unfair to keep them from 
guarding installations and persons where particularly high security considerations 
come into play.102 
And so, the discriminatory measure remains. Civic actors found it difficult to un-
derstand how the judgement of the Constitutional Court could demand, on one 
hand, that the security industry be ‘fair and reasonable’ in deciding whether or not 
to grant an exemption to a refugee applicant, while on the other hand, failing to de-
clare the discriminatory provision in the Security Industry Act to be unconstitu-
tional. In this case, the social distance between the state and civic actors remained 
wide after the Constitutional Court explicitly recognised the government‘s com-
mitment to refugees, but failed to challenge this area of ‘protected’ employment. 
The observation by the Court shifted the social distance between the two parties 
slightly in relation to the meaning of the Security Industry Act. However, the fact 
that the Security Officers Board was merely urged to consider the possibility of em-
ploying refugees meant that the Court’s observation was essentially meaningless, 
since the interests of both parties still diverged completely. Consequently, the con-
stitutionality of the discriminatory measure was essentially confirmed. 
                                                        
98  (Security Industry Case 2006) By the time the case reached the constitutional court, two applicants 
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6.4.3 Securing the right to social grants 
Unlike the long-fought and ultimately unsuccessful efforts to eliminate citizen-
based discrimination within the security industry, civic actors have been reasonably 
successful in claiming social grants for asylum seekers and refugees. Unlike in 
other countries, both in Europe as well as in countries that manage large refugee 
camps, the government of South Africa has not provided social assistance for asy-
lum seekers or refugees. On the other hand, asylum seekers and refugees have been 
free to ‘self-settle’, avoiding the harsh and demoralising conditions faced in coun-
tries that require asylum seekers and refugees to reside in refugee camps or that 
prevent them from working. 
In the absence of government assistance, some very modest emergency assis-
tance has been provided by a small number of civic organisations, including NGOs, 
faith-based groups and refugee-led organisations. When the numbers of asylum 
seekers arriving in South Africa (during the early to mid-1990s) was small, these 
organisations received generous support from the UNHCR and other donors, and 
were able to provide a reasonable service. But as the numbers of asylum seekers 
steadily increased from 1996 onwards, the civic organisations that provided these 
services quickly found themselves overwhelmed. 
In the cases of Khosa103 and Mahlaule104 referred to earlier, brought by lawyers 
of the Wits University Law Clinic, which concerned a lack of social services to 
former Mozambican refugees, the Constitutional Court determined that the gov-
ernment‘s limiting of social grants to citizens was unconstitutional. More recently, 
in a 2006 case brought by NGOs in Duale v Minister of Social Development,105 the 
court declared that refugees were entitled to food vouchers as ‘social relief of dis-
tress’, and ordered the Minister of Social Development to issue the vouchers and 
conduct an assessment of their situation.106 
In all three of these cases, the social distance between NGOs and the South Af-
rican government narrowed as the court declared the government to be obliged to 
provide social assistance, recognising South African citizens and refugees as having 
essentially the same interests, at least in relation to accessing social grants. 
6.5 WHAT CHANGED? FROM RECOGNITION TO RELIEF 
Beyond a judicial declaration that a government policy or action is invalid or that 
rights exist,107 a further aspect of litigating refugee rights in South Africa worthy of 
critique has been the form of interdictory relief obtained from the court. This sec-
tion explains what civic actors have accomplished structurally by litigating refugee 
                                                        
103  (Khosa case 2003). 
104  (Mahlaule case 2003). 
105  (Duale case 2006). The court granted a consent order on 14 September 2006. 
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107  (Currie and De Waal 2005: 199-216). 
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rights and obtaining an order, including interdictory relief from the court, whether 
in the form of (1) final relief by judgement, (2) interim or final relief through a 
court-ordered settlement, or (3) structural interdicts. 
6.5.1 Final relief through judgement 
The obtaining of final relief through judgements, or ‘decided cases’, represents the 
greatest potential for shaming governments, since the government is forced by the 
court to take positive steps to correct its behaviour. Judgements can also be re-
ported.108 However, seeking a judgement represents a strategic risk to civic actors; 
the court could potentially rule against them. There are also financial risks, since 
such cases tend to be complex and often require engaging the services of expensive 
senior counsel, especially when cases are taken on appeal. Both of these risks were 
evident in the Security Industry case brought by the UDW and others that chal-
lenged the discriminatory policy of the security industry, and was finally met with a 
mixed judgement in the Constitutional Court. As a consequence of all these factors, 
very few judgements have been issued on refugee-related cases in the South African 
courts. 
In at least one decided case, Van Garderen,109 the judgement of the court pro-
vided a dramatic remedy for the individual applicants concerned; but this was of 
marginal use as a precedent in other cases, since the judgement was distinguished in 
respect of a very specific set of facts. Van Garderen concerned an application by a 
guardian ad litem to protect the best interests of three refugee children on whose 
behalf he was acting. In a similar way to the approaches of rights translators in 
cases preceding this one, the lawyers in this case drew extensively on both South 
Africa’s constitutional and international law obligations, including the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. 
The children’s applications for refugee status had been considered, and rejected, 
by the Refugee Appeal Board (RAB), and the children were facing deportation. The 
court was asked to ‘substitute its finding for that made by the RAB and to accord 
asylum to the children’.110 The court accepted this argument by the applicants and 
issued an order, both setting aside the decision of the RAB and granting asylum to 
the children. This was a significant departure from the Baramoto case heard ten 
years earlier, in which the court was unwilling to make a judgement on the asylum 
claim. However, the case could also be distinguished since the Department had not 
yet taken the opportunity to review the applicants’ claims, and the facts of the 
Baramoto case were obviously rather different as well. One of the reasons the court 
may have decided to rule in favour of the children and grant them status could be 
explained in terms of legal consciousness, notably the court’s awareness of the su-
premacy of international law, in this case the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
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Consequently, the case represents a very interesting example of the effective role 
played by translators in ensuring that global rules find local application. 
With regard to other judgements discussed in this chapter, the Kabuika, 
Watchenuka and Centre for Child Law cases111 were strategically brought to chal-
lenge broader policies of the DHA, and did not require the court to interfere as 
much in the Department’s decision-making. These cases provided both a remedy 
for the applicants concerned, and structurally changed government policy and be-
haviour. The Kabuika case, for example, recognised the principle of non-
refoulement as a legally binding principle. In Watchenuka, the court overturned the 
provision in the Regulations to the Refugees Act prohibiting work and study for 
asylum seekers. In the Centre for Child Law case, the judgement imposed a positive 
duty on the part of government departments to liaise with one another to formulate 
and implement practical arrangements regarding unaccompanied foreign children in 
South Africa. 
The judgement in the Durban Refugee Forum case112 fell somewhere in between 
the ‘delicate balance‘ of allowing departmental discretion, on one hand, and exer-
cising judicial oversight, on the other. Although specifically targeting the plight of 
two Iraqi men who had smuggled themselves onto a ship, the case presented an op-
portunity (perhaps beyond the Forum’s initial intentions) to ‘localise’ global knowl-
edge by confronting the DHA at one of its regional offices with its international law 
and constitutional obligations. The case represents an interesting example of judi-
cial activism. Going beyond a confirmation that there was a right of access to pro-
cedures and written reasons for refusal, the Durban court called on the DHA to an-
swer on why the Department had violated international obligations to protect 
refugees. It was encouraging to note how serious these matters were seen to be by 
the ‘provincial’ division of the High Court, where such cases were far less often 
heard, in that the Court issued an extraordinary rebuke and emphasised the govern-
ment‘s constitutional and international law obligations. 
6.5.2 Interim or final relief through settlements (court-ordered) 
Since courts tend to be cautious in substituting a government department’s judge-
ment for that of their own, obtaining interim or final relief through a court-ordered 
settlement often represents the best strategic option for civic actors. From the gov-
ernment’s perspective, there is always the damaging possibility that the court will 
find against them; and in any event, the cost implications for a public institution 
also create pressures to settle. Consequently, most cases are settled out of court. 
A ‘consent order’ from the court is a legally enforceable confirmation of the 
terms of a settlement agreement. A consent order provides for the future possibility 
of holding the government in contempt of court if they violate the terms of the set-
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tlement.113 However, even with a consent order attached, settlements have more 
limited ‘shaming’ value, unless the government blankly refuses to live up to the 
terms of the settlement. 
Cases such as Pembele,114 which confirmed the right of applicants to written 
reasons for the rejection of their refugee status claims, and the LHR (2001) case,115 
that challenged the DHA’s ‘first country of asylum’ policy, are notable since they 
resulted in more or less permanent improvements in the country’s refugee policy. 
They are also clear examples of cases in which the court’s negotiation of the ‘deli-
cate balance‘ fell on the side of allowing administrative discretion, as opposed to 
the court exercising their judicial imposition. By contrast, in the Duale case,116 the 
court exercised a higher level of judicial imposition; the court not only confirmed 
the terms of the settlement, but also required the DHA to ‘inform the Applicants 
(through) Lawyers for Human Rights of its decisions on the Applicants applications 
for social relief of distress grants’.117 Furthermore, in the Duale case the court left it 
open for the applicants to apply for further relief if they were ‘not satisfied with the 
decision made on their applications’.118 
Despite the existence of a consent order, the potential for compliance and ‘deter-
rence’ against bad government behaviour for the majority of settled cases – few as 
they have been in number – has remained a serious point of contention. For cases 
that have targeted very specific policies – such as in Pembele, LHR (2001) and Du-
ale – the prospects of compliance in an individual consent order have tended to be 
higher. However, since a full judgement in these cases was never issued, the court 
failed to deal with the full implications of the government’s constitutional and in-
ternational obligations. Consequently, the long-term impact these cases have had in 
‘deterring’ government from repeating the same mistakes is questionable, especially 
the impact on successive generations of government departments, where senior of-
ficials have been replaced. In other words, there has been little incentive on the part 
of government to comply with the terms of a court-ordered settlement regarding, or 
in relation to, similar cases in the future.  
A kind of stalemate has emerged, between the demands from civic actors that 
the government comply with its constitutional and international law obligations, the 
intransigence of government unwilling to have its decisions questioned and – with 
the exception of the court-ordered settlement in the Duale case – the reluctance of 
the courts to substitute their own opinion for that of the government. As a result, 
new types of enforcement-seeking orders in the administrative law field have been 
explored, with the aim of escaping this stalemate. One such order has been the 
structural interdict. 
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6.5.3 Structural interdicts 
South Africa’s Constitution grants the judiciary far-reaching powers in developing 
remedies for harm suffered as a result of violations of the Constitution;119 one of the 
more innovative remedies developed by the courts in constitution and administra-
tive law cases is the structural interdict. The purpose of a structural interdict is to 
direct a government department – or any other violator – ‘to rectify the breach of 
fundamental rights under court supervision’. Currie and Waal have characterised 
these interdicts as consisting of five elements. The first element of a structural in-
terdict is a declaration that government have violated the constitution. The second 
element is an order by the court that a government department comply with its obli-
gations under the constitution. Thirdly, a structural interdict requires a department 
to produce a report ‘within a specified period of time’ in respect of which – fourthly 
– the applicant who brought the case should be given an ‘opportunity to respond’. 
Finally, the report is discussed in an open hearing, and ‘if satisfactory, the report is 
made an order of the court’.120 
Put another way, a structural interdict is issued when the court finds against the 
government, but is willing to give it a further opportunity to ‘mend its ways’. Such 
an interdict actively engages civic actors beyond their role as litigants, since they 
play an active role in monitoring government behaviour within the context of this 
highly structured relationship. For their part, the courts negotiate the social distance 
between civic actors and government officials. Structural interdicts create an im-
posed relationship between the court, the government and the civic actors who bring 
these cases that seeks to bring meanings, interests and political positions of the civic 
actors and the government in line with each other. 
The terms of such interdicts vary, but essentially require the government to re-
port on its progress in meeting the requirements of a court order within a set time 
frame. Not reporting can lead to a contempt order from the court (and, theoretically, 
a jail sentence).121 Lawyers have indicated that while structural interdicts can be a 
useful way of monitoring government behaviour and forcing government to take 
concrete steps to improve the situation, they can also be used as a delaying tactic by 
a government if it is already reluctant to take action.122 Asked about the value of 
structural interdicts, Kerfoot, a refugee lawyer in Cape Town, remarked that ‘litiga-
tion is also not working’, at least not on its own. Instead, Kerfoot suggested that a 
combination of litigation, vigilant advocacy and damning stories in the media could 
bring results.123 
                                                        
119  (Currie and De Waal 2005: 190-228) and (Ebadolahi 2008: 1576-1579). 
120  (Currie and De Waal 2005: 217-218). 
121  (Currie and De Waal 2005: 218). 
122  Confirmed in (‘Interview with Hlapolosa and Slabbert’ 2006); (‘Interview with S. Magardie’ 
2006); (‘Interview with J. Van Garderen (1)’ 2006) and (‘Interview with W. Kerfoot’ 2006). 
123  (‘Interview with W. Kerfoot’ 2006). 
Chapter 6 
182 
In terms of the High Court’s structural interdict issued in connection with a 
judgement issued by the court in 2005,124 the DHA was required to hire the services 
of a consultant or ‘process engineer’, who was to report back to the High Court on 2 
February 2006. In the Kiliko judgement,125 the structural interdict similarly required 
the DHA to report on whether received and processed asylum applications were in 
line with national and international refugee law, as well as with the SA Constitu-
tion. In relation to the structural interdicts issued in both the LHR and Kiliko cases, 
the process engineer hired by the DHA presented a progress report on 1 February 
2006.126 The consultants of IQ Business Group (IQ) produced a dense, highly tech-
nical 79-page report, referring explicitly to the order of September 2005127 and to 
reports written by civic actors, including the NCRA and LHR.128 
The progress report written by the consultants did not address the substantive 
nature of the work of RROs and RSDOs, beyond looking at their respective work-
loads. Much attention was paid to the statistical output of officials, and in particular 
the number of cases decided. Attention was also paid to time-management issues, 
notably the period of time spent on particular tasks, and office requirements such as 
PCs, desks and fingerprint-capturing devices.129 These were all important issues 
that confirmed the serious resource constraints faced by the Department in terms of 
adequate personnel, reception facilities and technical equipment. However, the re-
port also recommended the establishment of a single processing centre, similar to a 
long-standing proposal by the Department of Home Affairs to establish a ‘reception 
centre’, which had received heavy criticism.130 
Many aspects were missing in the consultants’ report. The report failed to make 
an assessment of key knowledge capacity issues amongst RSDOs and RROs, for 
example interviewing techniques or the ability to recognise and respond sympa-
thetically to traumatised applicants. Other aspects that were missing in the consult-
ants’ report included a proper understanding of the minimum administrative law 
requirements for producing a decision in a timely, unbiased and informed manner. 
Also missing in the report were an assessment of writing skills to produce a prop-
erly motivated decision, details of the numerous hazards involved in interpretation 
or translation, and guidelines to the management of secondary data used to reinforce 
an RSDO‘s decision to grant or reject refugee status. Noted South African lawyers 
such as William Kerfoot, who had been handling refugee cases since the mid-
1990s, identified these problematic issues as early as March 1998, during a confer-
                                                        
124  (‘LHR Press Release’ 2005). 
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ence organised by LHR.131All of these aspects were also specified in 1999, during 
the course of a training programme implemented at the request of the DHA by 
LHR, together with the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.132  
6.6 THE ENFORCEMENT OF REFUGEE RIGHTS THROUGH NON-LEGAL MEANS 
Litigation, clearly, is not an end in itself. It is often tied to broader civic efforts to 
hold government accountable by other, non-legal means. Refugee rights have been 
most effectively mobilised in South Africa through inter-woven strategies of mass 
social mobilisation and public shaming. While a full assessment (and critique) of 
this important, growing dimension of advocating for accountability in South Africa 
goes beyond the scope of this book, this section explores some of these non-legal 
means.133 
As explained in chapter four, the emergence of a Refugees Act in South Africa 
involved extensive participation by civic actors, from human rights advocacy or-
ganisations to academics in the process of policy framing. The success of efforts by 
civic actors in translating international obligations to protect refugees into the lan-
guage of government policy was facilitated by broad platforms of civic participa-
tion, both under the auspices of the National Consortium on Refugee Affairs 
(NCRA), and in government-led processes of refugee policy reform. 
Civic actors have mobilised to protect refugees in South Africa in numerous 
ways beyond policy framing. They have written letters to the government, mobi-
lised the media, organised policy-oriented and popular conferences, produced aca-
demic and general awareness-oriented publications, and organised demonstrations. 
But while there are virtually endless creative expressions of public shaming and 
civic disobedience that can be exercised by civic actors, the real impact of these 
interventions – on their own – is highly questionable. While the scope for exercis-
ing agency by pursuing a social action against the government is much broader and 
far less conditioned by state-created structures, the potential for ‘elaborating’ these 
structures (i.e. leading to structural change) is very limited. 
There is some evidence, however, that public shaming and social mobilisation 
efforts in combination with legal action, or threat of legal action, can have an influ-
ence. One such example, documented by Belvedere, was a letter written by national 
and international civic actors to government ministers about the government’s por-
trayal and treatment of foreigners.134 The letter came in the midst of regular moni-
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toring, and of several individual legal cases brought by LHR against the DHA con-
cerning unlawful detention, as well as ongoing investigations by the South African 
Human Rights Commission concerning abuse of foreigners in the Lindela Centre 
for the processing of suspected undocumented persons.135 In response, the DHA and 
Lindela Centre introduced measures to quickly validate the legal status of suspected 
undocumented migrants held at Lindela, and to challenge unlawful deportations.136 
What began as a highly confrontational situation concerning the routine detention of 
foreigners, involving much social distance between civic actors and the govern-
ment, was transformed – albeit temporarily – into a situation in which interests con-
verged and the corresponding social distance narrowed. 
A further example of combined mobilisation of legal and non-legal means came 
in the midst of numerous longstanding concerns about the functioning of the refu-
gee reception office in Johannesburg, which later also formed the subject of litiga-
tion. Of particular concern was the DHA’s failure to issue legal permits to asylum 
seekers, and instead to issue them with appointment letters. This practice left count-
less already vulnerable individuals subject to apprehension and detention by the 
police; many ended up at Lindela Centre and faced the possibility of deportation.137 
In response, Johannesburg-based NGOs Black Sash and the Human Rights Com-
mittee issued letters in 2002 and 2003 that were addressed to law-enforcement offi-
cials, explaining the nature of the asylum seeker’s status in the country. 
These NGOs worked together with the police to ensure that the letters were re-
spected by police officers. The DHA office eventually responded by increasing 
their daily intake, although access remained a serious problem.138 In the midst of 
these actions, a group of NGOs, including Black Sash, brought an official complaint 
to the Office of the Public Protector, which eventually issued its report in 2005.139 
The DHA responded by shutting down its offices in April 2005, and LHR and LRC 
subsequently filed cases against the DHA regarding poor access to the RROs in 
Johannesburg and Cape Town, following numerous additional letters of their own.  
Although in this case political positions converged as civic actors became in-
volved in what would ordinarily have been the government‘s sole responsibility – to 
verify the legality of the asylum seekers’ status – the meaning (i.e. implication) of 
these interventions was very different for civic actors from what it was for the gov-
ernment, and so the corresponding social distance was still very wide. Furthermore, 
the NGOs involved in this initiative compromised themselves by harming the rela-
                                                                                                                                  
Tshwete) of all foreigners in South Africa as criminals’. The letter went on to condemn allegations 
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unlawful and improper conduct and prejudice in the rendering of services at Braamfontein refugee 
reception office, Pretoria. 
 Litigating and shaming: civic participation in refugee policy enforcement 
185 
tionship of trust with refugees and asylum seekers, some of whom they represented 
in legal actions.140 In any event, the matter eventually had to be dealt with by the 
courts, which imposed a structural interdict in order to monitor the progress of gov-
ernment efforts to improve access to the RROs. 
6.7 CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN POLICY ENFORCEMENT 
This chapter addressed the role of civic actors in the enforcement of government 
policy by way of confrontational civic-state interactions. The handful of legal cases 
mentioned here reveal the growing sophistication of civic actors in South Africa to 
develop strategic, legal challenges to the South African government’s policies, in-
cluding restrictive entry policies, poor access to RROs, lack of access to social ser-
vices and restriction of key areas of work to citizens only. Such restrictive measures 
are hardly new, at least from a global perspective. As far back as 1992, Hathaway 
spoke of the so-called ‘emerging politics of non-entrée’.141 As discussed earlier, 
confrontational responses to restrictive government measures are also not new, from 
a South African perspective, though lawyers and other advocates have become 
more sophisticated and creative in challenging government policies. 
The examples of civic enforcement of refugee rights contained in this chapter il-
lustrate how civic actors have contributed to a culture of constitutionalism; and in 
particular how administrative law has been the principal medium for realising refu-
gee rights through formal means. These examples also provide insights into how 
state structures (i.e. administrative structures and the legal structure) have condi-
tioned civic agency; yet they also show how civic actors can elaborate these struc-
tures in progressive ways. Civic agency has been effectively utilised to confront 
governments with their human rights obligations and – in certain instances – to pub-
licly shame governments. In exercising agency in this way, civic actors have medi-
ated the translation of international legal norms into their local contexts. As transla-
tors, civic actors have opportunities to stimulate structural changes that advance 
refugee rights in the government’s policy or implementation procedures. 
However, despite all the efforts of civic actors, and especially lawyers, to try to 
advocate state accountability through legal and non-legal challenges, structural 
changes or ‘elaboration’ of the government structure cannot be guaranteed. As the 
Security Industry case showed, the conditioning factor of the courts (the legal struc-
ture) can sometimes prove insurmountable, and end up maintaining the status quo. 
The extent to which courts have been willing to issue judgements about particular 
cases has depended on the manner in which they have negotiated a ‘delicate bal-
ance‘.142 This balance has required courts, on one hand, to allow administrative of-
ficials to take their own decisions and refrain from undue judicial interference, and 
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on the other, to ensure that decisions of administrative officials do not violate con-
stitutional and human rights, including constitutionally protected due process. 
As this last section explains, the illustrative examples contained in this chapter 
have confirmed this book’s three theoretical propositions: (1) the capacity of civic 
actors to hold states accountable is shaped by structural changes in the normative 
international and national legal framework; (2) the boundaries that define the struc-
tural relationship between civic actors and the state have shifted in very specific 
ways that must be respected by civic actors (agents) if they want to be strategic in 
their efforts; and (3) civic actors play a crucial role in mediating the translation of 
international legal norms into local contexts. 
6.7.1 Civic capacity and government accountability in litigating refugee rights 
The capacity of civic actors to hold government accountable by litigating refugee 
rights is due to South Africa’s locally-produced culture of constitutionalism, which 
incorporates the government’s international law commitments. This culture of con-
stitutionalism not only created clear obligations to protect refugees; it also created 
opportunities for civic actors to hold the South African government accountable – 
drawing on constitutional and administrative law principles – in the courts. 
All three types of remedies obtained through civic interventions – judgements, 
court-ordered settlements and structural interdicts – reveal a narrow but significant 
scope for civic actors to exercise their agency and hold the government accountable 
through legal means. The still relatively new ability of the courts to hold govern-
ment accountable by reviewing its administrative decisions has clearly not broken 
the intransigence of government departments accustomed to making decisions 
without having them questioned. However, it has provided the principal medium 
through which refugee rights are formally claimed. 
While the scope for exercising civic agency through non-legal measures is much 
broader, comparatively, its scope for holding the government accountable is limited. 
As the next section explains, a combination of legal and non-legal measures pro-
vides the greatest potential scope for civic actors to confront government and hold 
them accountable for their international and national legal obligations. From insist-
ing that written reasons be provided, to advocating access to the procedure, protect-
ing the special access rights of children and securing social grants, civic actors have 
persistently pushed the South African government to live up to its national and in-
ternational legal obligations towards refugees. 
6.7.2 Strategic assessments within defined boundaries in litigating refugee 
rights 
Civic actors’ strategic assessments when litigating a refugee rights issue have taken 
into consideration the boundaries of legal, administrative and constitutional moni-
toring structures, as defined by national and international norms and mediated 
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through administrative law principles. In making these strategic assessments, civic 
actors have become more sophisticated in their strategic use of legal measures to 
confront states with their accountability to refugees. However, as this chapter has 
also illustrated, the strategic opportunities for litigating rights are much stronger if 
they are combined with non-legal measures. 
Cases brought by civic actors challenging the South African government‘s sys-
tem to improve access to its refugee status determination regime, as well as provide 
some social relief to refugees and asylum seekers, have had mixed success. How-
ever, these kinds of cases have involved strategic networking by civic actors, such 
as in the Security Industry case and the Centre for Child Law case. In particular, 
lawyers have worked more closely with refugee groups. The once-relatively closed 
network of lawyers and NGOs engaged in legal advocacy on behalf of refugees has 
gradually broadened, building relationships of trust between NGOs and the asylum 
seeker and refugee community. This has had the additional benefits of enhancing 
the legitimacy of legal advocacy NGOs, as well as strengthening NGOs’ monitoring 
capacity. Refugee-led organisations such as the Co-ordinating Body of Refugee 
Communities (CBRC) have regularly notified LHR and other NGOs if a docu-
mented asylum seeker or refugee finds himself in detention at Lindela Centre or the 
notorious ‘transit hotel’143 at the airport, and faces imminent threat of deportation. 
LHR has been able to secure the release of several individuals on an urgent applica-
tion to the court.144 
But while legal interventions have led to some groundbreaking remedies for asy-
lum seekers and refugees, the efforts on the part of civic actors to combine these 
legal interventions with non-legal measures such as public shaming and mass mobi-
lisation have still been relatively limited, at least in comparison with the highly co-
ordinated strategies of the pre-1994 era.145 The contemporary efforts of civic actors 
to hold the government accountable to its obligations towards refugees can also be 
contrasted with other contemporary legal and non-legal strategies in other areas. 
These include well-co-ordinated civic efforts to litigate and mobilise access to wa-
ter,146 shelter147 and access to anti-retroviral drugs for patients with the HIV vi-
rus148. 
Co-ordinated civic advocacy on refugee rights has made some progress. The 
Working Group on Forced Migration, co-ordinated by the University of the Wit-
watersrand in Johannesburg, the Tutumike network in Cape Town and the national 
                                                        
143  (‘Interview with D. Ndessomin’ 2006) and (‘Interview with J. Van Garderen (1)’ 2006). The mis-
named ‘transit hotel’ at Oliver Tambo International Airport in Johannesburg is a detention facility 
for undocumented foreigners. LHR has made numerous interventions to secure the release of indi-
viduals who claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution. 
144  (‘Interview with J. Van Garderen (1)’ 2006). 
145  (Kessel 2000); (Abel 1995) and (Atkinson 1992). 
146  (Dugard 2007). 
147  (S. Wilson 2007) 
148  (Heywood 2002). 
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civic network on refugees and migrants co-ordinated by the Consortium on Refu-
gees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) – which replaced the National Con-
sortium on Refugee Affairs – have all demonstrated their value as platforms for co-
ordinated civic advocacy. However, these efforts of civic organisations have been 
outstripped by the persistent efforts of government to pursue containment measures. 
A 2006 study by Ingrid Palmary of the Forced Migration Studies Programme of 
the University of the Witwatersrand determined that social advocacy efforts within 
the sector have been inadequate. After having interviewed close to forty-five or-
ganisations within the refugee and migrant advocacy sector, she concluded: 
there is a frustration within the sector that there are too few linkages between moni-
toring research, lobbying and advocacy and legal services making the sector unco-
ordinated and sometimes unsuccessful in its interventions.149 
Palmary went on to explain that, while monitoring work is carried out to identify 
violations of refugee and migrants’ rights, this is done in an ‘ad hoc’ and unsustain-
able manner.150 In a 2008 report by the Consortium on Refugees and Migrants in 
South Africa (CoRMSA), the lack of public advocacy by NGOs was identified as a 
contributing factor to the wave of xenophobic violence that took place in South Af-
rica in May 2008. Loren Landau, the chair of CoRMSA’s executive committee, 
remarked: ‘the recent wave of violence has upset us all. Campaigners for non-
citizens’ rights and welfare have been particularly unsettled. Clearly, we have failed 
in efforts (to) ensure that all people’s rights, lives and livelihoods are not imperilled 
by those who would do them harm’.151 
6.7.3 Translating legal norms for holding the government accountable by 
litigating refugee rights 
By undertaking confrontational legal and – to a lesser extent – non-legal measures 
to hold states accountable to their national and international obligations, civic actors 
have played a crucial role in mediating the translation of international legal norms 
into South African law. In all three types of remedies – judgements, court-ordered 
settlements and structural interdicts – the presence of a formal relationship between 
the court, the government and civic actors who have brought a case can again be 
understood in terms of social distance, as measured by divergences in meanings, 
interests and political positions.  
In bringing cases to challenge the lawfulness of the DHA’s implementation of 
its policies, civic actors have helped establish a number of precedents that have im-
posed checks on the DHA’s wielding of administrative power in refugee status de-
terminations, particularly when the social distance had narrowed to the point of 
shared interests between the government and civic actors. This has especially been 
                                                        
149  (Palmary 2006: 30). 
150  (Palmary 2006: 33). 
151  (‘CoRMSA Annual Report’ 2008: 4). 
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illustrated by lawyers’ extensive references to international law in their legal argu-
mentation, from references to the principle of non-refoulement as a rule of jus co-
gens in the Kabuika case to the invoking of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child in the Centre for Child Law case. 
In short, as the experience of litigating refugee rights in South Africa has dem-
onstrated, civic organisations and their lawyers have the capacity to fiercely resist 
restrictive measures by the government. While there is certainly space for im-
provement, the results of their efforts can serve as a potentially significant counter-
weight in a narrow but significant space for civic participation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
We have set out on a quest for true humanity, and somewhere on the distant horizon 
we can see the glittering prize. Let us march forth with courage and determination, 
drawing strength from our common plight and our brotherhood. In time we shall be 
in a position to bestow upon South Africa the greatest gift possible – a more human 
face. – Steven Biko 1 
 
On 31 January 2008, South African police officers raided the Central Methodist 
Church in Johannesburg. Employing heavy-handed tactics, which allegedly in-
cluded pepper spray and dogs, the police proceeded to round up suspected undocu-
mented migrants, who they claimed had no permits to stay in South Africa.2 Among 
those arrested were Zimbabwean asylum seekers, who had fled growing violence in 
Zimbabwe and then managed to avoid detention at a notorious detention facility in 
Musina on the South Africa-Zimbabwe border, before seeking refuge in Johannes-
burg.3 These asylum seekers had a legitimate right to stay in terms of national and 
international laws that the South African government was legally obliged to respect. 
In the months that followed the January raid, a growing number of reports in the 
media highlighted widespread abuses of asylum seekers and refugees by the police 
and the Department of Home Affairs (DHA). Civic organisations stepped up their 
advocacy and launched a series of further public and legal challenges.4 Civic or-
                                                        
1  From an article entitled ‘Black consciousness and the quest for a true humanity’, first published in 
(B. Moore 1973) Reprinted in (S. Biko 1996: 98). 
2  (‘Raid Highlights Migrant Abuse’ 2008). 
3  As explained by (Hermes 2008) and others, the growing number of asylum seekers from Zimbabwe 
was due to growing state-organised violence by Mugabe’s authoritarian regime that peaked in 2005 
in the context of ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ and again in April 2008, following the Zimbabwe 
government‘s rejection of the 29 March 2008 elections. 
4  Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) and the Consortium on Refugees and Migrants in South Africa 
(CoRMSA) issued a series of press releases condemning the behaviour of the South African police 
and the DHA. This series of public challenges were later posted on their websites: 
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ganisations insisted upon the government‘s accountability to migrants and asylum 
seekers in general, and condemned the police raids on the Methodist church.5 In 
May, the local and international media began to report on a ‘wave’ of attacks 
against foreigners, mainly in township areas. Houses and shops were looted. People 
were beaten and even set on fire in the street. By 31 May 2008, at least 62 people 
had been killed and many more forced to flee.6 The violence was so widespread that 
the government was compelled to establish emergency relief centres to protect the 
victims of xenophobic violence. However, in August 2008 the government threat-
ened to close the relief centres.7 At the same time, the government refused to close 
the detention centre in Musina, which had developed a reputation for widespread 
abuses, including allegations of torture.8 
Civic organisations responded to these developments with co-ordinated re-
sponses and legal challenges that illustrated a growing sophistication in advocating 
for accountability. Supported by numerous other civic organisations, including the 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), Consortium on Refugees and Migrants in 
South Africa (CoRMSA) and others, Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) launched 
constitutional challenges to the closure of the relief centres.9 After many appeals by 
South African civic organisations to close the Musina immigrant detention facility – 
run by the South African Border Police in co-ordination with the DHA – LHR 
found itself supporting the Director-General of the DHA, who eventually agreed 
with the civic organisations that the facility be closed. LHR issued a press release 
on 20 November 2008: 
(LHR) supports the call by the Director-General of the Department of Home Affairs 
for the closure of the detention facility in Musina for foreign nationals … The facil-
ity is run by the South African Police Service with no safeguards to prevent unlaw-
ful detentions, the deportation of refugees or independent monitoring of the condi-
tions of detention. 
LHR described the conditions at the Musina detention facility, making extensive 
reference to international law and South African law: 
We have found large numbers of children, often unaccompanied, detained along 
with adults in contravention of both the Constitution and the Children’s Act … 
South Africa has been cited for its mistreatment of detainees in immigration deten-
tion by the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention … (which) has 
included abusive handcuffing, beatings with hosepipes and in one incident, detain-
ees were forced to roll in urine on the floor. Such treatment is not only a criminal 
                                                                                                                                  
http://www.lhr.org.za/news and http://www.cormsa.org.za/press/ Last checked on 31 December 
2008. 
5  (Burger 2008). 
6  (‘Xenophobic Attacks Plague the Country’ 2008); (‘Xenophobia Death Toll Hits 62’ 2008). 
7  (Bell 2008). 
8  (Mbelle and Dissel 2008). 
9  (Irri 2008). 
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offence, but a violation of South Africa’s obligations under the UN Convention 
Against Torture. 
Reflecting on more than a decade of civic advocacy for government accountability 
for refugee rights in South Africa, this concluding chapter will revisit the book’s 
central research question: how can the dynamics of civic interactions to advocate 
state accountability to promote, protect and fulfil refugee rights in South Africa be 
strengthened; under what circumstances do civic-state interactions lead to structural 
change, and what do these interactions teach us about the potential and pitfalls of 
realising rights in general? Answering this question explains the emergence of civic 
capacity, the strategic importance of recognising the structural boundaries of the 
state and the role of civic actors in mediating the translation of global rules into lo-
cal contexts, which can lead to structural change. 
This concluding chapter first presents the findings of this study, explaining how 
civic actors have interacted with governments through both co-operation and con-
frontation. Secondly, it explains the context in which civic actors have acquired 
capacity to advocate government accountability, and how this has shaped the possi-
bilities for realising refugee rights in South Africa. Thirdly, the chapter explains the 
importance of respecting structural boundaries in a culture of constitutionalism. 
Fourthly, it explains how civic actors translate global rules into their locally rele-
vant contexts. Finally, this concluding chapter explains how civic capacity to realise 
rights travels across time and space: across time, in terms of the ongoing relevance 
of social justice strategies from one historical period to the next, and across space in 
terms of the global relevance that social justice strategies in one country have re-
garding other struggles in different countries. 
7.1 CIVIC CAPACITY, STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES AND THE SCOPE FOR 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
Civic-state interactions in the twelve years that have passed since the South African 
government ratified the international refugee conventions have reaffirmed the ca-
pacity of civic actors to hold states accountable to their human rights obligations, 
clarified the structural boundaries of civic-state interactions, and revealed the scope 
for these interactions to lead to structural change.  
In this book, I have sought to explain the dynamics of civic interactions to advo-
cate state accountability in promoting, protecting and fulfilling refugee rights in 
South Africa, the circumstances under which civic-state interactions lead to struc-
tural change, and the potentials and pitfalls of these interactions in realising rights 
in general. Civic interventions to promote the state’s accountability for its human 
rights obligations in South Africa are principally understood through the country’s 
culture of constitutionalism. Carefully honed in the struggle against apartheid, civic 
actors – including lawyers and legal advocacy organisations in the post-1994 de-
mocratic era – have wielded both ‘shield’ and ‘sword’ in their advocacy of new 
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human rights issues, including refugee rights, advocating a new kind of ‘politics by 
other means’.10 
In contrast to the pre-democracy era in which challenges against a government 
decision were almost unthinkable, administrative law has proven to be a dynamic 
mechanism, available to challenge the government directly on the content of its 
policies. It has been a powerful shield against ill-informed, biased or arbitrary deci-
sions made in individual applications for refugee status. It has also become an ef-
fective sword, both in halting restrictive policies for admission to the country, and 
in advocating for economic and social rights, such as the right of refugees to study, 
their right to social grants, and their right to work in particular employment sectors. 
Beyond explaining the civic potential for realising refugee rights, I have ques-
tioned how such a role could be strengthened. Further, I have asked what this has 
taught us about the potential of civic interventions in realising rights in general. 
Civic advocacy for refugee rights in South Africa demonstrates how state account-
ability can be promoted, or in more limited circumstances enforced, by way of co-
operative and confrontational interactions between government and civic actors. 
7.1.1 Civic-state interactions in refugee policymaking 
The first example of civic-state interactions, discussed in chapter four, revealed 
both the opportunities and challenges for civic actors in South Africa to co-operate 
with the government in the development of national policies to protect refugees. 
South Africa is in many respects a model of participatory democracy, placing a duty 
on the government to ensure that there has been some level of civic involvement in 
the policymaking process. While the courts in South Africa have determined some 
of these duties to be enforceable, it is generally a matter of discretion as to what 
form this ‘public involvement’ takes.11 
Where a process was too one-sided in terms of the dominant role played by civic 
actors – as in the Refugees Green Paper process – the South African government 
questioned its legitimacy, as was shown by its reluctance to implement. Similarly, 
where the government neglected to consult civic actors, as was the case in the de-
velopment of the Regulations to the Refugees Act, civic actors contested the out-
come of that process as illegitimate. By contrast, where civic actors actively partici-
pated in a government-led policy initiative, as was the case in the Refugees White 
Paper process, the legitimacy of the process, as well as the possibilities for its im-
plementation, have been correspondingly enhanced. Broadly speaking, government 
and civic actors alike welcomed the outcome of the White Paper process: the Refu-
gees Act. 
Clarity regarding the respective roles of civic and state actors has made it possi-
ble to explain the motivations for their respective participation in a policymaking or 
                                                        
10  (Abel 1995). 
11  (Hoexter 2007: 75-76), commenting on the (Doctors for Life case 2006) and the (Matatiele case 
2007). 
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implementation process at a particular historical moment. This in turn has illus-
trated how the presence of social distance, at that moment, defined the strategic 
possibilities for a desirable outcome at a particular time, at least from the perspec-
tive of civic actors participating in a given policy or implementation process. 
In the formation of the Refugees Act of 1998, it was notable that both civic and 
government representatives in the White Paper Task Team, as well as most observ-
ers to the process, commonly recognised the need for the Department of Home Af-
fairs (DHA) to set policy, as long as appropriate consultation also took place. In 
other words, the opportunities for exercising civic agency were conditioned by ad-
ministrative and legal structures in existence. Furthermore, there was a common 
understanding that the South African government was obliged to give effect to its 
ratification of the international Refugee Conventions. This recognition of the condi-
tioning nature of state-created structures did not, however, mean that the views of 
civic actors were one and the same. There were, indeed, many differences of opin-
ion as to how much the Refugees White Paper and Bill ought to make explicit refer-
ence to the rights of asylum seekers and refugees, and to the obligations of the gov-
ernment. And yet it was still possible to advocate for structural change (in Archer’s 
terminology elaboration) in the DHA’s legal and administrative structure. The legal 
structure that emerged from the White Paper process incorporated international law 
principles regarding the status determination procedure as well as due process prin-
ciples contained in South Africa’s constitution. The administrative structure in-
cluded various possibilities for internal appeal, as well as for oversight by the 
Standing Committee and Refugees Appeal Board. 
7.1.2 Civic-state interactions in refugee policy implementation 
Unlike the refugee white paper policymaking process, the possibilities for civic ac-
tors to influence the direction of the DHA’s policy were more limited in the context 
of the implementation programme for former Mozambican refugees. As discussed 
in chapter five, this second example of co-operative civic-state interactions in the 
status regularisation project for former Mozambican refugees was conditioned by 
South Africa’s historical involvement in the violent civil war in Mozambique, and 
the legal and administrative structure that had denied these refugees a formal 
status.12 By the same token, the desire of the South African government to repair 
this injustice to the government and people of Mozambique meant that it was possi-
ble for civic actors to promote a correction of this injustice and to elaborate the le-
gal and administrative structure by granting the former refugees a legal residential 
status. 
                                                        
12  According to (Rupiya 1998) and others, the previous South African government‘s support for the 
right-wing, opposition RENAMO forces that were fighting the once-Soviet-backed, left-wing 
FRELIMO government forces formed part of South Africa’s regional destabilisation campaign. The 
civil war in Mozambique generated millions of refugees, many of whom sought refuge in countries 
throughout the region, including South Africa. 
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Accordingly, a Tripartite Commission consisting of the governments of Mo-
zambique and South Africa, together with the UNHCR, aimed to resolve the situa-
tion for the hundreds of thousands of Mozambican refugees who ended up in South 
Africa.13 The commission’s two main commitments were to repatriate those who 
wished to return to Mozambique, and to grant an ‘amnesty’ or regularise the legal 
status of former Mozambican refugees (FMRs) who wished to remain in South Af-
rica. 
When civic actors, and particularly AWEPA, expressed an interest in facilitating 
the implementation of the regularisation project, it was clear that the structural con-
ditions favouring administrative due process were hardly in place for this to happen. 
The marked lack of political will on the part of the DHA, and the shaky legal and 
administrative structure that finally emerged to implement the project, which in-
volved extensive closed-door involvement by AWEPA to elaborate this structure, 
created a situation in which the ability for local civic actors and FMRs to exercise 
their agency was highly circumscribed. Particularly uncomfortable for local civic 
actors was the role that AWEPA played in conflating its interests with that of the 
South African government. The AWEPA co-ordinator’s lack of distinction between 
his organisation’s interest and the interests of the DHA, coupled with AWEPA’s 
central co-ordinating role, artificially reduced the social distance between the DHA 
and local civic actors. This situation made it extremely difficult for local civic ac-
tors to challenge the behaviour of the DHA officials and ensure that administrative 
due process was being respected. 
Furthermore, the significance of a credible monitoring presence was under-
emphasised, as were concerns about ‘survival fraud’. Finally, a moratorium on de-
portations was downplayed and then sidelined altogether by the government, with 
no objection from AWEPA. To make matters worse, when civic actors eventually 
did raise concerns about the project’s implementation, AWEPA openly undermined 
them in the presence of government. This combination of factors both compromised 
the independence of local civic actors and had catastrophic results for thousands of 
FMRs, who were denied regularised status in structural circumstances that failed to 
comply with basic standards of administrative due process. 
7.1.3 Litigation and shaming by civic actors 
While co-operative interactions represented something relatively ‘new’ to civic ac-
tors, emerging as they did from political struggle, and later a negotiated constitu-
tional transition that led to an accountable government, confrontational measures – 
through litigating and shaming the government into fulfilling its obligations to refu-
gees – have been far more familiar territory for civic advocates. 
                                                        
13  The forming of the Tripartite Commission followed a 1992 peace agreement in Rome between the 
two main parties to the Mozambican conflict. 
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The history of the anti-apartheid struggle mapped out two specific directions for 
civic actors, which to some extent carried on in the post-1994 dispensation, al-
though the experience of advocating refugee rights has tended to stress one particu-
lar direction over the other. As civic actors accustomed to litigating refugee rights 
took advantage of expanded opportunities for judicial review of administrative de-
cisions, as provided for in the constitution, there have been correspondingly fewer 
efforts to publicly shame government. On one level this is surprising, given that, as 
illustrated in chapter three, advocacy efforts that combined litigation with a civic 
mobilisation campaign (and strategic use of the media), have tended to lead to more 
favourable outcomes. On another level, this might be explained by the fact that (1) 
the DHA was obliged to radically transform its administrative structure, and that (2) 
the opinions of the general public – and the media – were generally unsympathetic 
to refugees and migrants. 
The potential for structural interdicts to precipitate concrete and lasting im-
provements – or structural elaboration, in refugee protection standards – remains to 
be seen. Structural interdicts create a special relationship between the court, gov-
ernment and civic actors in which this elaboration can take place. However, this 
relationship also contains underlying tensions. The first, and more obvious source 
of tension is between the government and civic actors, as acutely observed in the 
case of LHR (2001), where the credibility of civic actors and their ability to chal-
lenge government decisions were explicitly brought into question. The second 
source of tension is between government and the courts; civic groups and individu-
als have only recently been permitted to comprehensively challenge decisions of the 
government on the grounds of whether they have acted in a ‘reasonable’ manner. 
Hoexter sums up the problem well: 
More than any other ground, review for reasonableness exposes the tension be-
tween two conflicting judicial emotions: the fear of encroaching on the province of 
the executive arm of government by entering into the merits of administrative deci-
sions, and the desire for adequate control over the decisions of administrative au-
thorities.14 
In other words, the courts in South Africa have faced a structural dilemma of main-
taining what Klaaren has referred to as a ‘delicate balance‘ between, on the one 
hand, allowing government to fulfil its role in determining the content of policy and 
its implementation and, on the other hand, acting as a constitutional check on gov-
ernment abuse of power.15 
                                                        
14  (Hoexter 2007: 293-294). 
15  (Klaaren 2006b). 
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7.1.4 From structural conditioning to structural change: translators, social 
distance and public law 
These three examples of civic-state interactions explain how the opportunities for 
civic agency have specific historical roots, which have conditioned civic agency to 
promote, protect and fulfil human rights, but have also allowed for structural elabo-
ration (or structural change). Civic actors have fulfilled an important mediating role 
in the translation of global rules into the development, implementation and chal-
lenges of national policies. This study of civic advocacy for refugee rights in South 
Africa has also emphasised the importance of social distance as a strategic factor for 
civic actors, when assessing the possibilities for interacting with government in 
promoting state accountability towards refugees. Finally, this study highlights the 
usefulness of public (administrative and constitutional) law as a means of translat-
ing global rules into their local, vernacular contexts and enforcing state accountabil-
ity to international human rights norms. 
As the following sections explain, civic interactions to advocate state account-
ability for respecting refugee rights can be explained through three theoretical 
propositions. Firstly, the capacity of civic actors to promote and impose state ac-
countability is shaped by structural changes in the normative international and na-
tional legal frameworks. Secondly, boundaries which define the structural relation-
ship between civic actors and the state shift in very specific ways that must be 
understood by civic actors (agents), if they want to be strategic and successful in 
their advocacy efforts. And finally, civic actors play a crucial role in mediating the 
translation of international legal norms into local contexts. 
7.2 CONTEXT SHAPES THE POSSIBILITIES FOR CIVIC-STATE INTERACTIONS 
The social and political context from which civic actors have emerged has shaped 
both the nature of civic organisations and the possibilities for civic actors to influ-
ence state policies, mobilise for their enforcement, and hold states accountable. As 
discussed in chapter three, in South Africa two distinct types of civic actors 
emerged out of a long political struggle against racism. The first mobilised in stra-
tegic, proactive ways to resist the apartheid regime. The other type of civic actor 
supported this resistance, mainly by engaging in ‘politics by other means’16 through 
a range of legal interventions, from providing protection to those facing the poten-
tial of torture during the course of police interrogations, to challenging forced re-
movals by blocking the implementation of the Group Areas Act. 
Since the country’s first democratic elections in 1994, civic actors have operated 
in a rapidly shifting context that has challenged civic actors to develop new advo-
cacy strategies. With the emergence of a constitutional culture, and a correspond-
ingly accountable government, civic actors have not only had to challenge govern-
                                                        
16  (Abel 1995), passim. 
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ment in order to hold it accountable; they have also been obliged to engage in poli-
cymaking and implementation programmes, supporting government when it has 
demonstrated a willingness to move in a progressive direction.  
Where co-operative interactions have failed, confrontational strategies by civic 
actors have tried to fill the gap in legal protection. However, litigation on its own 
tends to provide little guarantee of a productive outcome. As argued in chapter six, 
well co-ordinated civic advocacy strategies, combining public shaming and mass 
mobilisation with legal interventions, have led to the most successful outcomes. 
The process of developing refugee policy in South Africa has drawn upon global 
policy discussions on refugee protection. In particular, the refugee policy discussion 
in South Africa has engaged in the debate of whether refugee law ought to be ‘re-
formulated’ in order to correspond better with state interests or, alternatively, ‘rein-
vigorated’ in order to correspond better with its original intentions. As illustrated in 
chapter four, the dominant position advocated by civic organisations in the process 
of refugee policy formulation in South Africa has more closely reflected Goodwin-
Gill’s view that mechanisms to encourage compliance need strengthening, and that 
NGOs play an important role in doing this. Refugee rights are the product of contes-
tation, and civic actors have endorsed the need for institutional strengthening to 
ensure state compliance. The process of forming a refugee policy has furthermore 
demonstrated that the principal medium through which these rights are realised is 
the field of administrative law. 
Pressures on the DHA to produce a new refugee policy came both internally and 
from outside, including from its ratification of the UN and OAU Refugee Conven-
tions. With the ratification of these documents, and South Africa’s increasing 
prominence in international relations, the DHA came under particular pressure from 
the UNHCR and other sections of government – including the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and ANC parliamentarians – to give permanent effect to these international 
commitments. However, the opportunities for civic interaction were constrained by 
structural factors from within the then-Government of National Unity. Buthelezi, of 
the opposition Inkatha Freedom Party, remained Minister of Home Affairs for some 
years, and openly clashed with the ANC on the government’s policy towards refu-
gees and migrants. Consequently, as Crush and McDonald argued, ‘progressive 
immigration reform was ultimately held hostage to the broader politics of IFP ap-
peasement’ in the Unity government.17 In some cases, civic actors used this to their 
advantage, as in the illustration given in chapter six in which lawyers challenged the 
DHA’s crude ‘safe third country’ policy. 
Furthermore, the DHA, following the advice of US government officials who 
drafted many of the Regulations to the Refugees Act, has appeared to follow the 
mantra of ‘irregular migration’, which holds that explicit provisions to protect refu-
gees lead to abuse of the procedure. If this assessment is correct, it explains the re-
luctance of the DHA to engage civic actors in the development of the Regulations. 
                                                        
17  (Crush and Mcdonald 2001: 9). 
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Whatever the reasons, this proved to be a strategic miscalculation on the part of 
government. While civic participation in the development of the Refugees Act cre-
ated a basis for co-operative civic-state interactions, the DHA’s lengthy and non-
consultative development of the Regulations predictably set the Department on a 
path of confrontation with civic actors. 
The contextual challenges faced by civic actors in promoting a comprehensive 
administrative law regime, by way of co-operative interactions that appropriately 
translate South Africa’s global human rights obligations, have been considerable. 
As Klaaren has noted,18 the asylum determination procedure in South Africa, and 
the rule of law in general, have for some time operated in a climate where opportu-
nities to claim rights, particularly prior to 1994, have been decidedly limited. The 
asylum procedure has become steadily more restrictive since its introduction in 
1993. 
Civic-state interactions must be seen as a cumulative process demanding ongo-
ing reflection, possible co-operation, and, potentially, confrontation as well. By ex-
plicitly translating South Africa’s international obligations and the rights contained 
in the constitution into the Refugees Act, civic actors have promoted a situation in 
which the DHA is obliged to correct its own behaviour. Where this has not suc-
ceeded, civic participation has advocated government accountability through a 
string of legal challenges to the DHA’s policies.  
7.3 RESPECTING STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES IN A CULTURE OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The strategic importance of civic actors in respecting structural boundaries is espe-
cially important in a country that respects a culture of constitutionalism. As men-
tioned earlier, this creates a primary tension where civic actors may (1) support 
government as it expresses a desire to move in a progressive direction, but in addi-
tion (2) will wish to maintain their critical independence. In this section, the struc-
tural conditioning of civic actors is explained in relation to the possibilities for 
structural elaboration, followed by a discussion of the circumstances in which civic 
actors make strategic choices on the basis of their assessment of the state-created 
structural boundaries with which they interact. 
7.3.1 Structural conditioning of civic actors and the possibilities for elaboration 
From a structure-agency view that draws on Archer’s approach of analytical dual-
ism, it has been possible to explain the outcome of civic refugee rights advocacy. 
This approach assumes that specific historical events determine state-created struc-
tures, and that the exercise of civic agency has been conditioned by these structures. 
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This approach also assumes that civic actors are able to elaborate these structures 
through a strategic assessment, thereby contributing to structural change. 
On one hand, the three main illustrative examples of this study have demon-
strated that civic advocacy interventions have played a significant role in holding 
states accountable. On the other hand, the three examples have confirmed that state 
accountability is by definition state-centred; civic actors that place themselves too 
centrally in a civic-state interaction – such as in the Refugees Green Paper policy-
making process, or the AWEPA-led regularisation project – risk eclipsing this es-
sential role of the state or government. Consequently, while the role of civic actors 
in promoting legal and social normative compliance is important, it should also not 
be over-emphasised. The principal responsibility for realising rights always remains 
with the state. 
Civic actors played key roles in the process of negotiated transition, and con-
tinue to fulfil multiple roles in South Africa’s ‘participatory democracy’ by making 
oral and written contributions to parliamentary hearings, participating in policy task 
teams, and even engaging in joint civic-state implementation projects. As Arnstein 
argues, assessing whether this participation is ‘meaningful’ and ‘likely to have an 
impact’ depends from which rung of the ‘ladder’ the civic actors make contribu-
tions. These range from the state avoiding civic participation altogether, through 
forms of manipulation, to ‘token’ consultation and finally to ‘partnership, delegated 
power and citizen control’.19 
In navigating the narrow but significant channels for advocating state account-
ability, civic actors have assessed and made strategic decisions, based on their 
growing knowledge of global standards of refugee protection, to interact with gov-
ernment on the basis of structural boundaries on which civic actors believe the gov-
ernment might be prepared to compromise. A strategic consideration of this princi-
pal conditioning factor increases the likelihood that a civic-state interaction will 
lead to structural change. 
In the study of refugee protection in South Africa, civic agencies’ capacity to in-
teract with and elaborate the country’s legal and administrative structure providing 
for the reception of refugees and the determination of their legal status have arisen 
out of specific historical events. These events are related to a long-fought social 
justice struggle for dignity and self-determination and were ultimately overtaken by 
a process of negotiated transition, during the course of which the state abandoned 
minority rule, and a democratic, accountable government came into being. 
As South Africa has come out of its international isolation and re-engaged with 
the international legal and political order, the new government has been obliged to 
change its approach to refugees. From an early stage, the government demonstrated 
a willingness to allow applications for refugee status on an individual basis, begin-
ning with the Russian defectors. At least initially, it also welcomed critical civic 
voices in the elaboration of a comprehensive refugee policy through a new legal and 
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administrative structure. This openness changed as government adopted a more de-
fensive stance against civic criticism, but as the White Paper process illustrated, 
possibilities still remained for structural elaboration of the refugee policy and its 
implementation. 
7.3.2 Structural boundaries and strategic choices 
Successful civic-state interactions depend on the strategic choices made by civic 
actors on the basis of a sober appreciation of state-created structural boundaries that 
not only condition their agency, but also allow for structural elaboration. By exten-
sion, the roles and responsibilities of both civic and state actors must be clear. This 
applies to any such civic-state interaction, whether it is in the development of a na-
tionally enforceable human rights policy, participation in an implementation project 
to realise human rights, or the enforcement of human rights obligations against a 
state. In all instances, the principal responsibility lies with the state and its govern-
ment, although civic actors often play a complementary role as ‘translators’ of 
global rules in local contexts. 
Drawing on knowledge of the specific historical circumstances surrounding a 
government department that is the focus of a civic interaction, a variety of strategic 
responses can be made. In Archer’s assessment, taking time to assess the structural 
challenges in which a civic interaction will take place is essentially about ‘being 
human’, not least because civic agency itself produces structurally conditioning 
factors. As Archer claims: ‘people are indeed perfectly uninteresting if they possess 
no personal powers which can make a difference’.20 This entails a careful consid-
eration as to who is representing a government department, what particular issue is 
at stake, how the government has handled itself in the past, what resources are 
available to the government to respond to the claims against it, and why govern-
ment may be motivated at all to take action. 
For example, individual government officials may have particular views or ex-
periences that shape their interpretation of a particular policy. The issue of asylum 
seekers’ right to work will be especially sensitive to the DHA, which also repre-
sents the interests of South African citizens. These are but two examples of mean-
ings, interests and/or political positions that shape how government officials frame, 
interpret and enforce a particular policy. Civic actors must strategically always bear 
these in mind. 
In making strategic choices, civic actors can, and should, assume that it is al-
ways primarily government‘s task to develop policy, not just as a matter of good 
governance, but in order to facilitate greater buy-in to that policy. Of course, this is 
not to say that civic organisations should not play a role. Indeed, governments often 
consult civic actors as experts or as concerned stakeholders. In some cases there 
may even be a legal obligation to consult. Civic actors also participate in policy-
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making processes by confronting the state with their obligations during a legislative 
process. 
Just as it is primarily government‘s responsibility to make policy, it is also gov-
ernment’s primary responsibility to implement it. Civic actors can, and often do, 
participate in policy implementation projects. They train officials, advise on imple-
mentation frameworks and even provide services on behalf of government. Civic 
actors do this in order to encourage and support government when it has displayed a 
willingness to move in a progressive direction. Such interventions ought not to be 
conducted uncritically, since there is always a danger of government and civic re-
sponsibilities becoming blurred. While civic actors have recognised the utility of 
supporting government in carefully defined circumstances, they have also learned 
the danger of becoming unwitting apologists for maladministration. 
Finally, enforcement of policy is, or ought to be, also primarily the responsibil-
ity of government through ‘self-corrective’ mechanisms. These may be components 
of the trias politica, with the elected legislative and independent judicial branches 
of government holding the executive accountable without the need for civic inter-
vention. Enforcement may also take place though an independent, constitutionally-
protected institution such as an ombudsman, semi-autonomous commission, or 
auditor-general. Unfortunately, more often than not such mechanisms are inade-
quate, and so the roles of civic actors have become crucial complements in national 
and global efforts to hold states accountable for their international obligations. 
These may include initiating a claim through judicial review in the courts, appealing 
to a global institution such as a human rights treaty body, publicly shaming the 
government through generating attention in the media, or communicating a strong, 
collective message by way of mass mobilisation. 
The elaboration of the legal and administrative structures that defined South Af-
rica’s refugee policy also illustrates how these structures are cultural systems that 
are, by definition, susceptible to change. As the next section explains, civic transla-
tors have played an important role in the process of elaborating these cultural sys-
tems. 
7.4 MEDIATING THE TRANSLATION OF GLOBAL RULES INTO LOCAL CONTEXTS 
In this book, I have tried to illustrate how civic actors have contributed to a culture 
of constitutionalism, which has both national and international dimensions that 
highlight the utility of administrative law as a principal medium for translating 
global rules into local contexts. Furthermore, the examples provided in this book’s 
study of civic advocacy for refugees have shown how civic actors can mediate the 
translation of global norms into local contexts, critically engaging within the exter-
nal relationship – as measured by social distance – that always exists between civic 
actors and the government, represented by divergent interests, meanings and politi-
cal coalitions. From different disciplinary perspectives, these illustrative examples 
have shown how civic actors could have an influence, at least in a modest way, on 
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the content of laws and policies to protect refugees in South Africa, and on the 
manner in which they are implemented. 
7.4.1 Legal culture and civic translators 
As socio-legal scholars maintain, legal culture is itself an object of investigation. 
This can be either the ‘internal legal culture’21 of legal academics and practitioners, 
courts and other institutions, or how the legal culture is shaped by external factors. 
As Cotterrell has put it: 
participants in law are not just lawyers but all those who seek to use legal ideas for 
their own purposes, to promote or control the interests of others … understand legal 
ideas in practical terms … legal ideas are a means of structuring the social world.22 
Evaluating the role of civic interventions to enhance state accountability for pro-
moting and respecting refugee rights in South Africa entails a critique of many dif-
ferent variables that characterise the legal culture in which civic actors operate. The 
evaluation in chapters four and five considered the approaches and means, as well 
as the mechanisms, adopted by civic actors to promote the South African govern-
ment‘s accountability towards refugees in terms of its global and constitutional le-
gal normative obligations. As discussed in chapter four, the government had clear 
interests, as shown by its inviting civic participation in the white paper task team. 
Clear though distinctly different interests motivated civic actors’ participation in the 
refugee policymaking process. Consequently, the task team became a highly pro-
ductive mechanism through which the competing interests of civic actors, the state 
and others such as the UNHCR and ‘section nine institutions’ (most notably the 
South African Human Rights Commission) could be mediated. 
Less productive was the mechanism employed by AWEPA and the DHA to 
regularise the status of FMRs, in which the interests of civic actors were far less 
clear; and in some cases, inextricably linked with those of the government. As a 
result, the potential of South African civic actors to exercise their agency was not 
only highly attenuated, but the due process of FMRs themselves became danger-
ously compromised as there was no critical monitoring presence or independent 
mechanism of appeal. 
Moore determined three decades ago that semi-autonomous social fields exist in 
which social actors are affected by legal norms, but that they also adapt by estab-
lishing their own social norms. In other words, each semi-autonomous social field is 
capable of producing its own rules, but is also vulnerable to external forces.23 
Merry’s development of Moore’s ideas into a theory that explains how global 
norms become translated or ‘vernacularised’ into local contexts provides a useful 
explanation for how rights translators have emerged, translating global rules 
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through contributions in policymaking processes, including, in South Africa, 
through co-operation in refugee policymaking and implementation projects.24 
By participating in global refugee protection discussions, a number of South Af-
rican NGOs and academics became familiar with international rules designed to 
protect refugees; they became trans-national elites. However, their participation in 
the refugee policymaking process in South Africa remained conscious of local reali-
ties, which included the manner in which the refugee policy had been implemented 
since 1993. Consequently, they possessed what Merry terms a ‘double conscious-
ness’.25 This made them effective translators of global rules, drawing on human 
rights as a resource both in terms of their substantive content (as a tool) and in the 
possibilities for the realisation of these rights (their consciousness). In addition, 
these legal translators had access to various legal enforcement institutions, which 
were discussed in chapter six. Furthermore, by employing extra-legal mechanisms, 
such as utilising the media to shame government, they have created greater space to 
engage with government on a critical basis. 
7.4.2 Appreciating the value of social distance 
Evaluating interactions in terms of social distance is another means of assessing 
civic participation in the implementation of refugee policies, for understanding the 
potential of civic interventions in realising refugee rights in South Africa , and in 
realising rights in general. Social distance is measured by divergences in interests, 
meanings and political positions, or the externally grounded reasons for participat-
ing in a given civic-state interaction. As this book’s study of civic advocacy for 
refugees has illustrated, the corresponding social distance between government 
lawmakers and civic actors has narrowed or widened according to the strategic de-
cisions taken by civic actors, with various consequences. 
The externally grounded reasons for civic participation in the process of refugee 
policy reform in South Africa diverged from those of the government, in terms of 
interests and meanings, but there were important areas of convergence in terms of 
political positions. During the refugee policymaking process, there were disagree-
ments on the explicit wording of entitlements that refugees would be given as pro-
tected persons, in accordance with the country’s constitutional and international 
obligations. On the other hand, the government largely agreed that refugee status 
determination be implemented through a hearings-based procedure, as proposed by 
civic actors. The degree of social distance created by whether or not civic actors and 
government diverged or converged in their political positions on a particular policy 
issue, therefore, varied considerably throughout the policymaking process, although 
convergence of political positions was clearly necessary before government would 
be willing to adopt a particular measure. Government always had the last word. 
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During the implementation of a status regularisation project for former Mozam-
bican refugees (FMRs), the social distance or externalisation between AWEPA and 
the South African government was initially very large, as civic actors raised multi-
ple concerns about how the project ought to be implemented. However, the inter-
ests, meanings and political positions between civic actors and the government be-
came almost indistinguishable as the project finally took shape and a critical 
monitoring presence was abandoned. What began as an ostensibly government-run 
project became known as ‘the AWEPA project’. In the absence of a credible moni-
toring presence, this social distance remained narrow throughout the project’s im-
plementation, resulting in limited space for critical responses by civic actors, and an 
administrative justice deficit for the FMRs. 
Where refugee rights have been litigated, the social distance between civic ac-
tors and the government, as measured by their respective interests, meanings and 
political positions, has remained substantial, as civic actors have affirmed their role 
as an independent critical voice. And yet, even in these circumstances, it has not 
always been possible to hold the government accountable. 
The courts have often proven reluctant to question the merits of a government‘s 
policy or exercise of discretion. But even where judges have found against the gov-
ernment, lawyers have often had to return to the courts, sometimes repeatedly, in 
order to secure compliance with an order or to argue a virtually identical case to 
what had been litigated earlier. In short, a high degree of social distance, or inde-
pendent critical voice, has not been a reliable indicator of success. Not all legal 
challenges necessarily produce results. 
However, a distinction should be made between litigation aimed at restraining 
government behaviour, in which more social distance exists, and cases aimed to 
promote good behaviour, which tend to involve a narrowing of the social distance. 
Put simply, the first type of case negatively insists that a certain policy be stopped, 
and tends to be more likely to succeed, while the other positively encourages the 
government to improve itself, and has proven to be more problematic. As one law-
yer has argued: 
confrontations are necessary … (and) it is easier to engage in public interest litiga-
tion when trying to stop something from happening; for example, seeking to stop 
the deportation of an asylum seeker by way of an urgent interdict. It is not so easy 
to insist that something happens.26 
Structural interdicts may offer new possibilities in the latter type of case. Where 
structural interdicts have been ordered to encourage good government behaviour, 
social distance has narrowed, as competing interests and political positions between 
government and civic actors have been replaced by structural undertakings by gov-
ernment to the court that it take deliberate steps to improve a situation. Civic actors 
in such cases have made contributions in helping the government to improve its 
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behaviour. In the ‘access’ cases, for example, process engineers who were hired by 
the DHA, on the basis of a consent order, to improve management and procedures 
at the Refugee Reception Offices, spent considerable time interviewing the civic 
actors who had brought the case against the government. While it is still too early to 
assess its lasting impact, the structural interdict may yet prove to be a significant 
tool to ensure positive compliance, since the process of reporting back to the court 
recognises both the legitimate interests of both civic actors and the government, and 
the essentially voluntary nature of human rights implementation. 
Ultimately, social distance can explain the potential for civic interactions to lead 
to structural change within the government by assessing the extent to which gov-
ernment has conceded to demands by civic actors in sharing their meanings, inter-
ests or political positions. This deserves further empirical study. In recent years, the 
DHA has faced persistent demands for reform from civic organisations, who have 
grown more sophisticated in their advocacy. Civic actors have – often simultane-
ously – appealed to the media, parliament and courts concerning abuse by govern-
ment officials, departmental inefficiency, corruption and mismanagement. 
The DHA has responded to these demands from civic organisations to a consid-
erable extent, and has initiated a consultative process to amend the Refugees Act; a 
draft bill was released for public comment in 2007.27 Following public hearings in 
South Africa’s Parliament that involved several civic organisations,28 and respond-
ing to long-standing criticisms from civic organisations about gaps in the refugee 
policy and its implementation, the government released a further draft bill in March 
2008.29 The government has also responded to the concerns raised by civic actors 
by calling for the closure of the Musina detention facility, as described above. Fur-
thermore, the DHA initiated a ‘turnaround strategy’ that involved participation from 
a number of civic actors, and the Minister has responded directly to questions re-
garding mismanagement of the DHA.30 
With these acknowledgements from the government – to some extent, in re-
sponse to the demands of civic actors – the social distance between civic actors and 
the government has narrowed as their respective interests in refugee protection and 
meanings about what this protection entails have converged, but not to the point 
that civic organisations have abandoned their critical monitoring role. Drawing on 
specific obligations contained in international and South African law, the June 2008 
Annual Report of CoRMSA comprehensively addresses the obligations of South 
Africa’s local and national government to protect refugees and migrants, from the 
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role of government in addressing the root causes of xenophobic violence to its role 
in facilitating access to employment and basic services.31 As the report confirms, 
while to some extent the interests and meanings of civic actors and the government 
may have converged, their respective political positions continue to diverge, as 
civic actors remain focused on holding the South African government – and espe-
cially the DHA – accountable for its legal obligations to protect refugees and mi-
grants. 
7.5 CIVIC CAPACITY TO REALISE RIGHTS IN GENERAL 
The interactions explored in this book concerned the role of South African civic 
actors in the development of the government‘s refugee policy, the implementation 
of government policy and, in certain cases, forcing government to comply with its 
policy through litigation. However, these civic-state interactions hold universal les-
sons for realising rights in general, across time (at different points in South Africa’s 
history) and space (in other countries and other human rights struggles). 
7.5.1 Realising rights across time (in South Africa) 
This study of civic advocacy for refugees provides vivid illustrations of the inter-
play between civic actors and the state in promoting a culture of constitutionalism 
for all persons (in the language of the Constitution) and not just South African citi-
zens. Refugees and asylum seekers who demonstrated in front of Union Buildings 
in 1996, claiming that the UNHCR and South African government should respond 
to their predicament, did not merely generate interest in the media. Just as the defi-
ance campaigns in South Africa from the 1950s mobilised thousands of South Afri-
cans to re-examine their position and resist apartheid, the July 1996 demonstration 
critically engaged South Africans in re-examining their relationship with refugees; 
and it precipitated a response from civic organisations. 
The demonstration by refugees in July 1996 took place at a historical moment. 
Having just brought into being the country’s final Constitution, South Africa was at 
a crossroads. Other, external factors certainly also played a role; namely, the gov-
ernment‘s obligations acquired as the result of having assented to international 
refugee conventions. Rather than holding government accountable, the demonstra-
tion spurred South African civic actors on, becoming mobilised to do more than just 
provide assistance, but also to advocate for wide-ranging improvements in the way 
refugees were received and integrated. In the months and years following the dem-
onstration, South African lawyers, churches and other civic organisations eventually 
mobilised for a good policy, sound implementation and a more accountable gov-
ernment. 
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South Africa now has a government policy that has translated international hu-
man rights obligations towards refugees, joint refugee-NGO initiatives that have 
secured key rights for refugees, and a number of landmark legal challenges through 
the South African courts with which to confront the government with its obligations 
towards non-South Africans in general, and refugees in particular. 
Of course, the picture has not always been so positive. Reports have emerged of 
arbitrary detention and ill treatment by the police and immigration officers, poorly-
motivated refusals to grant refugee status and allegations of corruption and abuse of 
power, as legal advocates have paid more attention to this issue. 
Ten years after South Africa became a party to the international refugee conven-
tions and the country’s Final Constitution came into being, the government faced 
another crossroads. Building a culture of constitutionalism has demanded responses 
at multiple levels. At the local level, municipalities have begun to see migrants from 
other countries, including asylum seekers and refugees, as citizens of Cape Town, 
Durban and Johannesburg. Confronted by lawyers and as-yet-unfulfilled obligations 
created by structural interdicts, national government has only begun to respond se-
riously to technical, process and management-related problems in implementing a 
fair and efficient-status determination procedure. Most notably, the government has 
accepted the need to develop and improve policy through amendments by way of 
parliamentary process rather than through ad hoc administrative regulations. 
Finally, at a global level, South Africa has, on one hand, been actively engaging 
in global policy discussions on migration that are edging towards containment, with 
so-called irregular migration as their centrepiece.32 On the other hand, South Africa 
has noted the highly unproductive and even violent consequences of maintaining a 
restrictive policy that unduly prioritises national interests over its international obli-
gations to protect migrants in general, and refugees in particular. 
7.5.2 Realising rights across space (other struggles in different countries) 
Recalling the measures used to hold the government accountable in the past on the 
basis of international human rights norms also resonates with other social justice 
struggles in different countries. The importance of clear roles and responsibilities 
and strategic recognition of structural boundaries has global application beyond the 
South African study. The strategies and moral resonance of South Africa’s anti-
apartheid struggle have motivated accountability advocates around the world, and 
not just because what happened in the country is necessarily unique. South Africa’s 
struggle against racism and injustice and the efforts that have been made to achieve 
social transformation reflect universal principles that define any social justice 
struggle that is engaged in advocating for accountability. 
For example, civic actors in Eastern European countries, many of whom are re-
cent member-states of the European Union (EU), have mobilised for better protec-
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tion standards for refugees and migrants by recognising EU-determined structural 
boundaries, and by translating global refugee protection standards into national ad-
vocacy efforts to protect refugees.33 Civic actors in Eastern Europe, whose activities 
prior to the early 1990s were highly constrained, have also participated in the de-
velopment of refugee policies.34 
In the Middle East, civic actors also play important roles in refugee protection. 
While a deeply problematic geo-political situation and ongoing military occupation 
prevents a local, rights-based solution to the plight of Palestinian refugees, and seri-
ous structural constraints make it virtually impossible to advocate for accountability 
against Israel, civic actors around the world, including academics, lawyers and 
pressure groups, have managed to generate widespread global awareness about the 
issue of Palestinian dispossession.35 Furthermore, by recognising these structural 
limitations and shifting to supra-national mechanisms instead, civic actors have 
strategically advocated for recognition of Palestinian residency and refugee rights 
against particular UN agencies international legal process. Unable to have any im-
pact at the local level, civic actors have translated Palestinian rights to UN organisa-
tions and treaty bodies, including the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination.36 Third states have also become an important forum for civic actors, 
making legal claims against companies that participate in violations of Palestinian 
refugee and residency rights,37 and against individuals who have committed war 
crimes against civilians in the refugee camps.38 
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Whether in South Africa, Eastern Europe or Palestine, and regardless of whether 
civic actors are engaged in a political struggle or a process of social transformation 
in co-operation with government, all these events can be seen as various forms of 
social justice struggle. In any social justice struggle, the key to civic actors being 
able to hold states and governments accountable for their human rights obligations 
lies in civic actors making strategic choices. 
Making strategic choices has various implications for civic actors, as this book’s 
study of realising refugee rights in South Africa has illustrated. First, civic actors 
must appreciate the social, political and legal context in which they operate; this 
historical appreciation reveals certain structural boundaries to realising rights that 
are nearly always imposed by the state. Second, civic actors must critically assess 
these structural boundaries that condition their behaviour, but also have the poten-
tial for structural change or ‘elaboration’, through civic actors interacting with the 
state in formal and also informal interventions. Third, civic actors must appreciate 
the social distance that always exists between themselves and the government, 
measured by divergences in meanings, interests and political positions. Through a 
critical engagement in this ‘external’ relationship, it is possible for civic actors to 
capitalise on these divergences in advocating a state’s accountability for realising 
human rights. Whether the social distance ought to be narrowed or broadened at a 
particular moment depends on (1) the context in which this takes place, (2) the 
structural boundaries that exist, and (3) the desired outcome. 
A critical engagement with the government allows civic actors to take advantage 
of that narrow, but significant space for achieving structural change. In this social, 
political and legal space, the potential for advocating the accountability of a state to 
promote, protect and fulfil human rights can flourish. 
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SAMENVATTING 
PLEITEN VOOR VERANTWOORDINGSPLICHT:  
DE INTERACTIE TUSSEN BURGERS EN  
OVERHEID TER BESCHERMING VAN 
VLUCHTELINGEN IN ZUID-AFRIKA 
 
 
 
1 OVERZICHT 
Dit boek bespreekt hoe burgers en overheid elkaar wederzijds beïnvloeden inzake 
de verplichtingen van de staat om mensenrechten te bevorderen, te beschermen en 
te verwezenlijken. Met de focus op de strijd voor vluchtelingenrecht in Zuid-Afrika 
gedurende de eerste jaren van de periode van democratie na 1994, wordt onderzocht 
en verklaard onder welke omstandigheden de interactie tussen burgers en staat kan 
leiden tot structurele veranderingen en wat deze interactie ons kan leren over het 
potentieel van burgers om in het algemeen rechten te verwezenlijken. 
Het boek is verdeeld in zeven hoofdstukken. In hoofdstuk 1 wordt het boek 
ingeleid en worden de achtergrond, de theoretische benadering en methodologie 
besproken. Dit eerste hoofdstuk introduceert ook de belangrijkste argumenten. Eén 
van de hoofdargumenten is dat burgeractivisten – en vooral pleitbezorgers van 
mensenrechten – een overheid moeten steunen als die zich in progressieve zin 
ontwikkelt, wat op gespannen voet staat met de gedachte dat ze onafhankelijk 
moeten blijven en hun capaciteit moeten behouden om regeringen aan te klagen als 
die de normen met betrekking tot de bescherming van mensenrechten schenden. Dit 
eerste spanningspunt dat zich voordoet aan burgeractivisten die proberen staten te 
houden aan hun mensenrechtenverplichtingen, heeft grote invloed zowel op de stra-
tegische keuzes die ze maken als op de acties die zij ondernemen om het 
overheidsbeleid te veranderen. Het tweede hoofdargument is dat de activisten die 
pleiten voor de verantwoordelijkheid van staten om te voldoen aan hun nationale 
verplichtingen met betrekking tot de bevordering, bescherming en verwezenlijking 
van mensenrechten, zowel coöperatieve als confronterende betrekkingen met de 
staat aangaan. De in dit boek onderzochte periode van 10 jaar van maatschappelijke 
pleitbezorging voor de bescherming van vluchtelingen geeft een interessante 
wisselwerking te zien tussen individuele en collectieve interacties tussen burgers en 
overheid. De wisselwerking tussen burgers en overheid met betrekking tot de strijd 
voor de plicht van regeringen om verantwoording af te leggen aan vluchtelingen is 
niet in voldoende mate kritisch onderzocht. In het algemeen hebben studies over de 
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bescherming van mensenrechten de neiging zich te richten op het juridisch-
normatieve aspect van zulke wettelijke claims – d.w.z. op de manier waarop de 
maatschappij zou moeten functioneren volgens de wet – zonder aandacht te 
schenken aan de sociale interactie tussen de burgeractivisten die deze claims 
maken, en de overheidsinstellingen die daarop moeten reageren. Bovendien zijn 
kritische pogingen om te beoordelen of de interactie tussen burgers en overheid in 
staat is om structurele veranderingen tot stand te brengen schaars, hoewel Shirin Rai 
heeft aangevoerd dat, om doeltreffend te zijn, burgeractivisten die hun sociale om-
geving willen veranderen meer ‘deliberatief’ moeten zijn, en zowel de risico’s als 
de mogelijkheden van een bepaalde interventie moeten afwegen. 
2 DE THEORETISCHE DOORDENKING VAN DE INTERACTIE TUSSEN BURGERS 
EN OVERHEID 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt het conceptuele kader van het boek geschetst. Drie theo-
retische stellingen worden getoetst ter verklaring van de interactie tussen burgers en 
overheid m.b.t. de strijd voor verantwoording van de staat. Het boek stelt, ten 
eerste, dat het vermogen van burgeractivisten om de verantwoordingsplicht van de 
staat te bevorderen en af te dwingen, afhankelijk is van structurele veranderingen in 
het normatieve juridische kader op nationaal en international niveau. Ten tweede, 
dat de grenzen die de structurele relatie tussen burgeractivisten en de staat bepalen, 
op zeer specifieke manieren verschuiven en dat burgeractivisten die verschuivingen 
moeten respecteren als zij strategisch willen zijn in hun inspanningen ter 
bevordering of handhaving van de verantwoordingsplicht van de staat. Ten derde, 
dat burgeractivisten een cruciale rol spelen bij de vertaling van internationale 
juridische normen naar de lokale context. 
Deze drie theoretische stellingen zijn gebaseerd op sociale, politieke en 
juridische verklaringen voor de interactie tussen burgers en overheid. Sociale 
verklaringen verwijzen naar het soort rollen dat burgers op zich nemen in hun strijd 
om de overheid sociaal en juridisch verantwoording te laten afleggen. Verklaringen 
in termen van structuur versus handeling stoelen op de benadering van Margaret 
Archer, namelijk van het analytisch dualisme, die (1) door de staat geschapen 
structuren beschouwt als producten van specifieke historische gebeurtenissen; (2) 
postuleert dat deze structuren bepalend zijn voor het handelen van burgers in hun 
relatie tot de overheid; en (3) stelt dat de interactie tussen burgers en overheid de 
mogelijkheid in zich draagt van structurele uitbouw (of structurele verandering). De 
stelling dat de interactie tussen burgers en overheid kan leiden tot structurele 
veranderingen correspondeert met de visie van Sally Merry op burgeractivisten als 
‘vertalers’ van mondiale regels naar een alledaagse lokale context. Sociale ver-
klaringen putten ook uit de interactionele benadering van Robert Kidder, die van 
buiten opgelegde wetten ziet als externe normen en beginselen ‘die de macht van 
externe juridische actoren om alternatieven aan te dragen vergroot (en) daarmee de 
kwetsbaarheid van het interne systeem verhoogt’. Volgens deze benadering kan de 
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mate van ‘externalisering’ of sociale afstand tussen de wetgever, bijvoorbeeld een 
administratieve ambtenaar, en de burgerlijke partij die een claim heeft, worden 
geïllustreerd aan de hand van verschillen in betekenisgeving, belangen en politieke 
standpunten. 
Politieke verklaringen beschouwen de ruimte voor maatschappelijke pleitbe-
zorging als de uitkomst van omwentelingen op het gebied van wetgeving, pleit-
bezorging en wetshandhaving. Deze politieke analyse omvat een beoordeling van 
de relatie tussen, en de specifieke rol van, de drie belangrijkste Zuid-Afrikaanse 
instellingen, te weten het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, verantwoordelijk 
voor immigratie en grensbewaking, alsmede het verlenen van vluchtelingenstatus; 
de parlementaire Commissie voor Binnenlandse Zaken; en de zogenaamde ‘sectie 9 
instellingen’, met name de Zuid-Afrikaanse Commissie voor de Mensenrechten. 
Juridische verklaringen zijn gebaseerd op, in de eerste plaats, Rosalyn Higgins’ 
notie van de deelname van burgers aan het internationale juridische proces; dat de 
conventionele noodzaak van een subject/object onderscheid overbodig maakt. 
Bovendien heeft de uitbreiding van de mogelijkheden tot administratieve toetsing in 
Zuid-Afrika, voortgekomen uit de democratische en grondwettelijke regelingen van 
na 1994, het mogelijk gemaakt dat burgers de overheid rechtstreeks ter verant-
woording kunnen roepen, met name onder verwijzing naar de Zuid-Afrikaanse 
grondwet. Dit werd versterkt door de Wet op de Bevordering van de Rechtspleging 
van 2000 en jurisprudentie op het gebied van het publiek recht. De ontwikkelingen 
in de Zuid-Afrikaanse grondwet en het administratief recht worden belicht. In dat 
kader worden de drie belangrijkste soorten ter beschikking staande sancties nader 
bekeken voor het oplossen van administratieve geschillen, te weten: gerechtelijke 
uitspraken, door de rechtbank opgelegde schikkingen, en (structurele) verorde-
ningen. 
3 EEN HISTORISCH OVERZICHT VAN JURIDISCHE PLEITBEZORGING 
Hoofdstuk 3 schetst de geschiedenis van juridische pleitbezorging in Zuid-Afrika, 
met name waar het gaat om de bescherming van vluchtelingen. Het plaatst het on-
derhavige onderzoek van maatschappelijke inzet ten behoeve van vluchtelingen in 
het wijdere verband van de geschiedenis van Zuid-Afrika’s migratiebeleid, en met 
name van de vier pijlers waarop het was gebaseerd vóór 1994. Dit wordt gevolgd 
door een algemene geschiedenis van maatschappelijke pleitbezorging in Zuid-
Afrika, uitmondend in het beleid ter bescherming van de rechten van vluchtelingen. 
Het belang van de regelingen van ná 1994, en met name de totstandkoming van de 
Zuid-Afrikaanse grondwet en de voorziening voor ongekende bevoegdheden tot 
rechterlijke toetsing, wordt uiteengezet. Ten slotte wordt in dit hoofdstuk uitgelegd 
hoe deze geschiedenis van migratie en pleitbezorging door burgers goed ge-
coördineerde maatschappelijke structuren omvatte ter ondersteuning van vluchte-
lingen en asielzoekers en om te lobbyen voor hun bescherming. 
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Onder verwijzing naar deze geschiedenis van juridische pleitbezorging worden 
de theoretische stellingen van het boek, waarnaar eerder is verwezen, getoetst aan 
drie vormen van interactie tussen burgers en overheid gericht op verantwoording 
door de staat voor de rechten van vluchtelingen. Er wordt onderscheid gemaakt tus-
sen coöperatieve vormen van interactie ter bevordering van de verantwoordings-
plicht van de staat voor de bevordering, bescherming en vervulling van de bin-
nenlandse en internationale wettelijke verplichtingen, en confronterende vormen om 
de staat ter verantwoording te roepen door middel van rechtzaken, soms in com-
binatie met niet-juridische vormen van maatschappelijk verzet. 
4 DE INTERACTIE TUSSEN BURGERS EN OVERHEID BIJ DE TOTSTANDKOMING 
VAN HET VLUCHTELINGENBELEID 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een eerste illustratie gegeven van de interactie tussen burgers 
en overheid, en wel de maatschappelijke inbreng bij de ontwikkeling van Zuid-
Afrika’s vluchtelingenbeleid, culminerend in de Vluchtelingenwet van 1998. Dit 
totstandkomingsproces van het vluchtelingenbeleid vond voor het grootste deel 
plaats in een tijdsbestek van twee jaar tussen 1996 en 1998, en omvatte een 
veelvoud aan interacties tussen burgeractivisten en de overheid. Het proces van 
totstandkoming van het vluchtelingenbeleid valt uiteen in twee verschillende 
‘sporen’; het eerste spoor heeft geleid tot de Vluchtelingenwet van 1998, terwijl het 
andere, dat niet direct tot een dergelijk resultaat leidde, aanzienlijke secundaire 
bijdragen daartoe heeft geleverd. Beide sporen illustreren, op verschillende ma-
nieren, hoe burgeractivisten compromissen moesten sluiten, ten gunste van, of in 
verzet tegen initiatieven om het eerste vluchtelingenbeleid van het land, de Vluchte-
lingenwet van 1998, vorm te geven – initiatieven die afkomstig waren van het 
maatschappelijk veld dan wel van de overheid. 
De betrokkenheid van burgers bij de ontwikkeling van het Zuid-Afrikaanse 
vluchtelingenbeleid heeft aan het licht gebracht dat er kansen en uitdagingen liggen 
voor burgeractivisten in Zuid-Afrika om samen te werken met de regering. Zuid-
Afrika is in veel opzichten een voorbeeld van participatieve democratie, wat de 
regering een verplichting oplegt om ervoor te zorgen dat er een zekere mate van 
maatschappelijke betrokkenheid is bij de beleidsvorming. Hoewel de rechter in 
Zuid-Afrika van een aantal verplichtingen heeft bepaald dat ze kunnen worden 
afgedwongen, kan de regering in veel gevallen naar bevind van zaken handelen als 
het gaat om de vraag welke vorm deze publieke betrokkenheid dient aan te nemen. 
Wanneer een proces te eenzijdig was in termen van de dominante rol van 
burgeractivisten – zoals in het Green Paper proces met betrekking tot vluchtelingen 
– trok de Zuid-Afrikaanse regering de legitimiteit ervan in twijfel, zoals aangetoond 
door haar weigering tot invoering. Evenzo, wanneer de overheid had nagelaten het 
maatschappelijke veld te raadplegen, zoals het geval was bij de formulering van de 
Verordeningen behorende bij de Vluchtelingenwet, betwistten burgeractivisten de 
uitkomst van dat proces als onwettig. Waar burgeractivisten daarentegen actief 
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hadden meegewerkt aan een door de regering geïnitieerd beleidsinitiatief, zoals het 
geval was met het vluchtelingen White Paper, werd de legitimiteit van het proces, 
alsmede de uitvoeringsmogelijkheden, dienovereenkomstig vergroot. In grote lijnen 
waren zowel de overheid als het maatschappelijke veld tevreden met het resultaat 
van het White Paper proces, te weten de Vluchtelingenwet. 
Duidelijkheid over de respectievelijke rollen van maatschappelijke en over-
heidsactoren heeft het mogelijk gemaakt om de motivatie voor hun deelname aan de 
beleidsvorming en uitvoering op een bepaald historisch moment te verhelderen. Dit 
heeft op zijn beurt geïllustreerd hoe het bestaan van sociale afstand, op dat moment, 
de strategische mogelijkheden voor een gewenst resultaat in een bepaalde periode 
heeft bepaald, althans vanuit het perspectief van burgeractivisten die meewerken 
aan een gegeven geval van beleidsvorming of -uitvoering. 
Bij de totstandkoming van de Vluchtelingenwet van 1998 was het opvallend dat 
zowel maatschappelijke als overheidsvertegenwoordigers in de White Paper werk-
groep, evenals de meeste waarnemers van het proces, erkenden dat het Ministerie 
van Binnenlandse Zaken (DHA – Department of Home Affairs) het beleid moest 
vaststellen, zolang tenminste ook terzake doend overleg had plaatsgevonden. Met 
andere woorden, de mogelijkheden voor uitoefening van maatschappelijke inspraak 
werden bepaald door de bestaande bestuurlijke en wettelijke kaders. Bovendien 
werd er algemeen van uitgegaan dat de Zuid-Afrikaanse regering verplicht was om 
uitvoering te geven aan haar ratificatie van de internationale Vluchtelingen 
Conventies. Deze erkenning van de inkadering door overheidsstructuren betekende 
echter niet dat burgeractivisten een en hetzelfde standpunt innamen. Er waren in de 
praktijk veel verschillen van mening over hoeveel het vluchtelingen White Paper en 
de betreffende wet expliciet moesten verwijzen naar de rechten van asielzoekers en 
vluchtelingen, evenals naar de verplichtingen van de overheid. En toch was het nog 
mogelijk om te pleiten voor structurele verandering (of verdere ontwikkeling) van 
de juridische en administratieve structuur van de DHA. De juridische structuur 
voortgekomen uit het White Paper proces omvatte beginselen van het internationale 
recht met betrekking tot de procedure voor statusbepaling en beginselen van 
rechtmatigheid vervat in de Zuid-Afrikaanse grondwet. De administratieve structuur 
omvatte verschillende interne beroepsmogelijkheden, alsmede toezicht door de 
Vaste Parlementscommissie en de Raad van Beroep voor Vluchtelingenzaken. 
5 DE INTERACTIE TUSSEN BURGERS EN OVERHEID BIJ DE IMPLEMENTATIE 
VAN HET VLUCHTELINGENBELEID 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt het tweede voorbeeld van de interactie tussen burgers en over-
heid gegeven, op basis van vergelijkbare theoretische uitgangspunten als die in het 
vorige hoofdstuk. Onderzocht wordt hoe het maatschappelijk veld meewerkte aan 
de uitvoering van een project van 2000 tot 2002 tot regularisatie van de juridische 
status van voormalige Mozambikaanse vluchtelingen, van wie de meesten in de 
jaren ‘80, ten tijde van de burgeroorlog in Mozambique, in Zuid-Afrika waren 
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aangekomen – zonder formele erkenning van Zuid-Afrika. Hoewel een aantal van 
deze vluchtelingen had deelgenomen aan een repatriëringsprogramma van het Hoge 
Commissariaat voor Vluchtelingen van de Verenigde Naties (UNHCR) in het begin 
van de jaren '90, en nog veel meer door de Zuid-Afrikaanse autoriteiten waren 
gedeporteerd, verbleven nog verscheidene honderdduizenden voormalige Mozam-
bikaanse vluchtelingen in Zuid-Afrika zonder enige vorm van juridische docu-
mentatie. Bij dit regularisatieproject waren meerdere burgeractivisten betrokken, 
zowel nationale als internationale, alsmede nationale en provinciale ambtenaren. In 
het hoofdstuk worden voorbeelden gegeven die illustreren hoe de maatschappelijke 
inbreng ernstig werd bemoeilijkt, en in feite zwaar ondermijnd, door van staatswege 
opgelegde structurele kaders, die door de betrokken burgeractivisten niet effectief 
werden bestreden, in het bijzonder niet door een Nederlandse NGO die het project 
coördineerde. 
In tegenstelling tot het beleidsvormingsproces van het vluchtelingen White 
Paper, waren de mogelijkheden voor burgeractivisten om invloed uit te oefenen op 
de richting van het DHA-beleid bij de uitvoering van het programma voor voor-
malige Mozambikaanse vluchtelingen beperkt. De mogelijkheden tot maatschap-
pelijke inbreng werden beperkt door Zuid-Afrika’s historische betrokkenheid bij de 
gewelddadige burgeroorlog in Mozambique, en door de wettelijke en administra-
tieve structuren die deze vluchtelingen een formele status hadden ontzegd. Evenzeer 
betekende de wens van de Zuid-Afrikaanse regering om dit onrecht t.o.v. de rege-
ring en het volk van Mozambique te herstellen, dat het mogelijk was voor burger-
activisten om te pleiten voor een correctie van dit onrecht en voor het scheppen van 
de juridische en administratieve kaders voor toekenning van een wettelijke status 
als ingezetene aan de voormalige vluchtelingen. 
Bijgevolg heeft een Tripartiete Commissie, bestaande uit vertegenwoordigers 
van de regeringen van Mozambique en Zuid-Afrika, samen met de UNHCR, zich 
toegelegd op het oplossen van de situatie voor de honderdduizenden Mozambi-
kaanse vluchtelingen die in Zuid-Afrika waren beland. De twee belangrijkste toe-
zeggingen van de Commissie waren om degenen die wilden terugkeren naar 
Mozambique te repatriëren, en om ‘amnestie’ te verlenen of de juridische status te 
regulariseren van de voormalige Mozambikaanse vluchtelingen die in Zuid-Afrika 
wensten te blijven. 
Toen burgeractivisten, en met name AWEPA, belangstelling toonden voor het 
begeleiden van de uitvoering van het regularisatieproject, was het duidelijk dat de 
structurele voorwaarden voor een rechtmatige administratieve afhandeling nauwe-
lijks waren vervuld. Het notoire gebrek aan politieke wil van de kant van de DHA, 
en de wankele wettelijke en bestuurlijke structuur die uiteindelijk tot stand kwam 
om het project uit te voeren, waarbij AWEPA uitgebreide onderhandelingen achter 
gesloten deuren moest voeren, schiep een situatie waarin de mogelijkheid voor 
inbreng van lokale activisten en voormalige Mozambikaanse vluchtelingen zeer was 
ingeperkt. Bijzonder ongemakkelijk voor lokale burgeractivisten was de rol die 
Samenvatting 
 219 
AWEPA speelde door hun belangen te laten samenvallen met die van de Zuid-
Afrikaanse regering. Het gebrek aan onderscheid van de kant van de AWEPA-
coördinator tussen het belang van zijn organisatie en de belangen van de DHA, in 
combinatie met AWEPA’s centrale coördinerende rol, verlaagde op kunstmatige 
wijze de sociale afstand tussen de DHA en lokale burgeractivisten. Deze situatie 
maakte het uiterst moeilijk voor de lokale burgeractivisten om het gedrag van de 
DHA ambtenaren aan de kaak te stellen en te garanderen dat het administratieve 
proces rechtmatig verliep. 
Bovendien, het belang van een geloofwaardig toezicht werd te weinig bena-
drukt, evenals de bezorgdheid over ‘overlevingsfraude’. Tenslotte, een moratorium 
op uitwijzingen werd door de overheid in de ijskast gezet en vervolgens volledig 
terzijde geschoven, zonder tegenwerpingen van AWEPA. Tot overmaat van ramp, 
toen burgeractivisten uiteindelijk hun zorgen over de projectuitvoering tot uit-
drukking brachten, viel AWEPA hen openlijk af in aanwezigheid van de overheid. 
Deze combinatie van factoren bracht de onafhankelijkheid van de lokale burger-
activisten in het geding en had tevens catastrofale gevolgen voor duizenden 
voormalige Mozambikaanse vluchtelingen, aan wie een geregulariseerde status 
werd ontzegd in structurele omstandigheden die niet voldeden aan de basisnormen 
van een rechtmatig administratief proces. 
6 RECHTZAKEN EN TE SCHANDE MAKEN VANUIT DE MAATSCHAPPIJ  
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een derde illustratie van de interactie tussen burgers en over-
heid gegeven; onderzocht wordt hoe het maatschappelijk veld zich inzette om de 
Zuid-Afrikaanse regering rechtstreeks te wijzen op haar nationale en internationale 
verplichtingen. Dit hoofdstuk illustreert de dynamische manier waarop mensen-
rechten worden gemobiliseerd en geclaimed via juridische en administratieve we-
gen. De belangrijkste zaken in het vluchtelingenrecht uit een periode van tien jaar 
worden onder de loep genomen, zowel zaken die administratief door het Ministerie 
van Binnenlandse Zaken werden afgehandeld, als zaken voor de Zuid-Afrikaanse 
gerechtshoven, afgehandeld door middel van administratieve en rechterlijke 
toetsing. Deze juridische procedures betroffen het afdwingen van een rechtmatige 
procedure voor het toekennen van vluchtelingenstatus en de toegang tot basisvoor-
zieningen, alsmede het aan de kaak stellen van discriminatie tegen vluchtelingen bij 
het vinden van werk. De juridische procedures werden vaak gecombineerd met 
andere – niet-juridische – vormen van confronterende maatschappelijke actie. 
Samenwerking met de overheid was relatief ‘nieuw’ voor burgeractivisten, af-
komstig als zij waren uit een traditie van politieke strijd, gevolgd door een grond-
wettelijke overgangsperiode op basis van onderhandelingen uitmondend in een 
democratische regime; meer confronterende maatregelen – zoals procederen en de 
overheid openlijk aanvallen tot zij haar verplichtingen jegens vluchtelingen 
nakwam – waren veel meer vertrouwd terrein. 
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In de geschiedenis van de anti-apartheid strijd waren twee specifieke richtingen 
voor maatschappelijke actie zichtbaar geworden, die beide tot op zekere hoogte 
werden doorgetrokken in de verhoudingen van na 1994, hoewel de pleitbezorging 
voor vluchtelingrechten meer tot een bepaalde richting neigde dan tot de andere. 
Burgeractivisten die gewend waren te procederen over vluchtelingenrechten, wisten 
goed gebruik te maken van de uitgebreide mogelijkheden voor rechterlijke toetsing 
van administratieve beslissingen zoals opgenomen in de grondwet, maar pogingen 
om de regering publiekelijk te schande te maken waren navenant schaarser. Aan de 
ene kant is dat verrassend, gezien het feit dat, zoals geïllustreerd in hoofdstuk 3, een 
lobby die gerechtelijke procedures combineerde met een maatschappelijke mobili-
satie campagne (en strategisch gebruik van de media) in het algemeen tot betere 
uitkomsten leidde. Aan de andere kant kan dit worden verklaard door het feit dat (1) 
het DHA haar administratieve structuur radicaal moest veranderen, en (2) de publie-
ke opinie – en de media – over het algemeen afwijzend stond tegenover vluchte-
lingen en migranten. 
Of de in dit hoofdstuk besproken mogelijkheid dat structurele veranderingen 
vooruit lopen op concrete en blijvende verbeteringen – of structurele uitwerking – 
in de normen voor de bescherming van vluchtelingen, valt nog te bezien. Structu-
rele houding creëren tussen de rechterlijke macht, de overheid en burgeractivisten 
een bijzondere verhouding, waarbinnen zo’n uitwerking zou kunnen plaatsvinden. 
Echter, deze verhouding bevat ook verborgen spanningen. De eerste, en meest voor 
de hand liggende bron van spanning is die tussen de overheid en burgeractivisten: 
de geloofwaardigheid van burgeractivisten en hun vermogen om beslissingen van 
de regering te betwisten kwamen expliciet in het geding. De tweede bron van 
spanning was die tussen de overheid en de rechterlijke macht, die pas sinds kort de 
ruimte had gekregen om besluiten van de regering aan te vechten op grond van de 
vraag of de regering ‘in redelijkheid’ had gehandeld. 
Met andere woorden, de rechters in Zuid-Afrika hadden te maken met een 
structureel dilemma, en wel het handhaven van een ‘delicaat evenwicht’ tussen, aan 
de ene kant, de overheid de gelegenheid geven om haar rol te spelen bij het bepalen 
van de inhoud van het beleid en de uitvoering ervan, en aan de andere kant, te 
fungeren als een grondwettelijke toets op machtsmisbruik van de kant van de 
regering. 
7 VERSCHILLENDE VORMEN VAN MAATSCHAPPELIJKE PLEITBEZORGING 
Pleiten voor verantwoordingsplicht kan vele andere vormen aannemen dan de drie 
genoemd in de hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6, die zijn gekozen op grond van de beschik-
bare empirische gegevens. Bovendien, maatschappelijke actie is niet noodzake-
lijkerwijs gericht op de staat die de mensenrechten schendt; voorbeelden van andere 
mogelijke doelwitten zijn journalisten, werkgevers of het grote publiek. Echter, 
maatschappelijke pleitbezorging houdt zeer vaak een beroep in op mondiale normen 
en hun ‘vertaling’ naar een lokaal relevante context. Bij het pleiten voor het afleg-
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gen van verantwoording door middel van juridische middelen – hetzij via deelname 
aan de beleidsvorming hetzij via rechtszaken – de belangrijkste middelen om 
mondiale normen te vertalen zijn het constitutioneel en administratief recht. 
Bij de toepassing van de theoretische stellingen van het boek op deze drie 
maatschappelijke actievormen, betoog ik dat de gevolgen van acties die verant-
woordingsplicht pogen te bevorderen door met de staat samen te werken, divers van 
aard zijn, maar dat deze acties niet noodzakelijk tot structurele veranderingen lei-
den, en als ze dat al doen, is het bijna nooit zonder compromissen. En omgekeerd, 
terwijl er slechts zeer beperkt mechanismen bestaan om te proberen de staat te 
dwingen tot het afleggen van verantwoording (via confrontaties), is hun potentieel 
om tot structurele veranderingen te leiden aanzienlijk, indien ze strategisch worden 
gebruikt. 
8 VERSTERKING VAN MAATSCHAPPELIJKE ACTIEVORMEN DIE LEIDEN TOT 
STRUCTURELE VERANDERINGEN 
In hoofdstuk 7 keert het verhaal van de juridische pleitbezorging in Zuid-Afrika 
weer tot zijn uitgangspunt terug. Het richt zich op de onderliggende normatieve 
vraag in dit boek, namelijk de vraag hoe de dynamiek van maatschappelijke pleit-
bezorgingsacties die beogen de staat ter verantwoording te roepen voor de bevorde-
ring, bescherming en naleving van de rechten van vluchtelingen in Zuid-Afrika zou 
kunnen worden versterkt; de omstandigheden waaronder zulke pleitbezorgings-
acties tot structurele veranderingen leiden; en wat deze interacties ons leren omtrent 
hun potentieel om rechten in het algemeen te verwezenlijken. Tekortkomingen in de 
structurele basis van overheidsinstellingen en het normatief kader, evenals in het 
handelen van burgerorganisaties, worden aan een kritisch onderzoek onderworpen, 
maar de nadruk ligt op structurele veranderingen. Bovendien toont het afsluitende 
hoofdstuk aan dat, hoewel de situatie in Zuid-Afrika in vele opzichten uniek is, 
inzover zij voortbouwt op een lange traditie van maatschappelijk verzet en confron-
terende vormen van actie, de ervaringen van de pleitbezorging voor rechten van 
vluchtelingen in Zuid-Afrika van belang zijn voor de studie van de bescherming 
van vluchtelingen in het algemeen, en kan dienen als algemene, leerzame voor-
beelden van maatschappelijke inspanningen ter bescherming van mensenrechten 
wereldwijd. 
In tegenstelling tot het tijdperk van vóór de democratie, toen protesten tegen een 
besluit van de regering nagenoeg ondenkbaar waren, heeft het administratief recht 
bewezen een dynamisch mechanisme te zijn, dat kan worden aangewend om de 
overheid rechtstreeks aan te spreken over de inhoud van haar beleid. Het is een 
krachtig schild tegen vermeend slecht geïnformeerde, bevooroordeelde of wille-
keurige beslissingen in individuele aanvragen voor vluchtelingenstatus. Het is ook 
een doeltreffend wapen gebleken, zowel voor het stoppen van een restrictief 
toelatingsbeleid, als bij het opkomen voor economische en sociale rechten, zoals het 
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recht van vluchtelingen om te studeren, hun recht op sociale uitkeringen, en hun 
recht op werk in bepaalde sectoren. 
Dit boek zet niet alleen het potentieel uiteen van maatschappelijke actie voor het 
verwezenlijken van de rechten van vluchtelingen, maar stelt ook de vraag aan de 
orde hoe een dergelijke rol zou kunnen worden versterkt. Verder heeft het de vraag 
opgeworpen wat dit ons heeft geleerd over de mogelijkheden van maatschappelijke 
interventies in de verwezenlijking van rechten in het algemeen. Pleitbezorging door 
burgeractivisten voor de rechten van vluchtelingen in Zuid-Afrika toont aan hoe de 
verantwoordingsplicht van de staat kan worden bevorderd, of in meer beperkte 
omstandigheden kan worden afgedwongen, middels coöperatieve en confronterende 
vormen van interactie tussen burgers en overheid. 
De drie voorbeelden van interactie tussen burgers en overheid laten zien dat de 
sociale ruimte voor maatschappelijke actie specifieke historische wortels heeft, die 
de kaders hebben bepaald waarbinnen mensenrechten kunnen worden bevorderd, 
beschermd of verwezenlijkt, alsmede structurele uitwerking (structurele verande-
ring) mogelijk hebben gemaakt. Burgeractivisten hebben een belangrijke bemidde-
lende rol gespeeld bij de toepassing van de internationale regels voor het 
ontwikkelen, uitvoeren en kritisch volgen van het nationale beleid. Deze studie van 
maatschappelijke pleitbezorging voor de rechten van vluchtelingen in Zuid-Afrika 
heeft ook het belang onderstreept van sociale afstand als een strategische factor 
voor de burgeractivisten bij de beoordeling van de mogelijkheden voor interactie 
met de overheid ter bevordering van de verantwoordingsplicht jegens vluchtelingen. 
Tot slot heeft deze studie het nut benadrukt van het publiek (administratief en 
constitutioneel) recht als een middel om mondiale regels naar alledaagse lokale 
contexten te vertalen en om de staat te dwingen zich te verantwoorden in termen 
van de internationale mensenrechtennormen. 
8.1 Bemiddeling bij het vertalen van mondiale regels naar locale contexten 
In dit boek heb ik geprobeerd te illustreren hoe burgeractivisten hebben bijgedragen 
aan een cultuur van constitutionalisme, met nationale zowel als internationale 
dimensies, die het nut onderstreept van het administratief recht als een belangrijk 
medium voor de vertaling van algemene regels naar lokale contexten. Bovendien 
hebben de voorbeelden die zijn gegeven in deze studie van maatschappelijke inzet 
ten behoeve van vluchtelingen, laten zien hoe burgeractivisten kunnen bemiddelen 
bij de vertaling van mondiale normen naar lokale contexten, daarbij kritisch blij-
vend binnen een externe relatie zoals die altijd bestaat tussen burgers en overheid – 
zoals gemeten door de sociale afstand, belichaamd door de uiteenlopende belangen, 
betekenissen en politieke coalities. Vanuit de verschillende disciplinaire invals-
hoeken, hebben deze voorbeelden laten zien hoe burgeractivisten invloed kunnen 
uitoefenen, althans in bescheiden mate, op de inhoud van wetgeving en op het 
beleid ter bescherming van vluchtelingen in Zuid-Afrika, en op de wijze waarop zij 
in praktijk worden gebracht. 
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Rechtscultuur en maatschappelijke vertalers 
Voor sociaal-juridische wetenschappers is de juridische cultuur zelf object van 
onderzoek. Evaluatie van de rol van maatschappelijke interventies ter versterking 
van de verantwoordelijksplicht van de staat bij de bevordering en eerbiediging van 
de rechten van vluchtelingen in Zuid-Afrika, impliceert een kritisch onderzoek van 
veel verschillende variabelen die kenmerkend zijn voor de juridische cultuur waarin 
burgeractivisten opereren. De evaluatie in de hoofdstukken 4 en 5 richtte zich op de 
methoden en middelen, alsook de mechanismen, die door burgeractivisten werden 
aangewend ter bevordering van de verantwoordingsplicht van de Zuid-Afrikaanse 
regering jegens vluchtelingen in termen van wereldwijd geldende normen en grond-
wettelijke verplichtingen. Zoals besproken in hoofdstuk 4, had de regering duide-
lijke belangen, zoals blijkt uit het feit dat zij burgers uitnodigde deel uit te maken 
van de White Paper werkgroep. Eveneens duidelijke, zij het heel andere, belangen 
motiveerden de burgeractivisten ertoe deel te nemen aan de beleidsvorming omtrent 
vluchtelingen. Bijgevolg werd de werkgroep een zeer productief platform waarop 
de concurrerende belangen van burgeractivisten, de overheid en anderen, zoals de 
UNHCR en ‘sectie 9 instellingen’ (met name de Zuid-Afrikaanse Mensenrechten 
Commissie) tegen elkaar konden worden afgewogen. 
Het mechanisme dat door AWEPA en het DHA werd ingezet om de status van 
voormalige Mozambikaanse vluchtelingen te regulariseren, was minder productief 
en de belangen van de burgeractivisten kwamen er veel minder duidelijk in tot 
uiting; in sommige gevallen waren ze onlosmakelijk verbonden met die van de 
regering. Het gevolg was dat het handelingspotentieel van Zuid-Afrikaanse burger-
activisten niet alleen sterk was verzwakt, maar een eerlijke rechtsgang voor de 
voormalige Mozambikaanse vluchtelingen zelf kwam gevaarlijk in het gedrang 
aangezien er geen kritische controle of onafhankelijk beroepsmechanisme was. 
Door deel te nemen aan de wereldwijde discussies omtrent de bescherming van 
vluchtelingen, werd een aantal Zuid-Afrikaanse NGO’s en academici bekend met 
de internationale regels op dit gebied; zij traden toe tot een transnationale elite. 
Echter, in hun deelname aan de ontwikkeling van het vluchtelingenbeleid in Zuid-
Afrika bleven zij zich bewust van de lokale realiteit, waaronder de wijze waarop het 
vluchtelingenbeleid sinds 1993 in praktijk was gebracht. Bijgevolg beschikten zij 
over een ‘dubbel bewustzijn’. Dit maakte hen tot effectieve vertalers van wereld-
wijd geldende regels, puttend uit de mensenrechtenbron in termen van hun inhoud 
(als instrument) en mogelijkheden voor hun verwezenlijking (hun bewustzijn). 
Daarnaast hadden deze juridische vertalers toegang tot de verschillende organen 
voor rechtshandhaving. Bovendien, door het inzetten van niet-juridische 
mechanismen, zoals het gebruik van de media om de overheid aan de schandpaal te 
nagelen, schiepen zij hebben meer ruimte voor een kritische omgang met de 
regering. 
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De erkenning van de waarde van sociale afstand 
Evaluatie van de betrekkingen in termen van sociale afstand is een ander middel ter 
beoordeling van de maatschappelijke participatie in de uitvoering van het vluchte-
lingenbeleid, om inzicht te krijgen in de mogelijkheden van maatschappelijke 
interventies ter verwezenlijking van de rechten van vluchtelingen in Zuid-Afrika, en 
in de verwezenlijking van rechten in het algemeen. Sociale afstand wordt gemeten 
door verschillen in belangen, betekenissen en politieke standpunten, oftewel de ex-
terne gronden voor deelname aan een bepaalde interactie tussen burgers en over-
heid. Zoals deze studie van maatschappelijke inzet ten behoeve van vluchtelingen 
illustreert, wordt de bijbehorende sociale afstand tussen de overheid als wetgever en 
burgers verkleind of vergroot in overeenstemming met de door burgeractivisten 
genomen strategische beslissingen, met uiteenlopende gevolgen. 
De externe gronden voor participatie van burgers in het hervormingsproces van 
het vluchtelingenbeleid in Zuid-Afrika waren andere dan die van de overheid, in 
termen van belangen en betekenissen, maar wat politieke standpunten betreft waren 
er belangrijke gebieden van overeenkomst. Tijdens het beleidsvormingsproces voor 
vluchtelingen waren er meningsverschillen over de expliciete formulering van de 
rechten die een vluchteling zou krijgen als beschermd persoon, in overeenstemming 
met de nationale constitutionele en internationale verplichtingen. Aan de andere 
kant heeft de regering er grotendeels mee ingestemd dat de vluchtelingenstatus zou 
worden bepaald door middel van een procedure op basis van hoorzittingen, zoals 
voorgesteld door burgeractivisten. De mate van gecreëerde sociale afstand hing 
ervan af of de politieke standpunten van burgers en overheid in een bepaalde kwes-
tie al dan niet uiteen liepen dan wel convergeerden; het varieerde derhalve aanzien-
lijk in de loop van het hele beleidsvormingsproces, hoewel convergentie van stand-
punten duidelijk nodig was voordat de overheid bereid was om een bepaalde 
maatregel over te nemen. De regering had altijd het laatste woord. 
Tijdens de uitvoering van het project ter regularisatie van de status van voorma-
lige Mozambikaanse vluchtelingen, was de sociale afstand of externalisering tussen 
AWEPA en de Zuid-Afrikaanse regering aanvankelijk erg groot, gezien het feit dat 
burgeractivisten voortdurend hun bezorgdheid kenbaar maakten over de manier 
waarop het project moest worden uitgevoerd. Echter, de belangen, betekenissen en 
politieke standpunten van burgeractivisten en overheid werden bijna niet te onder-
scheiden toen het project definitief vorm kreeg en een kritisch controlemechanisme 
verdween. Wat begon als een ogenschijnlijk door de regering gerund project werd 
bekend als ‘het AWEPA project’. Bij het ontbreken van geloofwaardig toezicht, 
bleef deze sociale afstand klein tijdens de gehele looptijd van het project, wat 
resulteerde in een beperkte ruimte voor kritische reacties van burgeractivisten, en 
een tekortschietende administratieve rechtsgang voor de vluchtelingen. 
Daar waar vluchtelingenrechten voorwerp zijn geweest van gerechtelijke proce-
dures, is de sociale afstand tussen burgers en de overheid, zoals gemeten door hun 
respectieve belangen, betekenissen en politieke standpunten, aanzienlijk gebleven, 
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aangezien burgeractivisten vasthielden aan hun rol als onafhankelijke kritische 
stem. En toch, zelfs in deze omstandigheden is het niet altijd mogelijk geweest om 
de regering tot verantwoording te roepen. 
De rechtbanken stelden zich vaak terughoudend op als het ging om de 
beoordeling van de merites van een beleidsmaatregel van de regering of het gebruik 
van discretionaire bevoegdheden. Maar zelfs wanneer de rechtbank de overheid in 
het ongelijk stelde, moesten advocaten zich in veel gevallen, en soms herhaaldelijk, 
opnieuw tot de rechter wenden om naleving van een uitspraak af te dwingen of een 
zaak aanhangig te maken die vrijwel identiek was aan een die eerder was voor-
gelegd. Kortom, een hoge mate van sociale afstand, of een onafhankelijke kritische 
stem, is geen betrouwbare indicator van succes gebleken. Niet alle gerechtelijke 
procedures leveren noodzakelijkerwijs resultaat op.  
Toch moet er een onderscheid worden gemaakt tussen procedures gericht op in-
perking van overheidsoptreden, waarbij de sociale afstand groter is, en gevallen ge-
richt op de bevordering van correct optreden, die de neiging hebben de sociale af-
stand te verkleinen. Eenvoudig gezegd, het eerste type geval dringt erop aan, in 
negatieve zin, dat een bepaald beleid wordt gestopt, en heeft een grotere kans van 
slagen, terwijl het andere type geval de overheid positief aanspoort tot verbetering, 
en heeft bewezen problematischer te zijn. 
Structurele interdicts kunnen nieuwe mogelijkheden bieden in het laatste type 
zaak. Wanneer structurele interdicts zijn opgelegd ter bevordering van correct op-
treden van de overheid, is de sociale afstand kleiner geworden, aangezien de con-
currerende belangen en politieke standpunten van burgers en overheid zijn ver-
vangen door structurele toezeggingen van de overheid aan de rechtbank doel-
bewuste stappen te nemen ter verbetering van een bepaalde situatie. Actievoerders 
hebben in dergelijke gevallen bijgedragen om de overheid te helpen haar gedrag te 
verbeteren. In de ‘toelatings’ gevallen, bijvoorbeeld, hebben de specialisten die 
door het DHA waren ingehuurd ter verbetering van het beheer en de procedures op 
de Opvangcentra voor Vluchtelingen, intensief overlegd met de activisten die de 
zaak tegen de regering hadden aangespannen. Hoewel het nog te vroeg is om het 
duurzame effect te beoordelen, kunnen de structurele interdict een belangrijk 
instrument blijken te zijn om te zorgen voor positieve naleving, aangezien het 
proces van terugrapporteren naar de rechtbank de legitieme belangen van zowel 
burgers als overheid erkent, en gezien het in essentie vrijwillige karakter van de 
naleving van mensenrechten. 
Uiteindelijk kan sociale afstand verklaren dat actievoeren het vermogen heeft tot 
structurele veranderingen binnen de overheid te leiden, door te kijken naar de mate 
waarin de regering heeft toegegeven aan de eisen van actievoerders door hun bete-
kenissen, belangen of politieke standpunten te laten samenvallen. Dit verdient ver-
der empirisch onderzoek. In de afgelopen jaren is het DHA geconfronteerd met aan-
houdende roepen om hervorming van de kant van maatschappelijke organisaties, 
die steeds verfijnder sophisticated zijn geworden in hun actievoeren. Actievoerders 
hebben zich – vaak tegelijkertijd – gericht tot de media, het parlement en de gerech-
Samenvatting 
226 
telijke instanties inzake machtsmisbruik door ambtenaren, inefficiëntie van ministe-
ries, corruptie en wanbeheer. 
Het DHA kwam in aanzienlijke mate tegemoet aan deze eisen van maatschap-
pelijke organisaties, en begon een proces van consultaties om de Vluchtelingenwet 
aan te passen; in 2007 werd een wetsontwerp vrijgegeven voor openbaar commen-
taar. Na openbare hoorzittingen in het Zuid-Afrikaanse Parlement, waarbij verschil-
lende maatschappelijke organisaties waren vertegenwoordigd, en in reactie op alou-
de kritiek van maatschappelijke organisaties m.b.t. lacunes in het vluchtelingen-
beleid en de uitvoering ervan, gaf de regering in maart 2008 nog een wetsontwerp 
vrij. De regering reageerde ook op de bezwaren van actievoerders door op te roepen 
tot sluiting van het Musina detentiecentrum, zoals hierboven beschreven. Boven-
dien startte het DHA een ‘terugdraai strategie’, waarin een aantal burgeractivisten 
deelnam, en de Minister reageerde direct op vragen over wanbeheer van het depar-
tement. 
Met deze tegemoetkomingen van de overheid – tot op zekere hoogte als reactie 
op de eisen van actievoerders – werd de sociale afstand tussen burgeractivisten en 
de overheid kleiner naarmate hun respectievelijke belangen in de bescherming van 
vluchtelingen en de interpretaties van wat deze bescherming met zich meebrengt 
convergeerden, maar niet tot het punt dat maatschappelijke organisaties hun rol als 
kritisch waarnemer opgaven. Op basis van de specifieke verplichtingen die zijn 
opgenomen in internationaal en Zuid-Afrikaans recht, gaat het Jaarverslag van 
CoRMSA van juni 2008 uitvoerig in op de verplichtingen van Zuid-Afrika’s lokale 
en nationale overheden inzake de bescherming van vluchtelingen en migranten, 
vanaf de rol van de overheid bij het aanpakken van de diepere oorzaken van xeno-
foob geweld tot aan haar rol in het faciliteren van toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt en tot 
basisvoorzieningen. Zoals het verslag bevestigt, terwijl de belangen en de interpre-
taties van burgers en overheid mogelijk tot op zekere hoogte samenvielen, bleven 
hun politieke standpunten uiteenlopen, aangezien burgeractivisten erop gericht ble-
ven de Zuid-Afrikaanse overheid – en met name het DHA – ter verantwoording te 
roepen voor haar wettelijke verplichtingen ter bescherming van vluchtelingen en 
migranten. 
8.2 De capaciteit van actievoerders in de realisatie van mensenrechten in het 
algemeen 
De in dit boek onderzochte interactie betreft de rol van Zuid-Afrikaanse burgerac-
tivisten in de ontwikkeling van het vluchtelingenbeleid van de overheid, de uit-
voering van het dat beleid en, in sommige gevallen, de afdwinging via de rechter 
dat de overheid zich aan haar beleid houdt. Echter, deze interactie tussen burgers en 
overheid bevat universele lessen voor de verwezenlijking van rechten in het alge-
meen, door de tijd heen (op verschillende momenten in Zuid-Afrika’s geschiedenis) 
en door de ruimte (in andere landen en andere strijd voor mensenrechten). 
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Deze studie van maatschappelijke inzet ten behoeve van vluchtelingen biedt een 
sprekende illustratie van de wisselwerking tussen burgers en overheid bij het bevor-
deren van een cultuur van constitutionalisme voor alle personen (in de taal van de 
Grondwet) en niet slechts Zuid-Afrikaanse burgers. Vluchtelingen en asielzoekers 
die in 1996 demonstreerden voor de Union Buildings regeringsgebouwen in Preto-
ria, met de oproep aan de UNHCR en de Zuid-Afrikaanse regering om iets aan hun 
situatie te doen, wekten niet alleen de interesse van de media. Net zoals de cam-
pagnes van lijdzame tegenwerking in Zuid-Afrika in de jaren ‘50 duizenden Zuid-
Afrikanen mobiliseerden om zich opnieuw op hun situatie te bezinnen en in verzet 
te komen tegen de apartheid, zo speelde de demonstratie van juli 1996 een cruciale 
rol om de Zuid-Afrikanen tot een nieuwe kijk te bewegen op hun relatie tot vluchte-
lingen, en bracht het een snelle reactie teweeg van de kant van burgerorganisaties. 
Het vluchtelingenbeleid van Zuid-Afrika op een tweesprong 
De demonstratie van vluchtelingen in juli 1996 vond plaats op een historisch 
moment. Net nadat de definitieve grondwet van het land het licht had gezien, be-
vond Zuid-Afrika zich op een tweesprong. Andere, externe factoren speelden zeker 
ook een rol, met name de verplichtingen die de regering op zich had genomen door 
in te stemmen met internationale vluchtelingenverdragen. In plaats van de regering 
ter verantwoording te roepen, spoorde de demonstratie Zuid-Afrikaanse activisten 
aan om meer te doen dan alleen hulp te bieden, en ook te pleiten voor verreikende 
verbeteringen in de manier waarop vluchtelingen werden opgevangen en opgeno-
men in de samenleving. In de maanden en jaren na de demonstratie, zetten Zuid-
Afrikaanse advocaten, kerken en andere maatschappelijke organisaties zich in voor 
goed beleid, een goede uitvoering en een betere verantwoordingsplicht van de kant 
van de regering. 
Zuid-Afrika heeft nu een overheidsbeleid dat internationale mensenrechten-
verplichtingen jegens vluchtelingen heeft overgenomen, gezamenlijke initiatieven 
van vluchtelingen en NGOs die de belangrijkste rechten voor vluchtelingen hebben 
veiliggesteld, en een aantal richtinggevende juridische uitspraken van de Zuid-
Afrikaanse rechtbanken om de regering te confronteren met haar verplichtingen ten 
aanzien van niet-Zuid-Afrikanen in het algemeen en vluchtelingen in het bijzonder. 
Natuurlijk is het beeld niet in alle opzichten zo positief. Er zijn rapporten 
opgedoken van arbitraire detentie en mishandeling door de politie en door immigra-
tiefunctionarissen, slecht gemotiveerde weigeringen vluchtelingenstatus te verlenen, 
en beschuldigingen van corruptie en machtsmisbruik. 
Tien jaar nadat Zuid-Afrika partij was geworden bij de internationale vluchte-
lingenverdragen en het land een definitieve Grondwet had aangenomen, zag de 
regering zich geplaatst voor een nieuwe keuze. Het bouwen aan een cultuur van 
constitutionalisme heeft effecten op meerdere niveaus geëist. Op lokaal niveau zijn 
gemeenten begonnen migranten uit andere landen, waaronder asielzoekers en 
vluchtelingen, als ingezetenen van Kaapstad, Durban en Johannesburg te zien. 
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Geconfronteerd door advocaten en met nog niet vervulde verplichtingen voortko-
mend uit structurele verordeningen, heeft de nationale regering slechts schoor-
voetend een begin gemaakt technische, procesmatig en management-gerelateerde 
problemen aan te pakken bij de uitvoering van een eerlijke en efficiënte procedure 
voor statusbepaling. Het meest opmerkelijke feit is dat de regering heeft ingestemd 
met de noodzaak om beleid te ontwikkelen en te verbeteren door middel van wijzi-
gingen die tot stand komen via parlementaire weg en niet via ad hoc administratieve 
regelingen. 
Ten slotte, op mondiaal niveau is Zuid-Afrika enerzijds actief betrokken bij 
mondiale beleidsdiscussies om migratie in te perken, met zogenaamde onregelma-
tige migratie als hoofdthema. Aan de andere kant heeft Zuid-Afrika de zeer onpro-
ductieve en zelfs gewelddadige gevolgen ervaren van het handhaven van een 
restrictief beleid dat ten onrechte voorrang geeft aan de nationale belangen boven 
internationale verplichtingen ter bescherming van migranten in het algemeen en 
vluchtelingen in het bijzonder. 
De strijd voor sociale gerechtigheid in andere landen 
De maatregelen die in het verleden zijn aangewend om de regering verantwoording 
te laten afleggen op basis van internationale mensenrechtennormen resoneren met 
de strijd voor sociale rechtvaardigheid in verschillende andere landen. Het belang 
van duidelijk afgebakende taken en verantwoordelijkheden en de strategische 
erkenning van structurele grenzen geldt wereldwijd, ook buiten de Zuid-Afrikaanse 
studie. De strategieën en morele weerklank van de Zuid-Afrikaanse anti-apartheid 
strijd hebben actievoerders voor democratische verantwoording over de hele wereld 
gemotiveerd, en niet louter omdat de gebeurtenissen in Zuid-Afrika altijd zo uniek 
waren. Zuid-Afrika’s strijd tegen racisme en onrecht, en de inspanningen die zijn 
verricht met het oog op sociale transformatie laten universele principes zien die 
gelden voor elke strijd voor sociale rechtvaardigheid die zich richt op het afleggen 
van verantwoording. 
Bijvoorbeeld, burgeractivisten in Oost-Europese landen hebben ingezet voor een 
betere bescherming voor vluchtelingen en migranten door de erkenning van door de 
EU vastgestelde structurele kaders, en door het vertalen van de wereldwijd gelden-
de normen naar nationale inspanningen om vluchtelingen te beschermen. Burger-
activisten in Oost-Europa, wier activiteiten voorafgaand aan het begin van de vroe-
ge jaren '90 zeer beperkt waren, hebben ook meegewerkt aan ontwikkeling van 
vluchtelingenbeleid. 
In het Midden-Oosten spelen burgers ook een belangrijke rol in de bescherming 
van vluchtelingen. Hoewel een zeer problematische geo-politieke situatie en de 
voortdurende militaire bezetting een lokale, op het recht gebaseerde oplossing voor 
de benarde situatie van Palestijnse vluchtelingen verhindert, en ernstige structurele 
beperkingen het vrijwel onmogelijk maken om te pleiten voor het afleggen van 
verantwoording van de kant van Israël, zijn actievoerders van over de hele wereld, 
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waaronder academici, juristen en pressiegroepen, erin geslaagd om wereldwijd 
bewustzijn op te wekken ten aanzien van de kwestie van de Palestijnse landonteige-
ning. Bovendien, door het erkennen van deze structurele beperkingen en door in 
plaats daarvan de aandacht te verleggen naar supranationale mechanismen, zijn po-
litieke activisten op strategische wijze opgekomen voor de erkenning van de rechten 
van Palestijnse vluchtelingen en hun recht op ingezetenschap, tegen de interna-
tionaalrechtelijke standpunten van bepaalde VN-organisaties in. Niet in staat om 
enig resultaat te boeken op lokaal niveau, hebben activisten de rechten van de 
Palestijnen voor VN-organisaties en verdragsinstanties gebracht, waaronder de VN-
Commissie voor de Uitbanning van Rassendiscriminatie. Derde landen zijn ook een 
belangrijk forum geworden voor de activisten, die gerechtelijke procedures begin-
nen tegen bedrijven die zich schuldig maken aan schendingen van het vluchte-
lingenrecht en het recht op ingezetenschap van de Palestijnen, en tegen personen die 
oorlogsmisdaden hebben begaan tegen burgers in de vluchtelingenkampen. 
Of het nu in Zuid-Afrika, Oost-Europa of Palestina is, en ongeacht of burgers 
zijn verwikkeld in een politieke strijd of een proces van sociale transformatie in 
samenwerking met de overheid, al deze gebeurtenissen kunnen worden gezien als 
verschillende vormen van strijd voor sociale rechtvaardigheid. In iedere strijd voor 
sociale rechtvaardigheid is het strategisch keuzes maken de sleutel voor het succes 
van actievoerders om staten en regeringen verantwoording te laten afleggen voor 
hun mensenrechtenverplichtingen.  
Het maken van strategische keuzes heeft verschillende gevolgen voor de activis-
ten, zoals deze studie over de verwezenlijking van het vluchtelingenrecht in Zuid-
Afrika illustreert. Ten eerste moeten actievoerders de sociale, politieke en juridische 
context waarin zij opereren doorgronden; zo’n historisch onderzoek blijkt bepaalde 
structurele beperkingen aan het licht te brengen voor de verwezenlijking van 
rechten, bijna altijd opgelegd door de staat. Ten tweede moeten actievoerders een 
kritische beoordeling maken van deze structurele beperkingen, die voorwaarden 
stellen voor hun handelen, maar ook de mogelijkheid in zich hebben tot structurele 
verandering of ‘uitwerking’ door middel van formele en informele interventies van 
burgers in samenspel met de overheid. Ten derde moeten actievoerders de sociale 
afstand die altijd bestaat tussen hen en de overheid in ogenschouw nemen, zoals die 
tot uitdrukking komt in de verschillende interpretaties, belangen en politieke stand-
punten. Door kritisch met deze ‘externe’ relatie om te gaan, is het mogelijk voor 
actievoerders om voordeel te trekken uit deze verschillen bij het bepleiten van de 
verantwoordinsgsplicht van de staat voor de verwezenlijking van mensenrechten. 
Of de sociale afstand moet worden verkleind of vergroot op een bepaald moment is 
afhankelijk van (1) de context waarin dit plaatsvindt, (2) de structurele beperkingen 
die er bestaan, en (3) het gewenste resultaat. 
Een kritische relatie tot de regering stelt actievoerders in staat om te profiteren 
van die kleine, maar significante ruimte voor het tot stand brengen van structurele 
veranderingen. In deze sociale, politieke en juridische ruimte, kan het potentieel 
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voor het bepleiten van verantwoordingsplicht van de staat ter bevordering, bescher-
ming en verwezenlijking van mensenrechten tot bloei komen. 
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